BANKRUPTS AND BANKRUPTCY.
such liens, is exercised, not over the state courts themselves, bat upon
the parties, through an injunction or other appropriate proceeding in
equity. Ibid.
6. The design of the Bankrupt Act was to secure a prompt and effectual ad-
ministration of the estate of all bankrupts, worked out by the courts of
the United States, without the assistance of state tribunals. Ibid.
7. The phrase in the 6th section, "any creditor or creditors who shall claim
any debt or demand under the bankruptcy," does not mean only such
creditors who come in and prove their debts, but all creditors who have
a present subsisting claim upon the bankrupt's estate, whether they have
a security or mortgage therefor or not. Ibid.
8. Such creditors have a right to ask that the property mortgaged shall be
sold, and the proceeds applied towards the payment of their debts; and
the assignee, on the other hand, may contest their claims. Ibid.
9. In the case of a contested claim, the District Court has jurisdiction, if re-
sort be had to a formal bill in equity or other plenary proceeding; and
also jurisdiction to proceed summarily. Ibid.
10. The principles established in the case of Ex parte the City Bank of New
Orleans in the matter of Christy, assignee of Walden, reviewed and
confirmed.
11. But this court does not decide whether or not the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court over all the property of a bankrupt, mortgaged or otherwise,
is exclusive, so as to take away from the state courts in such cases. Nor-
ton's Assignee v. Boyd, 426.
2. Where the defendant below became a bankrupt, this court will not award
a supersedeas to stay an execution, because the assignee of the bankrupt
has his remedy in the Circuit Court.. Black v. Zacharie, 453.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. In cases of trust, where the trustee has violated his trust by an illegal con-
version of the trust property, the cestui que trust has a right to follow the
property into whosesoever hands he may find it, not being a bona fide pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration, without notice. Oliver v: Piatt, 333.
2. Where a trustee has, in violation of his trust, invested the trust property
or its proceeds in any other property, the cestui que trust has his option,
either to hold the substituted property liable to the original trust, or to
hold the trustee himself personally liable for the breach of the trust. Ibid.
3. The option, however, belongs to the cestui que trust alone and is for his
benefit, and not for the benefit of the trustee. Ibid.
4. If the trustee, after such an unlawful conversion of the trust property, should
repurchase it, the cestui que trust may, at his option, either hold the original
property subject to the trust, or take the substituted property in which it
has been invested, in lieu thereof. And the trustee, in such a case, bas
no right to insist that the trust shall, upon the repurchase, attach exclu-
sively to the original trust property. Ibid.
5. Where the trust property has been unlawfully invested, with other funds
of the trustee, in other property, the latter, in the hands of the trustee, is
chargeable pro tanto to the amount or value of the original trust property.
Ibid.
6. What constitutes a notice of a trust? Ibid.
7. An agent, employed by a trustee in the management of the trust property,
and who thereby acquires a knowledge of the trust, is, if he afterwards
becomes possessed of the trust property, bound by the trust, in the same
manner as the trustee. Ibid.
8. Where, upon the face of the title-papers, the purchaser has full means of
acquiring complete knowledge of the title from the references therein
made to the origin and consideration thereof, he will be-deemed to have
constructive notice thereof. Ibid.
9. A co-proprietor of real property, derived under the same title as the other
proprietors, is presumed to have full knowledge of the objects and, pur-
poses and trusts attached to the original purchase, and for which it is
then held for their common benefit. Ibid.
10. A purchaser by a deed of quit claim, without any covenant of warranty,
is not entitled to protection in a court of equity as a purchaser for a
valuable consideration, without notice; and he takes only what the vendor
could lawfully convey. Ibid.
11. A warranty, either lineal or collateral, is no bar to an heir who does not
claim the property to which the warranty is attached by descent, but as
a purchaser thereof. Ibid.
12. Whether a bill in equity is open to the objection of multifariousness or
not, must be decided upon all the circumstances of the particular case.
No general rule can be laid down upon the subject; and much must be
left to the discretion of the court. Ibid.
