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Common, § 3; Trial, § 295; Trusts, § 89; | husband did not join, was void.-Driskill v. Wills, 88 559, 616; Witnesses, §§ 144, 149, Ashley, 167 S. W. 1026. 191, 268, 330.
Under Rev. St. 1879, § 669, relating to conveyances by married women, a deed by a wife, signed and acknowledged by her husband, passes good title, though the husband was not named as one of the grantors.-Id.
I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
86 (Mo.) Evidence, in a suit by a widow to set aside conveyances of land and avoid gifts of money by her deceased husband, held to show no fraud, and that the disposition of the property was not in anticipation of death, but by way of advancement to their children with her consent.-Pollman v. Schaper, 167 S. W. 953.
III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND
8492 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife treated animals as her separate property under a mistaken view of the law, there was no gift to the wife, but if the husband relinquished his claim because it was just to the wife, there was a gift by him to her of such animals.-Wofford v. Lane, 167 S. W. 180.
IV. DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGES
881 (Tex.Civ.App.) A married woman would not be bound by covenants of warranty contained in a deed by her.-Vineyard v. Heard, 167
S. W. 22.
§ 89 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 8304, authorizing a married woman to contract as a feme sole, a married woman may ratify an adoption made by her before the passage of the act in 1889.-Horton v. Troll, 167 S. W. 1081. Ratification after removal of disability of coverture is valid.-Id.
§ 102 (Mo.App.) As a general proposition, a husband is liable for the torts of the wife, and this liability is not affected by the Married Women's Act, emancipating the wife so far as her property rights and right to sue and be sued are concerned.-Claxton v. Pool, 167 S. W. 623. A husband is not liable for the acts of the wife which result in the alienation of the affections of the husband of another woman, where such acts are committed out of his presence, and amount to a greater injury to him than to the other woman.-Id.
§102 (Tenn.) A married woman who permitted, during her husband's absence, another to keep vicious dogs on her premises is liable for the injuries inflicted by them.-Missio v. Williams, 167 S. W. 473.
A married woman is not liable for torts committed through the negligence of her husband under the rule respondeat superior.-Id.
V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE.
(A) What Constitutes.
§ 133 (Ky.) Evidence held to show that money loaned and notes taken therefor belonged to a wife and her mother, freed from any claim of the husband.-Glass v. Bradford, 167 S. W. 926.
(C) Liabilities and Charges.
§ 171 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a wife executed a mortgage to secure her husband's note, extension of such note without her consent, which would be binding upon both parties, so that the holder of the note could decline to accept payment until the extended date, would release her property so mortgaged.-Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S. W. 304.
193 (Tex. Civ.App.) A wife, during coverture, neither at common law nor under Rev. rights and powers of married women, could St. 1911, arts. 4621, 4622, prescribing the make an enforceable contract to convey her land, unless joined by her husband.-Connell v. Nickey, 167 S. W. 313.
(D) Conveyances and Contracts to Convey.
§ 193 (Mo.) Prior to the married women's act.
§ 198 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where land was the separate property of a wife, a deed from the stepmother of the wife to the wife's husband conveyed no title, notwithstanding the wife permitted and acquiesced in the conveyance.-Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S. W. 304.
§ 205 (Ky.) Since the enactment of the Weissinger Act of 1894, a married woman may sue and recover of her husband any debt that he may owe her.-Greenup v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W. 910.
§ 214 (Tenn.) Where a married woman, during her husband's absence, permitted vicious dogs to be kept upon her premises, the husband is liable jointly with her for injuries inflicted by the dogs upon another.-Missio v. Williams,
167 S. W. 473.
VII. COMMUNITY PROPERTY. § 254 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife exchange their homestead for other land upon which they never resided, such land be comes part of the community estate.-Witt v. Teat, 167 S. W. 302.
§ 266 (Tex.Civ.App.) A wife may not renounce to her husband her interest in the community estate by contract, practically without consideration, even through the intervention of a trustee. Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.
