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V. ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY.

DRAINS.

8211 (Mo.App.) While if it appears on a pre- See Municipal Corporations, § 330. liminary hearing for alimony pendente lite that the wife's suit for divorce is without any just

DRAMSHOPS.

or reasonable foundation, no allowance should See Intoxicating Liquors.
be made, yet making the allowance is largely
in the court's discretion.-Scism v. Scism, 167
S. W. 455.

See Trial, § 11.

DOCTORS.

See Physicians and Surgeons.

DRUGGISTS.

Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 152, 171.

Though all the facts tending to show right to See divorce, proved on hearing for alimony pendente lite, are not within the allegations of the petition for divorce, an allowance may be made, as the petition may be amended before final See Constitutional Law, §§ 252-309. hearing. Id.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

DUPLICITY.

DOCKETS.

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III. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF
WIDOW.

of dower in lands claimed by defendant but al-
$78 (Mo.) Where, in a suit for the assignment
leged to have been owned by the husband dur-
ing his life, an inchoate right accrued to the
wife and something which afterward occurred is
relied on to defeat it, it must, under the Code, to
be made available as a defense, be pleaded by
the defendant.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W.
1017.

II. INCHOATE INTEREST.

(B) Bar, Release, or Forfeiture.

§ 44 (Mo.) Evidence, in a suit by a widow to set aside conveyances of land and avoid gifts of money by her deceased husband, held to show no fraud, and that the disposition of the property was not to defeat dower, but by way of advancement to their children with her consent.Pollman v. Schaper, 167 S. W. 953.

§ 116 (Mo.) In a suit for the assignment of dower in land purchased by defendant from the husband in his lifetime, defendant could not have deducted from the dower interest the widow's portion of an amount he had paid for taxes at the purchase of the land.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W. 1017.

§ 44 (Mo.) Where a wife did not join her husband in a conveyance, her dower remains outstanding.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030.

See Indictment and Information, §§ 125, 132, 202.

DYING DECLARATIONS.

See Homicide, §§ 203-218.

EASEMENTS.

See Vendor and Purchaser, § 108.

EJECTMENT.

See Boundaries, § 37; Taxation, §§ 791, 810;
Trespass to Try Title.

I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DE-
FENSES.

9 (Ky.) In ejectment plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and must show either a title of record or one by adverse possession.-Logan v. Williams, 167 S. W. 124.

III. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE. claimed under a blanket title comprising within § 86 (Ky.) A plaintiff suing to recover land its exterior lines a specified number of acres and excluding therefrom a specified number of acres must show that the land in controversy is within the exterior lines and not within the exclusions.-Le Moyne v. Litton, 167 S. W. 912.

$90 (Ky.) In ejectment for land, title to which depended upon the boundary line between rely upon the recitals in the deed to defendant, the lots of plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff may particularly where his own deeds refer to the descriptions in defendant's chain of title.Davis v. Clay, 167 S. W. 915.

IV. TRIAL, JUDGMENT, ENFORCE-
MENT OF JUDGMENT, AND
REVIEW.

§ 110 (Mo.) An instruction in ejectment held objectionable, as limiting plaintiff's right to possession to the surface of the ground.-Bimmerle v. Langdeau, 167 S. W. 532.

$ 52 (Mo.) The remarriage of a husband after separation from a first wife, though raising a presumption of divorce from the first wife, does not raise the presumption that such divorce was granted for the misconduct or fault of the first wife, so as to defeat her dower rights.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W. 1017.

§111 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2389, a verdict for plaintiff in ejectment, which does not find that defendant was in possession at the time of the commencement of the action or

at any other time, was fatally defective.-Bim- | tence, will be counted for the Republican candimerle v. Langdeau, 167 S. W. 532. date.-Id.

A ballot voted under the Democratic party V. DAMAGES, MESNE PROFITS, IM- device, and having a cross mark in the square PROVEMENTS, AND TAXES. opposite the blank line below the name of the Republican candidate, and also opposite the blank line in the Progressive column below the words "for sheriff," will be counted for the Republican candidate, under Ky. St. § 1471, prohibiting the rejection of a ballot which indicates a choice of the voter.-Id.

