Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley Cambridge University Press, 2001. 10. 8. - 414페이지 This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
도서 본문에서
41개의 결과 중 1 - 5개
10 페이지
... moral force to the lower - level elements ( called " ordinary " ) ; and such that the " constitutional " norms and rules place binding legal and / or moral limits on the scope of authority granted to any group of government officials ...
... moral force to the lower - level elements ( called " ordinary " ) ; and such that the " constitutional " norms and rules place binding legal and / or moral limits on the scope of authority granted to any group of government officials ...
11 페이지
... moral , as the case may be on the share of authority that any group of government officials has either to create valid ordinary rules or to settle the meaning of constitutional rules . The constitutional rules - legal or moral - cannot ...
... moral , as the case may be on the share of authority that any group of government officials has either to create valid ordinary rules or to settle the meaning of constitutional rules . The constitutional rules - legal or moral - cannot ...
12 페이지
... moral on the authority of a group of officials to pass valid laws or settle the meaning of the constitution in the face of opposi- tion from others . As already indicated , any command issued by an absolute ruler might be recognized as ...
... moral on the authority of a group of officials to pass valid laws or settle the meaning of the constitution in the face of opposi- tion from others . As already indicated , any command issued by an absolute ruler might be recognized as ...
15 페이지
... moral ) that - among other things - place limits on the authority granted to any group of officials to resolve interpretative disputes , it will be counted as constitutional . As we have already emphasized , however , our approach is ...
... moral ) that - among other things - place limits on the authority granted to any group of officials to resolve interpretative disputes , it will be counted as constitutional . As we have already emphasized , however , our approach is ...
17 페이지
... normative argument that says that well - functioning constitutions ought not to contain substantive or first - order rules . See Buchanan 1984 , 444 . incompatible with what is sometimes called a " moral reading Editors ' Introduction 17.
... normative argument that says that well - functioning constitutions ought not to contain substantive or first - order rules . See Buchanan 1984 , 444 . incompatible with what is sometimes called a " moral reading Editors ' Introduction 17.
목차
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
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Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York