페이지 이미지
PDF
ePub

18

22

cording to agreement.1 BLANK.19 Lacking something essential to completeness;20 unrestricted;21 a part of an instrument not written upon or filled up.2 In mechanics, a piece of metal prepared to be made into something by a further operation, as a coin, screw, nuts.23

[ocr errors]

BLANK BAR. The old name of a plea in bar in an action of trespass put in to oblige plaintiff to assign the certain place where the trespass was committed.24

BLANKET.25 As a noun, a heavy, loosely woven fabric, usually of wool, and having a nap, used in

18. Ferriere Doctrine de Droit [quot Musson v. U. S. Bank, 6 Mart. (La.) 707, 718, where the court said: "It is not to be expected that much may be found in law books upon this very unusual mode of transacting | business, which now and then, when men, in the simplicity of their manners, could rely on each other's honesty, was indulged in.. ... This power, we say, is personal, and, as all other powers, dies with the attorney"]. 19. Blank:

In:

Accident insurance policy see Accident Insurance § 55. Appeal bond see Appeal and Error § 1243.

Bond generally see Bonds [5 Cyc 739].

bed clothing;26 also a similar fabric used as a robe, or as a cover for a horse or dog;27 hence, any similar piece of cloth.28 As an adjective the term designates anything which covers a wide range or large number of interrelated names, conditions, objects, items, or the like.29

BLASFEMIA. In Spanish law blasphemy, which consisted in speaking disrespectfully of God, the virgin, or the saints.30 It was formerly 31 punished severely, but the present Spanish penal code omits any specific mention thereof, confining its penalties in such matters to those who offend or ridicule the state religion.32

20. Anderson L. D.

[a] Papers to be used as envelopes and cut in that form but not yet pasted are not dutiable as paper envelopes under the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897 (30 U. S. St. at L. 188 c 11 § 1 Schedule M par 399), but are "blanks" dutiable as manufactures of paper under par 407 of said act. Hunter v. U. S., 134 Fed. 361, 362, 67 CCA 343.

21. Anderson L. D. 22. Burrill L. D.

Date as affecting commercial paper [a] Information to be furnished a see Bills and Notes § 190. railroad commission.-Rev. St. (1895) Form of telegraph company as bind-art 4571, requiring the railroad coming contract on sender see Tele- mission to prepare "suitable blanks" graphs and Telephones [37 Cyc with questions eliciting information 1693]. concerning roads desired by the commission, and imposing a penalty for failure of a company or its officers to fill out and return the "blanks" or correctly answer questions propounded therein, imposes a penalty only when the questions propounded and information requested on the face of the "blanks" are not answered and furnished, and orders passed by the commission requiring a company to give information as to the number of freight cars handled at designated stations during specified months and calling for information as to salaries of attorneys, etc., are not the "blanks" required, and to authorize imposition of the penalty it must appear that the commission forwarded to the company blanks calling for the information and that it failed to fill them up and return them to it. State v. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 55 Tex. Civ. A. 108, 111, 118 SW 736.

Certificate of acknowledgment see
Acknowledgments § 186.
Contract generally see Contracts [9
Cyc 302].

Deed as affecting its validity: Generally see Deeds [13 Cyc 540, 551].

As against subsequent bona fide purchaser when wrongfully filled out see Vendor and Purchaser [39 Cyc 1692]. Negotiable instrument see Bills and Notes §§ 313-322. Supersedeas bond see Appeal and Error 1433. Indorsement in, of commercial pa

per:

Generally see Bills and Notes §§ 536-542..

Right of transferee to sue in own name see Bills and Notes § 1087. Transferee of corporate stock, when obliged to satisfy corporation of genuine purchase see Corporations [10 Cyc 617].

Warrant of arrest see Criminal Law [12 Cyc 300]. Filling blank:

[blocks in formation]

26. Webster Int. D. [a] Common use of term."Blankets, in general, are used as coverings for protection against outer temperature and influences, Alteration of instrument see Al- and, in common speech, would be unteration of Instruments § 119-derstood to refer to things so used." 144.

As:

Forgery see Forgery [19 Cyc 1367]. In mortgage see Mortgages [27 Cyc 1107].

Implied power to fill in blank in: Commercial paper see Bills and Notes § 313.

Contract generally see Contracts [9
Cyc 302].
Power of attorney see Agency § 56.

Bredt V. U. S., 65 Fed. 496, 497 (where it was held that the term as used in a tariff act did not include thick-woven woolen belts or blankets for paper or printing machines). 27. Webster Int. D.

articles as "blankets." Smith V. Great Northern R. Co., 15 N. D. 195. 197, 107 NW 56.

