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were called out: but these nine were enough. They enabled Scott to go to Mexico, and Taylor to conquer at Buena Vista, and to finish the war victoriously.

A comic mistake grew out of this change in the President's message, which caused the ridicule of the sedentary line to be fastened on Mr. Calhoun-who in fact had counselled it. When the message was read in the Senate, Mr. Westcott, of Florida, believing it remained as it had been drawn up, and induced by Mr. Calhoun, with whose views he was acquainted, made some motion upon it, significant of approbatory action. Mr. Benton asked for the reading of the part of the message referred to. Mr. Westcott searched, but could not find it: Mr. Calhoun did the same. Neither could find the passage. Inquiring and despairing looks were exchanged: and the search for the present was adjourned. Of course it was never found. Afterwards Mr. Westcott said to Mr. Benton that the President had deceived Mr. Calhoun-had told him that the sedentary line was recommended in the message, when it was not. Mr. Benton told him there was no deception-that the recommendation was in the message when he said so, but had been taken out (and he explained how) and replaced by an urgent recommendation for a vigorous prosecution of the war. But the secret was kept for the time. The administration stood before the country vehement for war, and loaded with applause for their spirit. Mr. Calhoun remained mystified, and adhered to the line, and incurred the censure of opposing the administration which he professed to support. He brought forward his plan in all its detail—the line marked out—the number of forts and stations necessary-and the number of troops necessary to garrison them: and spoke often, and earnestly in its support: but to no purpose. His plan was entirely rejected, nor did I ever hear of any one of the cabinet offering to share with him in the ridicule which he brought upon himself for advocating a plan so preposterous in itself, and so utterly unsuited to the temper of our people. It was in this debate, and in support of this sedentary occupation that Mr. Calhoun characterized that proposed inaction as "a masterly inactivity :” a fine expression of the Earl of Chatham-and which Mr. Calhoun had previously used in the Oregon debate in recommending us to do nothing there, and leave it to time to perfect our

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title. Seven years afterwards the establishment of a boundary between the United States and Mexico was attempted by treaty in the latitude of this proposed line of occupation-a circumstance, one of the circumstances,-which proves that Mr. Calhoun's plans and spirit survive him.

In all that passed between the President and Mr. Benton about this line, there was no suspicion on the part of either of any design to make it permanent; nor did any thing to that effect appear in Mr. Calhoun's speeches in favor of it; but the design was developed at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace, and has since been attempted by treaty; and is a design which evidently connects itself with, what is called, preserving the equilibrium of the States (free and slave) by adding on territory for slave States-and to increase the Southern margin for the "UNITED STATES SOUTH," in the event of a separation of the two classes of States.

CHAPTER CLXV1.

THE WILMOT PROVISO; OR, PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES: ITS INUTILITY AND MISCHIEF.

SCARCELY was the war with Mexico commenced when means, different from those of arms, were put in operation to finish it. One of these was the return of the exiled Santa Anna (as has been shown) to his country, and his restoration to power, under the belief that he was favorable to peace, and for which purpose arrangements began to be made from the day of the declaration of the war-or before. In the same session another move was made in the same direction, that of getting peace by peaceable means, in an application made to Congress by the President, to place three millions of dollars at his disposal, to be used in negotiating for a boundary which should give us additional territory: and that recommendation not having been acted upon at the war session, was renewed at the commencement of the next one. It was recommended as an "important measure for securing a speedy peace;" and as an argument in favor of granting it, a sum of two millions similarly placed at the disposition of Mr. Jefferson when about to nego

the other, to accomplish their own purposes. Many courageous men denounced it as such—as a game to be kept up for the political benefit of the players; and deplored the blindness which could not see their determination to keep it agoing to the last possible moment, and to the production of the greatest possible degree of national and sectional exasperation. It was while this contention was thus raging, that Mr. Calhoun wrote a confidential letter to a member of the Alabama legislature, hugging this proviso to his bosom as a fortunate event-as a means of "forcing the issue" between the North and the South; and deprecating any adjustment, compromise, or defeat of it, as a misfortune to the South: and which letter has since come to light. Gentle and credulous people, who believed him to be in earnest when he was sounding the tocsin to rouse the States, instigating them to pass disunion resolutions, and stirring up both national and village orators to attack the proviso unto death: such persons must be amazed to

