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the proper clerk or bookkeeper;39 to the officers of another bank occupying the premises of the specified bank at which the note is payable; or to a receiver of the bank at his office.41 But it is not sufficient to make presentment out of banking hours to a clerk of the bank who has no authority to pay the paper, nor any control of the funds;*2 but where the presentment is otherwise sufficient 48 or unnecessary,** as where a bank is closed when a notary calls during business hours with paper payable there, the fact that he afterward makes demand on one who has been, but is no longer, an employee of the bank, does not affect the sufficiency of the demand at the bank or the failure to make it.46

43

45

[781] 3. Where Several Are Primarily Liablea. In General. If several persons who are not partners have joined as makers or acceptors of a note or a bill, presentment must be made to all, unless there is sufficient excuse.48 This is true, although one may in reality be surety for the other joint maker and known to be such by the indorsee.49 The same rule has been applied by some of the courts in 39. Armor v. Lewis, 16 La. 331; Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 443.

[a] Delivery of check to bank porter. The delivery of a bank check by one bank to the porter of another bank on which the check is drawn, and the return of the same as not good, accompanied by evidence of the invariable practice of the porter to present checks thus received and to return them if dishonored on the same day as that on which they are delivered to him is sufficient proof of presentment to authorize the submission of the case to the jury. Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 443.

40. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 73 Mo. 327; Union Bank v. McKilligan, 4 Man. 29.

41. Hutchison V. Crutcher, 98 Tenn. 421, 39 SW 725, 37 LRA 89; Ballard v. Burton, 64 Vt. 387, 24 A 769, 16 LRA 664. But see Schlesinger v. Schultz, 110 App. Div. 356, 96 NYS 383 (holding that a note made payable at a national bank which has been placed in the hands of a receiver need not be presented to the receiver for payment, the receiver having no authority to appropriate any money in his hands to the payment of the note); Jackson v. McInnis, 33 Or. 529, 54 P 884, 55 P 535, 72 AmSR 755, 43 LRA 128 (holding that a demand on the receiver of a bank which issued a certificate of deposit is insufficient to charge an in dorser, as the receiver is not an agent of the bank, nor authorized to pay the certificate).

[a] A certificate of deposit, payable on its return to the bank, may be presented to the receiver. Ballard v. Burton, 64 Vt. 387, 24 A 769, 16 LRA 664.

42. Newark India Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Bishop, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 48: Swan v. Hodges, 3 Head (Tenn.) 251. 43. See supra §§ 762-778. 44. See supra §§ 739-747. 45. See supra § 765. 46. Berg v. Abbott, 83 Pa. 177, 24 AmR 158 and note.

47. U. S. Tayloe v. Davidson, 23 F. Cas. No. 13,769, 2 Cranch C. C. 434. Iowa. Closz v. Miracle, 103 Iowa 198, 72 NW 502; Red Oak Bank v. Orvis, 40 Iowa 332; Blake v. McMillen, 33 Iowa 150, 22 Iowa 358; Allen v. Harrah, 30 Iowa 363.

Mass.-Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen 435; Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. 504, 41 AmD 541; Gilbert v. Field, 1 Pick. 413 note.

Mo.-Nave v. Richardson, 36 Mo.

130.

N. Y.-Shutts v. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 NE 588, 53 AmR 231; Gates v.

Beecher, 60 N. Y. Willis v. Green, 5 351.

the case of a joint and several note,50 but other courts have held that a demand on one of the several makers of such a note is sufficient.51

The Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that, where there are several persons, not partners, primarily liable on the instrument, and no place of payment is specified, presentment must be made. to them all.52

[§ 782] b. Partners. If a note is made by a firm, or if a bill is drawn on, or accepted by, a firm, presentment may be made to any one of the partners and need not be made to all.53 This is so in case of the dissolution of the firm, even though, it has been held, the holder has no actual knowledge of the dissolution;55 and if a partner dies before the maturity of a partnership note, demand is sufficient if made of the surviving partner." If all the partners are absent from their places of residence, presentment may be to the agent of one of them.57

56

The Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that, where the persons primarily liable on the instrument are liable as partners, and no place of 518, 19 AmR 207; [a] An informal demand on one Hill 232, 40 AmD of two joint makers is not a basis for charging indorsers. New York Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 145 App. Div. 669, 130 NYS 412.

[a] Under a statute (Mass. Pub. St. c 77 § 15), providing that persons becoming parties to a note by signature on the back thereof in blank before delivery shall be entitled to notice of nonpayment the same as an indorser, it is not necessary that demand for payment shall be made on all of those so signing in order to bind the others so signing. Legg v. Vinal, 165 Mass. 555, 43 NE 518.

48. Blake v. McMillen, 33 Iowa 150; Smith v. Little, 10 N. H. 526; McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Oh. St. 113.

[a] Where a joint note was executed by a husband and a wife and the husband deşerted his wife before maturity and could not be found, it was held that a demand on the wife was sufficient. McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Oh. St. 113.

[b] Note payable in particular town.-If some of the makers of a note reside in the particular town in which the note is made payable, it is sufficient for the holder to present it at their place of business or residence, unless the other maker who resides elsewhere gives notice at what place in that town he will be ready to pay it. Smith v. Little, 10 N. H. 526.

[c] If one of the joint makers of a note dies before maturity, demand is to be made of the surviving maker. Blake v. McMillen, 33 Iowa 150.

