222, 280, 681 238, 241 473 567 610 661 228 (Jenkin) v. S. U. S. v. v. Younghusband Williamson, R. v. Willis's case. Willis, R. v. 6 Cox, 343 1 Cox, 363 R. & M. C. C. R. 387 1 Den. C. C. 39 (1893) 1 Q. B. 320 9 Cox, 448 12 Cox, 101 4 F. & F. 286 8 C. & P. 284 81 Ala. 1 39 Ala. 532 44 Ala. 41 14 Ohio, 222 1 Cliff. C. C. 5 1 Hagg. 304 1 Stark. R. 139 3 C. & P. 635 1 Cox, 97 1 Hawk. c. 89, s. 17 1 Den. C. C. 80 495, 535, 536 654, 655 153 308, 665 473 567 125 531 269 224, 230, 238 159 493 569 27, 28 201 402 153 3 42 550, 568 390 363, 379 358 218 610 560 A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS. BOOK THE FOURTH. OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS. CHAPTER THE FIRST. OF MURDER.1 SEC. I. Definition of offence.2 MURDER is the killing any person under the King's peace, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied by law. (a) Of this description the malice prepense, malitia præcogitata, is the chief characteristic, the grand criterion by which murder is to be distinguished from any other species of homicide; (b) and it will therefore be necessary to inquire concerning the cases in which such malice has been held to exist. It should, however, be observed, that when the law makes use of the term malice aforethought as descrip 1 In many of the United States only murder which is accompanied by a deliberate intention to take life is punished with death, and all other kinds of murder are treated as homicide in the second degree. Deliberation, however, for a single moment, has been held to be sufficient to constitute murder in the first degree; but the state of mind of the prisoner, and the weapon used, thus become very important elements in deciding whether the murder was deliberate or not. In murder in the first degree, malice aforethought, or rather a premeditated intention to slay, must be proved. See VOL. III. - - 1 Davis v. S., 39 Md. 355. Green v. C., 12 Allen (Mass.), 155, and Bishop, i. s. 600; ii. ss. 723-730. 2 In most of the States of America the distinctions between murder and manslaughter are the same as in England; but in New York and some of the States there are statutes in some degree limiting the definition of murder, or reducing certain acts to manslaughter. Bishop, ii. ss. 720, 721, 722. See C. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295. Wharton on Homicide, 2nd Ed. ss. 660-664. |