tiate for Florida (which ended in the acquisition of Louisiana), was plead as a precedent; and justly. Congress, at this second application, granted the appropriation; but while it was depending, Mr. Wilmot, a member of Congress, from Pennsylvania, moved a proviso, that no part of the territory to be acquired should be open to the introduction of slavery. It was a proposition not necessary for the purpose of excluding slavery, as the only territory to be acquired was that of New Mexico and California, where slavery was already prohibited by the Mexican laws and constitution; and where it could not be carried until those laws should be repealed, and a law for slavery passed. The proviso was nugatory, and could answer no purpose but that of bringing on a slavery agitation in the United States; for which purpose it was immediately seized upon by Mr. Calhoun and his friends, and treated as the greatest possible outrage and injury to the slave States. Congress was occupied with this proviso for two sessions, became excessively heated on the sub-read in that exhumed letter, written during the ject, and communicated its heat to the legislatures of the slave States-by several of which conditional disunion resolutions were passed. Every where, in the slave States, the Wilmot Proviso became a Gorgon's head-a chimera dire—a watchword of party, and the synonyme

fiercest of the strife, these ominous words:

compromise or adjustment of the proviso, or "With this impression I would regard any even its defeat. without meeting the danger in its whole length and breadth, as very unforwithout removing the danger. or materially tunate for us. It would lull us to sleep again, diminishing it.”

of civil war and the dissolution of the Union. Many patriotic members were employed in resisting the proviso as a bona fide cause of break- This issue to be forced was a separation of ing up the Union, if adopted; many amiable the slave and the free States; the means, a comand gentle-tempered members were employed in mercial non-intercourse, in shutting the slave devising modes of adjusting and compromising State seaports against the vessels of the free it; a few, of whom Mr. Benton was one, pro-States; the danger to be met, was in the trial duced the laws and the constitution of Mexico to of this issue, by the means indicated; which show that New Mexico and California were free were simply high treason when pursued to the from slavery; and argued that neither party overt act. Mr. Calhoun had flinched from that had any thing to fear, or to hope—the free soil act in the time of Jackson, but he being dead, party nothing to fear, because the soil was now and no more Jacksons at the head of the govfree; the slave soil party nothing to hope, be- ernment, he rejoiced in another chance of meetcause they could not take a step to make it ing the danger-meeting it in all its length and slave soil, having just invented the dogma of breadth; and deprecated the loss of the proviso "No power in Congress to legislate upon slave- as the loss of this chance. ry in territories." Never were two parties so completely at loggerheads about nothing: never did two parties contend more furiously against the greatest possible evil. Close observers, who had been watching the progress of the slavery agitation since its inauguration in Congress in 1835, knew it to be a game played by the abolitionists on one side and the disunionists on

Truly the abolitionists and the nullifiers were necessary to each other-the two halves of a pair of shears, neither of which could cut until joined together. Then the map of the Union was in danger; for in their conjunction, that map was cloth between the edges of the shears, And this was that Wilmot Proviso, which for two years convulsed the Union, and prostrated men

of firmness and patriotism-a thing of nothing in itself, but magnified into a hideous reality, and seized upon to conflagrate the States and dissolve the Union. The Wilmot Proviso was not passed: that chance of forcing the issue was lost: another had to be found, or made.

CHAPTER CLXVII.

volved in circumlocutory phrases, are intelligible to the point, that Congress has no power to prohibit slavery in a territory, and that the exercise of such a power would be a breach of the constitution, and leading to the subversion of the Union. Ostensibly the complaint was, that the emigrant from the slave State was not allowed to carry his slave with him: in reality it was that he was not allowed to carry the State law along with him to protect his slave. Placed in that light, which is the true one, the complaint is absurd: presented as applying to a

MR. CALHOUN'S SLAVERY RESOLUTIONS, AND piece of property instead of the law of the

DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO PRO-
HIBIT SLAVERY IN A TERRITORY.

On Friday, the 19th of February, Mr. Calhoun introduced into the Senate his new slavery resolutions, prefaced by an elaborate speech, and requiring an immediate vote upon them. They were in these words:

Resolved, That the territories of the United States belong to the several States composing this Union, and are hell by them as their joint and common property.

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Resolved, That Congress, as the joint agent and representative of the States of this Union, has no right to make any law, or do any act whatever, that shall directly, or by its effects, make any discrimination between the States of this Union, by which any of them shall be deprived of its full and equal right in any territory of the United States acquired or to be acquired. "Resolved, That the enactment of any law which should directly, or by its effects, deprive the citizens of any of the States of this Union from emigrating, with their property, into any of the territories of the United States, will make such discrimination, and would, therefore, be a violation of the constitution, and the rights of the States from which such citizens emigrated, and in derogation of that perfect equality which belongs to them as members of this Union, and would tend directly to subvert the Union itself. Resolved, That it is a fundamental principle in our political creed, that a people, in forming a constitution, have the unconditional right to form and adopt the government which they may think best calculated to secure their liberty, prosperity, and happiness; and that, in conformity thereto, no other condition is imposed by the federal constitution on a State, in order to be admitted into this Union, except that its constitution shall be republican; and that the imposition of any other by Congress would not only be in violation of the constitution, but in direct conflict with the principle on which our political system rests."