49. Britt v. Lawson, 15 Hun (N. Y.) 123.

50. U. S.-Tayloe v. Davidson, 23 F. Cas. No. 13,769, 2 Cranch C. C. 434.

Conn.-Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 367, 6 AmD 244. Iowa.-Blake v. McMillen, 22 Iowa

358.

Mass.-Union Bank V. Willis, 8 Metc. 504, 41 AmD 541. But compare Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401, 11 AmD 209 (where a demand made on one of the makers by an agent having the note with him was held sufficient).

N. Y.-Britt v. Lawson, 15 Hun 123: Willis v. Green, 5 Hill 232, 40 AmD 351.

Wash.-Benedict V. Schmieg, 13 Wash. 476, 43 P 374, 52 AmSR 61, 36 LRA 703 and note.

51. Hestres v. Petrovic, 1 Rob. (La.) 119; McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Oh. St. 113; Harris v. Clark, 10 Oh. 5; Greenough v. Smead, 1 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 516, 10 WestLJ 271 [aff 3 Oh. St. 415].

52. New York Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 145 App. Div. 669, 130 NYS 412.

53. U. S.-Greatrake v. Brown, 10 F. Cas. No. 5,743, 2 Cranch C. C. 541.

Ala.-Brown v. Turner, 15 Ala. 832. Iowa.-Mt. Pleasant Branch State Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa 306.

Minn.-Coon v. Pruden, 25 Minn.

105.

Mo.-St. Louis Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen, 52 Mo. 207; Hunter V. Hempstead, 1 Mo. 67, 13 AmD 468.

N. Y.-Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 19 AmR 207; Erwin v. Downs, 15 N. Y. 575; Otsego County Bank v. Warren, 18 Barb. 290. Eng.-Porthouse V. Parker, 1 Campb. 32.

Ont.-Michigan Bank v. Gray, 1 U. C. Q. B. 422.

[a] Apparent partnerships.-The rule applies if an acceptance is by an apparent partnership. Erwin v. Downs, 15 N. Y. 575.

[b] Note by partner to the firm.Where a note is made by a member of a firm to the order of the firm and is indorsed by it, the relation of the firm is that of indorser and demand on the maker is necessary to make the firm liable. Coon v. Pruden, 25 Minn. 105.

54. U. S.-Greatrake v. Brown, 10 F. Cas. No. 5,743, 2 Cranch C. C. 541 (in case of renewal note).

Ala.-Brown v. Turner, 15 Ala. 832. La.-Helme v. Middleton, 14 La. Ann. 484; Wogan v. Thompson, 9 La. Ann. 300.

Md.-Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill 194. Mo.-St. Louis Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen, 52 Mo. 207.

N. Y.-Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 19 AmR 207 [aff 3 Thomps. & C. 404].

Vt.-Ballard v. Burten, 64 Vt. 387, 24 A 769, 16 LRA 664.

[a] Thus a demand made on a member of a firm at the place which one of the firm said was their place of business was good, even though the partnership had been dissolved. St. Louis Fourth Nat. Bank V. Heuschen, 52 Mo. 207.

[b] Dissolution by bankruptcy is within the rule. Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 19 AmR 207 [aff 3 Thomps. & C. 404].

[c] A renewal note is within the rule. Greatrake v. Brown, 10 F. Cas. No. 5,743, 2 Cranch C. C. 541.

55. 56.

Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill 194. Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 635; Barlow v. Coggan, 1 Wash. T. 257.

57.

Brown v. Turner, 15 Ala. 832.

payment is specified, presentment for payment may be made to any one of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the firm.58

[ 783] 4. To Personal Representatives. If the acceptor or the maker dies before maturity of the paper, presentment should be made to his personal representative, if appointed, and if he can be found or his address is known,59 even though the indorser himself is an executor or an administrator.60 The rule applies, even though the executor or the administrator is temporarily absent, notwithstanding the notary is ignorant of the maker's death,61 and although the maker's estate is insolvent.62 If no personal representative has been appointed, payment of a note should be demanded at the last residence of the deceased maker,63 or it may be presented to the widow of the maker at such residence, she answering that it will not be paid at present, although she has nothing to do with the estate.65 Presentation of a note, payable thirty days after demand, to the administrator of the deceased maker as a claim against the estate is not a sufficient de

58. See statutory provisions. 59. Iowa.-Blake v. McMillen, 33 Iowa 150.

La.-Toby v. Maurian, 7 La. 493. Me.-Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16, 43 AmD 247.

Mo.-Frayzer v. Dameron, 6 Mo. A.

153.

N. Y.-Piper v. Hayward, 71 Misc. 41, 127 NYS 240.

S. C.-Price v. Young, 12 S. C. L. 339; Price v. Young, 10 S. C. L. 438.

[a] If a joint maker of a note dies before its maturity, demand must be made on his administrator. Blake v. McMillen, 33 Iowa 150.

[b] A notary who is informed at the residence of the maker of the latter's death should make demand of the heirs or representatives, and not merely of a colored woman on the place. Toby v. Maurian, 7 La.

493.

[blocks in formation]

61. Frayzer v. Dameron, 6 Mo. A. 153.

62. Gower v. Mcore, 25 Me. 16, 43 AmD 247.

63. Huff v. Ashcraft, 1 Disn. 277, 12 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 620 [rev 1 Disn. 60, 12 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 487].

