the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, can not choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, can not cast her off from its bosom.” Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Nelson, min. to Spain, Apr. 28, 1823, Br. and For. St. Pap. (1853–'4), XLIV. 138. Extracts from these instructions aer given in Am. St. Pap. For. Rel. V. 408. "I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and the Isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being." Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Monroe, Oct. 24, 1823, S. Doc. 26, 57 Cong. 1 sess. "If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should not only be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce whilst it shall remain in its present condition; but human foresight can not anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every portion of our Union. This can never become a local question. "1. With suitable fortifications at the Tortugas, and in possession of the strongly fortified harbor of Habana as a naval station on the opposite coast of Cuba, we could command the outlet of the Gulf of Mexico between the peninsula of Florida and that island. This would afford ample security both to the foreign and coasting trade of the Western and Southern States which seek a market for their surplus productions through the ports of the Gulf. "2. Under the Government of the United States, Cuba would become the richest and most fertile island of the same extent throughout the world, . . "It would be difficult to estimate the amount of bread-stuffs, rice, cotton, and other agricultural, as well as manufacturing and mechanical productions; of lumber, of the products of our fisheries and of other articles which would find a market in that island, in exchange for their coffee, sugar, tobacco and other productions. This would go on, increasing with the increase of its population and the development of its resources; and all portions of the Union would be benefited by the trade. "Desirable, however, as the possession of the island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free consent of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor, would be dearly purchased. Whilst such is the determination of the President, it is supposed that the present relations between Cuba and Spain might incline the Spanish Government to cede the island to the United States, upon the payment of a fair and full consideration. . . "The apprehension which existed for many years after the origin of this Government, that the extension of our federal system would endanger the Union, seems to have passed away. Experience has proved that this system of confederated Republics, under which the Federal Government has charge of the interests common to the whole, whilst local governments watch over the concerns of the respective States, is capable of almost indefinite extension, with increasing strength. This, however, is always subject to the qualification that the mass of the population must be of our own race, or must have been educated in the school of civil and religious liberty. With this qualification, the more we increase the number of confederated States, the greater will be the strength and security of the Union; because the more dependent for their mutual interests will the several parts be upon the whole and the whole upon the several parts. "It is true that of the 418,291 white inhabitants which Cuba contained in 1841, a very large proportion is of the Spanish race. Still many of our citizens have settled on the island and some of them are large holders of property. Under our Government it would speedily be Americanized, as Louisiana has been. 66 Within the boundaries of such a federal system alone, can a trade, exempt from duties and absolutely free, be enjoyed. With the possession of Cuba, we should have throughout the Union, a free trade on a more extended scale than any which the world has ever witnessed— arousing an energy and activity of competition which would result in a most rapid improvement in all that contributes to the welfare and happiness of the human race. What state would forego the advantages of this vast free trade with all her sisters, and place herself in lonely isolation! "But the acquisition of Cuba would greatly strengthen our bond of Union. Its possession would secure to all the States within the valley of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico, free access to the ocean; but this security could only be preserved whilst the shipbuilding and navigating States of the Atlantic shall furnish a navy sufficient to keep open the outlets from the Gulf to the Ocean. Cuba, justly appreciating the advantages of annexation, is now ready to rush into our arms. Once admitted she would be entirely dependent for her prosperity and even existence, upon her connection with the Union; whilst the rapidly increasing trade between her and the other States, would shed its benefits and its blessings over the whole. Such a state of mutual dependence, resulting from the very nature of things, the world has never witnessed. This is what will insure the perpetuity of our Union. "With all these considerations in view, the President believes that the crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to purchase the Island of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to entrust you with. the performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. A written offer might produce an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us, hereafter, in the acquisition of the Island. Besides, from the incessant changes in the Spanish Cabinet and policy, our desire to make the purchase might thus be made known in an official form to Foreign Governments and arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed, even if the present Cabinet should think favorably of the proposition, they might be greatly embarrassed by having it placed on record; for, in that event, it would almost certainly, through some channel, reach the opposition, and become the subject of discussion in the Cortes. Such