28. Webster Int. D. 29.

Standard D.

[a] Blanket consent.-A consent for a street railway to use the city streets which does not mention the termini or the routes is a "blanket consent," and is invalid when questioned by proper authority. State v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 80 Nebr. 357, 360, 114 NW 429.

[b] Blanket notice.-A notice given by a purchaser of a certificate of land sold for taxes which includes many descriptions is insufficient, being a "blanket notice." Ambler v. Patterson, 80 Nebr. 570, 573, 114 NW 781.

[c] Blanket policy of insurance.(1) "Blanket and floating policies are sometimes issued to factors or to warehousemen, intended only to cover margins uninsured by other policies, or to cover nothing more than the limited interest which the factor or warehouseman may have in the property which he has in charge." Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U. S. 527, 541, 23 L. ed. 868. (2) "It appears that the problem of adjusting the loss between the several insurers is rendered difficult by the fact that one or two of the policies are what are called blanket policies, covering the machinery in the several buildings, and underwriting it for a round sum; while the others are what are called specific policies, and while covering the same machinery, limit their loss to a fixed sum on each separate parcel of machinery as found in the different rooms.' American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Landau, 62 N. J. Eq. 73, 104, 49 A 738. (3) "The policy was what is commonly called a blanket policy, not intended to apply specifically to any particular number of bushels of grain that might have been in any particular granary at the time the policy was written, but to continue on this class of property, even though replaced by other of a similar specie, during the entire term of the policy." Johnston V. Phelps County Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 73 Nebr. 50, 53, 102 NW 72. See generally Fire Insurance [19 Cyc 565].

See

30. Escriche Diccionario. Blasphemy post p 1117. 31. Partidas VII, tit. XXVIII, ley 32. Spanish Pen. Code arts 226

[a] Burlap manufactured into covers for horses are "blankets" 4. within the purview of a schedule of railroad rates including that sort of 228.

For later cases, developments and changes in the law see cumulative Annotations, same title, page and note number.

BLASPHEMY

BY EDWARD C. ELLSBREE

[Matters not in this Title, treated elsewhere in this Work, see Cross References infra this page]

[blocks in formation]

C. Intent [§§ 5-6] p 1120

1. In General [§ 5] p 1120

2. Respectful Discussion; Religious Freedom [§ 6] p 1120 D. Publication or Utterance in Presence of Others [§ 7] p 1121

III. PROSECUTION [§§ 8-11] p 1121

A. Indictment [§ 8] p 1121

B. Issues, Proof, and Variance [§ 9] p 1122

C. Evidence [§ 10] p 1122

D. Questions for Jury [§ 11] p 1122

CROSS REFERENCES

Breach of the peace see Breach of the Peace [5 Cyc 1023].

Criminal law generally see Criminal Law [12 Cyc 70]. Disorderly conduct see Disorderly Conduct [14 Cyc 466].

Indictment and information generally see Indictments
and Informations [22 Cyc 157].
Profanity see Profanity [32 Cyc 578].

I. DEFINITION

[1] Blasphemy, according to the most concise maliciously attacking the christian religion individdefinition, is the malicious reviling of God or reli- ually, for the purpose of exposing its doctrines to gion.1 It consists in reviling God or in wantonly or contempt and ridicule. The offense of blasphemy 1. Com. V. Kneeland, 20 Pick. evil of the Deity with an impious "The virgin Mary was a whore and (Mass.) 206, 241; Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 purpose to derogate from the divine Jesus Christ was a bastard." State Johns. (N. Y.) 290, 5 AmD 335; Bell's majesty, and to alienate the minds v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553. (4) A pubCase, 6 City Hall Rec (N. Y.) 38. of others from the love and rever-lication stating Jesus Christ to be an [a] Etymologically, to blaspheme ence of God. It is purposely using is to speak ill or evil of. Anderson words concerning God, calculated and L. D.; Century D. designed to impair and destroy the reverence, respect, and confidence due to him, as the intelligent creator, governor and judge of the world. It embraces the idea of detraction, when used towards the Supreme Be[c] Bouvier thus defines blas- ing, as 'calumny' usually carries the phemy: "To attribute to God that same idea, when applied to an indiwhich is contrary to his nature, and vidual. It is a wilful and malicious does not belong to him, and to deny attempt to lessen men's reverence of what does. A false reflection uttered God, by denying his existence, or his with a malicious design of revil-attributes as an intelligent creator, ing God." Bouvier L. D. (Rawles governor and judge of men, and to ed).