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State, it becomes specious-has deluded whole
communities; and has led to rage and resent-
ment, and hatred of the Union. In support of
these resolutions the mover made a speech in
which he showed a readiness to carry out in ac-
tion, to their extreme results, the doctrines they
contained, and to appeal to the slave-holding
States for their action, in the event that the
This was the
Senate should not sustain them.
concluding part of his speech:

"Well, sir, what if the decision of this body shall deny to us this high constitutional right, not the less clear because deduced from the whole body of the instrument and the nature of the subject to which it relates? What, then, is the question? I will not undertake to decide. It is a question for our constituents-the slave-holding States. A solemn and a great question. If the decision should be adverse, I trust and do believe that they will take under solemn consideration what they ought to do. I give no advice. It would be hazardous and dangerous for me to do so. But I may speak as an individual member of that section of the Union. There I drew my first breath. There are all my hopes. There is my family and connections. I am a planter-a cotton planter. I am a Southern man, and a slave-holder; a kind and a merciful one, I trust-and none the worse for being a slave-holder. I say, for one, I would rather meet any extremity upon earth than give up one inch of our equality-one inch of what belongs to us as members of this great republic. What, acknowledge inferiority! The surrender of life is nothing to sinking down into acknowledged inferiority.

"I have examined this subject largely-widely. I think I see the future if we do not stand up as we ought. In my humble opinion, in that case, the condition of Ireland is prosperous and happy-the condition of Hindostan is prosperous and happy-the condition of Jamaica is prosperous and happy, to what the Southern States will be if they should not now stand up These resolutions, although the sense is in- manfully in defence of their rights."

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When these resolutions were read, Mr. Ben- the federal government-contrary to its practon rose in his place, and called them "fire- tice during that time-contrary to Mr. Calbrand." Mr. Calhoun said he had expected the houn's slavery resolutions of 1838-contrary support of Mr. Benton as the representative to his early and long support of the Missouri of a slave-holding State." Mr. Benton answered compromise-and contrary to the re-enactment that it was impossible that he could have ex- of that line by the authors of the Texas anpected such a thing. Then, said Mr. Calhoun, nexation law. That re-enactment had taken I shall know where to find the gentleman. To place only two years before, and was in the which Mr. Benton: "I shall be found in the very words of the anti-slavery ordinance of '87, right place on the side of my country and the and of the Missouri compromise prohibition of Union." This answer, given on that day, and 1820; and was voted for by the whole body of on the spot, is one of the incidents of his life the annexationists, and was not only conceived which Mr. Benton will wish posterity to remem- and supported by Mr. Calhoun, then Secretary ber. of State, but carried into effect by him in the despatch of that messenger to Texas in the expiring moments of his power. The words of the re-enactment were: "And in such State, or States as shall be formed out of said territory north of the said Missouri compromise

for crime) shall be prohibited." This clause re-established that compromise line in all that long extent of it which was ceded to Spain by the treaty of 1819, which became Texian by her separation from Mexico, and which became slave soil under her laws and constitution. So that, up to the third day of March, in the year 1845 not quite two years before the date of these resolutions-Mr. Calhoun by authentic acts, and the two Houses of Congress by recorded votes, and President Tyler by his approving signature, acknowledged the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in a territory! and not only acknowledged the power, but exerted it! and actually prohibited slavery in a long slip of country, enough to make a "State or States," where it then legally existed. This fact was formally brought out in the chapter of this volume which treats of the legislative annexation of Texas; and those who wish to see the proceeding in detail may find it in the journals of the two Houses of Congress, and in the congressional history of the time.

Mr. Calhoun demanded the prompt consideration of his resolutions, giving notice that he would call them up the next day, and press them to a speedy and final vote. He did call them up, but never called for the vote, nor was any ever had: nor would a vote have any prac-line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except tical consequence, one way or the other. The resolutions were abstractions, without application. They asserted a constitutional principle, which could not be decided, one way or the other, by the separate action of the Senate; not even in a bill, much less in a single and barren set of resolves. No vote was had upon them. The condition had not happened on which they were to be taken up by the slave States; but they were sent out to all such States, and adopted by some of them; and there commenced the great slavery agitation, founded upon the dogma of 66 no power in Congress to legislate upon slavery in the territories," which has led to the abrogation of the Missouri compromise linewhich has filled the Union with distractionand which is threatening to bring all federal legislation, and all federal elections, to a mere sectional struggle, in which one-half of the States is to be arrayed against the other. The resolves were evidently introduced for the mere purpose of carrying a question to the slave States on which they could be formed into a unit against the free States; and they answered that purpose as well on rejection by the Senate as with it; and were accordingly used in conformity to their design without any such rejection, which-it cannot be repeated too oftencould in no way have decided the constitutional question which they presented.

