sume any greater liability than that of maker of the very instrument which he indorses.92

In Massachusetts, if the payee of a note, not negotiable, writes his name on the back, in blank, at the making of the note, he may be charged by the holder as an original promisor, or as a guarantor.9 93

Intent to become indorser. However, all the courts agree that a payee of a nonnegotiable note may become liable as an indorser by expressing such intent in his indorsement or otherwise, or by inducing the assignee to take it by an agreement to that effect.95

Liability to remote indorsees. As a rule, however, the liabilities which the court hold to have been created by an indorsement of a nonnegotiable instrument are limited to the immediate indorsee and do not extend to subsequent holders," although there is some authority to the contrary.97

In

[§ 74] b. Indorsement before Delivery.98 many of the states apparently no distinction is made in the decisions concerning irregular indorsers (indorsement of third person other than payee before delivery), between instruments which are negotiable in their character and those which are not, the presumptive liability of the indorser being the same in either case.99 Thus, in states, where, by the common law he was held to be a maker or guarantor,2 in case of a negotiable instrument, the note] good if it was not," he might be held as a guarantor of the solvency of the maker).

96. U. S.-Bradley v. Knox, 3 F. Cas. No. 1.782, 5 Cranch C. C. 297. Compare Codwise v. Gleason, 5 F. Cas. No. 2,939, 3 Day (Conn.) 12.

Cal-Kendall v. Parker, 103 Cal. 319, 37 P 401, 42 AmSR 117. Ky.-Jones v. Wood, 3 A. K. Marsh,

Mich.-Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150, 18 AmR 171.

Mo.-Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Mo. 74, 59 AmD 286; Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo. 440, 38 AmD 465.

S. C.-Cockrell v. Milling, 32 S. C. L. 444.

Tex.-Carr v. Rowland, 14 Tex. 275; Cook v. Southwick, 9 Tex. 615, 60 AmD 181.

Vt.-Barrows v. Lane, 5 Vt. 161, 26 AmD 293.

Va.-Orrick v. Colston, 7 Gratt. (48 Va.) 189.

W. Va.-Kidd v. Beckley, 64 W. Va. 80, 60 SE 1089; Young v. Sehon, 53 W. Va. 127, 44 SE 136, 97 AmSR 970 and note, 62 LRA 499; Long v. Campbell, 37 W. Va. 665, 17 SE 197.

See Baltimore Third Nat. Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 138, 34 AmR 304.

1. Mass.-Sweetser v. French, 13 Metc. 262.

Mich.-Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150, 18 AmR 171.

Mo.-Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Mo. 74, 59 AmD 286; Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo. 440, 38 AmD 465. See Herrick v. Edwards, 106 Mo. A. 633, 81 SW 466.

S. C.-Cockrell v. Milling, 32 S. C. L. 444. Compare Tucker v. English, 29 S. C. L. 673.

N. B.-Piers v. Hall, 18 N. B. 34. Compare McMurray v. Talbot, 5 U. C. C. P. 157.

2. Rogers v. Schulenburg, 111 Cal. 281, 43 P 899; San Diego First Nat. Bank v. Babcock, 94 Cal. 96, 29 P 415, 28 AmSR 94; Ranson v. Sherwood, 26 Conn. 437; Castle v. Candee, 16 Conn. 223; Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213, 29 AmD 282; Welton v. Scott, 4 Conn. 527; Huntington v. Harvey, 4 Conn. 124; Parker v. Rid

6

same rule has been applied to nonnegotiable paper. In some states, however, negotiable and nonnegotiable instruments are not governed by the same rules. Thus, in New York, such a signer is liable as maker or guarantor, according to his intention.* So in Indiana 5 and Wisconsin he is presumptively liable as an original promisor. In still other states, including Georgia, Iowa, New Jersey, North Carolina,10 Oklahoma,11 and Pennsylvania 12 it seems that there is no presumptive liability, but that his relation depends on the agreement under which his indorsement is made.

dle, 11 Oh. 102 (holding that, where
a stranger indorses a nonnegotiable
note, he is a guarantor and is en-
titled to demand). See also Culbert-
son v. Smith, 52 Md. 628, 36 AmR 384
(after delivery); Johnson v. Lassiter,
155 N. C. 47, 71 SE 23; McPhee v.
McPhee, 19 Ont. 603.