[b] Blackstone speaks of it as "blasphemy against the Almighty, by denying his being or providence.' 4 Blackstone Comm. 59 [cit Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206].

prevent their having confidence in
him, as such." Com. v. Kneeland, su-

pra.

impostor and a murderer in principle. Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 8 ECL 12, 107 Reprint 11 (where it seems that the court dealt particularly with the question whether the offense was punishable as a temporal one, but before the verdict was pronounced one of the jurors asked whether a work which denied the divinity of Christ was a libel, and the court answered that the work speaking of Jesus Christ in the language used in the publication in question was a libel, christianity being a part of the law of the land). But see Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox C. C. 217 infra text and note 23, (8); and notes 23, 48. (5) Discourses on [a] Illustrations of blasphemous the miracles of Christ in which delanguage.-(1) "Jesus Christ was a fendant maintained that they were bastard, and his mother must be a not to be taken in a literal sense but whore." Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. that the whole religion of the life Y.) 290, 5 AmD 335 (holding that of Christ in the New Testament was these words import wantonness and an allegorical_one. Rex v. Woolston, a wicked and malicious disposition in Fitzg. 64, 94 Reprint 655, Str. 834, 93 their utterance, and that after con- Reprint_881. And see Cowan v. Milviction it will be intended that the bourn, L. R. 2 Exch. 230 (where it words were so uttered, and were not was held that a discourse maintainuttered in a serious discussion on ing that the character of Christ is any controverted point in religion). defective and his teachings mislead(2) "Christ is a whoremaster and re-ing and that the Bible is no more inligion is a cheat, and profession a spired than any other book is blascloak . . .'fear neither God, devil, nor phemy, and that therefore a contract man. Christ is a bastard, and to let rooms could be avoided by dedamn all Gods of the Quakers," etc. fendant who is sued thereon, where Rex v. Tayler, 3 Keb. 607, 84 Reprint the purpose of plaintiff was to use 906, Vent. 293, 86 Reprint 189. (3) the rooms for the purpose of deliv*Author of "Abortion" 1 C. J. 307, "Admiralty" 1 C. J. 1241, "Aliens" 2 C. J. 1039, "Ambassadors and Consuls" 2 C. J. 1297, "Animals" 3 C. J. 1, "Annuities" 3 C. J. 199, "Appearances" 4 C. J. 1312, "Army and Navy" 5 C. J. 289, "Asylums," 5 C. J. 1416, "Attorney and Client" 6 C. J. 556, "Attorney-General" 6 C. J. 804, "Bastards," 7 C. J. 935, "Inspection" 22 Cyc 1363, "Novation" 29 Cyc 1129, "Obscenity" 29 Cyc 1314, "Piracy" 30 Cyc 1626, "Post Office" 31 Cyc 970, "Salvage" 35 Cyc 716, "Towage" 38 Cyc 553, "Weights and Measures" 40 Cyc 879, "Wharves" 40 Cyc 892; and joint author of "Religious Societies" 34 Cyc 1112, "Street Railroads" 36 Cyo 1338.

[d] Relaxation of oaths.-In Reg. v. Hetherington, 5 Jur. 529, it was argued that to cast disgrace on the old testament was not blasphemy because it was no longer necessary that witnesses should be sworn on the Bible or the New Testament, but the court held that this proposition could not be acceded to without saying that there was no mode by which religion holds society together but by the administration of oaths, which is not so.

2. Ex p. Delaney, 43 Cal. 478; State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553; Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206, 213. And see dissenting opinion of Morton, J., in Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206, 239.

"In general, blasphemy may be described, aş consisting in speaking

(1)

may be classified under the following heads:
Denying the being and providence of God; (2) con-
tumelious reproaches of Jesus Christ, profane and
malevolent scoffing at the scriptures, or exposing any
part of them to contempt and ridicule; (3) certain
immoralities tending to subvert all religion and mo-
rality which are the foundations of all governments.3
These are substantially the same as the common-law
offenses against religion mentioned by Hawkins.
all the different descriptions of the offense, one idea
is common, which is the willful denial of God and
of His creation and government of the world, with
an intent and purpose to impair and to destroy the
reverence due Him.5

In

Profanity distinguished. Blasphemy and profanity agree in expressing the irreverent use of words, but the former is the stronger and the latter the wider. Profanity is language irreverent toward God or holy things, covering especially all oaths that, litII. NATURE AND

erally interpreted, treat lightly the attributes or acts of God. Blasphemy is generally more direct, intentional, and defiant in its impiety, and is directed toward the most sacred things in religion. It is in this latter sense that blasphemy is considered here. Yet the expression is sometimes used as characterizing terms employed by one who is charged with profanity or profane cursing, in the sense of profanity as above interpreted, as where the charge is of profanely and blasphemously swearing in a public place, it being obvious that the offense charged is not a direct attempt to revile the Deity or the christian religion, and that the contempt into which these sacred things are brought by the use of the language employed is only an incident to the actual offense.

