stantinople permanently, he saw no cause at present for war. Russia demanded the destruction of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, he would remit that question to the consideration of the European Powers. If she asked the opening of the Dardanelles, under proper regulations, he would accord it; but he suggested that many Russian statesmen would think Russia had more to lose than to gain by opening the Straits to the ships-of-war of all nations.
Mr. Forster, at Bradford, advocated a policy even more precise and vigorous than Sir Henry James. He held that there was no danger of Russia's taking Constantinople; but if any such danger there was, it was even more the business of Germany and Austria than of England to prevent it. Prince Bismarck had said that no Pomeranian ploughman ought to risk his life in this quarrel— probably because he knew that Constantinople was in no danger; but whether that were so or not, certainly no Bradford artisan or Dorsetshire labourer should risk his life for this cause, if the Pomeranian ploughmen were held excused from all responsibility for it. In other words, though Europe might properly unite to forbid a Russian occupation of Constantinople, it was no duty of England's, acting alone. Again, as to the Dardanelles, it was no duty of ours to shut them up on our own behalf only. How could we reasonably say, "Our ships shall always have a right of passage through the artificial strait of Suez, but Russian ships shall never have any similar right of passage through the natural strait of the Bosphorus"? "If we take that ground," said Mr. Forster, "we should have no support from any Power in Europe." He would go to war, he said, even in a time of commercial distress, to discharge the duty of England; but it was not, and could not be, the duty of England to defeat Russia in order that we might make ourselves responsible once more for Turkish tyranny. There were no efforts within the pale of the Constitution which he would not make to preserve his country "from this calamity and crime."
Sir William Harcourt, at Oxford, was neither quite so strong nor quite so much in earnest as Mr. Forster, and his position on both the Dardanelles question and the Constantinople question was a little ambiguous, except that on neither did he expect Russia to ask what was commonly expected; but his speech was very able, and in parts of it he was very eloquent. He quoted Lord Derby's repeated warning that Great Britain would not interfere to save Turkey from her fate; then showed how our Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Eliot, had argued that, though we should never interfere simply for such an end as that, we might properly shield Turkey on grounds of self-interest, even though the alliance of a half-barbarous Power involved the occasional massacre of 10,000 or even 20,000 persons; and he recalled to his audience how warmly Great Britain had repudiated and execrated that doctrine, the moment it was advanced. He then proceeded :-" If we are to go to war for Turkey as the ally of Turkey, I suppose