liament, and was intended for the conveyance of passengers in carriages drawn by steam, but at the time of the offence the conveyance of passengers for hire had not commenced, and the traffic was confined to the carriage of materials and workmen. A railway truck was placed by the prisoners across the railway so as to obstruct the passage of any carriage and endanger the safety of persons conveyed therein, but its position was discovered, and it was removed before any collision occurred; it was objected that the case was not within the statute - 1st, because the railway was not used for the conveyance of passengers for hire; 2ndly, because no actual obstruction took place; but, upon a case reserved, it was held that the case was within the statute. It must be assumed that the railway was completed, and that all that required to be done was to open it for the public traffic. The prisoners did put an obstruction on the line, and they put it in such a position as to endanger the safety of the persons conveyed. The case therefore came within both branches of the section; there was an obstruction put on the line, and it was put so as to endanger the safety of the persons conveyed. It was contended that there could be no obstruction until some train were absolutely obstructed; but such a construction could not be maintained. The object of the legislature was obviously to prevent any disaster to those using the railway, and to punish those who put obstructions in such a manner as was likely to cause such disaster. The case was, therefore, within the intention of the statute; and though, in the ordinary course of things, it would generally be after the railway was fully opened that the public required to be protected, yet an obstruction before that time was within the mischief as well as the words of the statute. (m)

On an indictment on the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 97, s. 15 (now repealed), for throwing a stone upon a railway in such a manner as thereby to endanger the safety of one G. C. and of divers other persons being conveyed on the engines and carriages then using the railway, it appeared that the defendant was on a bridge over the railway, and let drop a stone on a train that was passing; the stone was a thin flat stone, about twice the thickness of a biscuit; and the train was travelling at the rate of about fifteen miles an hour. The railway was opened in January, 1845, but no Act of Parliament was obtained until the July following. It was objected on the interpretation clause, sec. 21, (n) that this railway was not constructed under an Act of Parliament; but Alderson, B., held that the effect of that clause was to extend and not to weaken the effect of sec. 15. (0) And his Lordship told the jury, there are two propositions for you to consider: -- First, did the defendant wilfully cast or drop this stone on the railway? and secondly, did the casting that stone on the railway in the manner in which it was cast endanger the safety of any of the persons travelling on the railway at that time? If you are satisfied on both these points, he is guilty. If the defendant had this stone in his hand at the time when the train was passing,

(m) R. v. Bradford, Bell, C. C. 268. (n) Ante, p. 339.

(0) Ante, p. 340, note (f). Alderson, B., said it would have been wiser if a count

had been inserted at common law for throwing a stone at a railway carriage, which is an offence at common law.

and it dropped accidentally from his hand on the railway, you should acquit him; for that which occurs by accident cannot be said to be wilful. Should you think that the defendant did cast the stone on the railway wilfully, the next question is, was it cast there by him under such circumstances as to endanger the safety of G. Č., the guard, the engineer, or any of the passengers or persons in the carriages? Now that would depend very much on the rate at which the train was proceeding at the time, and the weight and the size of the stone dropped. The former is material, because it is the same thing whether I throw a stone at your head or you run your head against the stone. If, therefore, the train were coming along at the rate of fifteen miles an hour, it would strike with that velocity a stone that meets it. You might drop a stone on a broad-wheeled waggon without doing any harm; but it may be very different when you drop it on a machine going at an enormous rate. Suppose a passenger in this train, going at the rate of fifteen miles an hour, had put his head out of the window, or the guard were to do so, which his duty might render necessary, a blow from a stone of this size and weight certainly might endanger his safety.' The jury found that the defendant foolishly dropped the stone on the railway, but not with the intention of doing any injury; Alderson, B.: The intention of the prisoner in dropping the stone is not the question. It is, "did he purposely drop the stone on the railway, and would the effect of the stone's being so dropped be to endanger the safety of the persons on the railway."' (p)

