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[§ 168] 6. Liability of Maker. The law of the place of contract governs the general liability of the maker, except in so far as controlled by the law of the place where the instrument is made payable.64 However, if no particular place of payment is specified the law of the place of contract governs." Generally his liability to others 66 or his right to set up an equitable defense 67 will be unaffected by the law of the place of transfer.

65

71

defenses against the indorsee, and, as far as that place is his intended place of payment, determines the measure of his liability for interest and damages.72 However, the place of contract is controlled by the law of the place of payment where that appears. The drawer's contract is for payment at the place where the bill was drawn, if no other place is expressed or indicated in the bill.74

73

[170] 8. Liability of Sureties. The law of the place of contract, except so far as it is controlled by that of an express place of payment, governs the liability of the surety to other parties and the liability of the principal to the surety.75 The contract of one who signs a note as a joint maker but who is in fact a surety is complete when his signature is affixed and the instrument is delivered to the payee, so as to be governed by the law of the place where the instrument is executed and delivered rather than of the state where the note is payable, although the instrument had no legal inception until it was discounted in another state, where such surety had no knowledge that it was to be negotiated there and did not intend that his contract should be Ind.-Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33, | refused acceptance. The liability of 77 AmD 79. the drawer of the bill was governed by the law of New York. Story v. McKay, 15 Ont. 169.

[169] 7. Liability of Drawer. The rules as to what law governs the liability of a drawer of an instrument, such as a bill of exchange or a check, are the same as those which govern the liability of an indorser for transfer, both being secondarily liable, and hence the law of the place where the instrument is drawn governs. The contract of the drawer of a bill is ordinarily regarded as made at the place where the bill is drawn and is governed by the law of that place in regard to the payee and any subsequent holder, as to its form and nature and the obligation and effect thereof,68 except as hereinafter indicated.69 This law governs his liability to an indorsee,7° determines his right to set up 63. Hyatt v. State Bank, 8 Bush (Ky.) 193; Woodruff V. Hill, 116 Mass. 310; Barrett v. Dodge, 16 R. I. 740, 19 A 530, 27 AmSR 777.

64. U. S.-Davis v. Clemson, 7 F. Cas. No. 3,630, 6 McLean 622.

Ala.-Camp v. Randle, 81 Ala. 240, 2 S 287.

Ark.-Pryor v. Wright, 14 Ark. 189. Conn. Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253, 8 AmD 183.

Ind. Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88, 85 AmD 413; Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33, 77 ÁmD 79; Midland Steel Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 34 Ind. A. 107, 72 NE 290.

Mo.-Brown v. Worthington, 162 Mo. A. 508, 142 SW 1082.

N. Y.-Merchants' Bank v. Brown, 86 App. Div. 599, 83 NYS 1037; Thompson v. Ketcham, 4 Johns. 285. Oh.-Montana Coal, etc., Co. v. Cincinnati Coal, etc., Co., 69 Oh. St. 351, 69 NE 613.

Wis.-Brown v. Gates, 120 Wis. 349, 97 NW 221, 98 NW 205, 1 AnnCas 85. [a] Joint makers.-(1) This is true also of the liability of joint makers (Phipps v. Harding, 70 Fed. 468, 17 CCA 203, 30 LRA 513), (2) although the law of the place of payment, New York, discharging a joint maker by the recovery of judgment against his comaker only, will not be enforced in Missouri to give that effect to a judgment recovered in Louisiana (Wiley v. Holmes, 28 Mo. 286, 75 AmD 126).

65. Barrett v. Dodge, 16 R. I. 740, 19 A 530, 27 AmSR 777.

66. Ory v. Winter, 4 Mart. N. S. (La.) .277.

[a] The liability of the maker to the indorsee is determined by the law of the state where the note is made and not of that where it is indorsed. Lockwood v. Lindsay, 6 App. (D. C.) 396; Woodruff v. Hill, 116 Mass. 310; Miller v. Mayfield, 37 Miss. 688.

67. U. S.-Brabston v. Gibson, 9 How. 263, 13 L. ed. 131.

Ill-Stacy v. Baker, 2 Ill. 417. Ind. Yeatman v. Cullen, 5 Blackf. 240.

Miss.-Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss.

119.

Va.-Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 477.

68. Ú. S.-Orr v. Lacy, 18 F. Cas. No. 10,589, 4 McLean 243 (as to liability for damages); Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. 191, 3 CCA 1, 17 LRA 595 [foll Tilden V. Blair, 21 Wall. 241, 22 L. ed. 632].

Iowa.-Thorp v. Craig, 10 Iowa 461.
Miss.-Wood v. Gibbs, 35 Miss. 559.
N. J. Brownell v. Freese, 35 N.
J. L. 285, 10 AmR 239.

N. Y.-Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N.
Y. 252, 82 NE 134, 121 AmSR 858,
12 LRANS 875, 12 AnnCas 450; Car-
roll v. Upton, 4 N. Y. Super. 171 (as
to place where notice to drawer
should be sent); Aymar v. Sheldon,
12 Wend. 439, 27 AmD 137; Hicks v.
Brown, 12 Johns. 142.

Eng.-Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Exch.
25
(as to rate of interest charge-
able); Allen v. Kemble, 6 Moore P.
C. 314, 13 Reprint 704.

