at any other time, was fatally defective.-Bim- | tence, will be counted for the Republican candiinerle v. Langdeau, 167 S. W. 532. date.-Id. A ballot voted under the Democratic party V. DAMAGES, MESNE PROFITS, IM- device, and having a cross mark in the square PROVEMENTS, AND TAXES. 8132 (Mo.) Where plaintiff sued for a strip of land 21⁄2 inches wide and 55 feet long in a city block, and it appeared that lots were worth $40 per front foot, a verdict allowing $100 damages for use and occupation was excessive. -Bimmerle v. Langdeau, 167 S. W. 532. ELECTION OF REMEDIES. See Indictment and Information, § 132. § 3 (Ky.) Plaintiff, having secured cancellation of a contract for the purchase of a steam engine for defendant's fraud, and been granted restitution, held not thereafter entitled to maintain an action for damages for defendant's breach of contract.-Piersall v. Huber Mfg. Co., 167 S. W. 144. ELECTIONS. See Animals, § 50; Courts, § 89; Depositions, §79; Evidence, § 29; Intoxicating Liquors, 30; Mandamus, § 187; Municipal Corporations, 867; Schools and School Districts, 8 53. VI. NOMINATIONS AND PRIMARY ELECTIONS. 8126 (Mo.) The court, in construing Rev. St. 1909, § 5862, providing for the filing of declarations of candidacy for public office at a primary election, will presume that the Legislature had in mind the fact that the Eighth judicial circuit is composed wholly of the city of St. Louis.-State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 5862, relating to primary elections, candidates for the nomination for circuit judge in the Eighth judicial circuit comprising the city of St. Louis, must file their declarations of candidacy with the Secretary of State.-Id. VII. BALLOTS. opposite the blank line below the name of the Republican candidate, and also opposite the blank line in the Progressive column below the words "for sheriff," will be counted for the Republican candidate, under Ky. St. § 1471, prohibiting the rejection of a ballot which indicates a choice of the voter.-Id. A ballot voted in the circle under the Progressive party device and in the square opposite the name of the Republican candidate for sheriff will be counted for the Republican candidate. -Id. A ballot voted under the Democratic party device, having a pencil cross just to the right of the circle, probably made by the clerk in marking the ballot for an illiterate voter, will be counted for the Democratic candidate.-Id. Ballots which have two or more stencil cross marks in the circle under the party device may be counted for the candidate of that party.-Id. $186 (Ky.) Mere inadvertent failure of the clerk to sign his name on ballots voted at an election was insufficient to invalidate them.Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404. election clerk failed to sign his name on the re$186 (Ky.) Ballots upon which the precinct verse side will be counted.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. Ballots voted entirely with cross marks made with a pencil will be counted.-Id. A ballot voted in the square opposite the name of rival candidates for the same office will be counted for neither.-Id. Ballots which have the secondary stubs attached may be counted.-Id. $ 190 (Ky.) Ballots which have irregular pieces torn out of the sides or bottom, which apparently was done in wrapping or unwrapping the ballots, may be counted.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. tioned in an election contest were marked in $194 (Ky.) Where a number of ballots quessuch a way as might have distinguished them, but their distribution among the several precincts was such as to render remote the probability that they were so marked for the purpose of identification, the ballots will be count $180 (Ky.) Ballots upon which the voter stamped his cross in the square below that op-ed.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. posite the candidate's name will be counted for the candidate.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. A ballot voted in the circle under the Democratic device, which had the name of the Republican candidate written in pencil in the Progressive party column, but which had no cross opposite the name nor under the Progressive party device, will be counted for the Democratic candidate.-Id. Under Ky. St. § 1471, prohibiting the rejection of a ballot for a technical error which does not make it impossible to determine the voter's choice, a ballot which has a pencil cross-mark opposite the word "sheriff," immediately above a candidate's name, will be counted for that candidate.-Id. A ballot voted in a circle under the Democratic device, and having a cross-mark in the square opposite a blank line in the column of a party which had no candidate for that office, will be counted for the Democratic candidate. -Id. A ballot which has a mark in the circle under the Democratic device, and another between and above the devices of two other parties, will be counted for the Democratic candidate.