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such privileges as those desired they would ultimately be converted into right of sovereignty, contrary to the will of the Dominican Government. These apprehensions are quite unfounded. The stipulation desired speaks for itself, and if granted would clearly define and restrict the limits of the privilege, which do not conflict with the rights of sovereignty of that Republic.

"If it should be found that such a place of deposit as is desired can not be obtained on Samana Bay, the most desirable place known here, any other place convenient for the purposes indicated might be acceptable, but we are not aware of any, and therefore could only agree to accept a site at Samana. Should, however, the Government of the Dominican Republic absolutely refuse to lease the place indicated and another be offered, this Government might cause an examination to be made to ascertain its fitness for the purpose, but would not treat for it before that was done.”

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Elliott, Oct. 5, 1855, MS. Inst. Special Missions, III. 69.

See the report of Captain George B. McClellan, Aug. 27, 1854, on Samana Bay as a naval station, H. Ex. Doc. 43, 41 Cong. 3 sess.; S. Ex. Doc. 17, 41 Cong. 3 sess.

"The President, by the full power which you will herewith receive, has authorized you to conclude a convention with the Dominican Republic for the cession or lease of certain territory of that Republic to the United States. It is expected that if the cession should

be made it will be in full sovereignty to the United States. This would of course be preferable to a lease. If, however, you should not be able to obtain the sovereignty, you may stipulate for a lease for the term of thirty years. In the event of a lease, also, an article similar to the separate one marked IV, hereunto annexed, must be included. During the administration of General Pierce an effort was made to obtain a lease of land on the bay of Samana as a coal station for passenger and naval steamers, and an army engineer was sent thither in a vessel of war for the purpose of selecting the site. Unfortunately the survey was prematurely made before any arrangement had been concluded with that Government on the subject. The desire of the United States having become known to the representatives of some foreign states in that quarter, they had influence enough to thwart our plans. The late intervention of Spain in the Dominican Republic had its motive in a jealousy of our desires for a naval station in Samana. It could not be expected that the proposition now under consideration will succeed, unless caution, secrecy, and dispatch shall be observed in carrying it into effect. Vice-Admiral Porter, of the Navy, will accompany you. It is not to be doubted that his great experience in foreign countries and especially his familiarity

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with the region you are about to visit will be found useful towards the purpose of your mission.”

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. F. W. Seward, Dec. 17, 1866, MS. Inst.
Special Missions, II. 39.

A special appropriation for the secret service of the Department of State was
obtained for the purposes of this mission and the carrying out of its
design. (Bancroft's Seward, II. 486.)

"It appears not improbable that the Government of the Dominican Republic will be desirous at some not distant day of renewing these negotiations upon the basis of the propositions discussed with them at few weeks since at St. Domingo by the Assistant Secretary of State. The President, therefore, by the full power which is herewith transmitted to you, has authorized you to conclude a convention for the cession or lease of the territory and waters in question, should you find it practicable to do so. These instructions are the same in effect as those which were given to Mr. F. W. Seward."

Mr. F. W. Seward, Asst. Sec. of State, to Mr. Smith, commercial agent, Santo
Domingo, Feb. 26, 1867, MS. Inst. Special Missions, II. 43.

"The President learns

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with much regret that the Government of Dominica has not at the date mentioned [April 8, 1867] decided to negotiate with the United States for a cession or lease of the peninsula of Samana to be occupied as a naval station, a consummation of which it is conceived would be altogether as beneficial to the Republic of Dominica as it would be to the United States.

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'There would be an inconvenience in leaving the proposals of this Government longer open to be accepted or rejected by the Government of Dominica. In the event, therefore, that when this dispatch shall come to your hands the Dominican Government shall not have decided to accept the proposal of the United States in one of the forms. in which it is expressed, you will desist from further prosecution of the business, and will give notice to the President that the proposals of the United States are no longer in force.”

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Smith, May 8, 1867, MS. Inst. Special Missions, II. 54.

See, further, as to Samana Bay, Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pujol, Jan. 10, Jan. 20, and Jan. 28, 1868, MS. Notes to Dom. Rep. I. 3, 19, 22; Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bassett, Dec. 22, 1869, MS. Inst. Hayti, I. 172, saying: "Negotiations are pending between the United States and President Baez, of the Dominican Republic, relative to the Bay of Samana.”

