that threat must be in writing, and the thing intended to be prevented was the misery occasioned to the party who had received the intimation that his premises would have the calamity of fire brought upon them. Unless the law went so far as to make it punishable to create that fear by any language the author knew would create that fear, the law would be powerless. The very fact of saying ironically, 'I don't say you are a thief,' could be expressed in such way as to make anybody understand that the party meant to make that charge; and, although there might be no single word in the letter which by itself would appear to mean so to a stranger, yet the party receiving it would perfectly well understand it. The jury must be satisfied that when he wrote those words 'You will suffer as before' - the writer intended to create in the mind of the party receiving the letter the fear that his house would be burnt down. Evidence might be offered that, under the particular circumstances, the words had not their ordinary meaning, but the meaning imputed to them upon the record, and therefore the witness might be asked whether he understood the meaning to be that which the record imputed. (0)

Venue. The 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, provided that offences against that Act might be tried in any county of England; but no such provision being made with respect to offences within the other repealed statutes, the trial of such offences was governed by the general rule. Upon this rule the trial might be in the county in which the prosecutor received the letter by the post, though delivered by the prisoner and put into the post in another county. (p) And it seems that the offender might be tried in the county in which he sent the letter, though the prosecutor received it in another county. The offence of sending a threatening letter would seem to be complete, as far as depends on the offender, by his putting the letter into the post-office to go into another county; though the party to whom it is sent afterwards receives it in the latter county. (7) The post-office marks in town or country, proved to be such, are evidence that the letters on which they appear were in the office to which those marks belong at the dates which the marks specify; (r) but a mark of double postage paid on any such letter is not of itself evidence that the letter contained an enclosure. (s)

Evidence to explain letter. The prisoner was tried for feloniously sending to J. S. Tucker the following letter, with intent to extort money from the said J. S. Tucker:

'SIR,

'You perhaps did not expect to hear from me so suddenly: but when you turned me away from Laytonstone for a mere trifle (that too at a

(0) R. v. Hendy, 4 Cox, C. C. 243. Mr. Moody gave me this note of this case an indictment averred that a fire of certain premises of the prosecutor had taken place, and that the prisoner sent a letter threatening to burn the house, &c., of the prosecutor, which was set out, and to the words, 'you shall suffer as before' added, 'meaning the said fire; and Erle, J., allowed the prosecutor to be asked what meaning he, at the time he received the letter, put on these words?' C. S. G.

(p) Girdwood's case, 1 Leach, 142. 2 East, P. C. c. 23, s. 4, p. 1120, ante, p. 240, where the letter was received by the prosecutor in Middlesex, and the trial had in that county, though the letter was delivered by the pris oner to a woman in London, and by her put

into the office, which was also in London. Esser's case, 2 East, P. C. c. 23, s. 7, p. 1125, where the offence was laid in Middlesex, though the letter was dated from Maidstone, in Kent, and sent by the post from Maidstone; and Lord Mansfield held that as the letter was directed to the prosecutor in Middlesex, where it was delivered, that was a sending in Middlesex, and that the whole was to be considered as the act of the defendant to the time of the delivery in that county.

(q) 2 East, P. C. c. 23, s. 7, p. 1125. Burn. Just. tit. Letter. And see now the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 12, vol. i. p. 5.

(r) Perkins's case, 1 Lew. 99, J. A Park, J. R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & A. 95. (s) R. v. Plumer, R. & R. 264.

time when by the late failures many scores of clerks were out of employ), you forgot that I had you in my power through your transactions with me five nights following (I have the dates and circumstances on paper written at the time), and that from your conduct to me before I went to live with you, you could expect no mercy from me. Did you not, however, let it pass? In a few words, I have taken advice upon the subject, and know that, if you are obstinate, it is in my power to bring down ruin on your head, and infamy on your name. However, I will be merciful. Allow me to return to L. in the same manner as before. I will never mention it again, as if I did I should lose everything and gain nothing; but it is impossible for me to get any situation in town at present. It is not true that Mrs. T. advertised, as you said; she is in great distress, and she is my mother, therefore I would wish to afford her a little relief, if possible; so send me five pounds to my address, which, with the other you lent me, I will IO U for, and pay when I get a place. I do not hear from you by Saturday morning, you will hear of it (enclosing five pounds). Now, consider ruin and beggary on one side, and wealth and comfort on the other; remember that, if you are obstinate, it will cost you all; do as I say, it will cost you nothing. I wait your answer before I proceed. As yet, I have given Mr. Norris no names, On Saturday night (if you are silent) I will go too far to retract. Your's obediently,

6

(Signed) JAMES TUCKER, Junr.'

If

The second count charged the prisoner with threatening to accuse the said J. S. Tucker of a certain infamous crime, viz., with attempting and endeavouring to commit the abominable crime of sodomy with the said J. Tucker, with the same intent. The third count charged him with threatening to accuse the said J. S. Tucker of an infamous crime, with the same intent. The fourth, fifth, and sixth counts were the same as the former, except that the letter was called a paper-writing, and the direction omitted. The third and sixth counts did not describe the specific crime, but alleged, generally, an infamous crime. All the counts concluded against the statute, &c. The prosecutor, after proving the letter in question, said, that on the Saturday following the Thursday on which he received the letter, he saw the prisoner at a public-house in the Strand, and that he, the prosecutor, asked him what he meant by sending him that letter, and what he meant by transactions five nights following.' The prisoner said that the prosecutor knew what he meant. The prosecutor denied it; and the prisoner afterwards said, 'I mean by taking indecent liberties with my person.' The prisoner, in cross-examination, asked the prosecutor whether on his oath he could deny that he did take indecent liberties with his (prisoner's) person. The prosecutor said he never did. Alexander, C. B., submitted the following question to the judges, whether parol evidence to explain the letter was properly received? Adding, that without it the prisoner could not have been convicted, and that by his cross-examination he in effect repeated the charge. And all the judges (except Littledale, J., who was absent) were unanimously of opinion that such evidence was properly received, and that the conviction was proper. (t)

(t) R. v. Tucker, R. & M. C. C. R. 134. It has been held, on the trial of an indictment for threatening to accuse a person of an abominable crime, that the jury need not confine themselves to the consideration of the expressions used before

6

the money was given, but may, if those expressions are equivocal, connect with them what was afterwards said by the prisoner when taken into custody. R. v. Kain, 8 C. & P. 187.