§ 132 (Mo.) Where plaintiff sued for a strip of land 21⁄2 inches wide and 55 feet long in a city block, and it appeared that lots were worth $40 per front foot, a verdict allowing $100 damages for use and occupation was excessive. -Bimmerle v. Langdeau, 167 S. W. 532.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES.

See Indictment and Information, § 132.

§3 (Ky.) Plaintiff, having secured cancellation of a contract for the purchase of a steam engine for defendant's fraud, and been granted restitution, held not thereafter entitled to maintain an action for damages for defendant's breach of contract.-Piersall v. Huber Mfg. Co., 167 S. W. 144.

ELECTIONS.

See Animals, § 50; Courts, § 89; Depositions, §79; Evidence, § 29; Intoxicating Liquors, 30; Mandamus, § 187; Municipal Corporations, 867; Schools and School Districts, § 53.

VI. NOMINATIONS AND PRIMARY

ELECTIONS.

$126 (Mo.) The court, in construing Rev. St. 1909, § 5862, providing for the filing of declarations of candidacy for public office at a primary election, will presume that the Legislature had in mind the fact that the Eighth judicial circuit is composed wholly of the city of St. Louis. State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 5862, relating to primary elections, candidates for the nomination for circuit judge in the Eighth judicial circuit comprising the city of St. Louis, must file their declarations of candidacy with the Secretary of State.-Id.

A ballot voted in the circle under the Democratic device, which had the name of the Republican candidate written in pencil in the Progressive party column, but which had no cross opposite the name nor under the Progressive party device, will be counted for the Democratic candidate.-Id.

Under Ky. St. § 1471, prohibiting the rejection of a ballot for a technical error which does not make it impossible to determine the voter's choice, a ballot which has a pencil cross-mark opposite the word "sheriff," immediately above a candidate's name, will be counted for that candidate.-Id.

A ballot voted in a circle under the Democratic device, and having a cross-mark in the square opposite a blank line in the column of a party which had no candidate for that office, will be counted for the Democratic candidate.

-Id.

A ballot which has a mark in the circle under the Democratic device, and another between and above the devices of two other parties, will be counted for the Democratic candidate.-Id.

A ballot in which there is a blur or blot in the circle under a party device, which had the appearance of having been made by the butt of the stencil, will be counted for the candidate of that party.-Id.

A ballot voted in the circle under the Progressive party device and in the square opposite the name of the Republican candidate for sheriff will be counted for the Republican candidate. -Id.

A ballot, voted in the circle under the Republican device, on which the Democratic em

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tioned in an election contest were marked in § 194 (Ky.) Where a number of ballots quessuch a way as might have distinguished them, but their distribution among the several precincts was such as to render remote the probability that they were so marked for the purpose of identification, the ballots will be count

VII. BALLOTS.

$180 (Ky.) Ballots upon which the voter stamped his cross in the square below that op-ed.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893. posite the candidate's name will be counted for the candidate.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893.

Ballots voted entirely with cross marks made with a pencil will be counted.-Id.

A ballot voted in the square opposite the name of rival candidates for the same office will be counted for neither.-Id.

Ballots which have the secondary stubs attached may be counted.-Id.

$ 190 (Ky.) Ballots which have irregular pieces torn out of the sides or bottom, which apparently was done in wrapping or unwrapping the ballots, may be counted.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893.

VIII. CONDUCT OF ELECTION.

§ 230 (Ky.) Where enough persons voting for the successful candidate for an office to have changed the result were bribed, it was immaterial that such candidate had no knowledge of the bribery, and he was not legally elected.Adkins v. Phipps, 167 S. W. 134.

§ 230 (Ky.) An election will not be set aside for bribery unless the result is affected to such an extent that it cannot be determined who was elected.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404.

IX. COUNT OF VOTES, RETURNS,
AND CANVASS.

§ 237 (Ky.) Where, in election contest, evidence showed that defendant received enough illegal votes to change the result, and there was nothing to show that the contestant received any less number of legal votes than those counted, held that the election would be awarded to the contestant, instead of ordering a new election.-Adkins v. Phipps, 167 S. W. 134.