Where on an indictment under the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 97, s. 15 (now repealed), it appeared that large quantities of earth and rubbish were found placed across the railway, and the prosecutor's case was that this had been done by the defendant wilfully and in order to obstruct the use of the railway; and the defendant's case was, that the earth and rubbish had been accidentally dropped on the railway; Maule, J., told the jury, that if the rubbish had been dropped on the rails by mere accident, the defendant was not guilty; but it was by no means necessary, in order to bring the case within this Act, that the defendant should have thrown the rubbish on the rails expressly with the view to upset the train of carriages. If the defendant designedly placed these substances, having a tendency to produce an obstruction, not caring whether they actually impeded the carriages or not, that was a case within the Act.' And on the jury asking 'what was the meaning of the term "wilfully" used in the statute?' the learned judge added, he should consider the act to have been wilfully done, if the defendant intentionally placed the rubbish on the line, knowing that it was a substance likely to produce an obstruction; if, for instance, he had done so in order to throw upon the company's officers the necessary trouble of removing the rubbish.' (q) In a case upon the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 97, s. 15, it was strongly intimated that the neglect of a driver and stoker of an engine to keep a good look-out for signals, according to the rules of the railway company, whereby a collision occurred, and the safety of the passen

(p) R. v. Bowray, 10 Jurist, 211.

(q) R. v. Holroyd, 2 M. & Rob. 339. See Roberts v. Preston, 9 C. B. (N. S.), 208.

gers endangered, was not an offence within the 15th section of this Act. (r)

On an indictment under the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 6, for maliciously placing a stone upon a railway with intent to obstruct the carriages travelling thereon, it appeared that the prisoners, two boys, were seen to go upon the railway, and whilst one held the lever by which the points were turned, so as to separate two portions of the rails, the other dropped a stone between them, so as to keep them separated; the result would have been, had the act not been detected, that the carriages would have been thrown off the rail. No motive was suggested except that of wanton mischief. The jury were told that it was not necessary that the prisoners should have entertained any feeling of malice against the railway company, or against any person travelling upon it; it was quite enough to support the charge if the act was done mischievously and with a view to cause an obstruction of a train. (8)

The prisoner was indicted on the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, ss. 6, 7, for maliciously throwing a torch at a railway truck with intent in one count to injure it, in another to endanger the safety of persons travelling in the truck; there was, however, no one on the truck, upon which the prisoner let the torch fall; and Channell, B., held that there was no evidence to support the second count. (t)

On an indictment on the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 7, for maliciously throwing a stone into a railway carriage with intent to endanger the safety of any person in it, it appeared that there had been considerable popular excitement against a person who was about to travel by the train, and there was a crowd assembled at the time of its departure, and the prisoner had thrown a stone intending to hit him, but without any previous ill-will. It was urged that the statute did not apply; its object was to protect passengers by railways, and not to afford any additional protection against common assaults. Erle, J., after consulting Williams, J., said: 'Looking at the preamble of the sections relating to this class of offences, which recites that it is "expedient to make further provision for the punishment of aggravated assaults," and looking also to the provision of these clauses as indicated by the terms of sec. 6, immediately preceding the section upon which this indictment is framed, I consider that the "intent to endanger the safety of any person" travelling on the railway, spoken of in both sections, must appear to have been an intent to inflict some grievous bodily harm, and such as would sustain an indictment for assaulting or wounding a person with intent to do some grievous bodily harm; but as that is a question of degree,

(r) R. v. Pardenton, 6 Cox, C. C. 247. Cresswell and Williams, JJ. But the words of that section were, 'every person who shall wilfully do, or cause to be done, any thing, &c.' See note (f), ante, p. 340.

(s) R. v. Upton, Greaves' Campb. Acts, 92. 5 Cox, C. C. 298, Wightman, J.

See

(t) R. v. Sanderson, 1 F. & F. 37. R. v. Court, ante, p. 340, note (d). It is reported to have been objected that the words matter or thing' were ejusdem generis with the other words employed, and

did not include the case of a combustible, which could only injure a truck by means of fire; for otherwise the 8th section would be nugatory, and that section requires proof of an intent to destroy the carriage by fire. Now, this is an error, for sec. 8 has nothing to do with railway carriages, but only with railway buildings, and it is quite clear that secs. 6, 7, include everything whatsoever that is used with any of the intents therein

mentioned.

which it is impossible to define further than in those terms, it must be a question for the jury, upon the facts, whether there has been such an intent;' and his Lordship directed the jury, that in order to convict the prisoner they must be satisfied that he intended to inflict on the person at whom he aimed some grievous bodily harm.' (u)