[a] In California one who writes
his name on the back of a nonnego-
tiable note to give credit thereto is
a guarantor and is prima facie bound
to pay
the note on the principal's
default, without demand or notice.
Tilden v. Goldy Mach. Co., 9 Cal. A.
9, 98 P 39.

8. Fear v. Dunlap, 1 Greene (Iowa)

331.

9. Absecom Bldg., etc., Soc. V. Leeds, 50 N. J. L. 399, 18 A 82, 5 LRA 353 (Dixon, J., dissenting); Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. L. 517, 524, 10 AmR 256 (where the court said: "In New York, a distinction has been made between the endorsement by one not the payee, of a note negotiable in form, and endorsements of notes which are not negotiable. As to the former, the contract is treated as one of endorsement; as to the latter, the endorser is regarded as maker or guarantor, and is not entitled to notice of dishonor. Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491, 100 AmD 527; Spies v. Gilmore, 1 N. Y. 321; Richards v. Warring, Keyes (N. Y.) 576; Hall v. Newcomb, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 416, 42 AmD 82. This distinction has been repudiated elsewhere (Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213, 29 AmD 282; Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 260; and cases cited in reporter's note to Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491) v.and cannot be maintained on any principle where it is held, as it is in this state, that the first endorsement by a person not a party to a note, creates no implied or commercial contract whatever"); Jacques v. Knight, 26 N. J. L. 92 note.

3. In re Wrentham Mfg. Co., 30 F. Cas. No. 18,063, 2 Lowell 119; Jordan v. Garnett, 3 Ala. 610 (holding that the engagement of an irregular indorser of a nonnegotiable note is that he will pay the debt if, by the use of proper diligence, it cannot be obtained from the maker. What would constitute such diligence would be a question of fact for the jury under all the circumstances of the case); Lumbermen's Nat. Bank Campbell, 61 Or. 123, 121 P 427 (liable as maker); Barr v. Mitchell, 7 Or. 346.

4. McMullen v. Rafferty, 89 N. Y. 456; Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491, 100 AmD 527; New York Security, etc., Co. v. Storm, 81 Hun 33, 30 NYS 605; Roe v. Hallett, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 128; Cawley v. Costello, 15 Hun (N. Y.) 303; Griswold v. Slocum, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 402; Paine v. Noelke, 43 N. Y. Super. 176 [aff 53 How Pr 273].

[a] It may be filled according to such intention. Richards v. Warring, 4 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 47, 1 Keyes 576.. 5. Pool v. Anderson, 116 Ind. 88, 18 NE 445, 1 LRA 712 and note (maker or surety); Wells v. Jackson, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 40; Oyler v. McMurray, 7 Ind. A. 645, 34 NE 1004.

6. Gorman v. Ketchum, 33 Wis. 427; Houghton v. Ely, 26 Wis. 181, 7 AmR 52.

or

7. Saussy v. Weeks, 122 Ga. 70, 71, 49 SE 809 (where the court said: "Where one who is neither maker nor payee of a nonnegotiable promissory note writes his name on the back of the note, either before after delivery to the payee, he becomes liable as indorser, guarantor, maker, or surety, according to the intention and agreement of the parties at the time he signs the paper. See 7 Cyc. 673-4. The decisions are by no means uniform, and some draw a distinction between cases where the signature is placed on the note before and after delivery; but we think the rule above stated the correct one.

The rule as above announced does not differ materially from the rule which prevails in cases of negotiable instruments. In both the real relation of the person whose signature is placed in blank on the back of the instrument is governed by the intention and agreement of the parties").

10. Crawford v. Lytle, 70 N. C. 385.

11. Steele v. Hudson, 30 Okl. 518, 120 P 616.

12. Leech v. Hill, 4 Watts (Pa.) 448; Lang v. Fegenbush, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 20.

13. Negotiable paper see infra §§ 739-747, 890-904, 958-998.

14. U. S.-Ish v. Mills, 13 F. Cas. No. 7,104, 1 Cranch C. C. 567.

Ga.-Gilbert v. Seymour, 44 Ga. 63. Iowa. Huse v. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501, 4 AmR 244; Billingham v. Bryan, 10 Iowa 317; Peddicord v. Whittam, 9 Iowa 471; Hall v. Monohan, 6 Iowa 216, 71 AmD 404; Wilson v. Ralph, 3 Iowa 450; Long v. Smyser, 3 Iowa 266.