delicate negotiations, at least in their incipient stages, ought always to be conducted in confidential conversation, and with the utmost secrecy and despatch. "At your interviews with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, you might introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition of Cuba, and the danger which exists that the population will make an attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the Spanish Government. In order to convince him of the good faith and friendship towards Spain with which this Government has acted, you might read to him the first part of my despatch to General Campbell, and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the Commanding General in Mexico, and to the officer having charge of the embarkation of our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the Island, or that it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take place between the two countries, arising out of the dismissal of Sir Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the British bondholders. You might assure him, that whilst this Government is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other nation. And, finally you might inform him, that under all these circumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent, the cession of Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar circumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I have merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you can fill up the outline from the information communicated in this dispatch, as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should the Minister for Foreign Affairs lend a favorable ear to your proposition, then the question of the consideration to be paid would arise; and you have been furnished with information in this despatch which will enable you to discuss that question. In justice to Mr. Calderon, I ought here to observe, that whilst giving me the information before stated, in regard to the net amount of revenue from Cuba which reached old Spain, he had not then, and has not now, the most remote idea of our intention to make an attempt to purchase the island. "The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of one hundred millions of dollars for the island, and its dependencies, in ten equal annual installments. This, however, is the maximum price; and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable." Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Saunders, min. to Spain, June 17, 1848, Mr. Buchanan, as President, in his annual message of December 19, 1859, "As to the purchase of Cuba from Spain, we do not desire to renew the proposition made by the late Administration on this subject. It is understood that the proposition, made by our late minister at Madrid, under instructions from this Department, or from the late President of the United States, was considered by the Spanish ministry as a national indignity, and that the sentiment of the ministry was responded to by the Cortes. After all that has occurred, should Spain desire to part with the island, the proposition for its cession to us should come from her; and in case she should make any, you will content yourself with transmitting the same to your Government for consideration." Mr. Clayton, Sec. of State, to Mr. Barringer, min. to Spain, Aug. 2, 1849, MS. Mr. Saunders, after seeking to carry out his instructions (supra), reported that that he believed such to be the feeling of the country, that, sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean." (Mr. Saunders, min. to Spain, to Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, Dec. 14, 1848, Br. & For. State Papers (1853. 1854), XLIV. 195, 196; H. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. 1 sess.) President Buchanan, Jan. 31, 1856, informed the Senate that no correspondence in relation to the purchase of Cuba had taken place except that which had been communicated to Congress. (S. Ex. Doc. 16, 35 Cong. 2 sess.) "I have. in common with several of my predecessors, directed the ministers of France and England to be assured that the United States entertain no designs against Cuba, but that, on the contrary, I should regard its incorporation into the Union at the present time as fraught with serious peril. Were this island comparatively destitute of inhabitants or occupied by a kindred race, I should regard it, if voluntarily ceded by Spain, as a most desirable acquisition. But under existing circumstances I should look upon its incorporation into our Union as a very hazardous measure. It would bring into the Confederacy a population of a different national stock, speaking a different language, and not likely to harmonize with the other members. It would probably affect in a prejudicial manner the industrial interests of the South, and it might revive those conflicts of opinion between the different sections of the country which lately shook the Union to its center, and which have been so happily compromised.” President Fillmore, annual message, December 6, 1852, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V. 165. "With an experience thus suggestive and cheering, the policy of my Administration will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion. Indeed, it is not to be disguised that our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world." Pres. Pierce, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1853, Richardson, Mess, and Pap. of the Pres. V. 198. “It is no longer, I believe, a secret in Spain that the United States wish to obtain the cession [of Cuba], and that you have authority to treat on the subject. . . . Should you find persons of position or influence disposed to converse on the subject, the considerations in favor of a cession are so many and so strong that those who can be brought to listen would very likely become converts to the measure. But should you have reason to believe that the men in power are averse to entertaining such a proposition that the offer of it would be offensive to the national pride of Spain, and that it would find no |