duce those who are not particularly acquainted or from or passing through the State, may bring with the section of the statute to which it re- with him and take with him any person lawfully fers, to believe that there is a law of this State held by him in slavery in the State from whence which allows a free importation of slaves into he came, provided such slaves do not remain here it, without restrictions as to object, and without more than nine months. The article of the conlimitation as to the persons who may do so; stitution of the United States which bears upon yet this is very far from being true. This law the present question, declares that no person held does not permit any inhabitant of this State to to service or labor in one State, under the laws bring into it any person held in slavery, under thereof, escaping to another State, shall, in conany pretence or for any object whatsoever; nor sequence of any law or regulation therein, be does it allow any person of any other State or discharged from such service or labor, but such country to do so, except such person is actually persons shall be delivered up on claim of the partravelling to or from, or passing through this ty to whom such service or labor may be due. State. This law, in its operation and effect, only I understand that, in the State of Massachusetts, allows persons belonging to States or nations this provision of the constitution has been dewhere domestic slavery exists, who happen to cided by the courts not to include the case of a be travelling in this State, to be attended by slave brought by his master into the State, and their servants whom they lawfully hold in escaping thence. But the courts of law in this slavery when at home, provided they do not re-State have uniformly given a different construcmain within our territories longer than nine tion to the same article of the constitution, and months. The difference between it and the one have always decided that it does embrace the implied by your interrogatory is so manifest, case of a slave brought by his master into this that it is perhaps fair to presume, that if those State, and escaping from him here. Conseby whose appointment you act in this matter quently, under this judicial construction of the had not misapprehended its character, they constitution, and without, and in defiance of any would not have instructed you to make it the law or regulation of this State, if the slave essubject of one of your questions. It is so re- cape from his master in this State, he must be stricted in its object, and that is so unexception-restored to him, when claimed at any time durable, that it can scarcely be regarded as obnox-ing his master's temporary sojournment within ious to well-founded objections when viewed the State, whether that sojournment be six in its true light. Its repeal would, I apprehend, months, nine months, or longer. It is not for have an injurious effect upon our intercourse me to say that this decision is erroneous, nor is with some of the other States, and particularly it for our legislature. Acting under its auupon their business connection with our com- thority, they passed the law to which you obmercial emporium. In addition to this, the re-ject, for the purpose, not of conferring new peal would have a tendency to disturb the polit-powers or privileges on the slave-owner, but to ical harmony among the members of our con- prevent his abuse of that which the constitution federacy, without producing any beneficial re- of the United States, thus expounded, secures to sults to compensate for these evils. I am not him. The law, as I understand it, was intended therefore in favor of it." to fix a period of time as a test of transient passage through, or temporary residence in the

The duration of nine months is not material in

This is an explicit answer, meeting the inter-State, within the provisions of the constitution. rogatory with a full negative, and impliedly rebuking the phrase "importation," by supposing it would not have been used if the Utica convention had understood the act. Mr. Seward answered in the same spirit, and to the same effect, only giving a little more amplitude to his excellent reasons. He says:

"Does not your inquiry give too broad a meaning to the section? It certainly does not confer upon any citizen of a State, or of any other country, or any citizen of any other State, except the owner of slaves in another State by virtue of the laws thereof, the right to bring slaves into this State or detain them here under any circumstances as such. I understand your inquiry, therefore to mean, whether I am in favor of a repeal of the law which declares, in substance, that any person from the southern or south-western States, who may be travelling to

the question, and if it be unnecessarily long, may and ought to be abridged. But, if no such law existed, the right of the master (under the construction of the constitution before menbe surrendered to him in all cases of travelling tioned) would be indefinite, and the slave must through, or passage to or from the State. If I have correctly apprehended the subject, this law is not one conferring a right upon any person to import slaves into the State, and hold them here as such; but is an attempt at restriction upon the constitutional right of the master; a quali fication, or at least a definition of it, and is in favor of the slave. Its repeal, therefore, would have the effect to put in greater jeopardy the class of persons you propose to benefit by it. While the construction of the constitution adopted here is maintained, the law, it would seem, ought to remain upon our statute book, not as an encroachment upon the rights of man, but a protection for them.

were these:

from labor, has been affirmed by the adjudications of the State tribunals, and by those of the courts of the United States."