-Id. A ballot in which there is a blur or blot in the circle under a party device, which had the appearance of having been made by the butt of the stencil, will be counted for the candidate of that party.-Id. A ballot, voted in the circle under the Republican device, on which the Democratic em VIII. CONDUCT OF ELECTION. § 230 (Ky.) Where enough persons voting for the successful candidate for an office to have changed the result were bribed, it was immate rial that such candidate had no knowledge of the bribery, and he was not legally elected.Adkins v. Phipps, 167 S. W. 134. § 230 (Ky.) An election will not be set aside for bribery unless the result is affected to such an extent that it cannot be determined who was elected.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404. IX. COUNT OF VOTES, RETURNS, § 237 (Ky.) Where, in election contest, evidence showed that defendant received enough illegal votes to change the result, and there was nothing to show that the contestant received any less number of legal votes than those counted, held that the election would be awarded to the contestant, instead of ordering a new election.-Adkins v. Phipps, 167 S. W. 134. X. CONTESTS. § 278 (Ky.) A contest of election of subdistrict school trustee must be instituted within ten days after the certificate of returns of election signed by a majority of the election officers, and that the successful candidate prosecuted mandamus to obtain the signature of the other election officer and to compel the county superintendent to recognize him as trustee was $286 (Ky.) Time specified by Ky. St. § 1596a, | for the filing of pleadings in an election contest is not mandatory, and the court in its discretion may permit the filing of pleadings notwithstanding a short delay after the time specified if a proper excuse is presented.-Powell v. Horn, 167 S. W. 928. In election contests it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to permit replies in two of the cases to be filed one and six days, respectively, after the time specified therefor had expired.-Id. insulated wire with which the house mover came in contact, is not for that reason relieved of the duty of exercising that extraordinary degree of care required by handlers of electricity. |-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. § 17 (Mo.App.) A power company, which had the control and care of electric wires by which current was carried to a schoolhouse, cannot escape liability for injuries because of the lack of insulation, on the ground that it did not own the wires; the injuries in the last analysis coming, not from the wires, but from the current.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. $293 (Ky.) Where ballots, when produced on a contest, were shown to be intact and the boxes appeared to be sealed up in the same manner as when delivered to the county court clerk, § 18 (Mo.App.) A house mover, injured by the ballots were properly admitted in evidence, contact with an uninsulated electric wire, is not though they were not strung, wrapped, sealed, barred of recovery because he did not have a and placed in an envelope as required by stat-city permit authorizing him to move the house. ute.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404. -Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. § 295 (Ky.) In an action to contest an election, evidence held to show that at least eight Voters were bribed, and that five of them voted for defendant, who on the face of the returns, received a majority of three votes.-Adkins v. Phipps, 167 S. W. 134. § 298 (Ky.) The eligibility of a contestant may not be determined in an election contest under Ky. St. § 1596a.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404. $299 (Ky.) A recount of the ballots may be had upon a naked allegation by a contestant of mistake and oversight on the part of the election officers in counting and certifying the vote, without a prima facie showing that the result will be changed by the recount.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. In an election contest where all the ballots, and not merely the questioned ones, are recounted by the court, the questioned ballots may be counted, even though the election officers did not certify such ballots in the manner required by Ky. St. § 1482.-Id. $299 (Ky.) Where a party to an election contest desires a recount of the ballots, he must tender with his motion evidence that the ballots had been properly preserved and not tampered with since their return, which may be shown by depositions or by oral testimony.-Powell v. Horn, 167 S. W. 928. § 305 (Ky.) In an election contest, held, that the finding of the trial court with regard to certain ballots marked for contestant will not be disturbed, although such marks were suspicious in their appearance, and the finding resulted in a considerable change from the result certified by the election officers.