"It is familiar law that the con-
tracts of the different parties to a
bill of exchange are independent and
carry different obligations. The
drawer of such a bill does not con-
tract to pay the money in the for-
eign place on which it is drawn, but
only guarantees its acceptance and
payment in that place by the drawee,
and agrees, in default of such pay-
ment, upon due notice, to reimburse
the holder in principal and damages
at the place where he entered into
the contract. His contract is re-
garded as made at the place where
the bill is drawn, and as to its form
and nature and the obligation and
effect thereof is governed by the law
of that place in regard to the payee
and any subsequent holder. (Story
on Bills of Exchange, §§ 131, 154.)
While as to certain details, such as
the days of grace, the manner of
making the protest and the person by
whom protest shall be made, the law
or custom of the place where it is
payable will govern, the necessity of
making a demand and protest and
the circumstances under which the
same may be required or dispensed
with are incidents of the original
contract which are governed by the
law of the place where the bill is
drawn rather than of the place where
it is payable. They constitute im-
plied conditions upon which the lia-
bility of the drawer is to attach ac-
cording to the lex loci contractus.
(Id. §§ 155, 175.) These principles
have been affirmed and enunciated by
so many decisions that it would be
out of place to attempt a general re-
view of the latter." Amsinck V.
Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252, 257, 82 NE
134, 121 AmSR 858, 12 LRANS 875, 12
AnnCas 450.

[a] Illustration.-A Canadian while Ala.-Crawford v. Mobile Branch in New York drew a bill in favor of Bank, 6 Ala. 12, 41 AmD 33. plaintiff on a person in Canada who

[b] Reason for rule.-The transfer by indorsement is equivalent in effect to the drawing of a bill, the indorser being in almost every respect considered as a new drawer. Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439, 27 AmD 137.

69. See infra §§ 177-179.
70.

436.

Everett v. Vendryes, 19 N. Y. 71. Babston v. Gibson, 9 How. (U. S.) 263, 13 L. ed. 131; Stacy v. Baker, 2 Ill. 417; Yeatman V. Cullen, Blackf. (Ind.) 240; Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 477.

72. See infra § 1450.

73. Wood v. Gibbs, 35 Miss. 559 (admissibility of defense); Sylvester v. Crohan, 138 N. Y. 494, 34 NE 273 (time for presentment).

[a] Measure of damages, rule applies to Ex p. Heidelback, 11 F. Cas. No. 6,322, 2 Lowell 526, 15 NatBankr Reg 495; Tenant v. Tenant, 110 Pa. 478, 1 A 532; In re Commercial Bank, 36 Ch.D. 522.

As to presentment and notice see infra §§ 177-179.

[b] Lex loci solutionis determines (1) the drawer's liability as to rate of interest and usury in acceptance, the acceptor being governed by that law and being the principal debtor. Brownell v. Freese, 35 N. J. L. 285, 10 AmR 239. (2) It also determines the drawer's liability on the question of the sufficiency of form of indorsement made in another county and valid there and at the place of payment. Everett v. Vendryes, 19 N. Y. 436, 439 (where Denio, J., said: "When, therefore, he directed the drawees to pay to the order of the payee, he must be intended to contemplate that whatever would be understood in New York to be the payee's order, was the thing which he intended by that expression in the bill").

74. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252, 82 NE 134, 121 AmSR 858, 12 LRANS 875, 12 Ann Cas 450.

[a] As to the drawer's liability for damages (1) this is true (Page v. Page, 24 Mo. 595; Bouldin v. Page, 24 Mo. 594; Price v. Page, 24 Mo. 65; Lennig v. Ralston, 23 Pa. 137), (2) even where the place of payment is shown by the drawee's address (Kuenzi v. Elvers, 14 La. Ann. 391, 74 AmD 434).

75. See Principal and Surety [32 Cyc 74].

governed by the laws of such state. This rule is on the theory that a contract to become a surety was complete when the instrument was signed and delivered to the payee, and it was then a contract beyond the recall of the surety, on which he in the future might become liable, when negotiated by the payee, if otherwise valid; and the place of the negotiation could not change the force or effect of his contract.76

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[171] 9. Liability of Indorser before Delivery." It is necessary in this connection to distinguish between the law which governs persons who indorse before delivery and the law governing those who indorse for transfer after delivery, although it would seem that in most respects the rules governing the two kinds of indorsements are the same." The law of the place of indorsement ordinarily governs the liability of one who indorses before delivery, notwithstanding the fact that the instrument itself was executed in another state,80 or is payable in another state,s1 although as to the latter proposition there is some authority to the contrary, 82 at least as to the necessity of giving notice of non76. Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538, 62 NE 672, 88 AmSR 614, 57 LRA 513 [rev 52 App. Div. 57, 64 NYS 1053].

79

77. Presumption as to place of indorsement see infra § 1314.

78. See New York L. Ins. Co. v. McKellar, 68 N. H. 326, 44 A 516.

79. Baxter Nat. Bank v. Talbot, 154 Mass. 213, 28 NE 163, 13 LRA 52; Benton v. German-American Nat. Bank, 45 Nebr. 850, 64 NW 227; Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kellogg, 183 N. Y. 92, 75 NE 1103, 111 AmSR 717, 2 LRANS 299, 5 AnnCas 158.

[a] Illustration.-Where one signs a note on the back before delivery, in one state, and an action is brought against him by the holder in another state, the law of the place of contract, rather than the law of the forum, governs the right to introduce evidence to prove that the irregular indorsement is in fact a contract of suretyship, although such evidence is not admissible by the law of the forum. Cooke v. Addicks, 6 Pa. Super. 115.

[b] Application of rule.-Where a note is dated and delivered in one state but is indorsed before delivery in another, the law of the latter state governs as to the necessity of showing an exhaustion of remedies against the maker before proceeding against the indorser and also the necessity of demand and protest. Columbia Finance, etc., Co. v. Purcell, 142 Fed. 984. See also infra §§ 177-180.

[c] The time to present a note, as affecting one who indorsed it before delivery, is governed by the law of the place of contract rather than the law of the forum. Ueland V. Hibbard, 32 Misc. 749, 65 NYS 790.