Heresy distinguished. Blasphemy and heresy are offenses of a different nature. Heresy is crimen judicii, an erroneous opinion; blasphemy is crimen malitiæ, a reviling of the name and the honor of God." ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE

honor and contempt of Almighty
God," and this was said to be an in-
dictment for blasphemy. Com. v.
Spratt, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 365. (2) But
in this state there were two statutes,
one against profanity, and the other
against blasphemy, the former pro-
viding a punishment for persons over
a certain age who should "profanely
curse or swear by the name of God,
Jesus Christ, or the Holy Ghost," and
the latter providing a punishment for
any person who should "wilfully, pre-
meditatedly and despitefully, blas-
pheme or speak wilfully and pro-
fanely of Almighty God, Jesus
Christ, the Holy Ghost, or the Scrip-
tures of Truth," and on an indict-
ment charging that defendant "did,
on the public streets and highways,
profanely curse and swear and take
the name of God in vain, to the evil
example and to the common nui-
sance," etc., it was held that the in-
dictment could not be sustained un-
der the statute against blasphemy,
because it did not charge that of-
fense; that it could not be sustained
under the statute against profanity,
because it was not framed under that
act, and that it could not be sustained
as charging a common-law offense,
because it did not charge the facts
and circumstances necessary to make
the swearing a common nuisance.
Com. v. Linn, 158 Pa. 22, 27 A 843,
22 LRA 353 and note. (3) These kin-
dred offenses, however, seem to be
punishable on the same general prin-
ciple. 2 Bishop New Crim. L. § 76
note. See also Breach of the Peace
[5 Cyc 1023]; Disorderly Conduct
[14 Cyc 466]; Profanity [32 Cyc
578].

[2] A. Written or Oral. The writing, print- constitute a blasphemous libel." But while the libel ing, and publishing of blasphemous language will may be technically a distinct offense from blasphemy ering such lectures); Nayler's Case, 5 | Tr. 927 (which also was a prosecu- | and blasphemous words following, to How. St. Tr. 802 (where, in 1656, de- tion for the publication of Paine's wit, Jesus Christ, to the great disfendant was convicted of horrid blas- Age of Reason, similar to the case phemy, in a proceeding in the house last mentioned with respect to the of commons, for having assumed the trial and the attitude of the court gesture, words, honor, worship, and on the questions involved). But see miracles of the blessed Saviour, and Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox C. C. 217, the names and incommunicable at- 219; Reg. v. Ramsey, 1 Cab. & E. tributes and titles of the blessed 126 (where the alleged libel consistSaviour, a part of his offense having ed of the publication, in a paper consisted in having ridden through a called the Freethinker, of these town, his company spreading their words: "The God whom Christians garments and singing "Holy, Holy" love and adore is depicted in the before him, and going bareheaded Bible with a character more bloodbefore his horse). (6) A publication thirsty than a Bengal tiger or a which questions or casts disgrace on Bashi-Bazouk. He is credited with the old testament. Reg. v. Hether- all the vices and scarcely any of the ington, 5 Jur. 529. (7) A statement | virtues of a painted savage. Wanthat "the Holy Scriptures were a ton cruelty and heartless barbarity mere fable: that they were a contradiction, and that although they contained a number of good things, yet they contained a great many lies." Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394. And see Reg. v. Petcherini, 7 Cox C. C. 79 (where defendant was convicted on an indictment charging him with having contemptuously and blasphemously burned and destroyed a certain authorized version of the Holy Scriptures, it appearing that the only fact submitted to the jury was whether any copy of the Holy Scriptures or any Bible of the authorized version was burned, the court holding that any conduct tending to bring christianity or the christian religion into dis respect or to expose it to hatred and contempt is an offense both against God and the common law of the land). (8) Publication of Paine's Age of Reason. Williams' Case, 26 How. St. Tr. 654, 655 (where, in an opinion to the society whose object was the preservation of the morals of the people, before the institution of these proceedings, Mr. Bayley said: "We do not meddle about any differences in opinion, and . . . we interpose only where the very root of Christianity itself is struck at, as it plainly is, by this allegorical scheme. The New Testament, and the whole relation of the life and miracles of Christ being denied." He seems to have been speaking with reference to whether the publication in question was punishable as a temporal offense, but on the trial Lord Kenyon, in summing up, virtually left the jury no discretion but to convict, which they did instantly, and he considered christianity a part of the law of the land in the sense that to asperse it was to violate the law). See also Eaton's Case, 31 How. St.