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. § 305 (Ky.) Where two sets of contest suits between the same parties for the same offices were filed, the first set after the first certificates had been issued and the second set after the second certificates were issued by the commissioners, the parties were not prejudiced by the consolidation of the two sets for trial, though the first set should have been stricken.-Powell v. Horn, 167 S. W. 928. ELECTRICITY. See Evidence, $8 145, 508; Mandamus, § 15; Master and Servant, §§ 119, 137, 213, 217, 285, 286; Municipal Corporations, 8 733; Trial, § 252. § 14 (Mo.App.) Those who handle and distribute electricity are bound to use the highest degree of care possible to protect members of the public who may come in contact with the wires or other instrumentalities carrying the current.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. § 15 (Mo.App.) One moving a house without a permit is merely a technical trespasser, and defendant, which maintained a dangerous and un A house mover, who attempted to raise an uninsulated wire over a house, cannot be defeated in an action to recover for consequent injuries on the ground that he was violating Rev. St. 1909, § 4579, making it a misdemeanor to tamper with electric equipment.-Id. A house mover, who did not know that one wire strung with ordinary telephone wires carried a dangerous current of electricity, is not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to use rubber gloves when he attempted to lift the group of wires over the house.-Id. § 19 (Mo.App.) Where a house mover was injured in attempting to lift an uninsulated light wire over a house, held, that defendant could not, as a matter of law, be declared free from negligence on the theory that, when it strung its uninsulated wire 20 to 25 feet above the ground, it could not foresee the accident which occurred.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. Where an uninsulated electric wire similar in size was strung with telephone wires, a house mover, who desired to lift the wires a little above a house and did not know that one of the wires carried a dangerous current, cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in grasping them in his hands. -Id. EMINENT DOMAIN. 1. NATURE, EXTENT, AND DELEGATION OF POWER. $13 (Tex.Civ.App.) Land cannot be taken for private use.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183. § 47 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the fee of a county road, as well as that of the right of way of a railroad company, remains in the landowner, the erection of a telephone line on either is an appropriation of his property which cannot be justified, except in case of condemnation by a public service telegraph or telephone company.Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183. II. COMPENSATION. (A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General. § 69 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where land is taken for public use, compensation must be paid.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS. See Death, §§ 11, 95; Evidence, § 236; Master and Servant, §§ 204, 228; Removal of Causes, § 3; Trial. EMPLOYÉS. See Master and Servant. ENTICEMENT. See Husband and Wife, §§ 325-335. EQUITY. See Cancellation of Instruments; Corporations, § 123; Creditors' Suit; Discovery; Estoppel, $856-93; Injunction; Judgment, §§ 143, 405451; Officers, § 82; Partition; Quieting Title; Receivers; Reformation of Instruments; Specific Performance; Trusts. topped, by certain deeds calling for the line as located by defendant, to claim that the line was not properly located.-Clemmons v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 1103. III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. (A) Nature and Essentials in General. § 56 (Mo.) The bringing of suit is not such a change of position by plaintiff as will estop defendant to deny previous_admissions of liability.-Barnett v. Kemp, 167 S. W. 546. § 56 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where it did not appear I. JURISDICTION, PRINCIPLES, AND that defendant held out an independent con MAXIMS. (A) Nature, Grounds, Subjects, and Extent of Jurisdiction in General. $38 (Mo.) The court, in a suit to declare void a deed of trust and a deed under foreclosure thereof, revived on the death of the grantor by her administrator, will grant relief to one having a claim against the property, and will not compel claimant to seek relief in the probate court.-McMurray v. McMurray, 167 S. W. 513. § 39 (Ark.) Where a court of equity assumed jurisdiction of an action to set aside a conveyance as a fraud on creditors, it should settle the entire controversy and enforce the creditor's rights by ordering the land sold to satisfy its judgment.-Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Harris, 167 S. W. 706. III. PARTIES AND PROCESS. 891 (Mo.App.) In a suit in equity, every person having a material legal or beneficial interest in the subject-matter may properly be made a party plaintiff or defendant, regardless of whether the interests are joint or several.Shelton v. Harrison, 167 S. W. 634. IV. PLEADING. (E) Demurrer, Exceptions, and Motions. § 241 (Ark.) An order of the chancery court overruling a demurrer, after which the cause was continued for the term, did not prevent the court from reconsidering the demurrer while the cause was pending before it, and from changing its decision, if it saw proper to do so.