80. Phelps v. Weber, 84 N. J. L. 630, 87 A 469 (holding that, where an indorsement of a note before its delivery to the payee was placed thereon in this state, and there was no evidence as to where the note was delivered to the payee, the indorser's liability was governed by the law of this state, although the note was made in another state); Colonial Nat. Bank v. Duerr, 108 App. Div. 215, 95 NYS 810.

81. Greathead v. Walton, 40 Conn. 226; Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1; Browning v. Merritt, 61 Ind. 425.

"The indorser promises upon certain conditions, which are not expressed in the contract of indorsement, but which are implied by law, that he will pay the note, but not that he will pay it at the place named in the note for payment. His prom

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payment to the indorser.83 However, there are sev-
eral decisions, some of which conflict with these
rules, holding that the law of the place where the
bill or the note is delivered so as to become binding
on the maker and the indorser controls, where dif-
ferent from the place of indorsement, at least if
the place of delivery and the place of payment are
the same,85 the general rule being that a contract
of an accommodation party is made in the state
where the instrument is first negotiated, so as to
become binding on him according to the law of that
state. But it has recently been held in New York
that a person who indorses a note before delivery, in
a state where he or she has no capacity to make such
a contract, is estopped to deny liability as against a
bona fide purchaser for value, instead of refusing a
recovery on the ground that the note was dated and
payable in another state where the note was negoti-
ated, and where the party had capacity to make the
indorsement.8 If the law of the place of delivery
conflicts with the law of the place of payment, the
latter governs.
[172] 10. Acceptance of Bill. The law of the
85. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Chatta-
nooga Constr. Co., (Tenn. Ch. A.) 38
SW 102.

87

ise is general, for the payment of the note upon the implied conditions; and such general promise, not specifically to be performed elsewhere, is governed by the lex loci contractus, which must determine the conditions upon which he is to be held liable. (Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33, 77 AmD 79)." Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 255, 259, 13 P 393, 59 AmR 546.

82. Montana Coal, etc., Co. v. Cincinnati Coal, etc., Co., 69 Oh. St. 351, 69 NE 613 (holding that where a note payable in Kentucky was signed by the principal debtor in Ohio, and before delivery in Ohio was signed in blank on the back by a party in Kentucky and by one in Pennsylvania, the contract of all the parties was governed, as to its validity and obligation, by the laws of Kentucky).

83. Phipps v. Harding, 70 Fed. 468, 17 CCA 203, 30 LRA 513 (holding that in so far as the necessity of giving notice of nonpayment to an indorser before delivery is concerned it is governed by the law of the place where the note is payable); New York L. Ins. Co. v. McKellar, 68 N. H. 326, 44 A 516 (holding that the liability of persons who sign their names on the back of a note before delivery, in so far as their right to notice of nonpayment the same as other indorsers is concerned, is governed by the law of the place where the note is payable, rather than the place where the note is executed).

84. U. S.-Phipps v. Harding, 70 Fed. 468, 17 CCA 203, 30 LRA 513; Stubbs v. Colt, 30 Fed. 417.

Ga.-Stanford v. Pruet, 27 Ga. 243, 73 AmD 734.

Ill-Smith v. Myers, 207 Ill. 126, 69 NE 858.

Ky.-Young v. Harris, 14 B. Mon. 556, 61 AmD 170.

Mass.-Nashua Sav. Bank v. Sayles, 184 Mass. 520, 69 NE 309, 100 AmSR 573; Lawrence v. Bassett, 5 Allen 140. N. H.-New York L. Ins. Co. v. McKellar, 68 N. H. 326, 44 A 516. N. Y.-Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615. Contra see Lowry v. Western Bank, 7 Ala. 120.

[a] Illustration. Where a note executed in Michigan was sent to Wisconsin for the indorser's signature, who, after indorsing by the maker's direction, sent it to the payee in Michigan, it was a Michigan contract, and the liability of the indorser was governed by the law of that state. Hackley Nat. Bank v. Barry, 139 Wis. 96, 120 NW 275 [foll E. L. Welch Co. v. Gillett, 146 Wis. 61, 130 NW 879].

86. Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kellogg, 183 N. Y. 92, 75 NE 1103, 111 AmSR 717, 2 LRANS 299.

87. Montana Coal, etc., Co. v. Cincinnati Coal, etc., Co., 69 Oh. St. 351, 357, 69 NE 613 (where the court said: "The note which is the subject of controversy in this case, was signed by one of the parties in Ohio, and before delivery by another in Kentucky and by another in Pennsylvania; but it was delivered to the agent of the payee in Ohio. The contract was within the control of the parties who are bound by it and did not become effective until it was delivered. Therefore, the loci contractus is Ohio. But the place of performance, the loci solutionis, is Kentucky; because the note is expressly made payable at Northern Bank, Covington, Ky. The plaintiff in error insists that this stipulation binds only the principal debtor, The Cincinnati Coal & Coke Co., which signed underneath the note and upon the face of it; and that the contract of the parties who signed in blank on the back of the note, although before its delivery, is like the engagement of an indorser, an independent contract which contains no stipulation as to the place of performance. Hence, it is argued, that as to these parties the case is controlled by the lex loci contractus, that is, the law of Ohio. From our point of view, Montgomery & Co., and McDonald were not indorsers in the regular way, and in the course of business as the owners or holders of the note. All of the defendants were original parties to the note, having signed it before it came into the possession of the first owner, the payee. The facts are undisputed and the obvious deduction therefrom is that the parties to the note at the time of its utterance all understood, and meant to be governed by, its terms; for at the time Montgomery & Co. and McDonald put their signatures on the back of the note the stipulation that the money should be payable at Northern Bank, Covington, Ky.,' was as much a part of the original contract as the promise to pay to the order of plaintiff the sum of money which is stated. in short, no separate contract after the making of the note: but the note came to the payee signed by all of the defendants and with the place of performance distinctly expressed").

