1857 was chosen professor of ecclesiastical history in the theological school in Cambridge. In the same year he took charge of the "Christian Examiner," the organ of the Unitarian body. He is also the present president of the American Unitarian association. His largest work is the "Prose Writers of Germany" (8vo., Philadelphia, 1848), in which extracts from 28 authors, from Luther to Chamisso, are given, each series preceded by a careful original sketch of the author and estimate of his genius and influence. Beside these introductory sketches, a large portion of the extracts were specially translated for the work by the compiler. Dr. Hedge has also published versions of many of the minor poems of eminent German writers, especially Schiller and Goethe. In 1853, in connection with the Rev. Dr. Huntington of Boston, he published a volume of hymns, many of the best of which are his own compositions and translations. In the same year also appeared his "Liturgy for the Use of the Church." He has also published sermons, orations, reviews, and magazine essays, extending in time over more than 30 years. Of these may be specified as the most remarkable, the sketch of the transcendental philosophy in the review of S. T. Coleridge ("Christian Examiner," 1833); the Phi Beta Kappa oration, on "Conservatism and Reform," delivered at Cambridge in 1840; the article on Augustine in "Putnam's Monthly" for March, 1856; and the article on Leibnitz in the "Atlantic Monthly" for June, 1858.

HEDGEHOG, an insectivorous mammal, of the genus erinaceus (Linn.). The teeth are 36 in number, but have been differently divided by zoologists; F. Cuvier gives the following: incisors, canines none, false molars, and true molars; according to Owen, they are developed as incisors 33, premolars, and molars. The central incisors of the upper jaw are separated from each other, those of the lower nearly touching; behind the first upper incisor on each side are 2 small single-rooted teeth, resembling false molars, but evidently incisors from their development in the intermaxillary bone; after these, and separated from them by a small interval, are 3 false molars, the 1st the largest; then the 4 true molars, the 2d the largest, the 4th very small, and all tuberculated; in the lower jaw, after the single incisor of each side, are 3 small single-pointed and single-rooted teeth resembling false molars, and after these, with a short interval, 4 molars, the 2d and 3d the largest; the crowns of the teeth lock into each other, as in other animals preying chiefly on insects. When full grown, the common hedgehog (E. Europaus, Linn.) is about 9 inches long, of a heavy form, short limbs, and slow plantigrade motion; the upper part of the body is covered with sharp prickles, about an inch long, arranged in clusters, divergent and crossing each other, of a brownish black color with a white point; the head is clothed with harsh brownish hairs, and the under parts of the body with a dirty white fur; the ears and

tail are short; the paws, end of nose, and tail are nearly naked; the eyes are prominent, and the opening of the ears may be closed by a valvular arrangement of the cartilages; the nose is considerably longer than the jaws, and fringed at the end; the lips are entire, and there are no cheek pouches; the 5 toes are armed with long nails, the middle the longest, suitable for digging; the soles are covered with naked tubercles, possessing an exquisite sense of touch; the mammæ are 10, 6 pectoral and 4 ventral. By means of the development of the panniculus carnosus muscle, belonging entirely to the skin, the animal is able to roll itself into a ball, and preserve this attitude as long as it pleases without much effort, presenting to its enemies a thorny mass which the most voracious and powerful dare not attack. The hedgehog is a nocturnal animal, concealing itself during the day in burrows or natural holes, coming out at night in search of worms, insects, snails, roots, and fruits; though possessing very limited intelligence, it has been so far domesticated as to be brought up in gardens, where it proves of great service in destroying insects injurious to vegetation; the flesh is said to be good eating. The young are born in May, covered with prickles, with eyes and ears closed, and about 2 inches long. When at rest, the hedgehog has the power of lowering the prickles, and of retaining them smooth on a level with the body. This species occurs throughout temperate Europe, and was well known to the ancients. The popular name urchin and the French hérisson are evidently derived from the Latin erinaceus ; it is the exos of the Greeks. The prickles were formerly used to hatchel hemp. A second species, the long-eared hedgehog (E. auritus, Pall.), is found in the eastern regions of the Russian empire; the ears are nearly as long as the head; the body and limbs are more slender, and the under hair finer, than in the preceding species. Like the other hedgehog, it hibernates in winter in holes a few inches below the surface of the ground; it can eat cantharides and other vesicating insects with impunity; it grows very fat in the autumn, preparatory to going into winter quarters. Other species of the genus are described. There is no proper hedgehog in America; the rodent porcupine, similarly armed with quills, is called hedgehog in some parts of the United States. This animal displays one of the most remarkable provisions of nature for protecting a weak and harmless creature against the attacks of the strong and cruel.