are his essential characteristics. If
any despot at the present time tried
to emulate, at the expense of his
subjects, the misdeeds of Jehovah,
the great majority of Christian men
would denounce his conduct in terms
of indignation." Coleridge, C. J., left
the question of intent to the jury).
Referring to the last case, Mr.
Bishop says: "Therefore, with us,
while probably the English case just
cited would be followed, the older
ones can be received only in a sort
of general way, not as being in all
particulars applicable here and now.
For example, it is not probable that
generally in our courts a conviction
could be obtained against a publisher
of Paine's 'Age of Reason.'
we have no established form of re-
ligion, libels on particular formali-
ties of worship might not be in-
dictable here to the extent to which
they formerly would have been and
perhaps would be now in England, if
directed against the formalities of
the English Church." 2 Bishop New
Cr. L. p 46 note.

And as

3. Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394.

4. 1 Hawkins P. C. 358. 5. Com. V. Kneeland, (Mass.) 206.

6. Century D.

8.

802.
9.

Nayler's Case, 5 How. St. Tr.

Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167, 5 ECL 104, 106 Reprint 624; Rex v. 20 Pick. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161, 5 ECL 101, 106 Reprint 621; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 28, 8 ECL 12, 107 Reprint 11; Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox C. C. 217; Eaton's Case, 31 How. St. Tr. 927; Williams' Case, 26 How. St. Tr. 654.

7. Young v. State, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 165; State v. Steele, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 135; State V. Graham, .3 Sneed (Tenn.) 134.

[a] Illustrations.—(1) Where the indictment charged that defendant "did wickedly, wilfully, premeditatedly and despitefully, utter and with a loud voice, and in the presence and hearing of divers of the citizens of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania aforesaid, did publicly and proclaim of and concerning Jesus Christ, the false, scandalous, malicious, wicked

[a] A correct account of proceedings in court cannot be published if such account contains matter of a scandalous, a blasphemous, or an immoral tendency; and it is a ground for a criminal information. Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167, 5 ECL 104, 106 Reprint 624. See also opinion of Mr. Bayley in Williams' Case, 26 How. St. Tr. 654.

[ocr errors]

committed by spoken words, and may be differently charged, yet the same act may, and often does, constitute both offenses, and the charge of blasphemy may be predicated of words written as well as of words spoken orally.10

Separate publications by several sales of copies. Every copy of a libel sold by a defendant is a separate publication, and subjects him to a distinct prosecution.11

[3] B. As Temporal Offense-1. In General. While the ecclesiastical courts punished blasphemy as an offense against God,12 it was not so viewed by the temporal courts but was treated independently of religious establishment as affecting the essential interests of civil society only, as imperiling the good order of society, or as tending directly to a breach of the peace. In this sense it was punishable as a com

10. Cal. Ex p. Delaney, 43 Cal. 478.

Del.-State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553 (where it was said that a written publication of blasphemous words would urdoubtedly be considered as an aggravation of the offense).

Mass.-Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 211.

N. Y.-Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 5 AmD 335.

Eng.-Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 8 ECL 12, 107 Reprint 11; Atwood's Case, Cro. Jac. 421, 79 Reprint 359; Rex v. Tayler, 3 Keb. 607, 84 Reprint 906, Vent. 293, 86 Reprint 189.

"Although these offences are in many respects, technically distinct, and may be differently charged, yet the same act may and often does constitute both. . . The latter consists in blaspheming the holy name of God, by denying, cursing or contumeliously reproaching God, his creation, government or final judging of the world; and this may be done by language orally uttered, which would not be a libel; but it is not the less blasphemy, if the same thing be done by language written, printed and published, although when done in this form it also constitutes the offence of libel." Com. v. Kneeland, supra. 11. Rex v. Carlisle, 1 Chit. 451, 18 ECL 248.

mon-law offense,13 although it has been the subject of statute both in England 14 and in this country.15 Many of these statutes did not abrogate the common law but only gave a cumulative punishment.16 If the crime is not defined by statute, the court will go to the common law for the legal definition of it.17

[§ 4] 2. Christianity as Part of Law of Land. The cases generally approve the statement, in connection with the offense of blasphemy, that christianity, the prevailing religion of the country, is parcel of the law.18 This must be taken, however, in connection with what has been said as to the nature of the offense as a temporal one;19 and, it is apprehended, means, not that the violation of religious precepts is to be punished as a temporal offense, but that notice is to be taken of the prevailing religion

to an admiralty decision. State v.
Chandler, 2 Del. 553.