X. CONTESTS.

$278 (Ky.) A contest of election of subdistrict school trustee must be instituted within ten days after the certificate of returns of election signed by a majority of the election officers, and that the successful candidate prosecuted mandamus to obtain the signature of the other election officer and to compel the county superintendent to recognize him as trustee was

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INDEX-DIGEST

§ 286 (Ky.) Time specified by Ky. St. § 1596a, | insulated wire with which the house mover came in contact, is not for that reason relieved for the filing of pleadings in an election contest is not mandatory, and the court in its dis- of the duty of exercising that extraordinary decretion may permit the filing of pleadings not-gree of care required by handlers of electricity. withstanding a short delay after the time speci- |-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. fied if a proper excuse is presented.-Powell v. Horn, 167 S. W. 928.

In election contests it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to permit replies in two of the cases to be filed one and six days, respectively, after the time specified therefor had expired.-Id.

§ 293 (Ky.) Where ballots, when produced on a contest, were shown to be intact and the boxes appeared to be sealed up in the same manner as when delivered to the county court clerk, the ballots were properly admitted in evidence, though they were not strung, wrapped, sealed, and placed in an envelope as required by ute.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404.

§ 295 (Ky.) In an action to contest an election, evidence held to show that at least eight Voters were bribed, and that five of them voted for defendant, who on the face of the returns, received a majority of three votes.-Adkins v. Phipps, 167 S. W. 134. of a 298 (Ky.) The eligibility contestant may not be determined in an election contest under Ky. St. § 1596a.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404.

§ 299 (Ky.) A recount of the ballots may be had upon a naked allegation by a contestant of mistake and oversight on the part of the election officers in counting and certifying the vote, without a prima facie showing that the result I will be changed by the recount.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893.

§ 17 (Mo.App.) A power company, which had the control and care of electric wires by which current was carried to a schoolhouse, cannot escape liability for injuries because of the lack of insulation, on the ground that it did not own the wires; the injuries in the last analysis coming, not from the wires, but from the current.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457.

§ 18 (Mo.App.) A house mover, injured by contact with an uninsulated electric wire, is not barred of recovery because he did not have a stat-city permit authorizing him to move the house. -Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457.

In an election contest where all the ballots, and not merely the questioned ones, are recounted by the court, the questioned ballots may be counted, even though the election officers did not certify such ballots in the manner required by Ky. St. § 1482.-Id.

$299 (Ky.) Where a party to an election contest desires a recount of the ballots, he must tender with his motion evidence that the ballots had been properly preserved and not tampered with since their return, which may be shown by depositions or by oral testimony.-Powell v. Horn, 167 S. W. 928.

A house mover, who attempted to raise an uninsulated wire over a house, cannot be defeated in an action to recover for consequent injuries on the ground that he was violating Rev. St. 1909, § 4579, making it a misdemeanor to tamper with electric equipment.-Id.

§ 305 (Ky.) In an election contest, held, that the finding of the trial court with regard to certain ballots marked for contestant will not be disturbed, although such marks were suspicious in their appearance, and the finding resulted in a considerable change from the result certified by the election officers.-Snowden v. Flanery, 167 S. W. 893.

A house mover, who did not know that one wire strung with ordinary telephone wires carried a dangerous current of electricity, is not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to use rubber gloves when he attempted to lift the group of wires over the house.-Id.

§ 19 (Mo.App.) Where a house mover was injured in attempting to lift an uninsulated light wire over a house, held, that defendant could not, as a matter of law, be declared free from negligence on the theory that, when it strung its uninsulated wire 20 to 25 feet above the ground, it could not foresee the accident which occurred.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457.

Where an uninsulated electric wire similar in size was strung with telephone wires, a house mover, who desired to lift the wires a little above a house and did not know that one of the wires carried a dangerous current, cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence, as matter of law, in grasping them in his hands. -Id.

a

ELECTRICITY.