HEEREN, ARNOLD HERMANN LUDWIG, & German historian, born in Arbergen near Bremen, Oct. 25, 1760, died in Göttingen, March 7, 1842. He studied at Bremen, and subsequently at the university of Göttingen, applying himself with particular zeal to philology and history under the guidance of Heyne, whose daughter he afterward married, and of Spittler. After a literary journey to Italy, France, and the Netherlands, he was appointed professor of philosophy, and in 1801 of history, at Göttingen..

He was for some time one of the editors of the Bibliothek der alten Literatur und Kunst, and, after the death of J. G. Eichhorn in 1827, editor of the Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen. The subject of his lectures at the university was chiefly the history of Greek and Roman antiquities and of literature, and a principal merit of his numerous historical writings consists in an original elucidation of the commercial affairs and relations, as well as of the origin and political development of the ancient states. Beside the edition of Menander's De Encomiis (1785), and the Ecloga Physica et Ethica of Stobæus (4 vols., 17921801), the following are his most important works: "Ideas on the Policy and Commerce of the most Distinguished Nations of Antiquity" (2 vols., 1793-'6; 4th ed., 6 vols., 1824-'6; the part relating to ancient Greece was translated into English by George Bancroft); "History of the Study of Classical Literature since the Renaissance" (2 vols., 1797-1802); "History of the States of Antiquity" (1799; 5th ed., 1826; translated into English by George Bancroft, Northampton, 1828); "History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies" (1809; 5th ed., 1830; translated by George Bancroft, Northampton, 1829); De Fontibus et Auctoritate Vitarum Parallelarum Plutarchi (1820); all of which were published in Göttingen, where also a collection of his "Historical Works" appeared in 15 volumes (1821-'6). To his minor writings belong sketches of Johannes von Müller, Spittler, and Heyne, a treatise on the influence of the Normans upon the French language and literature, and a dissertation on the crusades. His "Ideas" were translated into English, and published at Oxford by D. A. Talboys, under the title of "Historical Researches." A uniform edition of his translated works, under the title of "Heeren's Historical Works," has been published by Bohn (7 vols. 8vo., London).

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH, a German philosopher, born in Stuttgart, Aug. 27, 1770, died in Berlin, Nov. 14, 1831. In the religious wars of the 16th century his ancestors, driven from Carinthia, found refuge in Swa bia. He was the eldest son of Georg Ludwig Hegel, a man of probity and public consideration, and his wife Maria Magdalena Fromme, a woman of good culture, who taught the studious and quiet youth the elements of grammar. From his 8th to his 18th year he was thoroughly trained in philology, mathematics, and history, in the gymnasium of his native town. His scholarship was already productive. He began a system, which he never abandoned, of making and arranging copious extracts from all the books and even journals that he read; and he was always a great reader of newspapers. These treasures, constantly accumulating, gave him materials in all branches of knowledge to be incorporated into his universal system. In 1788 he became a student of theology at Tübingen, having a stipend on a ducal foundation. He heard Storr on dogmatics,

