COURT'S DRAFT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. No. 128. Ist. The disinclination of the Peishwah to a connection with the company, and that it was not until the last extremity that he consented to the alliance. 2nd. The tendency which the treaty had to involve the company in immediate hostilities with the other Mahratta chieftains. St. The legal objections under the defect of the go vernor general's powers to conclude the treaty. Disinclination and jea- 30. 1. When it is considered how new every lousy of the Peishwah. species of alliance of the nature of the treaty of Bas sien is to the Mahratta powers, and with what difficulty they are brought to relinquish their ancient prejudices, and to enter into other views of things, the obstacles which attended any preliminary connection with the Peishwah are not a matter of surprise. 301. We were not, however, to relinqui h our advantages because others were jealous of them, nor were we to desist from pursuing a certain line of conduct, evidently favourable to our interests, because another either did not rightly appreciate it, or found in it something hostile to his prejudices. Nothing certainly but the fullest impression of the necessity for a subsidiary alliance could ever have induced the Peishwah to have accepted it. Lord Welesey always relied for the accomplishment of an alliance at Poonah, on the necessity which induced the Peishwah to seek the protection of the company, against the oppression of his feudatory cbiettains. The necessity for the connection is the foundation of every political alliance. Assistance was never proposed by us, but as a relief to the Peishwah's embarrassments; and it could not be supposed that he should ever have viewed the proposal in any other light. The solid advantages which ihe Peishwah acknowledges himself to have derived from his alliance with the company, afford sufficient security for the Peishwah's future faith. If the connection had not been formed at the particular juncture at which the treaty took place, at what other time could it have been made with equal advantage! Were we to wait until the Peishwah's enemies bad wrested all authority out of his hands ? In that case we should have lost our Ally, while another power would have been greatly strengthened by his ruin. The weakness of the Peishwah's government, therefore, afforded the most favourable occasion for concluding the alliance; the effects of which might ultimately be expected to strengthen the Peishwah's just power. Tendency of the treaty 302. 2d. Any argument founded upon a supposed of Bassein to produce hos- aversion to the treaty on the part of Scindiah and the tilities. rajah of Berar, is best answered by the declaration of those chiefs, " that they had no objections to offer against it.'' One benefit to be derived from the alliance was, that any unfriendly disposition on the part of Scindiah, or the rajah of Berar, would be less dangerous, and that their means of injury would be diminished. Scindiah certainly did not find any thing in the treaty of Bassein of which he could justly complain, or he suppressed his feelings at a time when he possessed the best opportunity of mani festing COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. Legality of the treaty of Bassein. Objections to the treaty of 1800, with the Soubahdar of the Deccan (the Nizam.) OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. festing them, for he expressly avowed, that the "treaty 303. But the truth is, that all parties engaged in the dissensions at Poonah, solicited the interference of the company; and this appeal to the British power afforded the most favourable opportunity for the successful and pacific mediation of the British government. In the conjuncture of affairs which at that time existed in the Mahratt empire it is evident, that the British government was compelled, either to employ its pacific and equitable efforts for the restoration of the Peshwah's authority, or to abandon all hope, consistently with public honour, or permanent advantage, of concluding with any of the Mah. ratta states those engagements, which have always, until the present moment been declared, by the secret committee and the government of India, to be essential to the complete consolidation of the British empire in India, and to the future tranquillity of Hindustan. 204. The argument respecting Scindiah's rights, as the guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, appears to be inapplicable to the question of the right of the Peishwab, and of the British government, to improve the connection which already subsisted between the two states. The duty of a guarantee to a treaty, cannot be considered to extend to the ob igation of precluding any change in the terms of such treaty, or even its entire abrogation, provided the contracting parties have agreed by mutual consent to vary or annut it. In his capacity of guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, Scindiah is merely authorised to bring to a right understanding either of the parties to that treaty, which shall deviate from its stipulation. In that capacity, therefore, Scindiah does not possess any authority to prevent the contracting parties from concluding any additional engagements, or even from abrogating the treaty of Salbye by mutual consent. At all events, his feelings and interests were sufficiently consulted by the offer which was made to him of becoming a party to the general defensive alliance, or of contracting separate engagements on the basis of that treaty. 305. 3d The court's objections to the legality of the treaty of Bassein, have already been discussed in a previous part of this paper. Under his instruction. there can be no doubt that lord Wellesley was not only authorised, but may be considered to have been directed to follow the course which he pursued, and that it was his positive duty to make every practicable effort to establish an alliance with the government of Poonah. 306. This treaty was concluded at Hyderabad in the month of October, 1800, and is now, for the first time, at the expiration of four years and an half, condemned by the court. The determination to conclude a general defensive alliance with the Nizam (which in fact was merely an improvement of COURT'S DRAFT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, of the existing treaty with that power) was stated as early 307. In fact, hostilities had not ceased in Mysore at the period of time when the treaty was negotiated and concluded. On the other hand, the interests of the British government, and of the Nizam, had become so far identified by the war in Mysore, that no doubt remained, that it would be incumbent on the British government, on every principle of sound policy, to defend and assist the Nizam in the most effectual manner, in the event of any attack on his highness by the Mahrattas, having for its object either the material reduction of his highness's resources and power, or the attainment of a prepon. derant influence in his councils. 