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in whole or part was liable to the author in damages and could be enjoined.

§ 496. Private letters.-Where letters have a literary value the writer has the sole right to publish them, even though the legal title to the paper is in the recipient. If it is apparent that they were intended for publication, the recipient may also publish them. Any attempt by others to publish them may be restrained by injunction, or damages may be recovered for the publication. So far as a letter has value for historic purposes the recipient may use it. And all papers of every kind may be used by any one as evidence in any suit, no matter what may be their value.

§ 497. Trade-marks and trade names.-A trademark is a name, symbol or device used by a person to designate that certain goods or property are made by or used by him only, or that a particular business is conducted by him. The essential quality of a trademark is that it is arbitrary in form. If the mark is descriptive of any quality of the goods it is not valid as a trade-mark. It is intended as a simple and convenient guide to customers. Whoever imitates the trade-mark and so palms off goods under false colors, commits a fraud upon the purchaser, and at the same time causes damage to the owner of the trade-mark, both by the profits he has lost and it may be by the injury to the reputation of his goods. This the law recognizes as a substantial damage, and the trade-mark is regarded as incorporeal property. The law of trade-marks is of comparatively recent origin, although the principles upon which it rests have been long settled as a part of the common law.

The remedy for infringement of trade-marks is practically the same as for infringement of patents, viz., damages for loss of profits, injunction, and recovery of the profits made by the infringer.

In the United States recent statutes have been passed authorizing the registry of trade-marks in some cases, and giving them greater value as evidence when registered than when not. The statutes are generally only declaratory of the common law, and all the remedies that formerly existed are preserved.

Though not a trade-mark technically, a trade name or sign will receive protection from the courts if it is not merely descriptive and contains no deceptive words or meaning, and a rival may be enjoined from using such name or sign so as to cause injury to the owner. By means of such trade names what is called the good will of a business is preserved and becomes a valuable property right.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

WRONGS TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

§ 498. Kinds of injuries.-Wrongs that may be done to the owner of personal property through fraud, negligence and nuisance have been considered; as have also the wrongs that may be done by mere breach of contract. There remain to be considered wrongs:

(1) By direct force injuring or disturbing the owner in his possession.

(2) By conversion or depriving the owner of his property.

(3) By neglect to restore to the owner upon demand property to which he is entitled.

§ 499. Trespass by force.-The first class of the wrongs named is known as a trespass by force or vi et armis. By this is intended only a direct injury by the unlawful forcible disturbance of another in his possession of the property. This may amount to a partial or complete destruction of the property. The wrong going only to the possession, it follows that one who has an interest in the property, but has not actual or constructive possession, is not entitled to complain of an injury as a trespass vi et armis, but the injury as to him should he redressed in some other form, as will be seen.

500. Possession.-The possession referred to may be (1) that of the general owner, (2) that of one having a special property, as a bailee, mortgagee, etc., or (3) that of one having no title beyond mere peaceable possession. The possession of a servant or agent is in law the possession of the master or principal, and need not be considered as a distinct possession.

Possession need not be actual. If one has the immediate right to possession, he has the general property and is said to have constructive possession. He may maintain an action for trespass against any wrong-doer, except the person who has the special property and actual possession.

Where there is a special property in goods, either the general or special owner may sue a third person for injury to the goods.

One who has mere peaceable possession has sufficient possession to warrant a suit for trespass against any wrong-doer except the owner.

§ 501. The force.-The force used may be by the wrong-doer personally, by his servants, or by his animals. It may be either express force, as in robbery, or implied force, as in the act of placing poison before animals. The degree of force is immaterial. To cut a rope tying a cow would be a trespass. It must moreover appear that the injury was proximate.

§ 502. Conversion.-Any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted by one person over another's property, in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it, is known as a conversion. It is the denial of the owner's right that distinguishes conversion from trespass, for trespass may sometimes be committed

even though the owner's right to property and possession be fully conceded. Whether the act be for the benefit of the wrong-doer or a third person, and whether it be for a temporary purpose or otherwise, it is a conversion, if the dominion of the owner be intentionally interfered with. It follows from this that many wrongs that are trespasses may, at plaintiff's option, be treated as conversions. Anything that is personal property, even though it have no value except to the owner, may be the subject of a conversion. Whoever has the mere possession of goods, provided the possession was not gained by force or fraud, is entitled to maintain an action for conversion against any one except the owner. And any one who has not the actual possession, but who has the right to immediate possession, may maintain the action.

§ 503. Conversion by persons rightfully in possession. When a person who has a special property in goods, as a bailee, mortgagee, etc., does any act in excess of his authority, and inconsistent with the rights of the general owner, his acts may be treated as a conversion. If a mortgagee should sell the mortgaged property, as his own, and in denial of the mortgage it would be a conversion; if sold subject to the terms of the mortgage, however, it would not be.

Whoever buys the property must ascertain the title, and if he takes possession and denies the owner's right, he is liable for conversion. The question of good faith is not involved. All who participate in the conversion, as seller or buyer, principal or agent, may be held liable. But if one is innocently in possession of goods belonging to another, and, before

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