13. The objection of multifariousness can be taken by a party to the bill only
by demurrer, or plea, or answer, and cannot be taken at the hearing of
the cause. But the court itself may take the objection at any time-at
the hearing or otherwise. The objection cannot be taken by a party in
the appellate court. Ibid.
14. Lapse of time is no bar to a subsisting trust in real property. The bar
does not begin to run until knowledge of some overt act of an adverse
claim or right set up by the trustee is brought home to the cestui que trust.
The lapse of any period less than twenty years will not bar the cestui que
trust of his remedy in equity, although he may have been guilty of some
negligence, where the suit is brought against his trustee, who is guilty
of the breach of trust,`or others claiming under him with notice. Ibid.
15. Where exceptions are taken to a master's report, it is not necessary for
the court formally to allow or disallow them on the record. It will be
sufficient, if it appears from the record, that all of them have been consi-
dered by the court, and allowed or disallowed, and the report reformed
accordingly. Ibid.
16. There is no principle of the common law which forbids individuals from
associating together to purchase lands of the United States on joint ac-
count at a public sale. Ibid.
17. The Supreme Court has no power to review its decisions, whether in a
case at law or in equity. A final decree in chancery is as conclusive as
a judgment at law. Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 413.
18. In case of controversy, a court of equity is the proper tribunal to prevent
an injurious act by a public officer, for which the law might give no ade-
quate redress, or to avoid a multiplicity of suits, or to prevent a cloud
from being cast over the title. Carroll v. Safford, 441.
19. The legal title to stock held in corporations, situated in Louisiana, does not
pass under a general assignment of property, until the transfer is com-
pleted in the mode pointed out by the laws of Louisiana, regulating those
corporations. Black v. Zacharie, 483.
20. But the equitable title will pass, if the assignment be sufficient to transfer
it by the laws of the state in which the assignor resides, and if the laws
of the state where the corporations exist do not prohibit the assignment
of equitable interests in stock. Such an assignment will bind all persons
who have notice of it. Ibid.
21. The laws of Louisiana do not prohibit the assignment of equitable interests
in the state by residents of other states. Ibid.
22. Personal property has no locality. The law of the owner's domicil is to
determine the validity of the transfer or alienation thereof, unless there
is some positive or customary law of the country where it is found, to
the contrary. Ibid.
23. When an issue is directed by a court of chancery, to be tried by a court of
law, and in the course of the trial at law, questions are raised and bills
of exceptions taken, these questions must be brought to the notice and
VOL. III.-102
decision of the court of chancery which sends the issue. Brockett ▼.
Brockett, 691.
24. If this is not done, the objections cannot be taken in an appellate court of
25. If the chancery court below refers matters of account to a master, his re-
port cannot be objected to in the appellate court, unless exceptions to it
have been filed in the court below in the manner pointed out in the
seventy-third chancery rule of this court. Ibid.
26. A defendant in ejectment cannot protect himself by setting up the record
in a prior chancery suit between the same parties, by which the plain-
tiff in the ejectment had been ordered to convey all his title to the
defendant in the ejectment, but in consequence of the party being
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, no such conveyance had been
made. Lessee of Hickey v. Stewart, 750.
27. And this is so, although the Court of Chancery, in following up its decree,
had legally issued a habere facias possessionem, and put the defendant in
ejectment in possession of the land. Ibid.
28. An equitable title is no defence in a suit brought by the United States, to
recover possession of land. An imperfect title derived from Spain,
before the cession, cannot be supported against a party claiming under a
grant from the United States. United States v. King et al., 773.
1. Every subsequent security given for a loan originally usurious, however
remote or often renewed, is void. Walker v. Bank of Washington, 62.
2. Where there was an application to a bank for a discount upon a note, to be
secured collaterally, and the party applying drew checks upon the bank,
which were paid before the note was actually discounted; and the bank
treated the note, when discounted, as having been so on the day of its
date, instead of a subsequent day on which its proceeds were carried to
the credit of the party, it was held not to be usury. Ibid.