308. The state of the Mahratta empire at that period of time rendered it nearly certain that the tranquillity and safety of the Nizam's dominions would be menaced by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. That chieftain had for a long period of time continued to commit various acts of hostility against the pos sessions of his highness the Nizam, and, by the success of his unwarrantable attacks upon the anthority of his highness the Peishwah, had acquired additional means of prosecuting his manifst designs against the Nizam, and against the general tranquillity of India. The aggrandizement of Scindiah in whatever form, must always have been prejudicial to our interests, and to those of the Nizam. It would have been particularly injurious to us, whenever it tended to weaken any of the barriers, which were placed between us and the Mahrattas, and it would have been dangerous to us in an imminent degree, if it ever had involved the actual removal of any of those barriers. The British government, therefore, was particularly interested in frustratg any hostile designs of Scindiah, upon the government of Hyderabad; and on this ground lord Wellesley was willing in April, 1800, to concert with the court of Hyderabad the means of providing, in the most effectual manner, against the danger to be apprehended from Scindiah, and, for that purpose, to enter into a defensive alliance with nis highness, the Nizam, for the mutual guarantee of his highness, and of the company's territories, against any attack COURT'S DRAFT, Defensive subsidiary al OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. which might be made by Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the possessions of either. 309. But the same considerations which claimed our protection of the Nizam against the meditated designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon his highness's territory and power, suggested also the expediency of extending that protection to a general guarantee of his highness's dominions against every hostile and unprovoked attack, from whatever quarter it might be made. If the interests of the company, and of the Nizam, were become so far identified, as to render it incumbent on us to defend his highness from the ambitious or violent projects of Scindiah, or of the Mahratta power, the security of those interests equally required, that we should counteract every attempt, whether secret or open, from any other quarter, to destroy the power of the Nizam, or to acquire the direction of it. 310. In this view of the subject, the British government felt no hesitation in agreeing to make the guarantee of the Nizam's dominions general, instead of confining it to the designs of Dowlat Rao Scindiah. The expediency of such an arrangement was the more obvious, as the Peishwah was completely in the power of Scindiah, who might, at any time, have compelled the Peishwah to take up arms against the Nizam, without appearing, himself, to be any further concerned in the contest, than in his character of a feudatory of the Mahratta empire, bound to obey the commands of his superior, the Peishwah. 311. But although, for the reasons stated, lord Wellesley was entirely prepared to make the proposed guarantee general, he did not think proper to proceed to that extent in the first instance, without obtaining from the Nizam a suitable return for so important a concession. 312. It had been constantly an object of the utmost solicitude at the court of Hyderabad, to obtain a general guarantee from the British government, and to secure the full benefits of the company's efficient protection: that court has evidently a deeper interest in such an alliance than the British government: it was, therefore, reasonable to expect, that his highness, the Nizam, should make suitable concessions to the company on this important occasion The result of this arrangement has produced a considerable augmentation of the subsidiary force serving in the Nizam's dominions; a commutation of the whole amount of subsidy for territory, assigned by the Nizam in perpetuity, and in complete sovereignty to the company; and lastly, the effectual removal of all the existing restraints on the commercial intercourse between the two states; and the regulation of that intercourse on principles mutually beneficial to the subjects of both, 313, The court ground their objections under liances, and commuting this head, on the reluctance with which the different parties COURT'S DRAFT, No 128. OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, subsidy for territory. Pa- parties entered into the engagements; and observe, Para. 104 and 105, observe that general Wellesley was obliged to march to Poonah unaccompanied by any of the Peishwah's troops. 314. This general objection to subsidiary alliances in India is entirely novel; alliances of a simi ar description have formed the basis of our power in every quarter of India, from the origin of the Brifish dominions in that country to the present moment; and, upon these principles, every foundation of our establishment in India might, with equal reason, be subverted. It is certainly true, that treaties of very unequal conditions have usually been found of short duration, and that no undue advantage should be taken in any political negotiation. Eut it may be observed, that no connection was ever formed between two states, of great inequality, in point of power, in which the advantages did not, sooner or later, preponderate in favour of the stronger. But are no such alliances therefore to be formed? Are we to forego our obvious advantages, lest others should not be equally benefited? It it sufficient that the agreement was voluntary, and that the weaker party conceived it to be his interest to accede to it. No idea has ever been entertained of governing the native states, with whom we have formed alliances, in a sense of government, when applied to their internal relations; but it is obvious, that our superior situation must necessarity create a great ascendancy over the course of their politics, by giving firmness and efficiency to their governments. If the existence of sentiments of jealousy, with respect to the British influence in India, could have affected our empire, it could never have attained its present extent. No state ever attained great eminence without calling forth the jealousy of its neighbours. And it cannot be doubted, that, in every period of our progress in India, certain states, especially the Mahrattas, have bcheld our advance. ment with feelings of envy. Admitting the facts alleged by the court, is there any measure adopted by the British nation, on any former occasion, for its advancement, which was not viewed with equal jealousy? All our treaties of alliance with the native states have arisen from their want of political resources to main. tain their respective governments, and must naturally bear the marks of the principles on which they were founded. 315. In adverting to the treaty with the Peishwah, the court observes, that only two chiefs joined general Wellesley on his march to Poonali. The fact, however, is, that general Wellesley was accompanied to Poonah by al the chiefs who had any power or authority in the southern provinces of the Mahratta state, and the governor-general's orders in that respect were strictly obeyed. It is true, that these chieftains did |