Schnurrer in exegesis, Flatt in philosophy; and was also well taught in botany, anatomy, and other sciences of observation. As yet the young Hegel was chiefly noted for iron diligence, reserve, and maturity; he was familiarly addressed as "old fellow." With some of the students he read Plato and Kant; but his subsequent philosophical fame took them by surprise. The progressive aspects of the French revolution enlisted his sympathies. In 1790 Schelling, then 15 years old, came also to Tübingen; he and Hegel studied, talked, and roomed together, little aware of that strange destiny by which the younger became the leader of the elder, and the elder supplanted the younger, and the younger yet again succeeded the elder in the development of German idealisın. After quitting the university, Hegel (like Kant and Fichte) was for a long time a tutor in private families; from 1793 to 1796 at Bern in Switzerland, and from 1797 to 1800 in a more eligible position at Frankfort-on-the-Main. His studies meanwhile took a wide range. He read Thucydides, Montesquieu, Gibbon, and Hume, and thoroughly pondered the Greek and German metaphysics. He began a "Life of Christ;" wrote and rewrote a "Criticism of Religious Ideas;" and corresponded with Schelling about his essay on the Ego (Vom Ich), which was stirring the pulse of ardent thinkers. He passed through, in his own experience, the conflict between the older supernaturalism and the prevalent rationalism, neither of which harmonized with his speculative tendencies. Yet, to the end of his life, he professed accordance with the Lutheran orthodoxy, and one of his later public addresses was a eulogy upon the principles of the Augsburg Confession, pronounced as rector of the Berlin university upon the tricentennial celebration in 1830 of the adoption of that instrument. Before 1800 he had drawn up the outline of a system of philosophy in 3 parts: the 1st on logic and metaphysics combined; the 2d on the philosophy of nature; the 3d on the philosophy of mind or spirit. Here was already foreshadowed that identification of logic and metaphysics, which is one of the marked peculiarities of the Hegelian system. But as yet he had not clearly mastered the idea or the method of his scheme; he needed sharper thought and conflict to know whereto all this study was to grow. Hegel's father died in 1799, leaving him a patrimony of 3,000 florins, and he at once determined to devote himself to philosophy at Jena. This university had been made illustrious in literature by the new romantic school of the Schlegels, Novalis, and Tieck; Fichte had just been driven thence to Berlin on the accusation of atheism; Schelling was now there, arousing the enthusi asm of the novices in the mystery and marvel of the new philosophical intuition; and here, too, Fries, Krause, and Ast were commencing their fruitful philosophical career. To the philosophical world Hegel presented as his introduction an essay on the "Difference between Fichte and Schelling," advocating, more defi

nitely than the latter had done, the position that this difference was not adequately designated by saying that the former taught a subjective and the latter an objective idealism, but rather that Schelling's system included both. This dissertation was published in the spring of 1801; in the autumn its author became Privatdocent or tutor in the university. Rosenkranz thinks it significant of the autumnal character of his system, that all the great changes in his life occurred in this season of the year. His dissertation on his appointment was De Orbilis Planetarum, a zealous advocacy of the German Kepler against the English Newton, and containing also an unlucky polemic against Bode's law about the proportional distances of the planets; even going so far as to suggest that, according to the true law, the space between Mars and Jupiter should not be filled up, ignorant that Piazzi had already discovered the asteroid Ceres. From 1801 to 1806 (in which last year he became professor) he lectured on logic, the philosophy of nature, psychology, ethics, &c. His first course was given to 4 auditors. Awkward in his delivery, incumbered by his thoughts, he failed to interest any but the most thoughtful. "He thinks in substantives," said one of his auditors; and not seldom was the structure of his sentences incomplete. Carrying to his lecture a mass of loose papers, he would fumble among them, arranging them dialectically, under his rigid categories, as he went along. But as his "dry light" became warm, his eye and voice would grow keen, and he would often break out into an aphorism, a sarcasm, or a pregnant antithesis, long to be repeated. His best MSS. were copied from the students' notes. At Jena, too, in conjunction with Schelling, he edited the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie; and these two philosophers were still so nearly agreed, that the authorship of one of the most important articles was afterward claimed by both; it is on the "Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General," and is included in Hegel's works, though claimed by Schelling as his own. Hegel's lectures at this period on the philosophy of history contain some of the strongest statements, afterward modified, implying a pantheistic confusion of God and the world. But even then God was to him, not a mere substance (as in Spinoza), but a subject, and, as such, spiritual, the absolute spirit. The statement sometimes made that Hegel identified God and nothing, and that this is the sense of his system, is an entire misconception as well as an absurdity. His career in Jena was brought to a close by the French invasion of 1806. In the turmoil of that campaign, his chief solicitude was about the fate of some of the last sheets of his "Phenomenology," which he was sending to a publisher in Bamberg. The MS. was saved, but the philosopher's house was sacked by French troops, and he was reduced to his last penny. In 1807-'8 he was editor of a political sheet in Bamberg, and there, too, he projected a work on the political constitution of Germany, which