See Evidence, §§ 145, 508; Mandamus, § 15;
Master and Servant, 88 119, 137, 213, 217,
285, 286; Municipal Corporations, 8733;
Trial, § 252.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

I. NATURE, EXTENT, AND DELEGA-
TION OF POWER.

$ 47 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the fee of a coun$305 (Ky.) Where two sets of contest suits between the same parties for the same offices ty road, as well as that of the right of way of were filed, the first set after the first certificates a railroad company, remains in the landowner, had been issued and the second set after the the erection of a telephone line on either is an second certificates were issued by the commis-appropriation of his property which cannot be sioners, the parties were not prejudiced by the justified, except in case of condemnation by a consolidation of the two sets for trial, though public service telegraph or telephone company. the first set should have been stricken.-Powell Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183. v. Horn, 167 S. W. 928.

§ 14 (Mo.App.) Those who handle and distribute electricity are bound to use the highest degree of care possible to protect members of the public who may come in contact with the wires or other instrumentalities carrying the current.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457.

$13 (Tex.Civ.App.) Land cannot be taken for ican Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183. private use.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Amer

II. COMPENSATION.

(A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General. 869 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where land is taken for public use, compensation must be paid. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS.

See Death, §§ 11, 95; Evidence, § 236; Master and Servant, §§ 204, 228; Removal of Causes, 3; Trial.

EMPLOYÉS.

§ 15 (Mo.App.) One moving a house without a permit is merely a technical trespasser, and defendant, which maintained a dangerous and un

See Master and Servant.

ENTICEMENT.

See Husband and Wife, §§ 325-335.

EQUITY.

See Cancellation of Instruments; Corporations, § 123; Creditors' Suit; Discovery; Estoppel, $$ 56-93; Injunction; Judgment, §§ 143, 405451; Officers, § 82; Partition; Quieting Title; Receivers; Reformation of Instruments; Specific Performance; Trusts.

MAXIMS.

§ 56 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where it did not appear I. JURISDICTION, PRINCIPLES, AND that defendant held out an independent contractor as her agent, or that plaintiffs were induced to extend him credit for that reason, defendant cannot be held liable for his debts on the theory of estoppel.-Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828.

(A) Nature, Grounds, Subjects, and Extent of Jurisdiction in General.

$38 (Mo.) The court, in a suit to declare void a deed of trust and a deed under foreclosure thereof, revived on the death of the grantor by her administrator, will grant relief to one having a claim against the property, and will not compel claimant to seek relief in the probate court.-McMurray v. McMurray, 167 S. W. 513.

$39 (Ark.) Where a court of equity assumed jurisdiction of an action to set aside a conveyance as a fraud on creditors, it should settle the entire controversy and enforce the creditor's rights by ordering the land sold to satisfy its judgment.-Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Harris, 167 S. W. 706.

III. PARTIES AND PROCESS. $91 (Mo.App.) In a suit in equity, every person having a material legal or beneficial interest in the subject-matter may properly be made a party plaintiff or defendant, regardless of whether the interests are joint or several.Shelton v. Harrison, 167 S. W. 634.

IV. PLEADING.

(E) Demurrer, Exceptions, and Motions.

§ 241 (Ark.) An order of the chancery court overruling a demurrer, after which the cause was continued for the term, did not prevent the court from reconsidering the demurrer while the cause was pending before it, and from changing its decision, if it saw proper to do so.-Radford v. Samstag, 167 S. W. 491.

X. DECREE AND ENFORCEMENT
THEREOF.

§ 423 (Ark.) In a suit to recover possession of land where others were added as parties who claimed the land and had ratified the lease to the defendant, the chancellor should determine the claim of one of the new parties to settle the entire controversy, although he found that the original defendant was entitled to possession un

der a lease from the agents of the plaintiffs.

Phillips v. Grubbs, 167 S. W. 101.

ERROR, WRIT OF.

See Appeal and Error.

ESTATES.

See Deeds, §§ 125, 133; Descent and Distribution; Dower; Landlord and Tenant; Tenancy in Common; Wills.

ESTOPPEL.