64. Washington Bank v. Reynolds, 2 F. Cas. No. 954, 2 Cranch C. C. 289; Simon v. Reynaud, 10 La. Ann. 506. 65. Washington Bank v. Reynolds, 2 F. Cas. No. 954, 2 Cranch C. C. 289. 66. Chase v. Evoy, 49 Cal. 467. 67. Burrill V. Smith, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 291; Hale v. Burr, 12 Mass. 86; Davis v. Francisco, 11 Mo. 572, 49 AmD 98.

68. Reed v. Spear, 107 App. Div. 144, 94 NYS 1007.

[a] What constitutes reasonable diligence.-On the day when an installment on a rote became due, the holder went two or three times to the banking office of the administrator of the deceased maker to make presentment, but was unable to find him. He also sought him at a railroad station near the seat of his other business interests at a time when it might be expected he would be there. It was held to warrant a finding that the holder exercised reasonable diligence to present the note for payment, and hence an indorser would be liable on receiving sufficient notice of its dishonor. Reed v. Spear, 107 App. Div. 144, 94 NYS 1007. [b] So in England, if no place of payment is named. Bills Exch. Act § 45.

64

mand.66 Demand is unnecessary if a note matures after the death of the maker and before the expiration of the year during which the administrators cannot be sued.67

The Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that, where the person primarily liable on the instrument is dead, and no place of payment is specified, presentment for payment must be made to his personal representative, if such there be, and if, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, he can be found.68

In the case of partners, no demand need be made on the representative of a deceased partner, where the bill of exchange mentions no place for payment and was drawn on, and accepted by, the partners as such.69

[784] G. By Whom Made-1. In General. Presentment and demand may be made, not only by the holder of a bill or note himself, but also by any one having possession and authority from him to receive payment,70 unless there is some stipulation to the contrary;71 71 and the authority of an

69. Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 635. See Barlow v. Coggan, 1 Wash. T. 257 (holding that demand for payment of a note executed by a firm should be made on the surviving partners, and not on the executor of a partner who died before maturity of the note). S. V. Barker, 12

70. U. S.-U. Wheat. 559, 6 L. ed. 728. Ala.-Eason v. Isbell, 42 Ala. 456. Cal.-Garthwaite v. Tulare Bank, 134 Cal. 237, 66 P 326.

Ill.-W. A. Fowler Paper Co. v. Bert Jones Sales Book Co., 183 Ill. A. 310; Ewen v. Wilbor, 99 Ill. A. 132 [aff 208 111. 492, 70 NE 575].

Iowa.-Citizens' Bank v. Pleasantville First Nat. Bank, 135 Iowa 605, 113 NW 481, 13 LRANS 303; Mt. Pleasant Branch State Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa 306; Smith v. Rolstan, Morr. 87.

Me.-Foss v. Norris, 70 Me. 117; Warren v. Gilman, 17 Me. 360.

Md.-Agnew v. Gettysburg Bank, 2 Harr. & G. 478.

Mass.-Wright v. Vermont L. Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 302, 41 NE 303; Adams v. Farnsworth, 15 Gray 423.

Mo.-Nave v. Richardson, 36 Mo.

130.

N. Y.-Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96; Baer v. Leppert, 12 Hun 516; Utica Bank v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230. Wis.-Blakeslee v. Hewett, 76 Wis. 341, 44 NW 1105.

Eng. Tennant v. Strachan, 4 C. & P. 31, 19 ECL 393; Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp. 115.

[a] Presentment by banker's clerk.-Presentment for payment made by a banker's clerk has been held to be sufficient. Leftley V. Mills, 4 T. R. 170, 100 Reprint 955.

[b] Presentment by messenger of bank.-It has been held sufficient where a note held by a bank was presented for payment by the messenger of the bank acting under the authority and direction of the cashier. Baer v. Leppert, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 516.

[c] Presentment by officer. Where a sheriff was duly authorized to make demand and to receive pay ment, it was held that a demand made by him was sufficient. Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 267.

[d] The drawer of a bill may act as the agent of the holder in presenting it for payment. Mt. Pleasant Branch State Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa 306.

[e] Demand may be made by the government or by its authorized officer, where the bill is held by the government. U. S. V. Barker, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 559, 6 L. ed. 728.

[f] Demand by the payee of a lost check-Where the addressee and payee of a check sent by mail never received the same, and it was paid by the drawee on a forged indorsement, a demand for payment by the payee was in legal contemplation as agent of the owner of the check, and was a good demand. Garthwaite v. Tulare Bank, 134 Cal. 237, 66 P 326.

[g] Demand by party on himself. -(1) "It seems to be a very clear proposition that a demand of payment made by John T. Smith & Co. of themselves is no demand at all. A demand should have been made by some third person authorized to receive the actual possession of the fund." Burch v. Newberry, 1 Barb. 648, 666 [aff 10 N. Y. 374, Seld. 28]. (2) But where the payee of a demand note died without having made demand, and two months thereafter the indorser on the note was made an administrator of his estate, and on the back of the note indorsed the words, "demand made for payment," defendant being the treasurer of the corporation maker of the note, it was held that the act of defendant in so indorsing the note was a demand by himself, as administrator, on himself, as treasurer, and that as indorser he necessarily had notice thereof. Yates v. Goodwin, 96 Me. 90, 51 A 804.