-Radford v. Samstag, 167 S. W. 491. X. DECREE AND ENFORCEMENT § 423 (Ark.) In a suit to recover possession of land where others were added as parties who claimed the land and had ratified the lease to the defendant, the chancellor should determine the claim of one of the new parties to settle the entire controversy, although he found that the original defendant was entitled to possession un der a lease from the agents of the plaintiffs. Phillips v. Grubbs, 167 S. W. 101. ERROR, WRIT OF. See Appeal and Error. ESTATES. See Deeds, §§ 125, 133; Descent and Distribution; Dower; Landlord and Tenant; Tenancy in Common; Wills. ESTOPPEL. See Appeal and Error, § 655; Carriers, § 76; Executors and Administrators, § 376; Injunction, § 239; Insurance, $$ 378-388, 558, 741, 755; Judgment, §§ 565-717; Negligence, § 82; Partnership, § 56; Principal and Agent, § 171; Sales, $$ 288, 441; Trusts, § 191; Vendor and Purchaser, § 190. II. BY DEED. (A) Creation and Operation in General. § 32 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a suit to establish a tractor as her agent, or that plaintiffs were induced to extend him credit for that reason, defendant cannot be held liable for his debts on the theory of estoppel.-Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828. (B) Grounds of Estoppel. § 63 (Ky.) Where a city contractor was unable to carry on the work, and the surety made arrangements for a loan to the contractor from a third person, and prepared an assignment to the lender of amounts retained by the city, and the notes executed by the contractor for the loan, the surety was estopped to rely on a prior assignment.-Commissioners of Sewerage of Louisville v. Gates, 167 S. W. 417. § 63 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a contract for the sale of orange trees above two feet in height in the seller's nursery, held, that the buyer's instruction to the seller not to sell to another any trees over two feet high did not estop the buyer from denying that title passed by the contract.Alsworth v. Reppert, 167 S. W. 1098. § 68 (Ky.) The action of certain devisees in joining with one claiming under a separate devise in bringing action for specific performance of a contract made by the other to sell the property to defendant, and in uniting with such other in a deed to defendant, would estop them erty.-McCrocklin v. O'Donaghue, 167 S. W. from setting up any, future claim to the prop901. $78 (Ky.) Where a contractor to reconstruct a vessel relied on an original contract and two supplemental contracts, the retention by him of a check stated to be for a partial payment on the original contract did not estop him from relying on the supplemental contracts.-Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 167 S. W. 384. § 93 (Mo.) The acts of plaintiff, to whom land was conveyed, held to raise no estoppel preventing him from asserting his prior title.Driskill v. Ashley, 167 S. W. 1026. EVIDENCE. See Adoption, § 8; Adverse Possession, § 85; Appeal and Error, §§ 232, 559, 882, 907-934, 997-1011, 1050, 1051, 1053, 1054, 1170: Assault and Battery, § 27; Attorney and Client, § 190; Bailment, § 31; Banks and Banking, $154; Bigamy, §§ 8, 9, 11; Bills and Notes, $$ 494, 497, 523, 524; Boundaries, $$ 5, 33, 37, 54; Brokers, § 82; Burglary, § 39; Carriers, $$ 57, 134, 163, 202, 228, 318; Conspiracy, § 47; Continuance, § 47; Corporations, $ 308; Criminal Law, § 338-538, 938, 1090, 1091, 1120, 1169, 11702; Damages, $$ 85, 158, 177, 185; Death, $$ 64-68; Deeds, $$ 56, 194-211; Depositions; Discovery; Disorderly House, § 17; Divorce, §§ 124, 128, 184; Dower, $8 44, 52; Elections, §§ 237, 295: Exceptions, Bill of, §§ 8, 13; Fixtures, § 35; Fraud, §§ 53, 58; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 302; Guardian and Ward, § 103; Homicide, §§ 145-255; Husband and Wife. § 6, 133, 313, 333; Injunction, § 186; Insurance, $$ 76, 602, 654, 665, 818, 819; Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 233, 236, 309, 310; Judg ment, § 101; Judicial Sales, § 61; Libel and Slander, $$ 100, 107, 111; Mandamus, §§ 165, ant, §§ 268-279; Mortgages, 88 37, 38; Mu- §80 (Tex. Civ.App.) A contract which is valid nicipal Corporations, $$ 122, 282, 485, 568, in Texas is presumably valid in a sister state. 706, 819; Negligence, § 121; New Trial, 88-Whited v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 812. 