3. The court below was right in refusing an instruction to the jury that, upon
such evidence, they might presume usury as a fact. Ibid.
4. In cases of a written contract, the question of usury is exclusively for the
decision of the court. Ibid.
5. This court adheres to the rule laid down in Walton v. Shelly, 1 T. R. 296,
sustained as it has been by the decisions of this court in The Bank of the
United States v. Dunn, 6 Peters, 57; The Bank of the Metropolis v. Jones,
8 Peters, 12; and Scott v. Lloyd; viz., that a party to a negotiable paper,
having given it value and currency by the sanction of his name, shall
not afterwards invalidate it by showing, upon his own testimony, that the
consideration on which it was executed was illegal. Henderson v. An-
derson, 73.
6. When a creditor, residing in Louisiana, drew bills of exchange upon his
debtor, residing in South Carolina, which bills were negotiated to a third
person, and accepted by the drawee, the creditor had no right to lay an
attachment upon the property of the debtor, until the bills had become due,
were dishonoured, and taken up by the drawer. Black v. Zacharie, 483.
7. By the drawing of the bills a new credit was extended to the debtor for the
time to which they ran. Ibid.
8. The laws of Louisiana, allowing attachments for debts not yet due, relate on-
ly to absconding debtors, and do not embrace a case like the above. Ibid.
9. The legal title to stock held in corporations situated in Louisiana, does not
pass under a general assignment of property, until the transfer is com-
pleted in the mode pointed out by the laws of Louisiana regulating those
corporations. Ibid.
10. But the equitable title will pass, if the assignment be sufficient to transfer
it by the laws of the state in which the assignor resides, and if the laws
of the state where the corporations exist do not prohibit the assignment
of equitable interests in stock. Such an assignment will bind all persons
who have notice of it. Ibid.
11. The laws of Louisiana do not prohibit the assignment of equitable inte-
rests in the state, by residents of other states. Ibid.
12. Personal property has no locality. The law of the owner's domicil is to
determine the validity of the transfer or alienation thereof, unless there
is some positive or customary law of the country where it is found, to the
contrary. Ibid.
13. Where a general objection is made, in the court below, to the reception
of testimony, without stating the grounds of the objection, this court con-
siders it as vague and nugatory; nor ought it to have been tolerated in
the court below. Camden v. Doremus, 515.
14. Where, at the time of the endorsement and transfer of a negotiable note,
an agreement was made that the holder should send it for collection to
the bank at which it was, on its face, made payable, and in the event of
its not being paid at maturity, should use reasonable and due diligence
to collect it from the drawer and prior endorsers, before resorting to the
last endorser, the holder is bound to conditions beyond those which are
implied in the ordinary transfer and receipt of commercial instruments.
Ibid.
15. Evidence of the general custom of banks to give previous notice to the
payer of the time when notes will fall due, was properly rejected, unless
the witness could testify as to the practice of the particular bank at which
the note was made payable. Ibid.
16. A presentment and demand of payment of the note, at maturity, within
banking hours, at the bank where the note was made payable, was a suf-
ficient compliance with the contract to send it to the bank for collection.
Ibid.
17. The record of a suit brought by the holder against the maker and prior en-
dorsers was proper evidence of reasonable and due diligence to collect
the amount of the note from them; and it was a proper instruction, that
if the jury believed that the prior endorsers had left the state and were
insolvent, the holder of the note was not bound to send executions to the
counties where these endorsers resided at the institution of the suit. Ibid.
18. The diligent and honest prosecution of a suit to judgment with a return of
nulla bona, has always been regarded as one of the extreme tests of due
diligence. Ibid.
19. And the ascertainment, upon correct and sufficient proofs, of entire and
notorious insolvency, is recognised by the law as answering the demand
of due diligence, and as dispensing with the more dilatory evidence of a
suit. Ibid.
20. If the holder cannot obtain a judgment against the maker for the whole
amount of the note, in consequence of the allowance of a set-off as be-
tween the maker and one of the prior endorsers, this is no bar to a full
recovery against the last endorser, provided the holder has been guilty
of no negligence. Ibid.
