number of ways, by force or by misconduct of officers or other voters. It is only for a small part of the wrongs in this matter that the law gives a private right of action. Where officers have neglected or refused to perform the preliminaries, so that votes can not be honestly and lawfully counted, the principal injury is not to any individual, but to the community. The loss is general, not special. So, also, where the officers have received illegal votes, it is the general injury to the community, rather than the injury to any individual that is involved. In such cases the law gives no action in favor of private persons, but leaves the wrong-doer to be punished under criminal process. There may be conduct, however, by which the principal and direct injury is to the individual, though there is present also a public injury, as where by force or threats one is kept away from the polling place, or prevented from casting his vote, or where the officers willfully and maliciously refuse to permit one to cast his lawful ballot, or where the officers wrongfully invade the voter's right to secrecy of the ballot. In such cases the law permits the injured voter to recover in an action for damages against the wrong-doer.

§ 334. The right to assemble.-The right of citizens to assemble in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good is a political right that is generally secured by the constitutions of the states. Whoever prevents any citizen from exercising this right may be held guilty of a wrong. If force is used, the remedy may be an action for assault, battery or false imprisonment, in which the deprivation of the right will enter as an element of damages.

But the wrong may consist in merely obstructing one from entering the meeting, and though such act may not amount to a battery or imprisonment, yet the law will afford redress by an action for damages.

§ 335. The right to bear arms.-This right is guaranteed by federal and state constitutions to every citizen. As used in the constitutions the word "arms" has the military sense and refers to such weapons as are suitable for the general defense of the community, and does not include such weapons as are peculiarly adapted to individual encounters. Therefore it would not be unconstitutional to prohibit the carrying of such weapons as the slungshot. The constitution does not forbid the passage of laws against carrying weapons concealed or against carrying weapons openly with intent to use them unlawfully.

It is evident that the invasion of this right must always be at the hands of the state, and accordingly there can be no recovery of damages in favor of one injured. His remedy must be to have the statute declared unconstitutional.

§ 336. Freedom of speech and of the press.-The constitutions of the United States and of the several states prohibit the enactment of any laws restricting the right to speak, write or print freely on any subject. The intent of these provisions is to forbid censorship or control by persons who exercise the power of the state. Freedom of speech or press is not thereby enlarged, but only protected against invasion. There is no unlimited freedom of speech or press. The right must be exercised subject to the bounds fixed by law. Liberty of the press consists in

printing without any previous license, but subject to the consequences of law.

The right of free speech and press does not warrant a man's using blasphemous, obscene or seditious language. Legislation directed against such speaking, writing or printing is uniformly held to be constitutional. The user of such language may be punishable criminally, and when the language is part of some civil wrong, it may be a valid ground for increasing the amount recovered in a civil suit. Where the direct and natural consequence of such language is to cause injury, the user may sometimes be held liable for the consequences, criminally or civilly.

No man may abuse the right of free speech or free press, by slandering or libeling another. The cases where one is not held responsible in damages for false statements, spoken or written, have been shown in the sections relating to privileged communication under the subject of libel and slander.

§ 337. The right to office.-The right to enjoy an office, to which one has been duly elected, may be violated by any one who excludes such officer therefrom, and the law will afford redress not only by ousting the wrong-doer, but also by giving damages against him for his wrongful act.

§ 338. Religious liberty.-The right to the complete enjoyment of religious freedom is subject only to the sovereign power of the state. This power can be exercised in restraint only so far as the public. good may require, taking into consideration the circumstances of the people and the general moral sense. Within this limit the legislature may impose

restrictions. Therefore it may prohibit sacrifices of human beings or animals, may prohibit polygamy or any other immoral practice. These are not strictly invasions of the right.

The right may, however, be invaded by individuals in any of the ways that the exercise of political rights may be invaded, and the law will afford redress by an action for damages. It frequently happens, as in the case of political rights, that the violation of religious liberty is incidental to some wrong that is actionable upon other grounds.

§ 339. The right to an education.-Where the state makes provision for education it is bound to do so upon equal terms to all citizens. The citizen has

then a civil right to the benefits. Whoever violates this right by wrongfully depriving another of such educational privileges may be liable in an action for damages. And if the wrong be by the act of an officer charged with the duty of furnishing such privileges, there may, in many cases, be a remedy by mandamus.

§ 340. Unlawful searches.-The right to be protected against unlawful searches is secured by the constitutions. Every citizen is entitled to maintain the privacy and secrecy of his home and business, whatever may be his reason for doing so. Whoever invades this right by a search that is not provided for by law may be liable therefor in damages, and where a search is made under legal process, if the process be used for a wrongful purpose, or if acts be done in excess of its authority, the wrong-doer may be held liable in an action for abuse of process or other appropriate action.

§ 341. Performance of official duties.-Wherever the law clothes one or more persons with power and imposes the duty to do certain acts, the corresponding right exists in the public or in individuals to have that duty correctly and honestly performed. The duty may be violated either through mere honest error, or through malicious and corrupt motives. But it is not for every such violation that the law gives a remedy, and for some violations the only remedy is in an action by the state, by mandamus or prohibition, by indictment or by impeachment.

In order to determine what, if any, remedy exists, the act in question must be submitted to several tests.

One test is whether the act was within or in excess of the authority conferred. If within authority the officer is generally protected, if in excess he may not be.

Another test is whether the act in question be one that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion as to the manner and propriety of doing it, or whether it is merely ministerial, i. e., the manner and propriety of its performance is precisely fixed by law. For acts of the discretionary kind the officer generally enjoys immunity from suit; for acts that are merely ministerial, he may be held responsible in legal proceedings.

Still another test lies in the effect of the act in question. Every violation of official duty is in some sense an injury to both the public, as a whole, and to every individual of the community. There are, however, some official duties that are imposed primarily for the public benefit, and that affect individuals only incidentally; and again there are duties