Mo.-Herrick v. Edwards, 106 Mo. A. 633, 81 SW 466.

N. Y.-Newman v. Frost, 52 N. Y. 422; Richards v. Warring, 4 Abb. Dec. 47, 1 Keyes 576 [foll Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491, 100 AmD 527]; White v. Low, 7 Barb. 204; Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403.

Va.-Broun v. Hull, 33 Gratt. (74 Va.) 23.

Eng.-Plimley v. Westley, 2 Bing. N. Cas. 249, 29 ECL 523, 132 Reprint 98.

Man.-Greenwood v. Kirby, 24 Man.

532.

BILLS AND NOTES

dishonor 15 is not necessary to fix the liability of the indorser to the indorsee, where such a liability exists, since the rules of the law merchant concerning notice apply to none but strictly commercial instruments. And this is so although he writes the word "indorser" after his signature.16

On the other hand, the contrary rule has been laid down in a few states, including Arkansas,17 Indiana,18 Minnesota,19 Tennessee,20 and Vermont.21 And in California it is held that if the indorsement shows an intent to treat the same as an indorsement of a negotiable note, demand on the maker of the nonnegotiable note is necessary.22

[76] d. Necessity for First Suing Maker. In those states where an indorser of a nonnegotiable note is held to be liable to the indorsee as a surety

in the cases of Hall v. Monohan, 6
Iowa 216, 71 AmD 404; Wilson v.
Ralph, 3 Iowa 450, and in Long v.
Smyser, 3 Iowa 266, the court in those
cases following the authority as laid
down in the case of Seymour v. Van
Slyck, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 403, 421, in
which it is held that such an indorse-
ment is equivalent to the making of
a new note, and is a direct and posi-
tive undertaking on the part of the
indorser to pay the note to the in-
dorsee, and not a conditional one to
pay if the maker does not upon de-
Such in-
mand, after due notice.
dorser is not entitled to the usual
privileges of an indorser of negotia-
ble paper." Billingham v. Bryan, 10
Iowa 317.

U. S.-Stubbs v. Colt, 30 Fed.
15.
417; Ish v. Mills, 13 F. Cas. No. 7,104,
1 Cranch C. C. 567.

Ga. High v. Cox, 55 Ga. 662; Pannell v. Phillips, 55 Ga. 618; Gilbert v. Seymour, 44 Ga. 63; Smith v. Barnes, 24 Ga. 442.

Iowa. Allison v. Hollembeak, 138 Iowa 479, 114 NW 1059; Huse v. McDaniel, 33 Iowa 406; Huse v. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501, 4 AmR 244; Billingham v. Bryan, 10 Iowa 317; Wilson v. Ralph, 3 Iowa 450; Long v. Smyser, 3 Iowa 266.

Ky. Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Hays, 96 Ky. 365, 29 SW 20, 16 KyL 505; Coyle v. Satterwhite, 4 T. B. Mon. 124.

V.

Co. La.-Hibernia Bank, etc.. Dresser, 132 La. 532, 61 S 561; Soubercase v. Caldwell, 8 Mart. 714. 130 V. Farnham, Mich. Barger Mich. 487, 90 NW 281; Briggs v. Parsons, 39 Mich. 400.

Minn.-Smith v. Tyler First State Bank, 95 Minn. 496, 104 NW 369.

Miss.-Runnels v. Spencer, 1 Miss.

362

Mo.-Stix v. Matthews, 75 Mo. 96; Herrick v. Edwards, 106 Mo. A. 633, 81 SW 466.

N. Y.-Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491, 100 AmD 527; Richards v. Warring, 4 Abb. Dec. 47, 1 Keyes 576; White v. Low, 7 Barb. 204; SeySee mour v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403. also Newman v. Frost, 52 N. Y. 422. N. C.-Johnson v. Lassiter, 155 N. C. 47, 71 SE 23; Sutton v. Owen, 65 N. C. 123; Plummer v. Christmas, 1 N. C. 46.

Pa.-Jordan v. Hurst, 12 Pa. 269. Contra Brenzer v. Wightman, 7 Watts & S. 264; Draper v. Sharp, 1 Pittsb. 478. V. Breckenridge, Va.-Pitman But see Wood Gratt. (44 Va.) 127. v. Duval, 9 Leigh (36 Va.) 6. Wis.-Ford v. Mitchell, 15 Wis.

304.