13. Ala.-Goree v. State, 71 Ala. 7.
Cal.-Ex p. Delaney, 43 Cal. 478.
Del.-State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553.
N. Y.-Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns.
290, 5 AmD 335.

Pa.-Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. 394.

Eng.-Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161, 5 ECL 101, 106 Reprint 621; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 8 ECL 12, 107 Reprint 11; Shore v. Atty.-Gen., 9 Cl. & F. 355, 8 Reprint 450; Rex v. Woolston, Fitzg. 64, 94 Reprint 655, Str. 834, 93 Reprint 881; Williams' Case, 26 How. St. Tr. 654; Reg. v. Hetherington, 5 Jur. 529; Rex v. Tayler, 3 Keb. 607, 84 Reprint 906, Vent. 293, 86 Reprint 189; Atty.Gen. v. Pearson, 3 Meriv. 353, 36 Reprint 135, 5 ERC 689.

[a] Misdemeanor. Blasphemy was a misdemeanor at common law. Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161, 5 ECL 101, 106 Reprint 621; Rex v. Tayler, 3 Keb. 607, 84 Reprint 906, Vent. 293, 86 Reprint 189.

14. 9 and 10 Wm. III c 32.

15.
16.

See statutory provisions.
Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161,
5 ECL 101, 106 Reprint 621. And see
cases infra this note.

[a] In New Jersey it was held
that the Crimes Act in that state
(Gen. St. [1895] p 1061. § 66) pro-
hibiting blasphemy did not abrogate
the common law, and that therefore
a blasphemer might be indicted under
either law. State v. Rosenstrauch, 5
N. J. L. J. 186.

12. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553. [a] Ecclesiastical jurisdiction.(1) The ecclesiastical tribunals assumed jurisdiction of all offenses purely against God and the Holy Scriptures, pro salute animæ, with- [b] In England (1) it was held out reference to the mere effect of that 9 & 10 Wm. III was to give sesuch offenses on the peace of so- curity to the government by renderciety, which the common law never ing men who entertained opinions did. Caudrey's Case, 5 Coke 1a, 77 hostile to the established religion inReprint 1; Rex v. Curl, Str. 788, 93 capable of holding office, the only Reprint 849. (2) Indictments for ma- penalty imposed being the exclusion liciously blaspheming God or the from office, and that penalty being infounder of the christian religion were curred by any manifestation of the sustained because such blasphemy dangerous opinion without proof of tended to subvert peace and good the intention either to induce others order which it was bound to protect, to be of that opinion or in any manbut no indictment for a mere sinner to disturb persons of a different against God as a common-law of- persuasion, and that the common-law fense was sustained where this ob- offense of blasphemy remained. Rex ject of its care was not affected. v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161, 5 ECL 101, While the ecclesiastical courts punished blasphemy as an offense against God, their punishments superseded the necessity for any procedure at common law for a mere temporal offense, but when the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction of the offense against God the common law had jurisdiction of the temporal offense. But the common-law judges, by yielding up that jurisdiction to the ecclesiastical courts and refusing to reverse or to revise their decisions when incidentally or collaterally presented in a common-law court, did no more intend by that to acknowledge the laws of holy church as common law than they intended to acknowledge admiralty law as common law when they gave faith and

redit

106 Reprint 621; Rex v. Woolston,
Fitzg. 64, 94 Reprint 655, Str. 834,
93 Reprint 881; Atty.-Gen. v. Pearson,
3 Meriv. 353, 36 Reprint 135, 5 ERC
689. (2) So 53 Geo. III which re-
moved the penalties imposed by 9 &
10 Wm. III on persons denying the
Trinity, and extended to such per-
sons the benefits conferred on all
other protestant dissenters by 1 Wm.
& M., did not alter the common law
as to blasphemous libel. Rex V.
Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 8 ECL 12,
107 Reprint 11; Atty.-Gen. v. Pear-

son, supra.

17. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553.
18.
State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553,
556; Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.)
290, 294, 5 AmD 335; Updegraph v.
Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394, 401;

Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 28, 8 ECL 12, 107 Reprint 11 (where, on holding a publication a blasphemous libel at common law and that the statute which made other penalties was merely cumulative, Best, J., said that "the legislature has never altered this law, nor can it ever do so whilst the Christian religion is considered to be the basis of that law"); Lord Hale in Rex v. Tayler, 3 Keb. 607, 84 Reprint 906, Vent. 293, 86 Reprint 189.

"The people of this state, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order. Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to declare such profanity lawful. It would go to confound all distinction between things sacred and profane; for, to use the words of one of the greatest oracles of human wisdom, 'profane scoffing doth by little and little deface the reverence for religion;' and who adds, in another place, 'two principal causes have I ever known of atheism-curious controversies and profane scoffing." (Lord Bacon's Works, vol. 2. 291. 503.) Things which corrupt moral sentiment, as obscene actions, prints and writings, and even gross instances of seduction, have, upon the same principle, been held indictable; and shall we form an exception in these particulars to the rest of the civilized world? No government among any of the polished nations of antiquity, and none of the institutions of modern Europe, (a single and monitory case excepted,) ever hazarded such a bold experiment upon the solidity of the public morals, as to permit with impunity, and under the sanction of their tribunals, the general religion of the community to be openly insulted and defamed. The very idea of jurisprudence with the ancient law-givers and philosophers, embraced the religion of the country. Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia. (Dig. b. 1. 10. 2. Cic. De Legibus, b. 2 passim)." Peo. v. Ruggles, supra.

[a] Lord Mansfield, in a speech in Chamberlain of London v. Evans [cit State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553, 556; Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394, 401], is reported to have said: "The eternal principles of natural religion are part of the common law; the essential principles of revealed religion are part of the common law; so that any person reviling, subverting, or ridiculing them, may be prosecuted at common law." 19. See supra § 3.

of the country for the purpose of punishing such attacks as tend to destroy the peace of society.20 It has been said that christianity, although a part of the common law of the state, is only so in the qualified sense that its divine origin and truth are admitted.21 It has been doubted whether the punishment of blasphemy is based necessarily on an admission of the divine origin or truth of the christian religion, or that it is incapable of being otherwise justified;22 and the proposition that because christianity is part of the law of the land any attack on its principles is an offense has been denied.23

Other religions may be attacked without any liability to prosecution being incurred.24

[5] C. Intent-1. In General. The rule is that the utterance or publication must be with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty of the Deity, or purposely to hold up the christian religion

to contempt or ridicule,20
25 as the offense is crimen
malitiæ.20 It is to be collected from the offensive
levity, scurrilous and opprobrious language, and
other circumstances whether the act of the party was
malicious.27

By statute the offense is sometimes defined as the
"'wilful" 11 28
17 29
or "profane" use of specified lan-
guage. Where the statute merely denounces the of-
fense by name, malice or intent is an essential ele-
ment as at common law.30

Drunkenness is no excuse but only aggravates the offense.31

[6] 2. Respectful Discussion; Religious Freedom. At an early date it was intimated that blasphemy did not embrace disputes between learned men on controverted points,32 and in more modern times the doctrine is recognized, both in the English 33 and in the American 34 cases, that, as contra

27. Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394.

cussion hostile to the inspiration insult, and mislead others, by means
or perfect purity of the Hebrew of licentious and contumelious abuse
Scriptures was against the law of applied to sacred subjects, or by wil-
the land, refused to assent thereto, ful misrepresentations or artful
and said: "It is founded, as it seems sophistry, calculated to mislead the
to me upon misunderstood expres- ignorant and unwary, is the criterion
sions in the judgment of great judges and test of guilt." Coleridge, L. C.
in former times, who have said, no J., in his charge to the jury, in Reg.
doubt, that, inasmuch as Chris- v. Ramsey, Cab. & E. 126, 137.
tianity is in a sense part of the law .[b] The bare denial of christian-
of the land, and as Christianity ity is no ground for a prosecution
adopts and assumes the truth, in for blasphemy, as malice is essen-
some sense or other, of inspiration, | tial. Reg. v. Ramsey, Cab. & E. 126.
and in some sense or other assumes 26. Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.
the purity of the Hebrew Scriptures, Y.) 290, 5 AmD 335.
anything which assails the truth of
Christianity, or asperses the purity
of the Hebrew Scriptures, however
respectfully, is a breach of the law.
I fail to see the consequence from
the premises, because you may at-
tack anything that is part of the law
of the land, in respectful terms,
without committing a crime or a mis-
demeanour, otherwise no alteration in
any part of the law could ever be
advocated by anybody. Monarchy is
part of the law of the land; primo-
geniture is part of the law of the
land; the laws of marriage are part
of the law of the land; and delib-
erate and respectful discussion upon
the first principles of government,
upon the principles of the law of in-
heritance, upon the principles which
should govern the union of the sexes,
on that principle, so far as I can see,
would be an indictable libel. The
consequence appears to me SO ex-
treme and untenable as to show that
the premises must be wrong").

20. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553 (where it is said that the people of the state have a full and perfect constitutional right to change their religion as often as they see fit, and that whatever religion they thus prefer the offense of blasphemy would be committed by publicly reviling it, on the principle that the religion of the choice of the people must thus be protected in order to protect the peace and welfare of society); Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465, 3 AmR 558 (where Sharswood, J., said, referring to the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom, that it was in entire consistency to hold that even if christianity is no part of the law of the land it is the popular religion of the country, an insult to which would be indictable as directly tending to destroy the public peace). 21. Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. (U. S.) 127, 198, 11 L. ed. 205 (where Story, J., said: "It is also said, and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania. But this proposition is to be received with its appropriate qualifications, and in connection with the bill of rights of that state, as found in its constitution of government. The constitution of 1790, (and the like provision will, in substance, be found in the constitution of 1776, and in the existing constitution of 1838,) expressly declares, "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with [a] Reason for rule.-(1) "A perthe rights of conscience; and no pref- son may, without being liable to erence shall ever be given by law to prosecution for it, attack Judaism, any religious establishment or modes or Mahomedanism, or even any sect of worship.' Language more com- of the Christian Religion, (save the prehensive for the complete protec- established religion of the country); tion of every variety of religious and the only reason why the latter ' opinion could scarcely be used; and is in a different situation from the it must have been intended to ex- others is, because it is the form estend equally to all sects, whether tablished by law, and is therefore a they believed in Christianity or not, part of the constitution of the counand whether they were Jews or in- try. In like manner, and for the fidels. So that we are compelled to same reason, any general attack on admit that although Christianity be Christianity is the subject of crima part of the common law of the inal prosecution, because Christianity state, yet it is so in this qualified is the established religion of the sense, that its divine origin and country." Alderson, B., in Gathertruth are admitted, and therefore it cole's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 237, 254. (2) is not to be maliciously and openly The reason is stated "that the case reviled and blasphemed against, to assumes that we are a christian peothe annoyance of believers or the in-ple, and the morality of the country jury of the public"). is deeply ingrafted upon christian22. Cooley Const. Lim. (3d ed) pity." Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.

472.

23. Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox C. C. 217. 225 (where Coleridge, C. J., referring to the view that any attack on the fundamental principles of the christian religion and any dis

24. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553; Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290, 5 AmD 335; Gathercole's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 237.

Y.) 290, 295, 5 AmD 335.

25. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553; Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394; Cooley Const. Lim. (3d ed) p 474.

[a] "A wilful intention to pervert,

28. Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206 (where the word "wilfully" was held to mean not merely "voluntarily" but with a bad purpose, and in the blasphemy statute was construed to mean an intended design to disparage the Supreme Being and to destroy the veneration due to him).

29. Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 394; Com. v. Spratt, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 365.

30. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553 (holding that the court will go to the common law for the definition of this offense, and that whether expressly laid in the indictment, or whether the indictment follows the words of the statute, malice or intent is traversable as an essential part of the offense).

31.
Peo. v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. (N.
Y.) 14; Kinninmount's Case, 1 Hume
Cr. L. (2d ed) 517.

Drunkenness as defense to crime see Criminal Law [12 Cyc 172].

32. Rex v. Woolston, Fitzg. 64. 94 Reprint 655, Str. 834, 93 Reprint 881. See also Gathercole's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 237.

33.

Reg. v. Ramsey, Cab. & E. 126; Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox C. C. 217. See also supra note 23; infra note 48.

34. Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206, 220; Peo. v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290, 5 AmD 335.

"It does not prohibit the fullest inquiry, and the freest discussion, for all honest and fair purposes, one of which is, the discovery of truth. It admits the freest inquiry, when the real purpose is the discovery of truth, to whatever result such inquiries may lead. It does not prevent the simple and sincere avowal of a disbelief in the existence and attributes of a supreme, intelligent being, upon suitable and proper occasions. And many such occasions may exist; as where a man is called as a witness, in a court of justice, and questioned upon his belief, he is not only permitted, but bound, by every consideration of moral honesty, to avow his unbelief, if it exist. He may do it inadvertently in the heat of debate,

« 이전계속 »