Looking ahead, we currently estimate a requirement for about 76,000 inductees during fiscal year 1963, a relatively low replacement year. In the following 4 fiscal years, fiscal years 1964-67, the average number of inductions is currently projected at about 90,000 per year. These requirements for inductees have been estimated by Army on the basis of the latest approved strengths. Full allowance has been made in these estimates for expected gains through voluntary manpower sources. The actual draft calls would, of course, continue to be determined on a monthly basis, based on the latest available experience on losses, enlistments, and reenlistments. In addition to the direct requirement for inductees by Army, all of the military services recognize that the existence of a military service obligation contributes substantially to their voluntary recruitment effort. Recent attitude surveys indicate that a large portion of new enlistees for active duty have been influenced to enlist, to some degree, by the existence of a draft liability. Our experience indicates that a large percentage of enlistees in the higher mental aptitude, or education, groups enlist for 3- or 4-year terms rather than being drafted, because they desire a greater choice of branch of service, of job assignments, and of training opportunities. In the absence of the induction authority, all services would experience serious difficulties in maintaining their numerical strengths and would experience intensified shortages of high quality personnel in their technical and combat leadership skills. This situation would not, moreover, be limited to the enlisted ranks. The draft liability is a major factor influencing entry into ROTC, into officer candidate schools, and into programs for direct appointment of professionals from civilian life. The elimination of the draft would adversely affect the number and quality of applicants for commissions in these and similar programs. It would seriously limit selectivity and would have a particularly severe impact upon our ability to attract officers with specialized professional backgrounds in engineering, science, law, and the health professions. The most serious effect, in the case of officers, would probably be felt in medical officer procurement. Under the so-called doctor-draft provisions of the current law, authority is provided for induction of medical, dental, or allied specialists under special calls, or for ordering to active duty of members of Reserve components, in these specialties, who have not reached their 35th birthday and have not performed at least 1 year of active duty. This authority is the keystone of the Department of Defense program for procurement of medical officers. The largest source of procurement of new doctors is through the program under which young physicians who are enrolled in the Reserves are deferred until they complete their residency training and then enter service for 2-year obligated tours of duty. Although these officers voluntarily enter this program, we recognize that the doctordraft authority serves as the major impetus for enrollment. The existence of this authority has, in most recent years, served to stimulate a sufficient number of volunteers so that direct recourse to Selective Service has not been necessary. During the Berlin crisis, in fiscal year 1962, the Department of Defense did, however, find it necessary to place special calls with Selective Service for about 1,000 physicians, as well as for more than 200 dentists and veterinarians. Review of medical manpower requirements for fiscal year 1964 indicates that a special call for nearly 1,400 physicians may also be necessary next summer. This requirement stems from the fact that so far there have been insufficient volunteers for active duty from this year's group of interns. So far we have confined our presentation to the requirements of the active Military Establishment. Let us consider now the personnel situation of our Reserve components. In recent years a very large portion of new manpower accessions into our National Guard and organized Reserve units has consisted of young men in the draft-liable ages who have chosen this alternative for fulfilling their military service obligation. If the induction authority were discontinued, it is highly probable that non-priorservice enlistments into Reserve and National Guard units would be drastically reduced. Non-prior-service personnel-men with a potential draft obligation-constitute about two-thirds of the overall strength of the Ready Reserves in paid training. Discontinuation of the induction authority would unquestionably curtail new inputs from among draft-liable men and would severely reduce the strength of our organized Reserves. The impact would, moreover, not be confined to non-prior-service personnel. A discontinuation of the induction authority would also drastically reduce the flow of prior-service personnel with an outstanding service obligation into our Ready Reserve mobilization pools. Over a period of years these Reserve pools would dwindle to very small numbers, after reservists, currently in this status, completed their obligation. MILITARY SERVICE STATUS OF DRAFT-AGED MEN Before concluding this portion of my testimony, I would like to call your attention to the chart attached to my prepared statement. This shows the present military service status of the draft-liable-age classes in our population: the percentage who have served or are now serving and the status of those men who have not served. Among men in the age classes which have just passed through the normal period of service liability-those who reached ages 26 or 27, last year our records indicate that as of June 1962, 640,000, or 58 percent, had entered active or Reserve service. The remainder consisted almost entirely of men deferred under the current law and regulations on grounds of unfitness, dependency, or other causes, and of fathers in class I-A, who are in a low priority order for induction. It is clear from Selective Service reports that as in earlier years virtually no qualified nonfathers in these age classes, available for service under Selective Service rules, are currently escaping their liability. You will