There was,

place where the acceptance is given determines its
sufficiency in form, such as whether it must be in
writing,88 and its interpretation.89 An agreement to
accept has been held to be governed by the law
where the agreement was made, and not the law of
the place where the bill was to be accepted;90 but
the supreme court of the United States has held
that in such a case the law of the latter place
governs, on the theory that the agreement to accept
is to be entirely performed in another state,"1 and
this decision has been followed in state courts.9
The interpretation of an agreement to accept as a
contract at common law or an acceptance is gov-
erned by the law of the place of acceptance,"
93 as is
a promise by the drawee to pay a bill to be drawn,9*
or an authority to draw such bill on the writer.95

92

Liability of acceptor. The law of the place of acceptance determines in general the liability of the acceptor, but if a place of payment is expressly designated the law of that place will govern;97 and this is true where the drawee's address is indicated on the bill.98 Where the acceptance of a draft is

88. Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. ed. 245 (resident of St. Louis, acceptance in Chicago, law of Illinois governs); Garrettson v. North Atchison Bank, 47 Fed. 867 [aff 51 Fed. 168, 2 CCA 145]; Mason v. Dousay, 35 Ill. 424, 85 AmD 368; Rutland Bank v. Woodruff, 34 Vt. 89. [a] In Canada the question is settled by Bills Exch. Act (1890) § 71 (1) b, which provides that, subject to the provisions of the act, the interpretation of the acceptance is determined by the law of the place where the contract is made, that is to say, the place where the bill is accepted. "If there could be any doubt about what is included within the term 'interpretation' it is set at rest by Romer, J., in Alcock v. Smith, [1892] 1 Ch. 238." Sandet V. St. Helens Smelting Co., 39 N. S. 370, 372.

89. Sanders v. St. Helens Smelting Co., 39 N. S. 370 (under Bills Exch. Act). See also supra § 145.

90. Hubbard v.. Yorkville Exch. Bank, 72 Fed. 234, 18 CCA 525 [aff 62 Fed. 112, 10 CCA 295] (necessity for writing); Russell v. Wiggin, 21 F. Cas. No. 12,165, 2 Story 213; Scott v. Pilkington, 15 AbbPr (N. Y.) 280. 91. Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116, 12 SCt 154, 35 L. ed. 956 [aff 34 Fed. 866] (so holding as to sufficiency of parol agreement to accept).

92. Laddonia Bank v. Bright-Coy Commn. Co., 139 Mo. A. 110, 120 SW 648.

93. Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 46; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 381; Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450.

94. Rutland Bank v. Woodruff, 34 Vt. 89 (holding that a parol agreement to pay a bill to be drawn, if made in a state where it is not valid as an acceptance, may be enforced as a valid contract in an action for money loaned in the place contemplated for acceptance and payment). But see Lonsdale v. Lafayette Bank, 18 Oh. 126.

95. Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450 (place from which the authority was mailed controls the place where the draft was drawn, to determine its effect as an acceptance).

[a] On the contrary the place where the draft was drawn was held to control, to support its validity as a contract, in Anderson County Deposit Bank v. Turner-Looker Co., 3 OhS&CP 581, 2 OhNP 73.

96. U. S.-Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. ed. 245; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111, 7 L. ed. 799.

Conn.-Webster v. Howe Mach, Co., 54 Conn. 394, 8 A 482 (bona fide

in one state, but the draft is afterward negotiated by the drawer with the authority of the acceptor in another state, the law of the latter state governs the liability of the acceptor, notwithstanding the acceptance was expressly stated to be payable in the state where the acceptance was written, since the liability of the acceptor does not arise until the subsequent delivery of the instrument to a bona fide holder, or where notice of acceptance is given to such a holder.99

Presumptions. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that a bill of exchange was accepted where dated.1

[173] 11. Transfer of Instrument—a. General Rule. In so far as the question as to what law governs the indorsement of bills and notes is concerned, it must be kept in mind that the question depends to a large extent on the particular matter relating to the indorsement which is to be determined. Generally, since the contract of indorsement is a new and independent contract, it is governed by the law of the state where it is made and takes effect;3 and character of holder and availability | 396, 13 NE 651, 3 AmSR 496; Crouch of defense); Roe v. Jerome, 18 Conn. v. Hall, 15 Ill. 263; Schuttler v. Piatt, 138 (liability for damages). 12 III. 417; Holbrook v. Vibbard, 3 Ind.-Johnson County Sav. Bank v. Ill. 465; Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. Kramer, 42 Ind. A. 548, 86 NE 84. v. Hinsey, 88 111. A. 234.

Ky. Kelly v. Smith, 1 Metc. 313.
Mass.-Worcester Bank v. Wells, 8
Metc. 107 (letter of acceptance writ-
ten in New York to Massachusetts,
New York law governs). But see
Fiske v. Foster, 10 Metc. 597.

Eng. In re Marseilles Extension
R., etc., Co., 30 Ch. D. 598 (formal
sufficiency of the indorsements under
which the holder claims title); Bur-
rows v. Jemino, Str. 733, 93 Reprint
815.

97. U. S.-Bainbridge v. Wilcocks,
2 F. Cas. No. 755, Baldw. 536.
Mass.-Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush.

46.

220.

Miss.-Frazier v. Warfield, 17 Miss.
N. J. Brownell v. Freese, 35 N.
J. L. 285, 10 AmR 239.