was never completed. At Nuremberg he was rector of the gymnasium from 1808 to 1816, and gave philosophical lectures to the lads, issued as the 18th volume of his collected writings under the title Propädeutik-a simple, clear outline of the main points of his general system, in as popular a style as the abstruse subject admits. His administrative ability was here seen to be of a high order; he was even punctilious as to all fit rules and observances. În Sept. 1811, he was joined in wedlock to Marie von Tucher, of an ancient Nuremberg family, 22 years his junior-a lady of refinement, decided in her Christian convictions, indefatigable in her daily charities, to whom he was attached with singular love and tenderness. To his constant friend Niethammer he wrote, that "when a man has found a position and a wife that he loves, he is quite complete for life." Often would he praise her in verse, and his best letters are those he wrote her on his journeys. Two sons, Karl and Immanuel, were the fruit of this union. His domestic affairs were carefully arranged; he himself kept a minute account of all expenses. This family life was one of unbroken peace; and it may have mitigated, as in the case of Comte, the abstractions of his system. Some of the severest parts of his "Logic," as the writer happens to know, were written while he was watching as a nurse at the bedside of this devout and loving woman. A curious parallel is suggested by the enumeration which Rosenkranz gives of the married and unmarried philosophers of modern times. Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Wolf, Locke, Hume, and Kant were unmarried; Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, and Krause were married.— But the biography of a philosopher centres in his writings; his life is the growth of his system. Hegel's "Phenomenology," which he used to call his "voyage of discovery," was issued at Bamberg in 1807. It sketches the psychological progress to his system. Its object is to describe the stages and process through which the mind must proceed from the simplest form of consciousness up to absolute knowledge; and to exhibit this, not merely as a matter of fact, but also as a (logically) necessary ascent. One of his disciples says that in this most finished of his writings he is the Dante of philosophy, since he shows how consciousness passes from the inferno of sense, through the purgatory of the understanding, into the paradise of philosophic freedom. In principle and method it is a protest against Schelling's imagination of a special intellectual intuition. The absolute is not "shot out all at once, like a ball from a pistol;" it is, and it is attained by, a process. The stadia of this process are, simple consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, spirit (here used as equivalent to objective morality), religion (including art), and absolute knowledge. The process itself is a necessary one; the method is immanent in thought. Its moving principle is that of contradiction or negation. Each lower stage is contradicted or negatived in thought; this ne

gation does not give zero (0) as its result, but rather an opposite or antagonistic principle; and these antagonistic principles struggle through (the negation of the negation) to a higher unity; and so on, until we arrive at that absolute knowledge which is the result as it was the source of these evolutions, in which all these antagonisms are both abolished and preserved. Arrived at this state of knowledge, the spirit knows itself to be identical with universal reason; the finite self-consciousness and the absolute self-consciousness are one; the infinite is no longer foreign to and outside of the finite. With a knowledge of this high consummation, the race enters upon a new epoch; the old has passed away; the conflicts of all the schools are adjusted. Man knows the absolute reason; the absolute reason knows itself in man. To this all history, all thought have been tending; the history of thought is this very process; the completion of thought is found in the science of the absolute. Such was the daring prophecy with which a secluded student, in the ancient and quiet city of Nuremberg, heralded a revolution in the world of mind. Nor did he stop with the proclamation. In his "Logic," published in 2 volumes, 3 parts, between March, 1812, and July, 1816, he developed his system in its most rigorous and abstract form. This is one of the boldest and subtlest works of human speculation. It is designed to answer the question to which the "Phenomenology" led, viz.: What is that absolute knowledge which has been shown to be necessary? It is the completion of the system of categories, which Kant had elaborated, after Aristotle. It is not logic alone, nor metaphysics alone; it is both together. It is not the science of thought alone, nor that of being alone; it is the science of both thought and being, viewed as identical and pervaded by the same logical law. The whole system is reason itself, or the absolute idea-absolute idealism. The terms logic, idea, and reason are used in an unusual, in a universal sense. Reason and idea are not merely subjective; logic gives the law of being as well as of thought. That Hegel reduced all knowledge to that of mere relations and all being to mere logic is an entire misconception of his theory. The system of logic, as the first part of philosophy, contemplates reason (the idea) as it is in itself, and not in its manifestations. Hegel used to call it "the kingdom of the shades;" his "voyage of discovery" led him first into this kingdom. He also speaks of it as equivalent to "God in his eternal being, before the finite world was created." In Platonic phrase, it is the ideas of the Divine mind, before they assume finite forms and modes. These ideas (this idea) are developed by an immanent law, the dialectic process of which we have spoken above; and herein consists the peculiarity of the work. The process is that of the idea itself, and all that we do in the matter is to stand by and see how it is done; though there must be "speculation in the eyes" that see this process carried through and out. Thus,

