ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

fraud of creditors, plaintiff creditor, by levying its attachment upon the property, acquired, under Kirby's Dig. § 360, a lien good as against the grantee and those who took with notice.Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Harris, 167 S. W. 706.

§ 228 (Mo.App.) Where a sale of a stock of merchandise in bulk is fraudulent under the Bulk Sales Law, § 1, a creditor of a seller may, despite section 2, attach the stock under Rev. St. 1909, § 2294, subd. 7, and section 2344, without showing that any particular part of the goods were sold by him.-Joplin Supply Co. v. Smith, 167 S. W. 649.

GUARANTY.

See Continuance, § 47; Insurance, §§ 514, 668; Principal and Surety.

ac

II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. § 38 (Ark.) Guaranty of a salesman's counts, executed during a certain contract, held not a continuing guaranty, so that the guarantor was not liable for liability accruing under his new or renewal contract.-Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Chastain, 167 S. W. 495.

$38 (Ky.) Guaranty of payment for goods sold to continue until notice was given, but

(C) Right of Action to Set Aside Trans-limiting the amount of the guarantor's liabil

fer, and Defenses.

§ 237 (Mo. App.) The denial of execution on a judgment recovered against an insane defendant whose assets were insufficient to satisfy all of his obligations does not deprive plaintiff of the right to sue to set aside fraudulent conveyances made by defendant, which could not be attacked by his guardian.-Girdner v. McWilliams, 167 S. W. 1182.

(G) Evidence.

§ 286 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff claimed under a conveyance of land which a debtor received in exchange for his homestead, made within six months after exchange, and defendant claimed by purchase at a sale under a judgment against the debtor, plaintiff may be interrogated as to whether he holds the land for the debtor.-Witt v. Teat, 167 S. W. 302.

§ 295 (Mo.) In a suit to declare a decedent the owner of land to which it was claimed he had the equitable title and to partition it among his heirs, evidence held insufficient to show that he had a part thereof conveyed to one of his sons to defraud his creditors.-McClanahan v. McClanahan, 167 S. W. 991.

$ 302 (Ark.) In a suit to set aside a conveyance as a fraud on creditors, evidence held to show that it was made with the purpose of defrauding the grantor's creditors, and that the grantee participated in such fraud.-Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Harris, 167 S. W. 706.

[blocks in formation]

ity, held a continuing obligation and not discharged by payment on the buyer's account unless made in discharge of the guaranty and with notice to that effect.-Ford v. House-Hasson Hardware Co., 167 S. W. 879.

IV. REMEDIES OF CREDITORS.

§ 86 (Ky.) In action on guaranty, an answer alleging payment held indefinite as to whether the allegation of payment referred to the debt guaranteed or to the guarantor's obligation, and the court should either have required it to be Ford v. House-Hasson Hardware Co., 167 S. W. 879.

made more definite or sustained a demurrer.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

I. GUARDIANSHIP IN GENERAL. $4 (Tex.Civ.App.) A parent cannot appoint himself guardian of his minor child's estate and dispose of the property without the sanction of court; his guardianship by nature not giving him such power.-Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22.

IV. SALES AND CONVEYANCES UNDER ORDER OF COURT.

§ 99 (Tenn.) Witnesses disqualified by Shannon's Code, § 5088, to purchase a ward's realty at a sale, held only such as testify to facts which would reflect in some material degree on the jurisdictional facts specified in section 5078, and influence the court's judgment.-Arbuckle v. Arbuckle, 167 S. W. 111.

§ 103 (Tenn.) Evidence of a purchaser on a proceeding to confirm a guardian's sale of a ward's interest in certain real property held insufficient to bar the witness' right to purchase under Shannon's Code, § 5088.-Arbuckle V. Arbuckle, 167 S. W. 111.

§103 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a father sold land which he had previously conveyed to his son, he cannot validate the sale by six years later applying for guardianship of the son's estate, and for confirmation of the sale as an act of guardianship; there being no order of sale made.Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22.

VI. ACCOUNTING AND SETTLEMENT.

§ 151 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 2036, providing that a guardian shall be allowed a reasonable compensation for his services, a guardian is not entitled to over 5 per cent. for ordinary services relating to the control and disbursement of the wealth v. Graves County Banking & Trust Co., funds which come into his hands.-Common167 S. W. 411.