21. Whenever, by express agreement of the parties, a sub-agent is to be em-
ployed by an agent to receive moncy for the principal; or where an au-
thority to do so may fairly be implied from the usual course of trade, or
the nature of the transaction; the principal may treat the sub-agent as
his agent, and when he has received the money, may recover it in an
action for money had and received. Wilson & Co. v. Smith, 763.
22. If, in such case, the sub-agent has made no advances and given no new
credit to the agent on account of the remittance of the bill, the sub-
agent cannot protect himself against such an action by passing the
amount of the bill to the general credit of the agent, although the agent
may be his debtor. Ibid.
1. The act of Congress, of March 2d, 1833, commonly called the Compromise
Act, did not, prospectively, repeal all duties upon imports after the 30th
of June, 1842. Aldridge et al. v. Williams, 1.
2. Repealing only such parts of previous acts as were inconsistent with itself,
it left in force, after the 30th of Junẹ, 1842, the same duties which were
levied on the 1st of June, 1842. Ibid.
8. Duties were directed, by the
of 1833, to be levied according to a home
valuation, "under such reg ions as may be prescribed by law." This
phrase embraces all regulations lawfully existing at the time the home
valuation went into operation, whether made before or after the passage
of the act of 1833. Ibid.
4. And the regulations established in the 7th and 8th sections of the act of
1832 are sufficient for the correct performance of the duty. Ibid.
5. The regulations prescribed by the secretary of the Treasury, under a power
given to him by the 9th section of the act of 1832, are also “regulations
prescribed by law." Ibid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See JURISDICTION.
1. A public officer, acting from a sense of duty in a matter where he is re-
quired to exercise discretion, is not liable to an action for an error of
judgment. Kendall v. Stokes et al., 87.
2. The charter of a bank is a franchise, which is not taxable, as such, if a
price has been paid for it, which the legislature accepted. Gordon v. Ap-
peal Tax Court, 133.
3. But the corporate property of the bank is separable from the franchise, and
may be taxed, unless there is a special agreement to the contrary. Ibid.
4. The legislature of Maryland, in 1821, continued the charters of several
banks to 1845, upon condition that they would make a road and pay a
school tax. This would have exempted their franchise, but not their pro-
perty, from taxation. Ild.
5. But another clause in the law provided, that upon any of the aforesaid
banks accepting of and complying with the terms and conditions of the
act, the faith of the state was pledged not to impose any further tax or
burden upon them during the continuance of their charters under the
act. Ibid.
6. This was a contract relating to something beyond the franchise, and ex-
empted the stockholders from a tax levied upon them as individuals, ac-
cording to the amount of their stock. Ibid.
7. Under the acts of Congress ceding to Pennsylvania that part of the Cum-
berland road which is within that state, and the acts of Pennsylvania
accepting the surrender, a carriage, whenever it is carrying the mail,
must be held to be laden with the property of the United States, within
the true meaning of the compact, and consequently exempted from the
payment of tolls. Searight v. Stokes, 151.
8. But this exemption does not apply to any other property conveyed in the
same vehicle, nor to any person travelling in it, unless he is in the ser-
vice of the United States, and passing along in pursuance of orders from
the proper authority. Ibid.
9. Nor can the United States claim an exemption for more carriages than are
necessary for the safe, speedy, and convenient conveyance of the mail.
Ibid.
10. The stipulation contained in the 6th section of the act of Congress, passed
on the 2d of March, 1819, for the admission of the state of Alabama into
the union, viz., "that all navigable waters within the said state shall for-
ever remain public hghways, free to the citizens of said state, and of the
United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, imposed by said
state," conveys no more power over the navigable waters of Alabama, to
the government of the United States, than it possesses over the navigable
waters of other states under the provisions of the Constitution. Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 212.
11. And it leaves as much right in the state of Alabama over them as the ori-
ginal states possess over navigable waters within their respective limits.
12. The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted
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