This decision of the Supreme Court-so clear and full-was further valuable in making visible to the legislative authority what was wanting to give efficacy to the act of 1793; it was nothing but to substitute federal commissioners for the State officers forbidden to act under it and that substitution might have been accom

A citizen of Maryland, acting under the federal law of '93, in recapturing his slave in Pennsylvania, was prosecuted under the State act of 1826-convicted-and sentenced to its penalties. The constitutionality of this enactment was in vain plead in the Pennsylvania court; but her authorities acted in the spirit of deference and respect to the authorities of the Union, and concurred in an "agreed case," to be carried before the Supreme Court of the United States, to test the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania law.plished in an amendatory bill of three or four That court decided fully and promptly all the lines-leaving all the rest of the act as it was. points in the case, and to the full vindication of Unfortunately Congress did not limit itself to all the rights of a slaveholder, under the recap- an amendment of the act of 1793; it made a tion clause in the constitution. The points denew law-long and complex-and striking the cided cover the whole ground, and, besides, public mind as a novelty. It was early in the show precisely in what particular the act of session of 1849-'50 that the Judiciary Commit1793 required to be amended, to make it work tee of the Senate reported a bill on the subject; out its complete effect under the constitution, it was a bill long and complex, and distasteful to independent of all extrinsic aid. The points all sides of the chamber, and lay upon the table six months untouched. It was taken up in the "The provisions of the act of 12th of February, last weeks of a nine months' session, and substi1793, relative to fugitive slaves, is clearly consti- tuted by another bill, still longer and more comtutional in all its leading provisions, and, indeed, plex. This bill also was very distasteful to with the exception of that part which confers authority on State magistrates, is free from the Senate (the majority), and had the singular reasonable doubt or difficulty. As to the au- fate of being supported in its details, and passed thority so conferred on State magistrates, while into law, with less than a quorum of the body a difference of opinion exists, and may exist on in its favor, and without ever receiving the full this point, in different States, whether State The matemagistrates are bound to act under it, none is senatorial vote of the slave States. entertained by the court, that State magistrates rial votes upon it, before it was passed, were on may, if they choose, exercise that authority, un- propositions to give the fugitive a jury trial, if less forbid by State legislation." "The power he desired it, upon the question of his condition of legislation in relation to fugitives from labor is exclusive in the national legislature." -free or slave; and upon the question of giving "The right to seize and retake fugitive slaves, him the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus. and the duty to deliver them up, in whatever The first of these propositions originated with State of the Union they may be found, is under Mr. Webster, but was offered in his absence by the constitution recognized as an absolute, posi- Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey. He (Mr. Webtive right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme force, uncontrolled ster) drew up a brief bill early in the session, and uncontrollable by State sovereignty or to supply the defect found in the working of the State legislation. The right and duty are co-act of '93; it was short and simple; but it conextensive and uniform in remedy and operation tained a proviso in favor of a jury trial when throughout the whole Union. The owner has the same exemption from State regulations and the fugitive denied his servitude. That would control, through however many States he may have been about always; and this jury trial, pass with the fugitive slaves in his possession in besides being incompatible with the constitutransitu to his domicil." "The act of the legis- tion, and contradictory to all cases of proceedlature of Pennsylvania, on which the indictment against Edward Prigg was founded, for carrying ing against fugitives, would have been pretty away a fugitive slave, is unconstitutional and sure to have been fatal to the pursuer's claim; void. It purports to punish, as a public offence and certainly both expensive and troublesome against the State, the very act of seizing and re- to him. It was contrary to the act of 1793, and moving a slave by his master, which the constitution of the United States was designed to jus- contrary to the whole established course of retify and uphold." "The constitutionality of claiming fugitives, which is always to carry the act of Congress (1793), relating to fugitives them back to the place from which they fled

throughout the Union was required to execute the duties under it. Since then, as we all know, the peace cannot be called upon to execute this the Supreme Court has decided that justices of law, and the consequence is, that they have almost every where refused to do so. The master seeking his slave found his remedy a good this defect is one that imperiously requires a one at the time, but now very ineffectual;. and remedy. And this remedy I am willing to provide, fairly and honestly, and to make such other provisions as may be proper and necessary. But I desire for myself that the original act should remain upon the statute book, and that the changes shown to be necessary should be made by way of amendment."