In

See Appeal and Error, § 655; Carriers, § 76; Executors and Administrators, § 376; junction, § 239; Insurance, §§ 378-388, 558, 741, 755; Judgment, §§ 565-717; Negligence, § 82; Partnership, $ 56; Principal and Agent, § 171; Sales, §§ 288, 441; Trusts, § 191; Vendor and Purchaser, § 190.

topped, by certain deeds calling for the line as located by defendant, to claim that the line was not properly located.-Clemmons v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 1103.

II. BY DEED.

(A) Creation and Operation in General. § 32 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a suit to establish a

III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

(A) Nature and Essentials in General.

§ 56 (Mo.) The bringing of suit is not such a change of position by plaintiff as will estop defendant to deny previous admissions of liability.-Barnett v. Kemp, 167 S. W. 516.

(B) Grounds of Estoppel.

§ 63 (Ky.) Where a city contractor was unable to carry on the work, and the surety made arrangements for a loan to the contractor from a third person, and prepared an assignment to the lender of amounts retained by the city, and the notes executed by the contractor for the loan, the surety was estopped to rely on a prior assignment.-Commissioners of Sewerage of Louisville v. Gates, 167 S. W. 417.

§ 63 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a contract for the sale of orange trees above two feet in height in the seller's nursery, held, that the buyer's instruction to the seller not to sell to another any trees over two feet high did not estop the buyer from denying that title passed by the contract.Alsworth v. Reppert, 167 S. W. 1098.

§ 68 (Ky.) The action of certain devisees in joining with one claiming under a separate devise in bringing action for specific performance of a contract made by the other to sell the property to defendant, and in uniting with such other in a deed to defendant, would estop them erty.-McCrocklin v. O'Donaghue, 167 S. W. from setting up any, future claim to the prop

901.

§78 (Ky.) Where a contractor to reconstruct a vessel relied on an original contract and two supplemental contracts, the retention by him of a check stated to be for a partial payment on the original contract did not estop him from relying on the supplemental contracts.-Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 167 S. W. 384.

§ 93 (Mo.) The acts of plaintiff, to whom land was conveyed, held to raise no estoppel preventing him from asserting his prior title.Driskill v. Ashley, 167 S. W. 1026.

EVIDENCE.

See Adoption, § 8; Adverse Possession. § 85;

Appeal and Error, §§ 232, 559, 882, 907-934, 997-1011, 1050, 1051, 1053, 1054, 1170: Assault and Battery, § 27; Attorney and Client, § 190; Bailment, § 31; Banks and Banking, $154; Bigamy, §§ 8, 9, 11; Bills and Notes, $$ 494, 497, 523, 524; Boundaries, $$ 5, 33, 37, 54; Brokers, § 82; Burglary, § 39; Carriers, $$ 57, 134, 163, 202, 228, 318; Conspiracy, 47; Continuance, $ 47; Corporations, 308; Criminal Law, § 338-538, 938, 1090, 1091, 1120, 1169, 11702; Damages, $$ 85, 158, 177, 185; Death, $$ 64-68; Deeds, $$ 56, 194-211; Depositions; Discovery; Disorderly House, § 17; Divorce, §§ 124, 128, 184; Dower, §§ 44, 52; Elections, §§ 237, 295: Exceptions, Bill of, §§ 8, 13; Fixtures, § 35; Fraud, §§ 53, 58; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 302; Guardian and Ward, § 103; Homicide, §§ 145-255; Husband and Wife, §§ 6, 133, 313, 333; Injunction, § 186; Insurance, $$ 76, 602, 654, 665, 818, 819; Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 233, 236, 309, 310; Judg ment, § 101; Judicial Sales, § 61; Libel and Slander, $$ 100, 107, 111; Mandamus, §§ 165,