N. Y.-Bright v. Judson, 47 Barb.
29.

2

Eng. Cooper V. Waldegrave,
Beav. 282, 17 EngCh 282, 48 Reprint
1189; Don v. Lippmann, 5 Cl. & F.
1, 7 Reprint 303, 5 ERC 930.

98. Lizardi v. Cohen, 3 Gill (Md.)
430 (recourse against drawer); Fraz-
ier v. Warfield, 17 Miss. 220. See
also supra § 155.
[a] Illustration.-Where a resi-
dent of New York city, while so-
journing in France, accepted a draft
directed to him at his address in New
York city, to be there paid, his lia-
bility on such acceptance was to be
governed by the laws of New York.
Weller v. Goslin, 32 Misc. 36, 65 NYS
232.

99. Tilden v. Blair, 21 Wall. (U.
S.) 241, 22 L. ed. 632.

1. See infra § 1301.

2. See Guernsey v. Imperial Bank, 188 Fed. 300, 110 ČCA 278, 40 LRANS 377.

3. U. S.-Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262, 11 L. ed. 967; Slacum v. Pomery, 6 Cranch 221, 3 L. ed. 204; Guernsey v. Imperial Bank, 188 Fed. 300, 110 CCA 278, 40 LRANS 377; Burrows v. Hannegan, 4 F. Cas. No. 2,206, 1 McLean 315; Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. No. 4,141, 3 McLean 397; McClintick v. Cummins, 15 F. Cas. No. 8,699, 3 McLean 158; Towne v. Smith, 24 F. Cas. No. 14,115, 1 Woodb. & M. 115.

Ala.-Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala. 139,
60 AmD 498; Dunn v. Adams, 1 Ala.
527, 35 AmD 42.

Conn-Greathead V. Walton, 40
Conn. 226; Downer v. Chesebrough, 36
Conn. 39, 4 AmR 29.

Ill.-Dunnigan v. Stevens, 122 Ill.

Ind.-Patterson v. Carrell, 60 Ind. 128; Rose v. Park Bank, 20 Ind. 94, 83 AmD 306; Brown v. Bunn, 16 Ind. 406; Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33, 77 AmD 79 [overr Shanklin v. Cooper, 8 Blackf. 41]; Smith v. Blatchford, 2 Ind. 184, 52 AmD 504. Nat. Bank V. Green, 33 Iowa 140; Huse v. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501, 4 AmR 244; Bernard v. Barry, 1 Greene 388.

Iowa.-Michigan

Ky. Weil v. Sturgus, 63 SW 602, 23 KyL 644; Hyatt v. Commonwealth Bank, 8 Bush 193; Short v. Trabue, 4 Metc. 299.

La.-Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257; Hatch v. Gilmore, 3 La. Ann. 508.

Mass.-Roland M. Baker Co. V. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 NE 1025; Williams v. Wade, 1 Metc. 82; Powers v. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77.

N. H.-Dow v. Rowell, 12 N. H. 49. N. J.-Mackintosh v. Gibbs, 79 N. J. L. 40, 43, 74 A 708 [aff 81 N. J. L. 577, 80 A 554, AnnCas1912D 163 and cit Cyc]; Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. 285, 10 AmR 239.

N. Y.-Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kellogg, 183 N. Y. 92, 75 NE 1103, 111 AmSR 717, 2 LRANS 299, 5 AnnCas 158; Spies v. National City Bank, 174 N. Y. 222, 66 NE 736, 61 LRA 193 and note [aff 68 App. Div. 70, 74 NYS 64]; Cook v. Litchfield, 9 N. Y. 279 [rev 7 NYSuper 330]; Artisans' Bank v. Park Bank, 41 Barb. 599; Heidelburger v. Heidelburger, 155 NYS 993; Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439, 27 AmD 137.

N. C.-Hatcher v. McMorine, 15 N.
C. 122.
Oh.-Conahan v. Smith, 2 Disn. 9.
Pa.-Lennig v. Ralston, 23 Pa. 137.
Tenn.-Douglas v. Bank of Com-
merce, 97 Tenn. 133, 36 SW 874.

W. Va.-Nichols v. Porter, 2 W.
Va. 13, 94 AmD 500.

Eng.-Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. Cas. 151, 27 ECL 584, 131 Reprint 1075, 6 C. & P. 25, 25 ECL 303. Que.-London, etc., Bank v. Maguire, 8 Que. Super. 358.

But see Springfield Third Nat. Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, (Tex. Civ. A.) 139 SW 665.

"The engagement of the endorser, like that of the drawer of a bill of exchange, is not a promise to pay the money at the time and place mentioned in the instrument, but an undertaking in case the money be not thus paid by him who has stipulated to pay it to indemnify the endorser

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instrument will not govern the law applicable to the transfer, to the exclusion of the law of the place of contract, unless such intention is clearly manifested by the parties.12

The law of the forum is controlled by the law of the place of indorsement.13

Intention as controlling. However, the law of the place of indorsement does not govern where the intention is apparent to have the place of performance govern.14

6. See supra § 163.

So if there are several indorsements, each is governed by the law of the place where made, and each may have a different lex loci contractus, unless the intention is to negotiate the instrument elsewhere.11 The domicile of the parties to a transfer of the against this disappointment. When therefore a note is endorsed in a different country from that in which it was made, or the money promised to be paid, the contract of the endorser referring to the law of no other country for its performance, must be interpreted by the law of the place where the endorsement was made that law determines the nature and extent of his liability." Hatcher v. McMorine, 15 N. C. 122,

124.

[a] Illustration.-Where a note executed and delivered in California and nonnegotiable by the local law was transferred by indorsement in New Jersey, after the passage of the Negotiable Instrument Act of April 4, 1902 (P. L. p 583), the indorser's contract was to be determined by such act. Mackintosh v. Gibbs, 79 N. J. L. 40, 74 A 708.