[h] Disputed title. The holder should present the note, although his right or title is disputed, as by reason of the indorser's bankruptcy. Jones v. Fort, 9 B. & C. 764, 17 ECL 340, 109 Reprint 284.

71. Farmers' Bank v. Johnson, 134 Ga. 486, 492, 68 SE 85, 137 AmSR 242, 30 LRANS 697; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Gastonia First Nat. Bank, 118 N. C. 783, 24 SE 524, 54 AmSR 753, 32 LRA 712.

"A check being in the nature of an order on a bank or banker to pay a certain sum purporting to be on deposit, there would seem to be no reason why the drawer could not direct the bank to pay only when presented through a specified channel or by a particular person or bank. The drawer is not compelled to make the check payable to bearer or order. Likewise no sound reason is perceived why, in giving direction to the bank of deposit, he cannot make an addition to the mere order for payment. If the person to whom the check is delivered is not willing to accept it with such direction, he can reject it; but if he accepts it payable only through a particular bank, or through a particular banker, he cannot insist that the bank on which it is drawn

agent need not be in writing.72 However, if the authority of a person presenting paper is questioned by the maker or the acceptor, and refusal to comply with the demand is based on a supposed want of authority, such authority must be shown.73 Presentment may be made by the personal representative of a deceased owner," by an assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency,75 or by a pledgee if he holds the note;76 and one who holds negotiable paper as collateral security for a debt due him should present it for payment." A power of attorney authorizing demand for payment is revoked by the death of the principal before such de

mand.78

79

77

It need not be made by a notary in order to charge indorsers, except according to some decisions in the case of a foreign bill.80

The Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that presentment for payment, to be sufficient, must be made by the holder, or by some person must disregard this direction given to it by its depositor on the face of the paper." Farmers' Bank v. Johnson, 134 Ga. 486, 492, 68 SE 85, 137 AmSR 242, 30 LRANS 697 and note.

[a] In case of a valid restriction stamped on the face of the check (1) that it will positively not be paid to a certain company or its agent, there must be a presentation to the drawee through some agency other than the one specified in order to hold the drawer of such a check. Commercial Nat. Bank V. Gastonia First Nat. Bank, 118 N. C. 783, 24 SE 524, 54 AmSR 753, 32 LRA 712. (2) A statement in a check that it is "payable" through a certain named bank in another city means that it is to be paid in that way and indicates the exclusive method of collection, instead of giving to the holder an option to present the check through that medium or through any other medium to the bank on which it is drawn. Where a check was drawn on a bank located in another town than the one in which the drawer resided, and immediately following the direction to the drawee bank, which was in the lower left-hand corner of the check, there were stamped, at the time the check was drawn, the words "payable through" a named bank in another city "at current rate," such words require the presentation of the check through the bank so named, and hence the drawee bank is not required to pay the check when presented directly by a third bank. Farmers' Bank v. Johnson, 134 Ga. 486, 68 SE 85, 137 AmSR 242, 3 LRANS 697 and note.

72. Gilbert V. Field, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 413 note; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 401, 11 AmD 209; Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 94; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 17 N. J. L. 487; Utica Bank v. Smith, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 230.

73. U. S.-Watt v. Potter, 29 F. Cas. No. 17,291, 2 Mason 77.

Miss.-Robertson v. Crane, 27 Miss. 362, 61 AmD 520.

N. H.-Ham v. Boody, 14 N. H. 27.

Tex.-Blankenship v. Berry, 28 Tex.

448.

Eng. Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp. 115; Solomons v. Dawes, 1 Esp. 83. [a] Statement of agent insufficient. A demand for money made by a clerk who shows no authority but his own statement that he has been sent for the purpose of obtaining it is not sufficient to sustain an action for the recovery of the money. Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp. 115.

74. White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray (Mass.) 258, 71 AmD 711.

[a] If such representative is not appointed until after maturity of the

authorized to receive payment on his behalf.81 It is held thereunder that a bank to whom a check was indorsed may present it to the drawee bank through the clearing house.82

[ 785] 2. Person in Lawful Possession of Paper. Presentment of a bill or a note for payment may be made by anyone lawfully in possession thereof, and possession at the time and place of payment is prima facie evidence of authority to demand payment.83 Paper payable to bearer or indorsed in blank is within this rule. However, if presentment is made by one wrongfully in possession of the paper, without authority from the owner, the indorser is not bound.85

[§ 786] 3. Foreign Bills. As a general rule, a foreign bill must be presented by a notary public,se and the weight of authority is to the effect that the notary must make the presentment personally and that it cannot be presented by his clerk or deputy,87 unless it is shown that there is an

paper, he may make demand within a reasonable time after his appointment. White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray (Mass.) 258, 71 AmD 711.

75 Hill v. Reed, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 280.

76. Jennison v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355; Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 3 N. Y. Super. 416.

Liability of pledgee for loss caused by his failure to present paper for payment see Pledges [31 Cyc 832].

77. Whitten v. Wright, 34 Mich. 92; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501, 83 AmD 756; Jennison v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355. See generally Pledges [31 Cyc 832].

78. Gale v. Tappan, 12 N. H. 145, 37 AmD 194.

79. Iowa.-Smith v. Ralston, Morr. 87.

La.-Marsoudet v. Jacobs, 6 Rob. 276; Harrison v. Bowen, 16 La. 282. Mass.-Gilbert v. Field, 1 Pick. 413

note.