26, 79; Parent and Child, §7; Partnership, 88 44-56, 336; Pleading, 111; Principal and Agent, §§ 20, 22, 23, 89; Principal and Surety, & 161; Prostitution, § 4; Railroads, §§ 347, 348, 395, 398, 441, 443, 480; Rape, $$ 38-52, 66; Reformation of Instruments, 88 44, 45; Robbery, § 24; Sales, §§ 288, 358, 416, 429, 440, 441; Street Railroads, §§ 93, 112, 114; Taxation, § 810; Trespass, § 46; Trespass to Try Title, §§ 35, 39; Trial, 88 139-143, 156, 244, 250-253; Trover and Conversion, § 35; Trusts, §§ 89, 107, 110; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 16, 284; 'Weapons, 8 17; Wills, §§ 55, 163; Witnesses; Work and Labor, § 28. § 83 (Tex.Civ.App.) In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that surveyors, in making a survey, did their duty and marked the corner thereof with some object of reasonable permanence, and the presumption is that the original survey was actually made on the ground.-Harkrider v. Gaut, 167 S. W. 164. Reception of, see Criminal Law, §§ 673-684; I. JUDICIAL NOTICE. § 12 (Mo.) The Supreme Court takes judicial | notice of the population of the city of St. Louis.-State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W. 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016. § 12 (Mo.App.) In a proceeding for a local option election, the county court must take judicial notice of the population of a town as determined by a census regularly taken under Rev. St. 1909, § 7239.-State ex rel. City of Elvins v. Marshall, 167 S. W. 1050. § 29 (Mo.) The court takes judicial notice of the general primary election law. State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W. 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016. $35 (Mo.App.) The Missouri courts will not take judicial notice that all of Kansas is prohibition territory, or that intoxicating liquors in that state have no market value there.-Febrenbach Wine & Liquor Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 631. Courts of one state do not take judícial notice of the laws of a sister state.-Id. § 41 (Mo.) The court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Eighth judicial circuit is composed wholly of the city of St. Louis.-State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W. 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016. II. PRESUMPTIONS. § 59 (Tex.Civ.App.) A freight brakeman is presumed by law to have acted with ordinary care in switching to protect himself from being thrown from the car by the usual and ordinary force incident to such work, and which he should have reasonably anticipated.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279. § 67 (Mo.App.) A proved condition or status as president of a corporation is presumed to have continued, in the absence of proof to the contrary.-Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Hodge, 167 S. W. 1186. § 76 (Mo.) Where a party in a civil case has full power to give testimony exonerating himself from a rational inference of inequitable conduct, but refuses to do so, the conclusion that he cannot deny such conduct may be drawn.-Schooler v. Schooler, 167 S. W. 444; Cowsert v. Same, Id. 447. $80 (Mo.) In the absence of proof of abrogation by statute, it will be presumed the common law concerning marriage is in force in another state.-Cherry v. Cherry, 167 S. W. 539. § 80 (Mo. App.) Kansas never having been under common-law jurisdiction, courts of Missouri would presume that Kansas laws were the same as in Missouri.-Fehrenbach Wine & Liquor Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 631. III. BURDEN OF PROOF. § 90 (Mo.App.) The burden of proof is the duty resting on a party asserting the affirmative of an issue of establishing it by a preponderance until the end of the trial.-Ranney v. Lewis, of the evidence, and remains with such party 167 S. W. 601. IV. RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY, AND (A) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Issues. (B) Res Gestæ. § 123 (Ky.) Statements by the engineer and conductor of a freight train, made about 15 or 20 minutes after an accident in which a brakeman was injured, and while they were gathered around the injured man, that they had seen his light go out were not part of the res gestæ.Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Walker's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 128. § 123 (Mo.App.) Entries made by an attorney as soon as a client left his office, consisting of a memoranda of the facts, were not a part of the res gestæ, and were inadmissible in his favor, in the absence of a showing that the client ever saw the entries.-Ranney v. Lewis, 167 S. W. 601. $185 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for commissions for the sale of cattle, evidence held to show that the possession of a letter evidencing the contract was wrongfully obtained by defendant, thus rendering secondary evidence of the contents thereof admissible without notice to defendant to produce the original.-Prieto v. Hunt, 167 S. W. 4. VII. ADMISSIONS. (A) Nature, Form, and Incidents in General. $ 200 (Mo.) Testimony of the mother of a boy struck by an automobile that the driver "told me he would do all in his power to help me, and be responsible for all debts in the case,' was properly stricken out, as the declaration was merely an offer to pay the costs of treatment.Winter v. Van Blarcom, 167 S. W. 498. 