Where on a trial for assault at the Central Criminal Court, it appeared that the prosecutrix and the defendant left Brighton together by a train which ran to the New Cross station, which is within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court; and the assault was committed between Brighton and the Three Bridges station, in the County of Sussex, and the prosecutrix there left the carriage in which she had been previously riding with the defendant, and travelled in another carriage to New Cross; it was held that by the combined operation of the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 13, and the Central Criminal Court Act, 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 2, the case might be tried at the Central Criminal Court. There was but one journey, and although the carriages were distinct, they all formed but one conveyance, and the fact that the prosecutrix and defendant rode in different carriages after the assault did not affect the question; it was the same as if they had occupied different parts of the same carriage. The words through which any carriage shall have passed' in the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, refer to the time of the trial, and not to a time antecedent to the commitment of the offence, and therefore make the offence triable at any place within the limits of the beginning and end of the journey, and do not confine the trial to any county through which the train had passed up to the time of the offence. (v)

6

(u) R. v. Rooke, 1 F. & F. 107. This case does not appear to have been argued on the part of the Crown, and, with all deference to the very learned judges, it clearly proceeded on a mistake. The 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, contains a number of enactments which have no bearing whatever on each other; the Act was framed to provide for totally different matters, which at that time called for a remedy for each. Secs. 1 and 2 relate to persons found by night with intent to commit felonies. Sec. 3 relates to administering chloroform. Secs. 4 and 5 relate to aggravated assaults. Then secs. 6, 7 and 8 are railway clauses, and it is perfectly clear that, although a person who commits an offence within either sec. 6 or sec. 7, may commit an assault, it is not essential to prove an assault in any offence contained in them, and no indictment upon them ever does allege an assault. They were most carefully framed for the very purpose of including every case where there was an intent to injure or endanger the safety of any person;' and those words were selected as much more general than with intent to

do grievous bodily harm. It is also a fallacy to suppose that, even if the sections were to be construed together, sec. 4 warrants this decision; for though one branch of it is inflict any grievous bodily harm,' the other is 'cut, stab, or wound' without any aggravation; so that a wound, however slight, and given without any intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, is within the section. Every indictment must allege the intent to be to injure or endanger the safety of some person, and it is very confidently submitted that the only proper question to be left to the jury in every case is, did the defendant do the act with intent to injure or endanger the safety of that person? C. S. G.

(v) R. v. French, 8 Cox, C. C. 252. The Recorder. Sussex was assumed to be out of the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court. It was also objected that the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, did not apply to railway trains, because they were not contemplated when that Act passed, and they did not come within the terms of the Act, this objection seems to have been tacitly overruled.

CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.

OF THREATS AND THREATENING LETTERS.1

Threats at common law.

It is said, that the dispersing of bills of menace threatening destruction to the lives or properties of those to whom they were addressed, for the purpose of extorting money, is, at common law, a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment. (a) Threats directed against persons immediately under the protection of a court are offences punishable by fine and imprisonment, as if a man threaten his adversary for suing him, a counsellor or attorney for being employed against him, a juror for his verdict, or a gaoler or other ministerial officer for keeping him in his custody, and properly executing his duty. (b) And a precedent is given of an indictment at common law against the attorney of a plaintiff in a cause for writing a letter to the attorney of the defendant, who had obtained a verdict on the evidence of his son, threatening to indict the son for perjury unless the defendant gave up the benefit of the verdict. (c)

But it was holden that threatening by letter or otherwise to put in motion a prosecution by a public officer to recover penalties for selling Fryar's Balsam without a stamp (which by the 42 Geo. 3, c. 56, is prohibited to be vended without a stamped label), for the purpose of obtaining money to stay the prosecution, was not such a threat as a firm and prudent man might not be expected to resist, and, therefore, was not in itself an indictable offence at common law, although it was alleged that the money was obtained, no reference being made to any statute which prohibits such attempt. A count alleged that the defendant, intending to abuse the laws for the protection of the revenue, sent the following letter:

SIRS,

I am applied to to prosecute an information against you for selling certain medicines without stamps. I have told the parties that all such informations must now be prosecuted by the public officer, and have advised them to let me write to you on the subject, and hear what you have to say. If I can be of any service to you in stopping them, you will write me accordingly, and I will get the best terms I can.'

(a) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 53, s. 1. Reference is made to 1 Hale, 567, but qu. the refer

ence.

(b) 4 Blac. Com. 126.
(c) 2 Chit. Crim. L. 149.

AMERICAN NOTE.

1 See S. v. Benedict, 11 Verm. 236.