N. J.-Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 17 N. J. L. 487.

N. Y.-Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96. 80. See infra § 786. 81. See statutory provisions. 82. Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 215 N. Y. 191, 197, 109 NE 179 (where the court said: "It is important to observe the distinction between presentment through the Clearing House and presentment at the Clearing House").

83. U. S.-U. S. Bank v. U. S., 2 How. 711, 11 L. ed. 439, 453; Picquet v. Curtis, 19 F. Cas. No. 11,131, 1 Sumn. 478.

Ala.-Hooper v. Herring, (A.) 70 S 308, 310 [cit Cyc].

Ill. Brinkley v. Going, 1 Ill. 366; W. A. Fowler Paper Co. v. Bert Jones Sales Book Co., 183 Ill. A. 310; Ewen v. Wilbor, 99 Ill. A. 132 [aff 208 Ill. 492, 70 NE 575].

Iowa. Smith v. Ralston, Morr. 87.
La.-Jex v. Tureaud, 19 La. Ann.
64; Follain v. Dupre, 11 Rob. 454;
Marsoudet v. Jacobs, 6 Rob. 276.
Md.-Agnew v. Gettysburg Bank, 2
Harr. & G. 478.

Mass.-Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick.
399; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 413; Hart-
ford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 94.
N. J.-Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 17
N. J. L. 487.

N. Y.-Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96, 10 HowPr 515; Baer v. Leppert, 12 Hun 516; Burbank v. Beach, 15 Barb. 326.

Pa.-Morris v. Foreman, 1 Dall. 193, 1 L. ed. 96, 1 AmD 235.

holder and owner of the note, may maintain an action thereon in his own name, and his possession is, in the absence of anything to show to the contrary, evidence that he is the bona fide holder and owner. Brinkley v. Going, 1 Ill. 366.

84. Ewen v. Wilbor, 99 Ill. A. 132 [aff 208 111. 492, 70 NE 575]; Cone v. Brown, 49 S. C. L. 262. To same effect Sprigg v. Cuny, 7 Mart. N. S. (La.) 253.

[a] If a bill of exchange, payable to a particular person, is indorsed in blank by him, but is made payable to a particular person by the last indorsement, it may be presented by the last indorser if he is in bona fide possession, without the indorsement of the last indorsee. Bachellor Priest, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 399.

85. Hofrichter V. Enyeart, Nebr. 771, 99 NW 658.

V.

71

86. U. S.-Sacrider v. Brown, 21 F. Cas. No. 12,205, 3 McLean 481.

Ala.-Donegan v. Wood, 49 Ala. 242, 20 AmR 275; Eason v. Isbell, 42 Ala. 456.

Ky.-Com. Bank v. Garey, 6 B. Mon. 626; Chenowith v. Chamberlin, 6 B. Mon. 60, 43 AmD 145. Mass.-Cribbs v. Adams, 13 Gray

597.

Miss.-Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 8 Miss. 294, 40 AmD 63; Carmichael v. Pennsylvania Bank, 5 Miss. 567, 35 AmD 408.

Mo.-Commercial dale, 36 Mo. 563.

Bank v. Barks

N. J.-Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 17 N. J. L. 487.

N. Y.-Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 269.

S. C.-Cape Fear Bank v. Stinemetz, 19 S. Č. L. 44. Bank, 7

Tenn.-Carter V. Union Humphr. 548, 46 AmD 89. Tex.-Locke v. Huling, 24 Tex. 311. Eng.-Leftley v. Mills, 4 T. R. 170, 100 Reprint 955.

[a] A justice of the peace, if ex officio a notary public, may make demand for payment of a bill or a note and may protest the same. Austen v. Miller, 2 F. Cas. No. 661, 5 McLean 153.

[b] Son of holder as notary-The relation which exists between a notary and the holder of commercial paper with regard to demand, protest, and notice to the drawer or the indorser is that of principal and agent, and a son of the holder of such paper, if he is a notary, may act as agent of his father in his notarial capacity. Eason v. Isbell, 42 Ala. 456.

[a] Illustrations.-(1) A presentation of a note for payment, made 87. U. S.-Sacrider v. Brown, 21 by a bank having it for collection, is F. Cas. No. 12,205, 3 McLean 481; sufficient. W. A. Fowler Paper Co. v. Whitehead v. Jones, 29 F. Cas. No. Bert Jones Sales Book Co., 183 Ill. A. 17,563, 2 McLean 28. But see Alexan310. (2) The payee of a negotiable dria Bank v. Wilson, 2 F. Cas. No. 856, note, with an indorsement thereon to 2 Cranchi C. C. 5 (holding that a dea third person, if he is the bona fidemand made by a notary's clerk who

established 88 usage or statute 89 to the con- where the note is protested, it is good everywhere.90 trary. If a demand by a notary's clerk is good

92

XXII.

PAYMENT AND DISCHARGE 91 [§ 787] A. General Considerations. A bill or a note may be satisfied or discharged (1) by actual payment or (2) by acts other than payment.93 If the instrument is discharged, all parties thereto, whether primarily or secondarily liable, are discharged; or, stated in another way, if the party primarily liable is discharged, the parties secondarily liable are also discharged.94 On the other hand, the discharge of parties secondarily liable does not necessarily discharge from liability parties primarily liable.95

which discharges the instrument; (2) by the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder;3 (3) by the discharge of a prior party; (4) by a valid tender of payment made by a prior party;5 (5) by a release of the principal debtor unless the holder's right of recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved; or (6) by any agreement binding on the holder to extend the time of payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved. This provision is also exclusive, and a party secondarily liable can be discharged in no other way. The Negotiable Instruments Law also expressly provides that the holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party to the instrument before, at, or after, its maturity.