$267 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife exchange their homestead for other land upon which they never resided, the community estate may be disposed of by the husband alone, without the consent of his wife.-Witt v. Teat, 167 S. W. 302.
$305 (Tex.Cr.App.) The statute defining the offense of abandonment after seduction and marriage authorizes abandonment by the man only for such acts of intercourse committed by her after marriage as would entitle him to a divorce, and not for her intercourse with another after her seduction, but before marriage. any-James v. State, 167 S. W. 727.
§ 273 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the survivor of a community estate paid the full value of the personal property to settle community debts, an heir of the deceased spouse could not recover anything from the survivor on that account.Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.
§ 274 (Tex.Civ.App.) A daughter having received certain real property on the death of her mother from her father as survivor of the community, and acquiesced in a family settlement, held to have received the same in full satisfaction of her claim against her mother's estate.Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.
$313 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, evidence that the prosecuting witness had given birth to a child held admissible.-James v. State, 167 S. W. 727.
In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, it is not necessary that the prosecuting witness be corroborated both as to the act of intercourse and the promise of marriage, although the fact that defendant had
tion against him for seduction was a circumstance tending strongly to corroborate on both issues.-Id.
In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, testimony of defendant to show that prosecutrix was unchaste when he See Wills, & 840. was alleged to have had his first intercourse with her held so unreasonable and contrary to all human experiences that a conviction would not be reversed.-Id.
X. ENTICING AND ALIENATING.
$325 (Mo.App.) A wife may sue third persons for enticing away her husband and alienating his affections, just as the husband might at common law.-Claxton v. Pool, 167 S. W. 623.
$326 (Ky.) A husband may recover for alienation of his wife's affections, even though she had previously been granted a divorce.-Hostetter v. Green, 167 S. W. 919.
§ 332 (Mo.App.) A petition for the alienation of the affections of plaintiff's husband by another woman held to state a good cause of action.-Claxton v. Pool, 167 S. W. 623.
A petition against a wife and husband for alienation of the affections of plaintiff's husband, which alleged that the acts were committed by defendant wife with the knowledge and consent of her husband, but did not allege that he encouraged, aided, or abetted her, did not charge him as a joint tort-feasor, but only upon the common-law liability of a husband for the wife's torts.-Id.
§ 333 (Ky.) In a husband's action for alienation of his wife's affections, the record in the previous divorce case in which both the husband and wife had sought divorce on the ground of abandonment, containing no admissions of any kind by the husband, held inadmissible.-Hostetter v. Green, 167 S. W. 919.
$ 333 (Mo.App.) In an action by a wife for alienation of her husband's affections, the burden is upon her to show, not only interference by defendant and infatuation by plaintiff's husband for defendant, but also that defendant's wrongful actions were the cause of the alienation.-Claxton v. Pool, 167 S. W. 623.
In an action by a wife for alienation of her husband's affections, evidence held sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that defendant was the enticer and inducer of plaintiff's husband, and not merely passive in the matter.-Id.
§ 335 (Mo.App.) In an action for the alienation of the affections of plaintiff's husband, an instruction held correctly to define the elements necessary to be found to establish defendant's liability and to cover the case.-Claxton v. Pool,
167 S. W. 623.
IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CON-
See Witnesses, §§ 330-414.
See Work and Labor.
See Insane Persons.
See Guaranty; Insurance, § 514; Mechanics'
See Wills, § 840.
§ 125 (Mo.) An information charging robbery in the first degree, as defined by Rev. St. 1909, § 4530, is not duplicitous merely because it charges that the offense was perpetrated both by violence to the person of prosecutor and by putting him in fear.-State v. Flynn, 167 S. W. 516.
$ 132 (Mo.) The time to compel the state to elect on which offense it will rely for conviction of rape of a child below the age of consent is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and, where it did not abuse its discretion to the injury of accused, he may not complain because
See Homestead, § 31; Municipal Corporations, §§ 278-568.
the election was not required until the close of the state's case disclosing two different assaults. -State v. Hughes, 167 S. W. 529.