we begin with the conception of being-the most universal and indeterminate of all. As entirely indeterminate, it is the same as nothing. Being and nothing are thus the same, but they are also different; they are identical, but antagonistic; and, as such, they result in a process of becoming (das Werden), for the very idea of becoming includes being and not-being. This is ingenious and acute as an analysis of the conceptions; but is it a real or possible process in being as such? The whole science of logic is distributed into 3 parts-being, essence, and conception; the first two are the ontological logic, the 3d is the subjective logic. The categories that fall under being are 3-quantity, quality, and measure. The categories under essence are also 8-essence in itself, phenomena as expressing essence, and actual existence as the union of the other two. Here also, of course, come the discussions about the antinomies of the understanding. The categories of the 3d part of logic, that is, of conceptions or notions, are 3-the subjective conception, the object, and last and highest of all, the idea. This logic, now, forms the first great division of Hegel's whole scheme of philosophy. This was fully presented, in outline, in his Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, published in 1817, a 3d edition in 1830, and issued in his collected works with additional notes from his lectures. Here the categories of the "Logic" are applied to all the particular sciences. Of his whole system, the most general idea is that of God or the Absolute Spirit. This spirit is not mere substance, as in Spinoza, but also subject, and as such contains the principle and law of its own evolution. This law is a perpetual trichotomy-thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Accordingly the "Encyclopædia" has 3 main parts, viz.: "Logic," the "Philosophy of Nature," and the "Philosophy of Spirit." Each of these has, again, a threefold division; and these 3 yet other 3; and this rhythm of triads makes the harmony of the system. Logic, as we have already indicated, presents this absolute spirit or idea, as it is in itself, in its shadowy, ghostly form. In the "Philosophy of Nature" we have the same idea in its objective manifestation, in the forms of space and time. Here the idea or spirit becomes, as it were, a stranger to itself, yet this, too, by an inward necessity. How it comes to do this is one of the knots of the system; but that it does so is evident from the fact that nature is. Nature is here reconstructed-or, Hegel would say, we see how it is constructed-according to the high a priori method, in its 3 departments of mechanics, physics, and organized beings. These refined demonstrations have not had much effect upon the naturalists. But the absolute spirit, having run through the round of nature, emerges into its 3d sphere (in an equally recondite way), that of mind or spirit itself; spirit here finds and knows itself, of course, in 3 stadia. First, it is subjective spirit, including anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. Then it passes