[788] B. Payment-1. In General-a. Scope of Subdivision. The general rules relating to the law regulating payment are elsewhere considered.10 Herein are considered only the rules more or less peculiar to the law of bills and notes.

The Negotiable Instruments Law, in a separate article entitled "Discharge of Negotiable Instrument," expressly provides that a negotiable instrument is discharged: (1) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor;96 (2) by payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation;97 (3) by the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder; 98 (4) by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money;99 or (5) when the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right. This provision applies to persons primarily liable and is exclusive, so that such persons can be discharged in no other way by the acts of the parties. In the next following section of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is expressly provided that a person "secondarily" liable on the instrument is discharged: (1) By any act had possession of the note with the | cient. Commercial Bank v. Barksassent of the holder was sufficient); dale, 36 Mo. 563. Browning v. Andrews, 4 F. Cas. No. 2,040, 3 McLean 576 (holding that where a note was deposited with a bank for collection a demand made by the teller of the bank, acting as clerk of the notary public who protested the note, was sufficient).

Ala.-Donegan v. Wood, 49 Ala. 242,

[§ 789] b. Payment in Due Course. In order to operate as a discharge, payment must be made in due course; that is, at or after the maturity of the instrument, to the holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title to the paper is defective. This rule is reiterated by the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law referring to payNegotiability as dependent on provi

[b] In Kentucky the doctrine, as laid down in the text, with reference to presentment by notaries' clerks prevails. But a distinction has been drawn between presentment by a notary's clerk and a notary's deputy, it being held that, in the case of a deputy, official authority may be implied in him to make the demand. Ky. Commonwealth Bank v. Gar- Com. Bank v. Garey, 6 B. Mon. 626. ey, 6 B. Mon. 626; Chenowith V. 88. Ky.-Chenowith v. ChamberChamberlin, 6 B. Mon. 60, 43 AmDlin, 6 B. Mon. 60, 43 AmD 145. Md.-Atwell v. Grant, 11 Md. 101. · Mass.- -Ocean Nat. Bank v. Wil- Mass.-Ocean Nat. Bank v. Williams, 102 Mass. 141; Cribbs v. Ad- liams, 102 Mass. 141. ams, 13 Gray 597.

20 AmR 275.

145.

Miss. Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 8 Miss. 294, 40 AmD 63; Carmichael v. Pennsylvania Bank, 5 Miss. 567, 35 AmD 408.

Mo.-Commercial Bank v. Barksdale, 36 Mo. 563.

N. Y.-Gawtry v. Doane, 51 N. Y. 84; Hunt v. Maybee, 7 N. Y. 266; Gessner v. Smith, 2 NYS 655; Marsh v. Palmo, 1 CodeRep 13; Warnick v. Crane, 4 Den. 460; Onondaga County Bank v. Bates, 3 Hill 53.

S. C.-Williamson v. Turner, 2 S. C. L. 410, 1 AmD 652.

Tenn.-Carter V. Union Bank, 7 Humphr. 548, 46 AmD 89.

Tex.-Locke V. Huling, 24 Tex.

311.

Eng.-Leftley v. Mills, 4 T. R. 170, 100 Reprint 955.

[a] Presentment by notary's agent who is himself a notary.-Where two notaries were in partnership in general business and one of them undertook to present the bill and to make the demand, and the other undertook to draw up the protest and to give the notice, and it appeared that the former made the demand as the agent of his partner, the other notary, it was held that there could be no partnership in such matters, and that the presentment for payment was insuffi

Mo. 421.

sions in regard to see supra §§
211-219, 225-259.

Of check by bank see Banks and
Banking §§ 383-392.
Parol evidence to prove payment of
see Evidence [17 Cyc 495].
Presentment for payment see supra
§§ 736-786.

Rights, duties, and liabilities of bank
receiving a bill or note for collec-
tion see Banks and Banking §§
268-283.

Tender of see Tender [38 Cyc 1127]. Time of maturity as fixing time for see supra §§ 587-625.

92.

See infra §§ 788-847.

Mo.-Miltenberger v. Spaulding, 33

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N. Y.-Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 269 [rev 3 Lans. 86]. Va.-Nelson v. Fortterall, 7 Leigh (34 Va.) 179.

89. Ky.-Lee v. Buford, 4 Metc. 7.
La.-Buckley v. Seymour, 30 La.
Ann. 1341; Citizens' Bank v. Bry, 3
La. Ann. 630; State Bank v. Lawless,
3 La. Ann. 129; Follain v. Dupré, 11
Rob. 454.

Miss.-Dwight v. Richardson, 20
Miss. 325; Chew v. Read, 19 Miss. 182.
Tenn.-Union Bank v. Fowlkes, 2
Sneed 555; Carter v. Union Bank,
Humphr. 548, 46 AmD 89.

Tex.-Sheegog v. James, 26 Tex.

501.

90. McClane v. Fitch, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 599; Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 8 Miss. 294, 40 AmD 63.