VII. MOTION TO QUASH OR DISMISS, AND DEMURRER.
8137 (Mo.) A motion to quash an information for duplicity, urged before trial, must be sustained if the objection is well taken.-State v. Flynn, 167 S. W. 516.
IX. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE.
§ 180 (Ark.) Where the prosecuting attorney was misled by the signature of the prosecuting witness to the grand jury minutes, and charged in the indictment for larceny that the owner's name was "J. R. R.," while his name was "J. B. R.," but the prosecuting witness was the identical person named in the indictment as "J. R. A.," there was no fatal variance between the proof and the indictment.-Joiner v. State, 167 S. W. 492.
III. PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCES. § 37 (Ky.) The courts have no inherent power to order the sale of an infant's real estate.Melcher v. Yager's Guardian, 167 S. W. 871.
Where a proceeding for sale for reinvestment of the property of infants could not be sustained under Civ. Code Prac. § 489, because the guarddian did not give the bond required by section 493, it could not be sustained under section 490, subsec. 2, as a suit for division, where the petition did not allege that the infants were in possession or that the land was indivisible, and the judgment did not reserve a lien until the guardian executed the bond required by section 497.-Id.
The chancellor is specially charged with the protection of infants and their real estate, and, having no inherent power to order a sale, he should deny a sale, unless all of the provisions of the statute are carefully followed.-Id.
$80 (Mo.App.) Where an infant's grandfather had had entire custody of him from birth, the fact that the grandfather's application for appointment as next friend, in an action for personal injuries received by the infant, stated he was the infant's father is immaterial.-Eisenman v. Griffith, 167 S. W. 1142.
II. SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND RELIEF.
(A) Actions and Other Legal Proceedings. § 26 (Tex.Civ.App.) A railroad company, prosecuted by a city in courts having jurisdiction for the penalties imposed by Rev. St. 1911, art. 1068, for failure to place its roadbed over a street in a proper condition for travel, has an adequate remedy at law, and may not sue to restrain actions at law.-City of San Marcos v. International & G. N. Ry. Čo., 167 S. W. 292.
The railroad company may not sue to restrain the actions on the ground that they are an attack on its franchise.-Id.
(B) Property, Conveyances, and Incumbrances.
§ 49 (Tex.Civ.App.) An injunction to restrain defendants from erecting a telephone line over plaintiff's property should be issued under Rev. St. 1911, art. 4643, the injury being an irreparable e.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183.
(H) Criminal Acts, Conspiracies, and Prosecutions.
§ 105 (Tex.Civ.App.) The enforcement of an unconstitutional criminal statute will not be enjoined, as the party has an adequate remedy at law.-Winn v. Dyess, 167 S. W. 294.
III. ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS. $114 (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant's agents and employés could not be enjoined, unless made parties by the petition.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Keys, 167 S. W. 186.
§ 118 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition merely alleging that plaintiff did not consent to defendants' erection of a telephone line over plaintiff's land does not sufficiently negative plaintiff's acquiescence therein to warrant an injunction_to_restrain the use of such a line.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co.,
§ 118 (Tex.Civ. App.) Where petition in suit | VII. VIOLATION AND PUNISHMENT. for injunction alleged that defendant's residence was unknown, but that he had agents and employés residing in the county upon whom process might be served, and the agents and employés were not made parties, injunction held properly denied, for failure to show parties and facts over which the court could exercise jurisdiction.-Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Keys, 167 S. W. 186.
§ 122 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 4649, requiring a petition for an injunction to be verified by the affidavit of the party, an affidavit by plaintiff's attorney, not upon his own knowledge, but to the best of his knowledge and belief, is insufficient.-Lane v. Jones, 167 S. W. 177.