3

Eng. Cundy v. Marriott, 1 B. &
Ad. 696, 20 ECL 654, 109 Reprint 945;
Plimley v. Westley, 2 Bing. N. Cas.
249, 29, ECL 523, 132 Reprint 98.

"The party writing his name across
the back of a negotiable instrument
an indorser,
can only be holden as
and unless the proper steps are taken
to charge him as such, he will not

in

or as a guarantor,23 it is generally held that,
order to fix the liability of the indorser or assignor,
it is necessary to use due diligence against the
maker by suing him,24 according to the rules relating
to diligence in first proceeding against the princi-
pal.25

Where exchange notes have been given between the maker and the assignor of a note as a consideration for each other, and the note given by the assignor has never been paid by him nor sued on, the assignee need not bring suit against the maker in order to charge the assignor.26

An assignee of an invalid, nonnegotiable draft, who relies on its invalidity as excusing him from attempting by suit to collect the money, must notify the assignor of his reason for not suing and offer No. ed. 33; Alexandria Bank v. Wilson. 2 F. Cas. No. 855, 1 Cranch C. C. 168; Dean v. Marsteller, 7 F. Cas. 3,710, 2 Cranch C. C. 121; Dent 55; Lemmons v. Choteau, 15 F. Cas. Ashley, 7 F. Cas. No. 3,809b, Hempst. No. 8,239a, Hempst. 85; McIver Cas. No. 8,830. Kennedy, 16 F Cranch C. C. 424; Mandeville v. Mackenzie, 16 F. Cas. No. 9,014, 1 Cranch C. C. 23.

liable. Cady v. Shepard, 12 Wis. 639.
But with, nonnegotiable paper the
The liability
case is quite different.
there is absolute and unconditional.
endorser."
The party is entitled to none of the
privileges of a
Ford v. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 304, 337.

common

V.

[a] Bank post note. It has been
held in Maryland that notice of dis-
honor of a bank post note is unnec-
Key v. Knott, 9 Gill & J.
Post note defined see 6
essary.
(Md.) 342.
[b] Bill not intended to be nego-
C. J. p 1187.
tiated.-(1) Under Ga. Code § 2739,
providing that protest and notice will
not be necessary to charge indorsers
of notes not made for the purpose of
negotiation or intended to be nego-
not necessary
that
tiated at a chartered bank, it was
notice is
held
where a note, although negotiable at
such bank, was not negotiated but
remained in the payee's hands until
and the surety made a written waiver
after maturity, when he indorsed it,
notice. Frank
(2) Where a
of demand and
Longstreet, 44 Ga. 178.
note was not made for the purpose of
negotiation, nor intended to be nego-
tiated, at a chartered bank, and it is
evident from the form of the trans-
fer or assignment of the note that
the indorser was not an accommoda-
tion indorser, but that he sold the
note to a bank, and stood, so far as
it was concerned, in the position of
the original maker, he was not en-
titled to notice of nonpayment or pro-
Bridges v. Phillips, 10 Ga. A.
(3) Neither the
279, 73 SE 423.
do-
drawer nor the indorser of a
mestic bill of exchange not to be ne-
gotiated nor left for collection at a
chartered bank is entitled to notice
of dishonor. Rogers v. Tiedeman, 9
Ga. A. 811, 72 SE 285.

test.

a

[c] County order. It has been held that notice of dishonor of county order drawn by one public officer on another is not necessary. Lyell v. Lapeer County, 15 F. Cas. No. 8,618, 6 McLean 446.

16. Herrick v. Edwards, 106 Mo. A.
633, 81 SW 466.
17. Jones v. Robinson, 11 Ark. 504,
54 AmD 212.
v. Johnson, 85 Ind.
Sinclair
18.
527 (where it was held that a non-
pay money is
negotiable order to
analogous to a bank check in its im-
plied requirement of notice to the
drawer of the failure of the drawee
to pay on presentation).

19. Hart v. Eastman, 7 Minn. 74.
20. Kirkpatrick v. McCullough, 3
Humphr. (Tenn.) 171, 39 AmD 158.
21. Aldis v. Johnson, 1 Vt. 136.
22. Haber v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445,
35 P 1035.