over into objective spirit, or the sphere of ethics, which has 3 subdivisions: 1, law or right; 2, morality, private and personal; 3, public ethics, including the family, society, and the state. In fine, spirit becomes absolute spirit, and as such shows itself in 3 modes, art, religion, and philosophy; and in the last the circle is completed, the end returns to the beginning, the absolute spirit knows itself, and the Hegelian system is all in all. This "Encyclopædia" was first issued while Hegel was in Heidelberg, where he became a professor in 1816, declining invitations to Erlangen and Berlin-the latter, it is said, in part because the Prussian minister proposed that he should be examined as to his capacity for lecturing after his 8 years' seclusion in Nuremberg. From this point his fame rapidly rose. His disciples began to be ardent and prophetic. His system was proclaimed as completing the structure of German idealism. Kant had critically prepared the way; Fichte had taught a subjective idealism; Schelling had not risen above an objective idealism; but in the absolute idealism, the partial was dethroned and the universal made supreme. Cousin, passing through Heidelberg, proclaimed to the world that in Hegel (whose "Logic" he said he could not grasp) he had found a man of genius; and in his later brilliant course at Paris, in 1828, he availed himself of the generalizations and methods of the great idealist for the interpretation of history and the history of philosophy. A second invitation to Berlin in 1818, urged by the minister Von Altenstein, Hegel's warm personal friend, was welcomed by him. He was now in the ripeness of his manhood, and animated by the consciousness that all past thought had found its culmination in him. As the devoted Michelet has it, he was "the crown of the whole past and the seed of the most fruitful future." His new position was most favorable for the propagation of his opinions. Berlin university had always been enthusiastic for speculation; it received Fichte when Jena expelled him, and Hegel came into Fichte's chair, expressing his confidence that "the sands of Berlin were more susceptible to philosophy than the romantic environs of Heidelberg." He would there "teach philosophy to talk German, as Luther had taught the Bible to do, and Voss Homer." His lectures soon became the rage. Officers of state and the literati and savants of Berlin sat on the students' benches. The government provided liberally for his salary, and also for journeys to Paris, Holland, &c. He took the bearing of the founder of a new and great school. Hegelianism was the road to office. The master became sometimes overbearing; even Varnhagen von Ense says that he was "tyrannical." Professor Gans was one of his most zealous disciples, but Hegel called him to a sharp account for having dared to "recommend," on the university bulletin, his work on ethics. "What had he done, that Gans should recommend him!" He mixed more freely in general society, and indulged himself in his two

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chief relaxations, snuff-taking and card-playing. But in society he was distant; it is on record that an intelligent young lady said she "never heard him speak a marked word." His previous lectures on the different branches of philosophy were carefully revised, and he wrote two new courses, on the "Philosophy of Religion" in 1821, and on the "Philosophy of History" in 1827, in both of these branches introducing an original and scientific elaboration of the materials. His "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right" was issued in 1821, combining in one exposition natural rights, ethics, and the philosophy of society and the state. Man's moral being expresses itself completely in the state; to this, natural rights, private morals, and even the church, are rightfully subordinate. preface to this work aroused more controversy than the work itself, since it summed up its teachings in the noted aphorism: "The rational is actual, and the actual is rational." This was interpreted in an ultra conservative sense; explained in any different sense, it was a mere truism. In fact, he was understood as supporting the existing Prussian system as the perfection of reason and freedom. This for a time helped his metaphysics; though his extreme disciples soon changed all that." He used to fight his battles in his prefaces. In a preface he declared against the position of Schleiermacher, that the feeling of absolute dependence is the essence of religion. These two men were then at the height of their fame, both at Berlin; neither liked the other, and their disciples have perpetuated the struggle to the present time. The theologian opposed the admission of the philosopher into the academy of science; and the philosopher would not allow the theologian to take part in his scientific journal. The real difficulty was that Schleiermacher tried to find in human nature a foothold for religion independent of philosophy, and Hegel's speculations did not allow this to be done. His system received concentration and impulse from the establishment, with the favor of government, of the Berlin Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik (1827). All things were here discussed in the light of absolute knowledge. The school became haughty and uncompromising; they had solved the problem of the universe, and nothing remained but to bring all thoughts into subjection. Germany was alive with speculation; it had never known such a philosophical ferment. Even orthodox men gave in their adhesion, and Hegel was not loath to encourage them. Göschel, the jurist, wrote "Aphorisms on Science and Nescience," applying Hegelianism to the defence of the mysteries of Christianity; and Hegel reviewed the work, with an almost eager welcome, in the Jahrbucher, to show that his system was the same thing in the sphere of speculation that the Christian religion was in the sphere of faith. In the preface to a new edition of his "Encyclopædia," he quoted from Tholuck on the oriental trinities to show that he held to the Trin