§ 163 (Ky.) Where settlements by a guardian, approved by the county court, made allowances for personal services, it will, in view of Ky. St. § 2038, be presumed that the services were only those relating to the management and disbursement of the ward's funds, where there were no vouchers showing any different services.-Commonwealth v. Graves County Banking & Trust Co., 167 S. W. 411.

A settlement in the county court, which made allowances to a guardian for personal services,

Ky. St. §§ 1067, 2038, prima facie evidence of its propriety, and the burden is on the guardian to sustain it.-Id.

§ 164 (Ky.) A wife who took her husband's note in the settlement of his guardianship, receipting that it was the balance due in such settlement, and, when it was found that more was due, gave a receipt for the balance, accepted such note in full satisfaction.-Greenup v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W. 910.

VIII. LIABILITIES ON GUARDIAN

SHIP BONDS.

V. REGULATION AND USE FOR
TRAVEL.

(B) Use of Highway and Law of the
Road.

§ 184 (Ky.) An allegation that defendant's employés wrongfully pulled or stretched a rope along a road in such a careless and negligent manner that it greatly frightened plaintiff's horse, and caused it to throw her backwards, was sufficiently broad to cover any negligent act that could reasonably be inferred from the proof.-Prestonsburg Coal Co. v. Wallen, 167 S. W. 395.

HOMESTEAD.

I. NATURE, ACQUISITION, AND
EXTENT.

§ 176 (Ky.) A wife could not set aside the See Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 52, 286. settlement of her former husband's guardianship, in which she accepted his note, and hold his surety, after 29 months from the settlement, when she must have known that the note was worthless and of any duress, and 20 months after she separated from him and learned of the fraud.-Greenup v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W. 910.

[blocks in formation]

I. ESTABLISHMENT, ALTERATION,

AND DISCONTINUANCE.

(C) Alteration, Vacation, or Abandonment.

$72 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 4303. providing that a "party aggrieved" by an order for the alteration of a county road may appeal, owners of land abutting the portion sought to be vacated, being parties to the proceedings, could appeal; the words "party aggrieved" not merely including the owners of property taken or injured by the opening of the new part of the road.-Carrick v. Garth, 167 S. W. 687.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series

(C) Acquisition and Establishment. § 31 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a donee of land accepted the gift with the understanding that the property should be his homestead, and he began to improve the property and erect a house thereon with intent to occupy it as a home, and the improvements were completed and occupied, the property was his homestead.-Wilkerson & Satterfield v. McMurry, 167 S. W. 275.

(D) Property Constituting Homestead. 3787, the owner of a homestead, who traded $77 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. it for other land upon which he never resided, holds such other land free from attachment for a period of six months from the time of the exchange.-Witt v. Teat, 167 S. W. 302.

III. RIGHTS OF SURVIVING HUS-
BAND, WIFE, CHILDREN,
OR HEIRS.

§ 135 (Ark.) Where a husband died in 1869, the rights of his widow and minor children in his homestead were fixed by Const. 1868, art. 12, § 5, and hence, under the direct provisions of that article, the widow's remarriage after her abandonment of the homestead.-Jarrett v. Jarchildren had reached their majority worked an rett, 167 S. W. 482.

§ 141 (Ark.) Under Const. 1868, art. 12, § 5, providing that the homestead of the owner shall, debts during the minority of his children and after his death, be exempt from payment of his so long as his widow shall remain unmarried, the homestead cannot be validly sold for payment of debts until after the widow's remarriage.-Jarrett v. Jarrett, 167 S. W. 482.

$145 (Tex.) Surviving spouse, regardless of solvency or insolvency, held entitled to use homestead exempt from forced sale for the payment of his own debts, which right ends upon the abandonment of the homestead.-Hoefling v. Hoefling, 167 S. W. 210.

$146 (Tex.) Under Const. art. 16, §§ 50, 52, and Rev. St. 1911, arts. 3235, 3413, 3414, and decedent's estate is solvent or insolvent, de3421-3428, inclusive, the homestead, whether scends to his heirs, subject to the rights of the widow and minor children, exempt from liability for the decedent's debts, and this status is not affected by a subsequent voluntary sale or abandonment.-Hoefling v. Hoefling, 167 S. W. 210.