23. See supra § 73.

24. U. S.-U. S. Bank v. Tyler, 4 Pet. 366, 7 L. ed. 888; U. S. Bank v. Weisiger, 2 Pet. 331, 481, 7 L. ed. 441, 492; Dulany v. Hodgkin, 5 Cranch 333, 3 L. ed. 117; Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch 142, 3 L. ed. 61; Yeaton v. Alexandria Bank, 5 Cranch 49, 3 L.

V.

V. 1

46

38

26

Ala.-Brown v. Fowler, 133 Ala.
310, 32 S 584; Jordan v. Garnett, 3
V. Wheeler,
Conn.-Gillespie
Ala. 610.
V. Camp,
v. Sherwood,
Conn. 410; Holbrook
Conn. 23; Ranson
Conn. 437; Castle v. Candee, 16 Conn.
223; Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213,
Conn. 175, 13 AmD 52 and note; Wel-
29 AmD 282; Prentiss v. Danielson, 5
ton v. Scott, 4 Conn. 527; Huntington
v. Harvey, 4 Conn. 124; Williams v.
Granger, 4 Day 444; Bradly v. Phelps,
2 Root 325.

Del.-Pyle v. McMonagle, 2 Del.
Iowa.-Voorhies v. Atlee, 29 Iowa

468.

49.

see

Ky.-Francis v. Gant, 80 Ky. 190; Williams v. Obst, 12 Bush 266; Robv. Evans, 7 B. Mon. 115; Clair v. Barr, erts v. Atwood, 8 B. Mon. 209; Levi 2 A. K. Marsh. 255. 12 AmD 391; Va.-Mackie v. Davis. 2 Wash. (2 Hogan v. Vance, 2 Bibb. 34; Spratt v. And 1 AmD 482. McKinney, 1 Bibb 595. Va.) 219, Thompson v. Govan, 9 Gratt. (50 Va.) 695; McLaughlin v. Duffield, 5 Gratt. (46 Va.) 133; Drane v. Scholfield, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 386; Caton v. Lenox, 5 Rand. (26 Va.) 31; Goodall v. Stuart, 2 Hen. & M. (12 Va.) 105; Bronaugh v. Scott, 5 Call (9 Va.) 78; Lee v. Love, 1 Call (5 Va.) 497.

W. Va.-Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Spates, 41 W. Va. 27, 23 SE 681, 56 AmSR 828; Morrison v. Lovell, 4 W. Va. 346; Nichols v. Porter, 2 W. Va. 13, 94 AmD 500.

See also infra § 667.

[a] Judgment note.-Where judgment on a note might have been entered on Sept. 12, 1848, and execution might have been issued on March 13, 1849, it was held that the assignor thereof was not liable to the assignee

for the amount thereof, where no proceeding was taken to collect the note until after the makBennett v. Moore, 5 October, 1849. er's death on Jan. 12, 1850, where the maker was not insolvent as late as Del. 350.

[b] Injury to indorser.-Where the holder of a nonnegotiable note, indorsed in blank, has without excuse neglected until long after maturity to bring suit, it is not necessary for the indorser, insisting on the laches of the holder as a discharge from 1iaPrentiss v. Danielbility, to show that he has sustained actual damage. son, 5 Conn. 175, 13 AmD 52. 25. See infra §§ 666-681. Caton v. Lenox, 5 Rand. (26

26.
Va.) 31.

later cases, developments and changes

VI. ORIGINAL PARTIES TO INSTRUMENT AND THEIR CONTRACT [80] A. In General.37 There are in general three original parties to a bill of exchange: (1) The drawer, he who gives the order; (2) the payee, he in whose favor the order is drawn; and (3) the drawee, he on whom the order is drawn. The drawee, after he has signified his assent to the bill of exchange, is called the acceptor.3

draft, or order;44 a promise to pay, as in the case of a promissory note or certificate of deposit;45 or a secondary promise by way of guaranty or suretyship for the original promise.16

Super. 459; Hawkins v. Barney, 27
35. See infra §§ 1087, 1096.
36. See Assignments § 193.
37. Bearer, who is see supra § 30.
Holder, who is see supra § 30.
"Primary" and "secondary" liabil-
ity defined see supra § 29.
38.
39. See infra §§ 92-106.
40. See infra § 527.

See infra § 467.

47.
Bromwich V. Loyd, Lutw.
1582, 125 Reprint 870; Fairley
Roch, Lutw. 891, 125 Reprint 489. See
also supra § 32.

48. Nichols, etc., Co. v. Hardman,
62 Mo. A. 153; Bromwich v. Loyd,
Lutw. 1582, 125 Reprint 870; Fairley v.
Roch, Lutw. 891, 125 Reprint 489; Eng-
lish Bill Exch. Act (1882) § 22 (1).