IV. PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCU-
(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure. § 144 (Tex.Civ.App.) In view of Rev. St. 1911, art. 4645, providing that on appeals relating to temporary injunctions the Court of Appeals shall determine the matter on the petition, answer, and affidavits, the lower court, on an application for temporary injunction in chambers, cannot pass upon exceptions to the petition, and, where no pleadings were filed, aside from the exceptions, the only question is whether the petition authorizes the injunction.
-Lane v. Jones, 167 S. W. 177.
(B) Continuing, Modifying, Vacating, or Dissolving.
186 (Mo.App.) Counsel fees should not be allowed as damages where a temporary injunc tion is dissolved, if the fees were incurred in defending the action generally, and the dissolution of the injunction was only incidental, although the converse is true where the merits of the case are only incidental to the dissolution of the injunction.-Joplin Gas Co. v. City of Joplin, 167 S. W. 660.
§ 231 (Tenn.) Where defendant answered petition for an attachment for contempt in violating an injunction by alleging various matters the petition on appeal on account of its general of excuse and avoidance, he could not attack State v. Ragghianti, 167 S. W. 689. averments and lack of specific allegations.
VIII. LIABILITIES ON BONDS OR
Where an injunction is only ancillary to the main case, and there is a separate trial on the motion to dissolve, evidence may be introduced and costs incurred which are also pertinent to the merits of the case; but that is no objection to the allowance of the same as damages for procuring the dissolution of the injunction.-Id. Where a temporary injunction is granted, the court may refuse to grant a separate hearing on the motion to dissolve, and may combine the hearing on the motion with the hearing on the See Bankruptcy. merits; but the action of the court in hearing the two together does not make the trial so essentially a trial on the merits as to prevent any expenses of the trial being assessed as damages See Master and Servant, § 311. in procuring the dissolution of the injunction. -Id.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 19, 82; Contracts, § 92; Deeds, §§ 196, 211; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 237.
V. PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCES.
without notice from the grantee of a person of § 61 (Ky.) One who purchases for value and unsound mind is entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser.-Bevins v. Lowe, 167 S. W.
$70 (Mo.App.) Where the estate of an insane person is insufficient to satisfy all of his liabilities, claims against him must, under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 498-500, be filed with the probate court and payment prorated by the guardian among the claimants.-Girdner v. McWilliams, 167 S. W. 1182.
To jury, see Criminal Law, 88 770-829; Trial, §§ 191-296.
To servant, see Master and Servant, § 157.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 1001, 1029, 1062, 1067, 1170; Evidence, $8 213, 501; Judgment, §§ 85, 101; Pleading, § 69; Principal and Agent, § 22; Reformation of Instruments, 45; Taxation, §§ 113, 168, 592; Witnesses, §§ 220, 268.
III. INSURANCE AGENTS AND
(A) Agency for Insurer.
§ 76 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action on a fire insurance policy held to warrant a finding that a broker, through whom the insurance was procured, was the agent of the insurer rather than the insured.-Lehmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 167 S. W. 1047.
§ 186 (Mo.App.) Upon the dissolution of a temporary injunction erroneously granted, the -defendants are entitled to recover the counsel fees reasonably incurred in procuring the dissolution of the injunction, whether or not such fees had been actually paid.-C. H. Albers Commission Co. v. Milliken, 167 S. W. 1056.
IV. INSURABLE INTEREST.
contractor for a
8115 (Tex.Civ.App.) A building may have an insurable interest sufficient to sustain a policy on the building under construction to the extent of whatever is due him, even though he is to be paid by the week and has no rights other than the statutory one of filing a mechanic's lien.-Western Assur. Co. v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarratt Co., 167 S. W. 816.
V. THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL. (B) Construction and Operation. § 146 (Ark.) Forfeitures are not favored in insurance policies, which are to be construed most strongly against the company.-Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 S. W. 845.