§ 146 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, arts. 1869, 2055, 2060, 2061, exempting the homestead from the debts of an insolvent decedent and vesting it in the heirs immediately, the amount received from a sale of the homestead by the heirs is not liable for the debts of the decedent.-American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Logan, 167 S. W. 771.

$150 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the homestead is clearly defined, so that its identity can be determined, the actual setting apart of the home& Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

stead of an insolvent decedent by the probate court, under Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 2046, is not essential to the vesting of the title, thereto in the heirs.-American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Logan, 167 S. W. 771.

that a remark was made by some one indicating an intention to make trouble, was properly excluded, where the witness did not know who made the remark, and it was not certain that it was any one who participated in the subsequent difficulty.-Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 167 S.

V. PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT W. 942. OF RIGHTS.

§ 189 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a debtor, who was the head of a family, and resided upon a large tract of land, conveyed it in fraud of his creditors, he is entitled, upon the setting aside of the conveyance, to select and hold 200 acres as his homestead.-Cobern v. Stevens, 167 S. W. 207.

$213 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a plea to set aside a homestead out of a larger tract did not designate the particular portion selected, but merely asked that his right be protected, and the plaintiff creditors did not except to the plea, the debtor is entitled to have his homestead set off.-Cobern v. Stevens, 167 S. W. 207.

HOMICIDE.

See Criminal Law, §§ 200, 675, 814, 823.

II. MURDER.

§ 9 (Ark.) A specific intent to take life is not an essential element of murder in the second degree. Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703. An intent to kill is an essential element in the offense of murder in the first degree.-Id.

III. MANSLAUGHTER.

§ 42 (Tex.Cr.App.) Except in the case of insult to a female relative, the provocation to reduce a homicide to manslaughter must arise at the time of the killing, although antecedent matters may be looked to in judging and passing on the question whether the provocation was sufficient to constitute adequate cause.-Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

$55 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homicide, held, that certain acts of deceased did not show false imprisonment which must be willful -that is, with evil intent-upon which an issue of manslaughter could be predicated.-Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

IV. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL. $90 (Tex.Cr.App.) A carving knife the handle of which was 54 inches long, the blade 94 inches long, 11/7 inches wide at the butt, and tapering to a point and weighing 7 ounces, was a deadly weapon per se.-Jones v. State, 167 S. W. 1110.

$95 (Tex.Cr.App.) Insulting language towards and of defendant's daughter, by one not present at the time of the shooting, though the father of the one shot, could not reduce the offense from assault to murder to aggravated assault.Singleton v. State, 167 S. W. 46.

Simply calling defendant's daughter a "wolf" was not statutory adequate cause to reduce a shooting from assault to murder to aggravated assault, though it would be a circumstance to be considered along with any others.-Id.

VII. EVIDENCE.

(A) Presumptions and Burden of Proof. $145 (Ark.) While the use of a weapon which is necessarily deadly, or its use in a way necessarily calculated to inflict great bodily harm, raises a presumption of intention to kill, a beer bottle is not necessarily a dangerous weapon; the danger to be anticipated depending entirely upon the method in which a blow therewith was inflicted.-Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703.

(B) Admissibility in General.

§ 158 (Ky.) Testimony by a witness for the defense that he saw deceased and several oth

§ 158 (Mo.) In a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, the court properly permitted a state's witness to testify to threats by accused against the prosecuting witness a year prior to the assault.-State v. Hyder, 167 S. W. 524.

§ 165 (Ark.) On trial for killing a woman between whom and deceased illicit relations existed, testimony that he asked a witness to go to her room and see if another man was there held competent.-Woolman v. State, 167 S. W. 851.

§ 166 (Mo.) Where the state, on a trial for murder committed during a robbery, relied on a confession by accused, showing that a third person was present, evidence that the third person was not present and could not have taken part in the crime was admissible to rebut the evidence of motive.-State v. Powell, 167 S. W. 559.