31. Wheeler v. Sauther, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 606 (holding that the payee of an order payable out of a particular fund, and not expressed to be for value received, which has never been [a] Illustration.-Where the mak.presented for acceptance or payment, er of a note under seal at the time cannot maintain an action thereon he executed it was capable of exeragainst the drawer, although the lat-cising thought, reflection, and judgter admitted the amount to be due ment, knew what he was doing, and from him to the payee). had sufficient memory and under32. See supra § 468. standing to comprehend the nature 33. Sears v. Lawrence, 15 Gray and character of the transaction, he (Mass.) 267; Hyland v. Blodgett, 9 was capable of making the note. Or. 166, 42 AmR 799. Rogers v. Rogers, 22 Del. 267, 66 A 374.

N. Y. 63, 4 NE 1, 54 AmR 657; Semler v. State, 27 Oh. Cir. Ct. 581. Effect where drawn by agent of drawee or payee see Agency § 285.

for the drawer's accommodation); Milmo Nat. Bank v. Cobbs, 53 Tex. Civ. A. 1, 115 SW 345.

Can.-Harvey v. Hamilton Bank, 16 Can. S. C. 714 (even where through mistake payee was not named in instrument).

[a] Rule applied to checks.-(1) One who, for value, issues to another his check on a bank thereby represents that he has funds in such bank subject to such check; and, if he is aware that there are no funds in the bank subject to his check and conceals that fact from the drawee, he is guilty of false representations to and fraud on such drawee. Gib-drawer see infra §§ 1416-1450. sonburg Banking Co. V. Wakeman Bank Co., 20 Oh. Cir. Ct. 591, 10 Oh. Cir. Dec. 754. (2) The signature of the drawer of a check was a representation to subsequent holders that the drawer had sufficient funds on deposit with the drawee and the drawee would accept and pay the checks when presented. Murfreesboro First Nat. Bank v. Nashville First Nat Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 SW_965.

Ont.-Young v. Cashion, 19 Ont. L. 491, 14 OntWR 717; Hagarty v. Squier, 42 U. C. Q. B. 165.

Effect of payment supra protest see infra §§ 885-889.

Amount recoverable against the

67. See infra § 84.

68. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252, 82 NE 134, 121 AmSR 858, 12 LRANS 875, 12 AnnCas 450 [aff 103 App. Div. 428, 93 NYS 871; Cummings v. Kent, 44 Oh. St. 92, 4 NE 710, 58 AmR 796 [aff 6 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 1178, 12 AmLRec 163].

Acceptance see infra §§ 467-506. Presentment for acceptance see infra § 457 et seq.

69. Presentment for payment see infra §§ 744-746.

70. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252, 82 NE 134, 121 AmSR 858, 12 LRANS 875, 12 Ann Cas 450.

71. Germania Bank v. Trapnell, 118 Ga. 578, 45 SE 446; Turner v. Hickey, 3 Mart. N. S. (La.) 256; Morley v. Culverwell, 7 M. & W. 174, 151 Reprint 727.

[a] In California Civ. Code § 3177, makes the drawer liable as the first indorser of a negotiable instrument.

72. Ill.-Bickford v. Chicago First Nat. Bank, 42 II. 238, 89 AmD 436. Ind. Sweetser v. Snodgrass, 7 Ind. A. 609, 34 NE 842.

Mass.-Shepard, etc., Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, 51 NE 9, 68 AmSR 446, 41 LRA 617.

N. Y.-Manchester v. Braedner, 107 N. Y. 346, 14 NE 405, 1 AmSR 829; Hargous v. Lahens, 5 N. Y. Super. 213; Mottram v. Mills, 3 N. Y. Super. 37; Foster V. Dayton, 10 Daly 225; Suckley v. Furse, 15 Johns. 338.

N. C.-Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C. 196, 12 SE 245, 22 AmSR 870.

Oh.-Cummings v. Kent, 44 Oh. St. 92, 4 NE 710, 58 AmR 796.

Tenn.-Schoolfield v. Moon, 9 Heisk.

Tex.-Lewis v. Parker, 33 Tex. 121 (especially where the acceptance was