also note that among men who were in ages 24 or 25 last year the overall percentages who had entered service by June 1962 is only slightly lower than among the 26- and 27-year-olds. In these and younger age classes, men are continuing to enter military service, through enlistments, officer programs, and inductions. If currently programed strengths are maintained through fiscal year 1967, it is clear that a majority of all men reaching age 26 in each year will continue to be required for active or Reserve service. SUSPENSION OF STRENGTH LIMITATIONS Section 2 of S. 846 provides for extension to July 1, 1967, of the suspension of certain statutory ceilings of the strength of the Active Forces. The ceilings in question were enacted as permanent legislation shortly after the end of World War II. These ceilings provide, in part, for a maximum strength of 837,000 for the Army, of 502,000 for the Air Force, of 500,000 for Regular Navy enlisted personnel and of 400,000 for the Marine Corps. With the exception of the Marine Corps, these ceilings are substantially below existing active duty strengths and programed requirements. In fact. it has been necessary for the Armed Forces to exceed these legislative limitations in each year since 1951. In each case this has been authorized by congressional action providing for the suspension of the ceilings. If the ceilings provided in the permanent legislation were to become operative, it would be necessary to reduce active military strengths by more than one-half million from the currently programed level of approximately 2,695,000. It would be impossible for our Armed Forces to meet their commitments if these ceilings, in fact, became effective. We, therefore, urge that the Congress continue the suspension of those strength limitations for an additional 4-year period. DEPENDENTS' ASSISTANCE ACT The next section of this bill, section 3, provides for extension of the provisions of the Dependents' Assistance Act of 1950 as amended. This act, which has been extended by the Congress at periodic intervals since 1950, was amended by the Congress last year by Public Law 87-531. The current law provides for continued payment of the class Q dependents' allotment to dependents of enlisted personnel in the grade of corporal (E-4) with 4 years or less of service and to the lower enlisted grades, while the more senior enlisted personnel are now paid a quarters allowance as part of their monthly compensation in the same manner as officer personnel. The dependents' allowances are recognized as an integral part of the military compensation structure for our junior grade enlisted personnel. At the current time, when a significant percentage of personnel in these enlisted grades are married, these allowances are absolutely essential to provide a means of meeting basic living expenses for our servicemen's families. The proposed military pay legislation, which is now being considered, is based on the assumption that these allowances will, in fact, be extended. We, therefore, strongly recommend that you approve the extension of these provisions. SPECIAL PAY FOR PHYSICIANS, DENTISTS, AND VETERINARIANS The fourth section of S. 846 authorizes a continuation for an additional 4 years of the special pay provisions for physicians, dentists, and veterinarians. Under the current law, the special pay for physicians and dentists, other than interns, is fixed at $100 monthly during their first 2 years of service; at $150 monthly for active service between 2 and 6 years; at $200 monthly between 6 and 10 years, and $250 per month for active service beyond 10 years. Veterinary officers receive $100 per month in special pay. The present scale of benefits for physicians and dentists was enacted in 1956. These measures were enacted to aid in stopping a dangerous increase in resignations of our medical and dental officers and to help, to some degree, in making military service more competitive with alternative civilian opportunities for these most essential specialists. The present rates of special pay represent a necessary recognition of many factors, including the cost and length of professional training required, the loss of current earnings during that time, and the relatively greater economic opportunities for these professions in civilian life. The effectiveness of these special pay provisions cannot be completely isolated from other career incentives currently offered to these officers, including the senior medical student plan, professional training opportunities for interns and residents, and the retirement benefits. It is, however, our judgment that these measures have, in fact, helped to increase the numbers of regular medical officers in all three services. Retention of the special pay provision is considered essential to the efforts of the uniformed services to maintain an effective peacetime medical corps and to provide an adequate hard core of experienced medical officers in the event of a need to rapidly expand medical services in an emergency. CONCLUSION I would like now to turn briefly to the considerations which have lead us to request an extension of these provisions for a 4-year period rather than for any shorter or longer period. We have been guided, in part, by the precedent of the Congress in establishing a 4-year period in each of the three preceding extensions of the draft law in 1951, in 1955, and again in 1959. We would have no objection to a longer period of extension of these authorities. On the other hand, we believe that any shorter period would be clearly undesirable. It would create an element of uncertainty in the minds of millions of young men in this country as to the future of their military service liability-as to whether they will be needed. Any such uncertainty would, I believe, be most unwarranted the hard facts which have been made available to your committee by Secretary McNamara and other witnesses during the recent posture hearings. In conclusion, I would like to express my conviction-and that of Secretary McNamara, as well-that there is no more vital piece of legislation affecting the national defense of this country than the proposals you are considering here today. (The tables referred to follow:) |