ant, §§ 268-279; Mortgages, §§ 37, 38; Mu- 880 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract which is valid nicipal Corporations, §§ 122, 282, 485, 568, in Texas is presumably valid in a sister state. 706, 819; Negligence, § 121; New Trial, 88-Whited v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 812. 26, 79; Parent and Child, 7 Partnership, 88 44-56, 336; Pleading, 111; Principal and Agent, §§ 20, 22, 23, 89; Principal and Surety, 161; Prostitution, § 4; Railroads, $$ 347, 348, 395, 398, 441, 443, 480; Rape, 88 38-52, 66; Reformation of Instruments, 88 44, 45; Robbery, § 24; Sales,, 88 288, 358, 416, 429, 440, 441; Street Railroads, §§ 93, 112, 114; Taxation, § 810; Trespass, § 46; Trespass to Try Title, §§ 35, 39; Trial, 88 139-143, 156, 244, 250-253; Trover and Conversion, 835; Trusts, §§ 89, 107, 110; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 16, 284; Weapons, 17; Wills. $8 55, 163; Witnesses; Work and Labor, § 28. Reception of, see Criminal Law, §§ 673-684; Trial, §§ 48-84.

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

§ 12 (Mo.) The Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the population of the city of St. Louis.-State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W. 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016.

§ 12 (Mo.App.) In a proceeding for a local option election, the county court must take judicial notice of the population of a town as determined by a census regularly taken under Rev. St. 1909, § 7239.-State ex rel. City of Elvins v. Marshall, 167 S. W. 1050.

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§ 80 (Mo.) In the absence of proof of abrogation by statute, it will be presumed the common law concerning marriage is in force in another state.-Cherry v. Cherry, 167 S. W. 539.

§ 83 (Tex.Civ.App.) In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that surveyors, in making a survey, did their duty and marked the corner thereof with some object of reasonable permanence, and the presumption is that the original survey was actually made on the ground.-Harkrider v. Gaut, 167 S. W. 164.

III. BURDEN OF PROOF.

§ 90 (Mo.App.) The burden of proof is the duty resting on a party asserting the affirmative of an issue of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence, and remains with such party until the end of the trial.-Ranney v. Lewis, 167 S. W. 601.

IV. RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY, AND
COMPETENCY IN GENERAL.

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(A) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Issues.

§ 101 (Ark.) In actions in a state court to enforce rights given by a federal statute, the rules of evidence of the state court control unless otherwise provided by the federal law.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

(B) Res Gestæ.

§ 123 (Ky.) Statements by the engineer and conductor of a freight train, made about 15 or 20 minutes after an accident in which a brake

man was injured, and while they were gathered around the injured man, that they had seen his light go out were not part of the res gestæ.Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Walker's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 128.

§ 123 (Mo.App.) Entries made by an attorney as soon as a client left his office, consisting of a memoranda of the facts, were not a part of the res gestæ, and were inadmissible in his favor, in the absence of a showing that the client ever saw the entries.-Ranney v. Lewis, 167 S. W. 601.

of

§ 127 (Ark.) Involuntary exclamations pain because of an injury, though several weeks thereafter, are admissible in evidence as to the extent of the injury, but narrative statements by the injured party as to the injury are inadmissible.-Prescott & N. W. R. Co. v. Thomas, 167 S. W. 486.

(C) Similar Facts and Transactions. § 135 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for fraudulent misrepresentations, by which the plaintiffs were induced to enter into a lease, evidence that similar representations were made by the defendant to other parties before and after the time they were made to plaintiff was admissible. -Loftus v. Sturgis, 167 S. W. 14.

(D) Materiality.

§ 145 (Mo.) In action for injuries from electric shock, testimony that a brad through which it was claimed the electric current reached the handle of a switch looked as though it had "het" and burned off or grounded, when examined two weeks after the accident, held properly admitted, the lapse of time not depriving the testimony of probative force.-Riley v. City of Independence, 167 S. W. 1022.

V. BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

§ 181 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action to recover an interest in land, where the addressee of a letter from plaintiff's intestate gave evidence § 80 (Mo. App.) Kansas never having been un- that he thought that the letter read to him was der common-law jurisdiction, courts of Mis- a copy of the original which he thought he had souri would presume that Kansas laws were the and which if found he would attach to his depsame as in Missouri.-Fehrenbach Wine & Liq-osition, but which was not done, did not lay a uor Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. proper predicate for the introduction of the W. 631. copy.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321.

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