[b] An assignment of a certificate of deposit, being a new contract, is governed by the law of the place where made. Morrison v. Levell, 4 W. Va. 346.

[c] But in England the Bills of Exchange Act (1882) § 72 "runs thus: 'Subject to the provisions of this Act, the interpretation of the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance supra protest of a bill, is determined by the law of the place where such contract is made. Provided that where an inland bill'-as this is-'is indorsed in a foreign country as this was the indorsement shall as regards the payer'which I read as the acceptor-be interpreted according to the law of the United Kingdom.' Now, this bill was indorsed in such a way that, interpret as you will, there is nothing wrong in the indorsement. In fact, if you interpret it according to English law, the result is just the same as if you interpret it according to any other law." Alcock v. Smith, 61 L. J. Ch. 161, 167.

4. U. S.-Guernsey V. Imperial Bank, 188 Fed. 300, 110 CCA 278, 40 LRANS 377.

Ala. Clanton v. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260.

Ark.-Moore v. Clopton, 22 Ark.

125.

N. J. Brook v. Vannest, 58 N. J. L. 162, 33 A 382.

N. Y.-Everett v. Vendryes, 25 Barb. 383 [aff 19 N. Y. 436].

Eng. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1 K. B. 677, 2 AnnCas 703. But see De la Chaumette v. Bank of England, 2 B. & Ad. 385, 22 ECL 165, 109 Reprint 1186, 9 B. & C. 208, 17 ECL 100, 109 Reprint 78 (holding that the validity of a transfer of a note as to its mode is governed by the law of the place of payment rather than by the law of the place of assignment).

Assignment without indorsement. This general

7. Moore v. Clopton, 22 Ark. 125; Roosa v. Crist, 171, 450, 65 AmD 679 (transfer by delivery only); De la Chaumette v. Bank of England, 9 B. & C. 208, 17 ECL 100, 109, Reprint 78; Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. Cas. 151, 27 ECL 584, 131 Reprint 1075, 6 C. & P. 25, 25 ECL 303.

[a] But a blank indorsement in France of an English bill payable in England will be recognized so far as to enable the indorsee to recover against the acceptor in an English court. In re Marseilles Extension R., etc., Co., 30 Ch. D. 598.

8.

514. 9.

Cas.

1075.

Horne v. Rouquette, 3 Q. B. D.

Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. 151, 27 ECL 584, 131 Reprint

10. U. S.-Slacum v. Pomery, 6 Cranch 221, 3 L. ed. 204; Davis v. Clemson, 7 F. Cas. No. 3,630, 6 McLean 622; Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. No. 4,141, 3 McLean 397; Mott v. Wright, 17 F. Cas. No. 9,883, 4 Biss. 53.

Ala.-Clanton v. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260; Lowry v. Western Bank, 7 Ala. 120; Dunn v. Adams, 1 Ala. 527, 35 AmD 42.

Conn. Greathead v. Walton, 40 Conn. 226; Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39, 4 AmR 29.

Ill-Dunnigan v. Stevens, 122 Ill. 396, 13 NE 651, 3 AmSR 496; Gay v. Rainey, 89 111. 221, 31 AmR 76; Holbrook v. Vibbard, 3 Ill. 465; Humphreys v. Collier, 1 Ill. 297. But see Stacy v. Baker, 2 Ill. 417.

Ind.-Rose v. Park Bank, 20 Ind. 94, 83 AmD 306; Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33, 77 AmD 79; Smith v. Blatchford, 2 Ind. 184, 52 AmD 504; Yeatman v. Cullen, 5 Blackf. 240; Krieg v. Palmer Nat. Bank, 51 Ind. A. 34, 95 NE 613.

Iowa.-Michigan

V.

Nat. Bank Green, 33 Iowa 140; Huse v. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501, 4 AmR 244; Chatham Bank v. Allison, 15 Iowa 357.

Kan.-Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 255, 13 P 393, 59 AmR 546.

Ky.-Weil v. Sturgus, 63 SW 602, 23 KyL 644; Hyatt v. Commonwealth | Bank, 8 Bush 193; Carlisle v. Chambers, 4 Bush 268, 96 AmD 304; Short v. Trabue, 4 Metc. 299.

La. Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257; Duncan v. Sparrow, 3 Rob. 167.

Mass.-Baxter Nat. Bank v. Talbot, 154 Mass. 213, 28 NE 163, 13 LRA 52; Williams v. Wade, 1 Metc. 82; Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194; Powers v. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77.

Miss.-Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss.

119.

N. H.-Dow v. Rowell, 12 N. H. 49. Compare New York L. Ins. Co. v. McKellar, 68 N. H. 326, 44 A 516.

N. Y.-Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615 [aff 32 Barb. 522, 20 How Pr 275]; Cook v. Litchfield, 9 N. Y. 279; Artisans' Bank v. Park Bank, 41 Barb. 599; Hodges v. Shuler, 24 Barb. 68 [aff 22 N. Y. 114]; Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439, 27 AmD 137.

5. Arnett v. Pinson, 108 SW 852, 33 KyL 36 (holding that the general rule that the law of the state in which an assignment is made controls as to its validity applies only where the assignor is a party, and in an action by the assignee of a note executed and payable in another state against the maker thereof, the fact that the note was assigned to plaintiff in this state would not make Tenn.-Douglas v. Bank of Comthe laws of this state controlling as merce, 97 Tenn. 133, 36 SW 874; Trato its validity). bue v. Short, 5 Coldw. 293.