to be tried. Thus, if a man commits an offence in one country, and flies to another, he is carried back; so, if he flies from one State to another; and so in all the extradition treaties between foreign nations. All are carried back to the place from which they fled, the only condition being to establish the flight and the probable cause; and that in the case of fugitives from labor, as well as from justice, both of which classes are put together in the constitution of the United States, and in the fugitive act of 1793. The proposition was rejected by a vote of eleven to twenty-seven. The yeas were: Messrs. Davis of Massachusetts, Dayton, Dodge of Wisconsin, Greene, Hamlin, Phelps, Smith, Upham, Walker of Wisconsin, and Winthrop. The nays were: Messrs. Atchison, Badger, Barnwell, Bell, Benton, Berrien, Butler, Cass, Davis of Mississippi, Dawson, Dodge of Iowa, Downs, Houston, Jones of Iowa, King, Mangum, Mason, Morton, Pratt of Maryland, Rusk, Sebastian, Soulé, Sturgeon, Turney, Underwood, Wales, Yulee. The motion in favor of granting the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus to the fugitive was made by Mr. Winthrop, and rejected by the same vote of eleven yeas and twenty-senators did not vote at all upon the bill, of seven nays. Other amendments were offered and disposed of, and the question coming on the passing of the bill, Mr. Cass, in speaking his own sentiments in favor of merely amending the act of 1793, also spoke the sentiments of many others, saying:

"When this subject was before the compromise committee, there was a general wish, and in that I fully concurred, that the main features of the act of 1793 upon this subject, so far as they were applicable, should be preserved, and that such changes as experience has shown to be necessary to a fair and just enforcement of the provisions of the constitution for the surrender of fugitive slaves, should be introduced by way of amendment. That law was approved by Washington, and has now been in force for sixty years, and lays down, among others, four general principles, to which I am prepared to adhere: 1. The right of the master to arrest his fugitive slave wherever he may find him. 2. His duty to carry him before a magistrate in the State where he is arrested, and that claim may be adjudged by him. 3. The duty of the magistrate to examine the claim, and to decide it, like other examining magistrates, without a jury, and then to commit him to the custody of the master. 4. The right of the master then to remove the slave to his residence. At the time this law was passed, every justice of the peace

The vote on the passing of the bill was 27 to 12, the yeas being: Messrs. Atchison, Badger, Barnwell, Bell, Berrien, Butler, Davis of Miss., Dawson, Dodge of Iowa, Downs, Foote, Houston, Hunter, Jones of Iowa, King, Mangum, Mason, Pearce, Rusk, Sebastian, Soulé, Spruance, Sturgeon, Turney, Underwood, Wales, and Yulee. The nays were: Messrs. Baldwin, Bradbury, Cooper, Davis of Mass., Dayton, Dodge of Wisconsin, Greene of Rhode Island, Smith, Upham, Walker, and Winthrop. Above twenty

whom Mr. Benton was one. Nearly the whole of these twenty would have voted for an amendment to the act of 1793, supplying federal officers in place of the State officers who were to assist in its execution. Some three or four lines would have done that; but instead of this brief enactment to give effect to an ancient and wellknown law, there was a long bill of ten sections, giving the aspect of a new law; and with such multiplied and complex provisions as to render the act inexecutable, except at a cost and trouble which would render the recovery of little or no value; and to be attended with an array and machinery which would excite disturbance, and scenes of force and violence, and render the law odious. It passed the House, and became a law, and has verified all the objections taken to it.

Mr. Benton did not speak upon this bill at the time of its passage; he had done that before, in a previous stage of the question, and when Mr Clay proposed to make it a part of his com promise measures. He (Mr. Benton) was op posed to confounding an old subject of constitu tional obligation with new and questionable sub jects, and was ready to give the subject an inde