91. Payment and discharge:
Generally see Payment [30 Cyc
1173].

Allowance of, by executors and ad-
ministrators see Executors and Ad-
ministrators [18 Cyc 408].
Application of payments by holder
see Payment [30 Cyc 1233].
Defense against bona fide purchaser
see infra § 1060.
Extension of time of see supra 88
626-665.

Arlington Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 214 Mass. 352, 101 NE 982 (declaratory of common law).

See infra §§ 815-818.

1.

2.

See infra § 849.

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See infra § 848 et seq.

10. See Payment [30 Cyc 1173]. 11. Fleece v. O'Rear, 83 Ind. 200; Bainbridge v. Louisville, 83 Ky. 285, 4 AmSR 153; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 545, 32 AmD 231; Torrance v. Bank of British North America, L. R. 5 P. C. 246; Scholey v. Ramsbottom, 2 Campb. 485; Lovell v. Martin, 4 Taunt. 799, 128 Reprint 545. [a] Good faith-Payment must be made and received in good faith. Fleece v. O'Rear, 83 Ind. 200; Torrance v. Bank of British North Amer-. ica, L. R. 5 P. C. 246; Scholey v. Ramsbottom, 2 Campb. 485; Lovell

ment as a discharge by adding the words "in due course," "' 12 and by defining a payment in due course as one made at or after the maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof, in good faith and without notice that his title is defective.13

such place, which are lost by the negligence of the holder in presenting the note, the maker is discharged.20 The parties may, by parol agreement, fix on a place for payment;21 but the place for payment cannot be assumed to be the place where a note is dated 22 or where it is made negotiable,23 although it is sometimes inferred from the circumstances that payment at the place where the note is dated was intended.24

Where no place for payment is designated in a bill of exchange, it is payable at the place named in the drawee's address 25 or at his residence;20 26 or, as against the drawer, at the place where the bill was drawn;27 and, as against an indorser, at the indorser's residence.28

[ 790] 2. Place of.14 Where no place of payment is expressed in a note, the place of payment is the makers residence or place of business,15 unless there is something in the note to indicate the contrary;16 and where a note is executed within the state and specifies no place of payment, it is prima facie payable within the state;" and where executed within the state where the maker resides, it is payable there, although the payee resides in another state.18 Generally the contract is to pay at the place where the note is made, if no other place is named;19 and where the maker provides funds at v. Martin, 4 Taunt. 799, 128 Reprint | would receive payment, and, on fail545. ure to elect, the maker could elect to make payment at a certain bank and give notice of his election to the holder. Stansbury v. Embrey, 128 Tenn. 103, 158 SW 991, 47 LRANS 980.

[b] Lost paper-Where the maker of a note has notice that it has been lost, he is liable to the true owner if he pays it to anyone except a bona fide holder for value before maturity, and it seems that in such a case the maker may require the person presenting the paper to establish his title. Bainbridge v. Louisville, 83 Ky. 285, 4 AmSR 153.

13.

12. See statutory provisions. See statutory provisions. 14. Cross references: See generally Payment [30 Cyc 1185]. Provisions in instrument as to see supra § 246-250.

15. U. S.-Campbell v. Clark, 4 F. Cas. No. 2,355a, Hempst. 67.

123

Iowa.-Baily V. Birkhofer, Iowa 59, 98 NW 594; Adair v. Egland, 58 Iowa 314, 12 NW 277; Hartford Bank v. Green, 11 Iowa 476. Tex.-Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Tex.

313.

Utah.-McCauley V. Leavitt, 10 Utah 91, 37 P 164. Wash.-Bardsley V. Washington | Mill Co., 54 Wash, 553, 103 P 822, 132 AmSR 1133.

Compare however Lockridge V. Stone, 7 Ky. Op. 35 (holding that, if the place for payment is not designated, a note is payable at the residence of the payee); McIntyre v. Michigan State Ins. Co., 52 Mich. 188, 17 NW 781 (to the effect that such a note is presumed to have been intended to be paid at the payee's residence).

[a] Rule applied where the note would be void for usury by the law of the place of execution, and where it was dated at the maker's place of residence. Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Tex. 313.

[b] In Utah, by statute, it is payable "at the residence or place of business of the maker, or wherever he may be found." McCauley v. Leavitt, 10 Utah 91, 37 P 164.

[c] If the post office address of the maker was stated to be in one county and the note was executed in another county, the court may find that the maker resided in either county. Adair v. Egland, 58 Iowa 314, 12 NW 277.

[d] Partnership notes are payable at the place of business of the firm, other notes made at the same time and in the same transaction having been made expressly payable there. Greenboum's Est., 173 Pa. 507, 33 A 224, 51 AmSR 774. 16. Harbor v. Morgan, 4 Ind. 158; Stansbury v. Embrey, 128 Tenn. 103, 158 SW 991, 47 LRANS 980.

[a] Thus, where a note was payable in money or in wheat, at the customary prices at a certain place, the wheat was to be delivered at that place. Harbor v. Morgan, 4 Ind. 158.

[b] The making of notes payable "at any bank" in a city authorized the maker to require the holder of the notes to elect a bank at which he

Note payable in specific property. The holder is not bound to receive the property at a place or on S. C.-Miller v. Thompson, 16 S. C. L. 526; Galpin v. Hard, 14 S. C. L. 394, 15 AmD 640.