N. C.-Hatcher v. McMorine, 15 N. C. 122. Pa.-Lennig v. Ralston, 23 Pa. 137. S. C.-Holt v. Salmon, 24 S. C. L. 91.

W. Va.-Nichols v. Porter, 2 W. Va. 13, 94 AmD 500.

Eng.-Horne v. Rouquette, 3 Q. B. D. 514; Rouquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525, 4 ERC 287.

Compare Jenks v. Doran, 5 Ont. A. 58.

[a]lustrations.-(1) The effect of an alteration to an instrument, as affecting the liability of an indorser, is to be determinat by the law of the state where the indorsement is made. Colonial Nat. Bank v. Duerr 108 App. Div. 215, 95 NYS 810. (2) Whether the acts of the holder of a note deprive the indorser of a remedy against the maker, so as to discharge him from liability, is to be determined by the law of the place where the note is executed, in so far as the effect of the acts to relieve the maker from liability is concerned. Spies v. National City Bank, 174 N. Y. 222, 66 NE 736, 61 LRA 193 [aff 68 App. Div. 70, 74 NYS 64J. (3) Plaintiff, a subsequent indorsee of a certificate of deposit executed in Indiana, but indorsed to plaintiff in Illinois, having elected to sue the payee and the depository and not plaintiff's immediate indorser, the question of liability under the Illinois law does not arise. Krieg v. Palmer Nat. Bank, 51 Ind. A. 34, 95 NE 613.

[b] The law of the place where a bill is indorsed and made payable will control that of the place where it is drawn, although the latter is also the place where the action is brought. Brabston v. Gibson, 9 How. (U. S.) 263, 13 L. ed. 131.

11. U. S.-Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. No. 4,141, 3 McLean 397.

Ind.-Rose v. Park Bank, 20 Ind. 94, 83 AmD 306.

Ky. Carlisle v. Chambers, 4 Bush 268, 96 AmD 304.

N. Y.-Spies v. National City Bank, 174 N. Y. 222, 66 NE 736, 61 LRA 193 [aff 68 App. Div. 70, 74 NYS 64]. Tex.-Bailey v. Heald, 17 Tex. 102. [a] Restatement.-"The drawer is liable according to the law of the place where bill is drawn, and each successive endorser is liable according to the law of the place where he endorses-every endorsement being treated as a new and substantive contract." Brownell v. Freese, 35 N. J. L. 285, 288, 10 AmR 239 [quot Mackintosh v. Gibbs, 79 N. J. L. 40, 43, 74 A 708].

12. Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 255, 13 P 393, 59 AmR 546. [a] Residence of indorser.Whether the indorser on a promissory note, on an independent contract made in one state after the making of the note in another state, was permanently or temporarily residing in the state of indorsement is irrelevant, since it is the place where the contract was made, and not the residence of the contractor, which governs. Heidelburger v. Heidelburger, 155 NYS 993.

13. McClintick v. Cummins, 15 F. Cas. No. 8,699, 3 McLean 158; Yeatman v. Cullen, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 240; Benton V. German-American Nat. Bank, 45 Nebr. 850, 64 NW 227.

14. Musson v. Lake, 4 How. (U. S.) 262, 11 L. ed. 967; Watson v. Lane, 52 N. J. L. 550, 20 A 894, 10 LRA 784; Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367, 38 AmR 518.

rule applies equally well to the assignment of a bill or note without indorsement.15

[174] b. Law of Place of Payment. The liability of an indorser is governed by the law of the place of the indorsement rather than by the law of the place where the instrument is payable.16

[§ 175] c. c. Where Is Place of Indorsement.17 Where an indorsement is made in one state, to take effect on delivery in another state, the indorsement is deemed to be made in the state where the instrument is delivered.18

[176] d. Right of Indorsee or Assignee to Sue.19 The law of the place of contract and of the forum rather than that of indorsement will de termine the indorsee's right to sue. other parties,20 especially where it is also the law of the place of payment.21 As to an assignee's .right to sue on the instrument, the law of the place of transfer is subordinate to that. of the forum 22 especially if the place of the forum is also the place where the contract was made.23 On the other hand, if by the law of the place of transfer the personal representative of a deceased holder can transfer an instrument so as to enable his transferee to bring suit, the transfer will carry the power of suit everywhere.24

[177] 12. Presentment for Payment, Protest, and Notice-a. In General. The drawer of a bill of

See also Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Q. B. 43, 41 ECL 428, 113 Reprint 1045; Hirschfeld v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. 340.

15. Barrett v. Gillard, 10 Tex. 69. 16. Ind.-Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33, 34, 77 AmD 79 (where the court said: "In the case of a note made in one State and payable in another, it is clear, by all the authorities, that the maker will be held liable according to the law of the place where it is payable; as that is the place where his contract is to be performed, and he is presumed to have contracted with reference to the law of that place. It does not follow, however, because the contract of the maker would be governed by the law of the place of payment, that the contract of the indorser would be governed by the same law. The mak: er binds himself to pay at the place named in the note for payment, and there his contract is to be performed. The indorser promises, upon certain conditions, which are not expressed in the contract of indorsement, but which are implied by law, that he will pay the note; but not that he will pay it at the place named in the note for payment. His promise is general, for the payment of the note upon the implied conditions; and such general promise, not specially to be performed elsewhere, is governed by the lex loci contractus, which must determine the conditions upon which he is to be held liable").

Ky.-Short v. Trabue, 4 Metc. 299. Mass. Glidden v. Chamberlin, 167 Mass. 486, 46 NE 103, 57 AmSR 479; Powers v. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77.

N. J. Brook v. Vannest, 58 N. J. L. 162, 33 A 382.

Tenn.-Trabue v. Short, 5 Coldw.

293.

17. Accommodation paper see also supra § 171.

Presumptions as to see infra §

1314.

18. U. S.-Stubbs v. Colt, 30 Fed. 417; In re Conrad, 6 F. Cas. No. 3,126, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 147; Mott v. Wright, 17 F. Cas. No. 9,883, 4 Biss. 53. Ga.-Stanford v. Pruet, 27 Ga. 243, 73 AmD 734.

Ill.-Gay v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221, 31 AmR 76.

Kan.-Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 255, 13 P 393, 59 AmR 546. Ky.-Young v. Harris, 14 B. Mon. 556, 61 AmD 170.

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exchange and the indorser of a bill or note are secondarily liable. Certain steps, such as presentment to the maker or acceptor for payment, protest, notice of dishonor, or an action against the maker or acceptor as a condition precedent, are required, or some of them, in nearly all jurisdictions.25 It is necessary to distinguish between the necessity for such proceedings as a condition precedent to liability of the drawer or indorser and the sufficiency of such proceedings, conçeding that they are necessary.26

[178] b. Necessity for. It is well settled that the necessity of demand, protest, and notice of nonpayment is governed by the law of the place where the bill is drawn or where the bill or note is indorsed, without regard to the law of the place where the note was made or where the bill or note is payable. In order to bind the drawer of a bill of exchange or check, the necessity for demand, etc., is governed by the law of the place where the bill is drawn.27 In order to bind an indorser of a bill or note, the necessity for demand, etc., is governed by the law of the place where the indorsement was made,28 subject to the rule that the place of delivery, pursuant to the indorsement, is the place of indorsement.29

26. See infra §§ 178, 179.

[179] c. Mode and Sufficiency of. Although La.-Breedlove v. Fletcher, 7 Mart. N. H.-New York L. Ins. Co. v. McKellar, 68 N. H. 326, 44 A 516.

524.

N. Y.-Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615 [aff 32 Barb. 522, 20 HowPr 275]; Cook v. Litchfield, 9 N. Y. 279; Weil v. Lange, 6 Daly 549.

an

[a] Illustration.-Where dorsement is written on a note by the payee thereof in one state and a sale and delivery of the note are made in another state, the contract of indorsement must be regarded as made and consummated in the place where the sale and delivery occurred, rather than where it was written, and the law of the latter state as to protest and notice will control. Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 255, 13 P 393, 59 AmR 546.

27. Thorp v. Craig, 10 Iowa 461; Williams v. Putnam, 14 N. H. 540, 40 AmD 204; Casper v. Kühne,' 79 Misc. 411, 140 NYS 86; Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439, 27 AmD 137; Raymond v. Holmes, 11 Tex. 54.

[a] The necessity for making in-demand and protest and the circumstances under which they may be required or dispensed with are incidents of the original contract and are governed by the law of the place where the bill of exchange is drawn, rather than of the place where it is payable. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252, 82 NE 134, 121 AmSR 858 and note, 12 LRANS 875, 12 AnnCas 450 and note [aff 103 App. Div. 428, 93 NYS 87] (reviewing at length decisions in New York claimed to assert a contrary rule).

19. As dependent on negotiability see supra § 160.

20. De la Chaumette v. Bank of England, 2 B. & Ad. 385, 22 ECL 165, 109 Reprint 1186, 9 B. & C. 208, 17 ECL 100, 109 Reprint 78.

21. Lebel v. Tucker, L. R. 3 Q. B. 77; In re Marseilles Extension R., etc., Co., 30 Ch. D. 598; Bradlaugh v. De Rin, L. R. 5 C. P. 473 [rev L. R. 3 C. P. 538]. And see Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. Cas. 151, 27 ECL 584, 131 reprint 1075, 6 C. & P. 25, 25 ECL 303.

22. Roosa v. Crist, 17 Ill. 450, 65 AmD 679 (holding that, even where the law of the place of transfer does not allow the assignee to sue in his own name, he may generally do so if permitted by the lex fori); Foss v. Nutting, 14 Gray (Mass.) 484.

23. Lodge v. Phelps 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 139, 2 Cai. Cas. 321.

[a] Contra as to a nonnegotiable note.-Owen v. Moody, 29 Miss. 79.

24. Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 239, 7 L. ed. 410; Andrews v. Carr, 26 Miss. 577; Grace v. Hannah, 51 N. C. 94; Leake v. Gilchrist, 13 N. C. 73. See also Barrett v. Gillard, 10 Tex. 69 (holding that the assignee of a nonnegotiable note from the administrator of the deceased payee may bring suit on it in his own name, if he can do so by the law of the payee's domicile). Contra Stearns V. Burnham, 5 Me. 261, 17 AmD 228; Thompson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 291.

25. See infra §§ 666-681, 736-786, 890-904.

28. U. S.-Guernsey v. Imperial Bank, 188 Fed. 300, 110 CCA 278, 40 LRANS 377.

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N. H.-Williams v. Putnam, 14 N. H. 540, 40 AmD 204.

54.

86.

Tex.-Raymond v. Holmes, 11 Tex.

See also Wright v. Andrews, 70 Me.

But see Brooke v. Rutland, 15 Ga. A. 26, 82 SE 580 (holding that, where an action was brought on a note to be paid in Tennessee against an indorser, his liability depended on the Negotiable Instruments Law of that state, as construed by its courts); Allen v. McNaughton, 7 N. B. 234 (holding that presentment is governed by the law of the place where the note is made and is payable).

29. Guernsey V. Imperial Bank, 188 Fed. 300, 110 CCA 278, 40 LRANS 377; Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 255, 13 P 393, 59 AmR 546 (holding that the necessity for notice of dishonor is governed by the law of the place where the notes were delivered and sold pursuant to the indorsement, rather than of the place where the indorsement was made and where the indorser placed the note in the hands of an agent for negotiation, where no particular place or person was contemplated in connection with the negotiation).

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