$146 (Tenn.) A fidelity bond indemnifying
an employer against loss due to the dishonesty of an employé is to be construed as an insurance contract and, in cases of doubt, against the insurer.-Hunter v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W. 692.
Words and phrases in an employers' fidelity bond are to be construed according to their context.-Id.
146 (Tex.Civ.App.) A forfeiture clause in an insurance policy should be strictly construed.Western Assur. Co. v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarratt Co., 167 S. W. 816.
VI. PREMIUMS, DUES, AND ASSESS
§ 186 (Ark.) An agent with authority to solicit insurance and receive payment of the premium has no apparent authority to accept the cancellation of his own indebtedness for such premium, and where the creditor has knowledge of the agency he cannot avail himself of pay ment made in that way.-Briggs v. Collins, 167 S. W. 1114.
§186 (Mo.) Where an application for a life policy dated May 24th stipulated for the annual premiums on that date, and that there should be no contract until a policy was delivered, and a policy dated May 31st, and not delivered until June 5th, when the first premium was paid, declared that it should not become effective until delivered, and the first premium paid, the policy insured the applicant for one year from June 5th, so that a tender of the second premium on May 31st of the year following was in time.-Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 167 S. W. 951.
8152 (Mo.App.) Where a statute makes pro-X. FORFEITURE OF POLICY FOR
BREACH OF PROMISSORY WAR-
(B) Matters Relating to Property or In
$198 (Tex.Civ.App.) That a rejected applicant for insurance who had given the agent his note for the first premium allowed the agent to apply to another company for insurance did not cancel the first company's debt for the money received by its agent.-Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Benson, 167 S. W. 266.
A negro who applied for insurance in an diana corporation and gave his note for the first premium to the agent was not charged with notice that the company's constitution and bylaws provided only for the insurance of white people.-Id.
$265 (Ark) A statement, in an application for accident insurance, that the applicant's habits of life were correct and temperate is not a warranty. Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 S. W. 845.
IX. AVOIDANCE OF POLICY FOR MIS-
(B) Matters Relating to Property or Interest Insured.
(A) Grounds in General.
§ 264 (Tenn.) Warranties by the insured are not favored by construction.-Hunter v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W.
§ 285 (Tenn.) A certificate by a bank to a guaranty company for renewal of a fidelity bond for its cashier, certifying that his books were examined in the regular course of business and found correct, etc., all moneys, etc., under his control being accounted for, "and he is not now in default," held not a warranty of the correctness of such accounts, and the phrase "and he is not now in default" not a warranty.-Hunter v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 S. W. 692.
(C) Matters Relating to Person Insured. § 297 (Ark.) Where an application for accident insurance stated that the applicant's habits were correct and temperate; that he was not subject to certain specified disabilities and was sound except as follows: No exceptionsthe words "no exceptions" refer to the freedom from disability, and not to the statement as to habits.-Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 S. W. 845.
building under construction, mistakenly nam328 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a policy on a ing the builder as the insured and the owner as the mortgagee and payee, and containing In-notify the insurer of any change of ownership, a mortgage clause requiring the mortgagee to held, that the ownership was that mentioned in occupant, so that the real mortgagee was not a rate slip correctly designating the owner or bound to give notice of the termination of the interest of the builder.-Western Assur. Co. v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarratt Co., 167 S. W. 816.
(C) Matters Relating to Person Insured.
$328 (Tex.Civ.App.) As regards the provision of a fire policy voiding it in the event of any change in interest, title, or possession of the subject-matter of insurance, insured having taken in two partners, put one in possession, and received part of the price, it is immaterial that he retained a lien on the goods for balance of price, and after the fire paid back the money to his partners.-Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Davis, 167 S. W. 175.
§ 335 (Tex.Civ.App.) An invoice of goods bought during three months, some time before issuance of a fire policy, does not satisfy a provision of the policy that it shall become void, if a complete, itemized inventory be not taken within a certain time, unless one has been taken within a certain time prior to the policy.Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Davis, 167