[c] Note payable at "office" may be construed as meaning the office of the payee. Burnham v. Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co., 149 Mich. 84, 112 NW 704.

17. Ala.-Smith v. Robinson, 11 Ala. 270.

Iowa.-Equitable L. Ins. Co. V. Gleason, 56 Iowa 47, 8 NW 790. Ky.-German Nat. Bank v. Zimmer, 141 Ky. 401, 132 SW 1023.

Tex. Cook v. Crawford, 4 Tex. 420. W. Va.-Hefflebower v. Detrick, 27 W. Va. 16.

[a] Thus, where a note which specifies no place of payment is discounted within the state where it is executed, and continues to be owned and held within that state, it will be treated as payable within that state, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. German Nat. Bank v. Zimmer, 141 Ky. 401, 132 SW 1023.

[b] Where there is no proof of the place where the note was made (1) it will be presumed to have been made, and to be payable, within the state (Cook v. Crawford, 4 Tex. 420; Hefflebower v. Detrick, 27 W. Va. 16), (2) and that the place where it is dated is within the state (Smith v. Robinson, 11 Ala. 270; Equitable L. Ins. Co. v. Gleason, 56 Iowa 47, 8 NW 790).

18. Strawberry Point Bank v. Lee, 117 Mich. 122, 75 NW 444; Gage v. McSweeney, 74 Vt. 370, 52 A 969.

[a] Illustrations.—(1) Where a note which specifies no place of payment is executed and delivered at a place in the state where the maker resides and where the debt which it represents was contracted, the note is payable at such place, although the payee resided in another state when the note was given and continued to do so. Gage v. McSweeney, 74 Vt. 370, 52 A 969. (2) A note is payable where the maker resides, that being the place where it was dated and signed, although describing the payee as of another state. Strawberry Point Bank v. Lee, 117 Mich. 122, 75 NW 444.

19. Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253, 8 AmD 183.

20. See supra § 763.

21. Brent v. Metropolis Bank, 1 Pet (U. S.) 89, 7 L. ed. 65; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265; Rose v. McCracken, 20 Tex. Civ. A. 637, 50 SW 152.

22. U. S.-Burrows v. Hannegan, 4 F. Cas. No. 2,205, 1 McLean 309. Me.-Pierce v. Whitney, 22 Me. 113, 29 Me. 188.

N. Y.-Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Den. 145, 45 AmD 457; Bank of America v. Woodworth, 18 Johns. 315; Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. 114, 7 AmD 442. Pa-Lightner v. Will, 2 Watts &

S. 140.

no

Vt.-Blodgett v. Durgin, 32 Vt. 361. [a] Illustration.-A circumstance of a note being dated at a particular place, as Charleston, furnishes presumption of its being payable at that place, nor of its being intended to be so. It may afford a reasonable ground for presumption that the person making it was at Charleston when it was made, but there is no evidence that he meant to pay it there, or that he resided there. Miller v. Thompson, 16 S. C. L. 526.

23. Brent v. Metropolis Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 89, 7 L. ed. 65.

24. Ala.-Rudulph v. Brewer, 96 Ala. 189, 11 S 314 (where "J. L. Holmes' office" was designated by the date); Schuessler v. Watson, 37 Ala. 98, 76 AmD 348 (note is not made payable in California because it is payable "after my [the maker's] arrival in San Francisco").

Ill-Lewis v. Headley, 36 Ill. 433, 87 AmD 227.

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472.

N. Y.-Stewart v. Eden, 2 Cal. 121, 2 AmD 222.

R. I.-Hazard v. Spencer, 17 R. I. 561, 23 A 729 (where dated "Providence, R. I." and payable "at bank").

S. D.-Jones v. Fidelity L. & T. Co., 7 S. D. 122, 63 NW 553 (where it is secured by a mortgage in that state and contains the stipulation, "It is agreed that this note is executed and is to be construed under the laws" of such state).

Tex.-Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Tex.

313.

25. U. S.-Cox v. New York Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 704, 25 L. ed. 739.

Ill.-Abt v. American Trust, etc., Bank. 159 Ill. 467, 42 NE 856, 50 AmSR 175.

Md. Lizardi v. Cohen, 3 Gill 430. Mass.-Worcester Bank v. Wells, 8 Metc. 107.

N. J. Brownell v. Freese, 35 N. J. L. 285, 10 AmR 239. Okl.-Tulsa First Nat. Bank V. Muskogee Pipe Line Co., 40 Okl. 603, 605, 139 P 1136 [quot Cycl.

26. Collins v. Sabatier, 19 La. Ann. 299; Tulsa First Nat. Bank v. Muskogee Pipe Line Co., 40 Okl. 603, 605, 139 P 1136 [quot Cyc]; Mitchell v. Baring, 10 B. & C. 4, 21 ECL 12, 109 Reprint 352, 4 C. & P. 35, 19 ECL 395.

27. Brownell v. Freese, 35 N. J. L. 285, 10 AmR 239; Story v. McKay, 15 Ont. 169. But see Sharp v. Bailey, 9 B. & C. 44, 17 ECL 29, 109 Reprint 17 (where it was held that the bill is presumably accommodation paper if payable at the drawer's residence).

28. Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20; Powers v. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77; Hicks v. Brown, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 142; Potter v. Brown, 5 East 124, 102 Reprint 1016.

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