These were new resolutions-the first of their kind in the (almost) sixty years' existence of

These resolutions of 1847, called fire-brand at the time, were further characterized as nullification a few days afterwards, when Mr. Benton said of them, that, "as Sylla saw in the young Cæsar many Mariuses, so did he see in them many nullifications.”

CHAPTER CLXVIII.

by enabling us to force the issue on the North. Something of the kind was indispensable to rouse and unite the South. On the contrary, if we should not meet it as we ought, I fear, greatly fear, our doom will be fixed. It would prove that we either have not the sense or

THE SLAVERY AGITATION: DISUNION: KEY TO spirit to defend ourselves and our institutions."

MR. CALHOUN'S POLICY: FORCING THE ISSUE: MODE OF FORCING IT.

In the course of this year, and some months after the submission of his resolutions in the Senate denying the right of Congress to abolish slavery in a territory, Mr. Calhoun wrote a letter to a member of the Alabama Legislature, which furnishes the key to unlock his whole system of policy in relation to the slavery agitation, and its designs, from his first taking up the business in Congress in the year 1835, down to the date of the letter; and thereafter. The letter was in reply to one asking his opinion "as to the steps which should be taken" to guard the rights of the South; and was written in a feeling of personal confidence to a person in a condition to take steps; and which he has since published to counteract the belief that Mr. Calhoun was seeking the dissolution of the Union. The letter disavows such a design, and at the same time proves it-recommends forcing the issue between the North and the South, and lays down the manner in which it should be done. It opens with this paragraph:

"I am much gratified with the tone and views of your letter, and concur entirely in the opinion you express, that instead of shunning, we ought to court the issue with the North on the slavery question. I would even go one step further, and add that it is our duty-due to ourselves, to the Union, and our political institutions, to force the issue on the North. We are now stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally. Un.ess we bring on the issue, delay to us will be dangerous indeed. It is the true policy of those enemies who seek our destruction. Its effects are, and have been, and will be to weaken us politically and morally, and to strengthen them. Such has been my opinion from the first. Had the South, or even my own State backed me, I would have forced the issue on the North in 1835, when the spirit of abolitionism first developed itself to any considerable extent. It is a true maxim, to meet danger on the frontier, in politics as well as war. Thus thinking, I am of the impression, that if the South act as it ought, the Wilmot Proviso, instead of proving to be the means of successfully assailing us and our peculiar institution, may be made the occasion of successfully asserting our equality and rights,

The phrase "forcing the issue" is here used too often, and for a purpose too obvious, to need remark. The reference to his movement in 1835 confirms all that was said of that movement at the time by senators from both sections of the

Union, and which has been related in chapter 131 of the first volume of this View. At that time Mr. Calhoun characterized his movement as defensive-as done in a spirit of self-defence: it was then characterized by senators as aggressive and offensive: and it is now declared in this letter to have been so. He was then openly told that he was playing into the hands of the abolitionists, and giving them a champion to contend with, and the elevated theatre of the American Senate for the dissemination of their doctrines, and the production of agitation and sectional division. All that is now admitted, with a lamentation that the South, and not even his own State, would stand by him then in forcing the issue. So that chance was lost. Another was now presented. The Wilmot Proviso, so much deprecated in public, is privately saluted as a fortunate event, giving another chance for forcing the issue. The letter proceeds:

"But in making up the issue, we must look far beyond the proviso. It is but one of many acts of aggression, and, in my opinion, by no means the most dangerous or degrading, though more striking and palpable."

In looking beyond the proviso (the nature of which has been explained in a preceding chapter), Mr. Calhoun took up the recent act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, repealing the slave sojournment law within her limits, and ob‐ structing the recovery of fugitive slaves—saying:

"I regard the recent act of Pennsylvania, and laws of that description, passed by other States, intended to prevent or embarrass the reclamation of fugitive slaves, or to liberate our domes tics when travelling with them in non-slaveholding States, as unconstitutional. Insulting as it is, it is even more dangerous. I go further, and hold that if we have a right to hold our slaves, we have a right to hold them in peace and quiet, and that the toleration, in the non-slaveholding States, of the establishment of societies and

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