Where an indictment contained three counts, each charging the sending of a different threatening letter, Byles, J., held that the prosecutor must elect on which count he would proceed, though any letter leading up to or explaining the letter on which the trial proceeded would be admissible. (u)

(u) R. v. Ward, 10 Cox, C. C. 42

STATUTES

RELATING TO THE

COURT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CROWN CASES RESERVED.

11 & 12 VICT. c. 78.

An Act for the further Amendment of the Administration of the

Criminal Law.

[31st August, 1848.]

1. When any person shall have been convicted of any treason, felony, or misdemeanor before any court of oyer and terminer or gaol delivery, or court of quarter sessions, the judge or commissioner or justices of the peace before whom the case shall have been tried may, in his or their discretion, reserve any question of law which shall have arisen on the trial (a) for the consideration of the justices of either bench and barons of the exchequer, and thereupon shall have authority to respite execution of the judgment on such conviction, or postpone the judgment until such question shall have been considered and decided, as he or they may think fit; and in either case the Court in its discretion shall commit the person convicted to prison, or shall take a recognisance of bail, with one or two sufficient sureties, and in such sum as the Court shall think fit, conditioned to appear at such time or times as the Court shall direct, and receive judgment, or to render himself in execution, as the case may be.

2. The judge or commissioner or Court of quarter sessions shall thereupon state, in a case signed in the manner now usual, the question or questions of law which shall have been so reserved, with the special circumstances upon which the same shall have arisen; and such case shall be transmitted to the said justices and barons, and the said justices and barons shall thereupon have full power and authority to hear and finally determine the said question or questions, and thereupon to reverse, affirm, or amend any judgment which shall have been given on the indictment or inquisition on the trial whereof such question or questions have arisen, or to avoid such judgment, and to order an entry to be made on the record, that in the judgment of the said justices and barons the party convicted ought not to have been convicted, or to arrest the judgment, or order judgment to be given thereon at some other session of oyer and terminer or gaol delivery, or other sessions of the peace, if no judgment shall have been before that time given, as they shall be advised, or to make such other order as justice may require;

(a) Where a prisoner has pleaded guilty to an indictment to which an objection is afterwards taken it is a question which has 'arisen on the trial,' and the Court has

power to entertain the case. See R. v. Brown, 24 Q. B. D. 357, commenting on R. v. Clark, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 54.

and such judgment and order, if any, of the said justices and barons, shall be certified under the hand of the presiding chief justice or chief baron to the clerk of assize or his deputy, or to the clerk of the peace or his deputy, as the case may be, who shall enter the same on the original record in proper form; and a certificate of such entry, under the hand of the clerk of assize or his deputy, or the clerk of the peace or his deputy, as the case may be, in the form, as near as may be, or to the effect mentioned in the schedule annexed to this Act, with the necessary alterations to adapt it to the circumstances of the case, shall be delivered or transmitted by him to the sheriff or gaoler in whose custody the person convicted shall be; and the said certificate shall be a sufficient warrant to such sheriff or gaoler, and all other persons, for the execution of the judgment, as the same shall be certified to have been affirmed or amended, and execution shall be thereupon executed on such judgment, and for the discharge of the person convicted from further imprisonment, if the judgment shall be reversed, avoided, or arrested, and in that case such sheriff or gaoler shall forthwith discharge him, and also the next Court of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery or sessions of the peace shall vacate the recognisance of bail, if any; and if the Court of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery or Court of quarter sessions shall be directed to give judgment, the said Court shall proceed to give judgment at the next session.

3. [The jurisdiction and authorities by this Act given to the said justices of either bench and barons of the exchequer shall and may be exercised by the said justices and barons, or five of them at the least, of whom the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, or one of such chiefs at least, shall be part, being met in the exchequer chamber or other convenient place; and] (b) the judgment or judgments of the said justices and barons shall be delivered in open court, after hearing counsel or the parties, in case the prosecutor or the person convicted shall think it fit that the case shall be argued, in like manner as the judgments of the superior courts of common law at Westminster or Dublin, as the case may be, are now delivered.

4. The said justices and barons, when a case has been reserved for their opinion, shall have power, if they think fit, to cause the case or certificate to be sent back for amendment, and thereupon the same shall be amended accordingly, and judgment shall be delivered after it shall have been amended.

5. Whenever any writ of error shall be brought upon any judgment on any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition, in any criminal case, and the Court of error shall reverse the judgment, it shall be competent for such Court of error either to pronounce the proper judgment or to remit the record to the Court below, in order that such Court may pronounce the proper judgment upon such indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition.

6. Every person who shall forge or alter, or shall offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any certificate of or copy certified by a chief justice, or any certificate of or copy certified by a clerk of assize or his deputy, or the clerk of the peace or his deputy, as the case may be, with intent to cause any person to be discharged from custody, or otherwise prevent the due course of justice, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be transported beyond the seas for any

(b) The words in brackets are repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1875.