§ 169 (Ark.) Where accused stated that he had given his pistol to a third person before boarding a train to his home, where he killed decedent, the marshal of the town, testimony as to the conduct of accused on the train and that he carried his right hand in his overcoat pocket was competent to show he was armed while on the train and to show his attitude in connection with the statement made to him that he would be arrested by the marshal if he did not behave himself.-McDaniels v. State, 167 S. W. 96.

§ 173 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where a carving knife, which was per se a deadly weapon, was identified, evidence as to its length, breadth, and weight, and that it was a deadly weapon, was admissible.-Jones v. State, 167 S. W. 1110.

that he regarded deceased as a dangerous man, § 188 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused testified having heard that he had been indicted for murder, and introduced the record of the indictment, the state can rebut the evidence by showing that deceased was acquitted, and that he did not participate in the killing.-Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

Where accused claimed that he killed in selfdefense, and testified that because of his knowledge of the numerous difficulties in which deceased had been engaged he regarded him as a dangerous man, the state may introduce evidence to show deceased's general reputation was that of a peaceable, law-abiding citizen.—Id.

§ 189 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused testified that he had heard of deceased's difficulties with others, and for that reason regarded him as a dangerous man, evidence of the details of those difficulties is properly excluded.-Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

for a defense for shooting one of a party who § 194 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant relied were in a yard, at the fence, when he drove along the road, not on the fact that they were together there, but that they came out, and first fired at him, evidence that they had come to the fence to repair it, and had done so, is not objectionable, within the rule that an innocent motive, unknown to defendant, for acts producing an appearance on which he had a right to act in self-defense, may not be shown.-Singleton v. State, 167 S. W. 46.

$199 (Tex.Cr.App.) A physician having testified that he would not state the wound was such as might probably result in death, his testimony showing the bullet did inflict serious bodily injury was admissible on the issue, if defendant was not guilty of assault to murder, whether the wound was of the character to call for a charge on aggravated assault or simple

(C) Dying Declarations.

§ 203 (Ark.) Where decedent's attending physician testified that he told decedent he could not live, and decedent expressed his concurrence in that opinion, the dying declaration of decedent was admissible.-McDaniels v. State, 167 S. W. 96.

§ 218 (Ark.) Whether deceased's statement that defendant had hit him with a bottle was made in extremis, was for the jury.-Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703.

(E) Weight and Sufficiency.

§ 254 (Ark.) Evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction of murder in the second degree.-Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703.

§ 255 (Ark.) Evidence held to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and not to show conclusively that defendant acted in selfdefense.-Woolman v. State, 167 S. W. 851.

VIII. TRIAL.

(C) Instructions.

the refusal of his special charges thereon was not error.-Jones v. State, 167 S. W. 1110.

§ 308 (Ark.) An instruction that a blow must be struck with malice before accused could be guilty of murder in the second degree was proper, and did not exclude the consideration of the degrees of manslaughter.-Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703.

§ 309 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 4462, where there was no evidence tending to prove that a killing was involuntary, an instruction on manslaughter in the third degree was properly refused.-State v. Prince, 167 S. W. 535.

$309 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where no statutory adequate cause to reduce the killing to manslaughter was testified to by any witness, and the court charged that the jury, in considering provocation, might consider all the facts in evidence, failure to charge on cooling time was not error.-Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

X. APPEAL AND ERROR.

§ 338 (Ark.) Where it was undisputed that defendant hit deceased with a bottle and the only conflict was whether she struck the blow with it or threw it and struck deceased, any error in admitting as a dying declaration his statement that defendant hit him with a bottle

$297 (Ark.) An instruction, in the language of Kirby's Dig. § 1765, does not require accused to establish mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, but merely places on him the burden of showing the circumstanc-held harmless.-Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703. es.-McDaniels v. State, 167 S. W. 96.

It is not improper to charge (Kirby's Dig. § 1765) that, where the killing is proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation devolves on accused, provided the jury is also told that accused is entitled to an acquittal, where the evidence on the whole case raises a reasonable doubt of his guilt.-Id.