See, also, Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Delmonte, Feb. 19, 1880, MS. Notes to Dom. Rep. I. 41; Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Durham, January 28, 1892, MS. Inst. Hayti, III. 229; Mr. Foster, Sec. State, to Mr. Geis, July 30, 1892, 187 MS. Dom. Let. 400.

(7) ISLANDS OF CULEBRA AND CULEBRITA.

§ 122.

Mr. George Bancroft was instructed, in 1867, while proceeding as minister to Berlin, to go by way of Madrid and sound the Spanish Government as to the cession of the islands of Culebra and Culebrita, in the Spanish West Indies, to the United States as a naval station." "The result of Mr. Bancroft's explorations was so discouraging that the subject was peremptorily dropped."

(8) DANISH WEST INDIES.
§ 123.

"The first negotiations of the United States for the purchase of the Danish Islands were begun by Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, in January, 1865, at least so it is supposed. There is mention in contemporary pamphlets of a dinner party at the French embassy, where Mr. Seward first expressed to General Raasloff, the Danish chargé d'affaires, the desire of the United States to buy the Danish Islands in the Antilles. Afterwards other conferences followed of an unofficial character, Mr. Seward urging the Danish minister, who replied that Denmark had no desire to sell the islands. Great secrecy was insisted upon and preserved. This was under the Presidency of Lincoln. General Raasloff, who was himself opposed to the sale, reported these interviews to his Government, who replied that it would be advisable to drop the negotiations, as the Danish Government had no desire to part with these colonies. Mr. Seward's carriage accident, consequent illness, and temporary incapacity for public affairs confirmed this attitude on the part of Denmark.

"In April came the assassination of the President, the wounding of Mr. Seward, and the accession of Mr. Johnson to the Chief Executive. Mr. Seward's recovery was slow, and it was not until December, 1865, on the eve of his departure for the South, a journey taken to restore his health, that the Secretary of State again mentioned the matter to General Raasloff. The complexion of affairs was now somewhat altered. A new ministry had come into power at Copenhagen, and it was less opposed to the sale than the former one had been. Hence, a note to Mr. Seward declaring that although the Government had no desire to sell, still it was not unwilling to entertain the Secretary's propositions.

@Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bancroft, min. to Prussia, May 29, 1867, MS. Inst. Prussia, XIV. 465; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hale, min. to Spain, May 29, 1867, MS. Inst. Spain, XVI. 593; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bancroft, min. to Prussia, August 8, 1867, MS. Inst. Prussia, XIV. 477.

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, October 28, 1867, MS. Inst. Gr. Br., XXI. 286. The islands above referred to passed to the United States with Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies under the treaty of December 10, 1898. See Knox, At.-Gen., Oct. 25, 1901, 23 op. 564.

A request was made that the United States declare how much it was

willing to give.

"Mr. Seward departed, and during his absence visited St. Thomas and convinced himself of the necessity of the purchase."

Report of Mr. Lodge, Committee on Foreign Relations, March 31, 1898, S.
Doc. 284, 57 Cong. 1 sess. 18.

July 6, 1866, Mr. Seward wrote to the Secretary of War that it was "deemed desirable to ascertain officially and authentically the value to the United States, especially for military and naval purposes, of the Danish West India Islands, supposing that we should acquire a title to them." It was therefore requested that an officer should be detailed to proceed thither for the purpose of examining and reporting upon the subject, or that such other measures should be adopted as might seem best to that end."

Ten days later Mr. Seward officially proposed to General Raasloff, the Danish minister at Washington, a negotiation "for the purchase of the Danish Islands in the West Indies, namely, St. Thomas and the adjacent islets, Santa Cruz and St. John," for $5,000,000 in gold, payable in the United States, the "negotiation to be by treaty, which you will of course understand will require the constitutional ratification of the Senate."

General Raasloff soon afterwards returned to Denmark, where he became minister of war, and the negotiations were carried on at Copenhagen by Mr. Yeaman, United States minister at that capital, and Count Frijs, Danish minister of foreign affairs, and General Raasloff. In addition to written instructions transmitted in the usual course, telegraphic instructions were occasionally sent to Mr. Yeaman through Mr. Adams, then United States minister at London.c

@ Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Stanton, July 6, 1866, MS. Inst. Special Missions, III. 137.