8213 (Mo.App.) Statements of the insurer's adjuster that they could give the insured only 50 cents on the dollar were not inadmissible where they were not in an effort to compromise, but in an interview looking to the adjustment of the loss, preparatory to making the necessary proofs, and prior to the bringing of suit.Lehmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 167 S. W. 1047. § 368 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an original letter was in the hands of the addressee, notice to defendant who had no right or control thereof was insufficient to obtain it for use at the trial. § 219 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for fraudulent misrepresentations, testimony of a witness for the plaintiff that defendant had induced-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321. him to leave the state in order to prevent his testifying was admissible.-Loftus v. Sturgis, 167 S. W. 14. § 219 (Tex. Civ.App.) In a personal injury action prosecuted to a conclusion by attorneys, assignees of one-half interest therein, after their client had compromised, evidence of the compromise with the client is admissible as tending, unexplained, to show an admission of negligence upon the part of the railway.-St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 167 S. W. 784. (C) By Grantors, Former Owners, or Priv ies. § 236 (Ark.) In action under the federal Employers' Liability Act, statements of deceased employé as to the cause of the injury held not admissible upon the issue as to the right to recover damages to the widow and child from the death; there being no privity.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83. VIII. DECLARATIONS. (A) Nature, Form, and Incidents in General. § 273 (Tex.Civ.App.) A statement of a husband prior to the incurring of a debt that certain personal property belonged to his wife was admissible in a contest between the creditor and the wife to determine the ownership of the property.-Wofford v. Lane, 167 S. W. 180. XI. PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVI- (A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding to § 390 (Mo.) Where a deed has been delivered, it henceforth speaks for itself, unaffected by any conditions or limitations not written thereon.-Miles v. Robertson, 167 S. W. 1000. § 425 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the purchase price of coal furnished a party havhotel, where the question was whether such ing charge of the heating and lighting of a purchaser was an independent contractor or the agent of the hotel proprietor, the purchaser may testify that a note given by him in connection with his business was really the obligation of the proprietor, and that it was understood the proprietor should discharge it, without violating the parol evidence rule.Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828. $ 427 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action prosecuted by attorneys, assignees of one-half the cause of action, after their client had compromised, where the written contract between the client and the attorneys expressed only the agree ment to pay one-half the recovery and not the fact of the assignment, the client was properly permitted to testify to a conversation with defendant's agent at the time of the compromise, in which he told the agent of the interest of the attorneys; it not varying the written contract.-St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 167 S. W. 784. (C) Separate or Subsequent Oral Agree ment. § 273 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action in the nature of trespass to try title, where the issue was whether the possession of plaintiff's intestate was that of owner or tenant, the fact of his possession and claim of ownership and his declarations with reference to improvements, to his effort to borrow money on security of the land, scription contract which recites that no repre8441 (Tex.Civ.App.) One signing a stock subthough self-serving and hearsay, held admissi-sentation by the person taking the subscription ble.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321. shall annul the contract, unless reduced to writHis declarations as to his purchase, the bal-ing, may not, in the absence of fraud, accident, ance due, etc., were not admissible to show an equitable title.-Id. In an action to recover an interest in land, self-serving and hearsay declarations of plaintiff's intestate contained in a letter to a third person held incompetent as against the defendant.-Id. IX. HEARSAY. $314 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the members of a firm, at a conference, agreed that one partner or mistake, show by parol an agreement not embodied in the contract.-Cattlemen's Trust Co. v. Beck, 167 S. W. 753. § 442 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a contract of sale was made by correspondence, a letter from the seller containing a warranty must be considered in determining the contract, though the buyer's letter ordering the goods was subsequently written.-A. S. Cameron Steam Pump Works v. Lubbock Light & Ice Co., 167 S. |