$300 (Mo.) Where the defense was self-defense not knowing that deceased was an officer undertaking to arrest accused, the court properly refused defendant's request that, even though he knew deceased was an officer, yet, if deceased used unnecessary force to effect the arrest, and defendant believed that, by reason of such force, deceased was about to kill him, etc., then defendant could kill deceased in selfdefense.-State v. Banks, 167 S. W. 505. An instruction, following the regular charge upon self-defense, that, "if the defendant shot (deceased) unnecessarily, * * there can be no self-defense in the case" was erroneous, because it deprived defendant of the right to act upon appearances.-Id.

$300 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the charge on selfdefense did not limit the defense in any way, it was not necessary to give a requested charge that the defendant had the right to carry arms in his necessary defense.-Carey v. State, 167 S. W. 366.

$300 (Tex.Cr.App.) A charge held to correctly submit accused's theory of self-defense.Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

§ 338 (Ark.) On a trial for killing a woman between whom and accused illicit relations had existed, the admission of evidence that accused asked a witness to go to deceased's room and see if some other man was there was harmless, if erroneous, where acused was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter only.-Woolman State, 167 S. W. 851.

V.

$340 (Ark.) Error in an instruction that striking with a beer bottle raised a presumption of intention to kill held not prejudicial, where defendant was only convicted of murder in the second degree.-Tolliver v. State, 167 S. W. 703.

Error in an instruction, allowing a conviction of murder in the first degree in the absence of any intent to kill, held not prejudicial, where defendant was only convicted of murder in the second degree.-Id.

§ 340 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where there was no issue of manslaughter in the case, errors in instructions on manslaughter are harmless.Johnson v. State, 167 S. W. 733.

§ 342 (Ark.) Where the jury under the evidence might have found defendant guilty of a higher degree than manslaughter, he could not complain of their failure to do so.-McGough v. State, 167 S. W. 857.

HOSPITALS.

See Charities, § 45.

Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1131, the evidence in a prosecution for homicide, held not to raise HOSTILE POSSESSION. any issue of manslaughter requiring instruc- See Adverse Possession, §§ 61-85.

tions.-Id.

Where the negotiations which culminated in the killing consumed only a short time, although there was a short interim between the first conversation and the final meeting, a separate charge on threats in presenting the issue of selfdefense was unnecessary.-Id.

§ 301 (Tex.Cr.App.) Defendant is not entitled to an instruction that if the person whom he shot, or those with him, made an unlawful attack on defendant's daughter, he should be acquitted, where the evidence is that any such assault was unknown to him, and after he shot. -Singleton v. State, 167 S. W. 46.

8 307 (Tex.Cr.App.) Defendant's threat to kill, and his striking with a large and dangerous knife, and attempting further use of it before it was taken away from him, held not to raise the issue of simple or accidental assault so that

HOUSEBREAKING.

See Burglary.

HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE. See Railroads, §§ 338, 348, 360, 400; Street Railroads, §§ 93, 103, 112.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Acknowledgment, § 37; Adverse Possession, $$ 62, 63; Appeal and Error, § 877; Bigamy; Criminal Law, §§ 785, 786; Divorce; Dower; Evidence, §§ 273, 501; Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 285-317; Marriage; Mortgages, § 587; Railroads, § 398; Telegraphs and Telephones, § 56; Tenancy in

Common, § 3; Trial, § 295; Trusts, § 89; | husband did not join, was void.-Driskill v. Wills, 88 559, 616; Witnesses, §§ 144, 149, Ashley, 167 S. W. 1026. 191, 268, 330.

I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.

§6 (Mo.) Evidence, in a suit by a widow to set aside conveyances of land and avoid gifts of money by her deceased husband, held to show no fraud, and that the disposition of the property was not in anticipation of death, but by way of advancement to their children with her consent.-Pollman v. Schaper, 167 S. W. 953.

III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND
OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

$ 492 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife treated animals as her separate property under a mistaken view of the law, there was no gift to the wife, but if the husband relinquished his claim because it was just to the wife, there was a gift by him to her of such animals.-Wofford v. Lane, 167 S. W. 180.

Under Rev. St. 1879, § 669, relating to conveyances by married women, a deed by a wife, signed and acknowledged by her husband, passes good title, though the husband was not named as one of the grantors.-Id.

193 (Tex.Civ.App.) A wife, during coverture,, neither at common law nor under Rev. St. 1911, arts. 4621, 4622, prescribing the rights and powers of married women, could land, unless joined by her husband.-Connell v. make an enforceable contract to convey her Nickey, 167 S. W. 313.