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Gen. Raaslof, July 17, 1866, MS. Notes, Danish Leg., VI. 337.

after his arrival at Copenhagen

"General Raasloff was appointed minister of war, and, in the work of reorganizing the Danish army, lost sight of affairs in America. Count Frijs, the Danish minister for foreign affairs, who consequently now had charge of the negotiations, was in favor of the sale, but still the affair dragged until January 19, 1867, when Mr. Yeaman, United States minister at Copenhagen, received the following telegram from Mr. Seward: 'Tell Raasloff haste important.' However, nothing was done for two months. Denmark felt a good deal of hesitation, owing to the uncertainty of the treaty being ratified by the Senate, but she became more assured by the absence of opposition in the United States to the purchase scheme and by the speedy ratification of the Alaska purchase treaty. Nevertheless, at the end of two months Mr. Seward telegraphed again to Mr. Yeaman: 'Want yea or nay now.' Mr. Yeaman at once communicated with General Raaslof, but it was not until the 17th of May, 1867, that Count Frijs made a counter proposition to Mr. Seward's note." ( (Report of Mr. Lodge, Com. on For. Rel., March 31, 1898, S. Doc. 284, 57 Cong. 1 sess.)

603

The difficulties in the way of the cession arose partly from sentiment, partly from the attitude of third powers, and partly from the question of price. The Danish cabinet at length decided to make a counter proposition to cede the three islands for $15,000,000, or the islands of St. Thomas and St. John for $10,000,000, in case France should refuse her consent to the transfer of Santa Cruz. It was also stated that the treaty must be ratified by the Rigsdag, and that the consent of the people of the islands must be obtained, and the request was made that the negotiations should be conducted at Copenhagen and not at Washington, as Mr. Seward had desired."

Mr. Yeaman was duly instructed as to this proposition, and was furnished with full powers and a draft of a convention. The United States would pay $7,500,000 for the three islands, and the treaty might be signed at Copenhagen; but no stipulation was to be admitted for a vote of the people of the islands, though a provision might be inserted allowing them two years in which to depart, if they preferred to retain their original allegiance. The treaty must be ratified by the Rigsdag before Aug. 4, 1867, and by the United States Senate before May, 1868, the ratifications to be exchanged at Washington.'

The Danish negotiators declared the consent of the people of the islands to be indispensable, and they declined to bind their Government to ratify the convention in advance of the United States. They offered, however, to take $7,500,000 for St. Thomas and St. John, and half as much for Santa Cruz, should France consent to the sale of the latter.c

Mr. Yeaman was instructed to accept the offer of St. Thomas and St. John for $7,500,000, but Mr. Seward, while urging that promptness was essential to the success of the negotiation and the acceptance of its results, refused to yield the point of the vote. Indeed, as late

a Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, No. 65, April 30, 1867 (confidential); No. 67, May 17, 1867 (confidential); No. 69, May 27, 1867. The question raised as to the cession of Santa Cruz grew out of the provisions of Art. V. of the convention signed at Copenhagen June 15, 1733, by which France ceded the island to the Danish West Indies Company. That article translated reads as follows: "As His Most Christian Majesty has a particular interest that the said island shall not pass, under any title whatever, to other nations, the Danish company engages and obligates itself, in the most formal and authentic manner, neither to sell nor to cede it on any terms to any other nation without the approval and consent of His Most Christian Majesty." (De Clercq, Recueil des Traités de la France, XV. Supplément, 5. “Art. V. Comme S. M. T. C. a un intérêt particulier à ce que ladite isle ne passe point, à quelque titre que ce soit, à d'autres nations, la Compagnie danoise s'engage et s'oblige, en la manière la plus formelle et la plus authentique, à ne la vendre ni la céder en aucun tems à nulle autre nation, sans l'approbation et le consentement de S. M. T. C.")

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Yeaman, May 27, 1867, MS. Inst. Denmark, XIV. 276; Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, No. 73, June 7, 1867; No. 74, June 13, 1867; MSS. Dept. of State.

e Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, No. 75, June 17, 1867, MSS. Dept. of State.

d Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, No. 81, July 12, 1867; No. 84, July 22, 1867; Mr. Seward to Mr. Yeaman, Aug. 7, 1867; MSS. Dept. of State.

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