§ 198 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where land was the separate property of a wife, a deed from the stepmother of the wife to the wife's husband conveyed no title, notwithstanding the wife permitted and acquiesced in the conveyance.-Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S. W. 304.

VI. ACTIONS.

singer Act of 1894, a married woman may sue
§ 205 (Ky.) Since the enactment of the Weis-
and recover of her husband any debt that he
may owe her.-Greenup v. United States Fidel-

IV. DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGES ity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W. 910.
OF COVERTURE.

(C) Contracts.

§ 214 (Tenn.) Where a married woman, during her husband's absence, permitted vicious 881 (Tex.Civ.App.) A married woman would dogs to be kept upon her premises, the husband not be bound by covenants of warranty contain-is liable jointly with her for injuries inflicted ed in a deed by her.-Vineyard v. Heard, 167 by the dogs upon another.-Missio v. Williams, 167 S. W. 473.

S. W. 22.

§ 89 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 8304, authorizing a married woman to contract as a feme sole, a married woman may ratify an adoption made by her before the passage of the act in 1889.-Horton v. Troll, 167 S. W. 1081. Ratification after removal of disability of coverture is valid.-Id.

(E) Torts.

§ 102 (Mo.App.) As a general proposition, a husband is liable for the torts of the wife, and this liability is not affected by the Married Women's Act, emancipating the wife so far as her property rights and right to sue and be sued are concerned.-Claxton v. Pool, 167 S. W. 623. A husband is not liable for the acts of the wife which result in the alienation of the affections of the husband of another woman, where such acts are committed out of his presence, and amount to a greater injury to him than to the other woman.-Id.

§102 (Tenn.) A married woman who permit ted, during her husband's absence, another to keep vicious dogs on her premises is liable for the injuries inflicted by them.-Missio v. Williams, 167 S. W. 473.

A married woman is not liable for torts committed through the negligence of her husband under the rule respondeat superior.-Id.

V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. (A) What Constitutes.

§ 133 (Ky.) Evidence held to show that money loaned and notes taken therefor belonged to a wife and her mother, freed from any claim of the husband.-Glass v. Bradford, 167 S. W. 926.

(C) Liabilities and Charges.

VII. COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 254 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife exchange their homestead for other land upon which they never resided, such land be comes part of the community estate.-Witt v. Teat, 167 S. W. 302.

not re

§ 266 (Tex.Civ.App.) A wife may nounce to her husband her interest in the community estate by contract, practically without consideration, even through the intervention of a trustee.-Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.

$267 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife exchange their homestead for other land upon which they never resided, the community estate may be disposed of by the husband alone, without the consent of his wife.-Witt v. Teat, 167 S. W. 302.

community estate paid the full value of the per§ 273 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the survivor of a sonal property to settle community debts, an heir of the deceased spouse could not recover anything from the survivor on that account.Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.

$ 274 (Tex.Civ.App.) A daughter having received certain real property on the death of her mother from her father as survivor of the community, and acquiesced in a family settlement, held to have received the same in full satisfaction of her claim against her mother's estate.— Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.

IX. ABANDONMENT.

$305 (Tex.Cr.App.) The statute defining the marriage authorizes abandonment by the man offense of abandonment after seduction and only for such acts of intercourse committed by her after marriage as would entitle him to a divorce, and not for her intercourse with an§ 171 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a wife executed other after her seduction, but before marriage. a mortgage to secure her husband's note, any-James v. State, 167 S. W. 727. extension of such note without her consent, which would be binding upon both parties, so that the holder of the note could decline to accept payment until the extended date, would release her property so mortgaged.-Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S. W. 304.

(D) Conveyances and Contracts to Convey.

§ 193 (Mo.) Prior to the married women's act. a conveyance by a married woman, in which her

abandonment after seduction and marriage, evi$313 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for dence that the prosecuting witness had given birth to a child held admissible.-James v. State, 167 S. W. 727.

In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, it is not necessary that the prosecuting witness be corroborated both as to the act of intercourse and the promise of marriage, although the fact that defendant had married her to secure dismissal of a prosecu

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »