ty.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Jesse, 167 S. | new trial after ten days from the judgment.W. 407. $103 (Ark.) A juror who stated that he would decide the case on the law and the evidence, if he could, but that he had a fixed opinion which would influence him at the trial, held disqualified.-McGough v. State, 167 S. W. 857. A juror who had an opinion founded on rumor which he could not change so as to decide according to the law and the evidence held disqualified, on the ground of a formed opinion.-Id. $103 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where a juror testified that he had formed and then had an opinion as to accused's guilt or innocence, but could lay it aside and render a fair and impartial verdict based alone on the testimony, he was competent.-Phillips v. State, 167 S. W. 353. § 137 (Ark.) While the court may, in its discretion, permit the defendant to exercise peremptory challenges after having accepted a juror, an election by the state to challenge a juror after his acceptance by both sides must be exercised before defendant has exhausted his challenges, and cannot be exercised thereafter. -McGough v. State, 167 S. W. 857. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. III. CIVIL JURISDICTION AND THORITY. Dickensheets v. Hudson, 167 S. W. 1097. 8126 (Tex.Civ.App.) While a justice, under Rev. St. 1911, art. 2374, has no authority to grant a new trial after ten days from the judgment, he can by article 2015, correct a mistake in the record of the judgment so as to make it speak the truth.-Dickensheets v. Hudson, 167 S. W. 1097. § 130 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a justice's judgment without jurisdiction adjudged against a lienor's right to a lien, and thereafter was corrected so as to state that the court had no jurisdiction to foreclose the alleged lien, the judgment as corrected was not res judicata of such issue.-Dickensheets v. Hudson, 167 S. W. 1097. $135 (Ark.) A judgment defendant in a justice's court who alleged fraud in the plaintiff's breach of an agreement to file a proper transcript had a complete remedy at law against execution on the judgment, and hence the chancery court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the judgment.-Radford v. Samstag, 167 S. W. 491. A complaint seeking to enjoin execution against a judgment defendant in a justice's court whose appeal was dismissed in the circuit court because the transcript filed therein failed to show an affidavit for appeal, not alAU-leging that any fraud was practiced in procuring the dismissal, held to state no cause of action, as, if the dismissal was erroneous, the remedy was by appeal to the Supreme Court. $36 (Tex.Civ.App.) An action by a city against a railroad company for the penalty imposed by Rev. St. 1911, art. 1068, for failure to place its roadbed over a street in a proper condition for travel, is for a money judgment within the jurisdiction of a justice's court.City of San Marcos v. International & G. N. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 292. § 43 (Mo.App.) An action on an itemized account totaling $500.16, exclusive of interest, without any credit or remission, is not within the jurisdiction of justice of the peace of the city of St. Louis, as limited by Rev. St. 1909, § 7615, for under sections 7412, 7413, the account is the foundation of the suit.-Guhman v. Dunaway, 167 S. W. 598. § 44 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 7412, 7615, where cause of action before justice of the peace was instituted by filing note for more than $500, justice held to have no jurisdiction, though memorandum filed therewith, summons, and entry in justice's docket stated the demand as $500.-Trapp v. Mersman, 167 S. W. 612. Though docket of justice of the peace is evidence of matters required by Rev. St. 1909, § 7404, to be kept therein, the justice cannot invest himself with jurisdiction of a claim in excess of his jurisdiction by issuing process for a less amount and so docketing, hearing, and determining it.—Id. § 58 (Mo.App.) The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace must affirmatively appear on the face of the proceedings.-Trapp v. Mersman, 167 S. W. 612. IV. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES. § 72 (Tex.Civ.App.) Subsequent purchasers of property which had been mortgaged to secure a note payable in a county in which neither the maker nor the purchasers resided are entitled to be sued before a justice of the peace in the county of their residence, although the maker may be sued in the other county, under Rev. St. 1911, art. 2308.-Noble v. Broad, 167 S. W. 1. $91 (Mo.App.) A complaint in a justice's court, stating that defendant, without leave, wrongfully entered upon plaintiff's land and cut timber of a certain value, and asking judgment under Rev. St. 1899, § 4572, was sufficient.-Falloon v. Fenton, 167 S. W. 591. -Id. V. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS. (A) Appeal and Error. § 141 (Mo.App.) Where a justice of the peace is without jurisdiction of a particular case, the circuit court acquires none on appeal therein.Guhman v. Dunaway, 167 S. W. 598. § 141 (Mo.App.) Where a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction, the circuit court can acquire none on appeal; its jurisdiction being purely derivative and dependent upon the justice's jurisdiction.-Trapp v. Mersman, 167 S. W. 612. $14! (Tex.Civ.App.) The county court has jurisdiction of an appeal from a justice's judgment for less than $20.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Fricke & Boyd, 167 S. W. 6. $146 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a judgment of a justice's court did not dispose of a plea in reconvention, the county court had no jurisdiction on appeal.-Anderson, Evans & Evans v. Smith, 167 S. W. 765. § 162 (Tex.Civ.App.) An appeal from a justice to the county court abrogates the judgment of the justice's court and puts the case in the county court for trial de novo.-Harper v. Dawson, 167 S. W. 311. dismissed an appeal from a justice because no $166 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the county court final judgment had been rendered, the dismissal left the case in the justice's court, and he could proceed to trial thereof.-Harper v. Dawson, 167 S. W. 311. § 174 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the amended account, filed in the county court on appeal from a justice's judgment, only amplified and enlarged the grounds of negligence originally alleged as a ground for recovery, and the county court determined that all the matters presented by the amended account had been orally pleaded in justice's court, refusal to strike out the amended account was proper.-Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Cook, 167 S. W. 158. § 183 (Mo.App.) Though a judgment of a justice of the peace for an amount less than that appearing to be due may in fact be for defendant's benefit, he may insist upon the justice's lack of jurisdiction, where the amount § 116 (Tex.Civ.App.) A justice, under Rev. of the demand is in excess of such jurisdiction. St. 1911, art. 2374, has no authority to grant a-Trapp v. Mersman, 167 S. W. 612. JUSTIFICATION. See Libel and Slander, §§ 56, 94, 123. KNOWLEDGE. See Animals, § 70; Elections, § 230; Evidence, 314; Insurance, § 379; Intoxicating Liquors, § 287; Parent and Child, 87; Telegraphs and Telephones, § 38. LACHES. See Adoption, § 21; Corporations, § 189; LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Abatement and Revival, § 73; Evidence, § 135; Executors and Administrators, §§ 131, 150; Frauds, Statute of, § 129; Railroads, § 259; Vendor and Purchaser, § 228; Waters and Water Courses, § 261; Weapons, § 14. IV. TERMS FOR YEARS. (D) Termination. § 108 (Tenn.) In order to forfeit a lease for nonpayment of rent, the landlord must demand lieve her on her surety from liability on the bond and the judgment for the lessor should, under section 4702, assess such liability.-Matthews v. Crofford, 167 S. W. 695. Where a tenant removed unlawful detainer under Shannon's Code, § 5111, for the value of proceedings to the circuit court, giving a bond the rent of the premises during litigation, the lessor need not declare a forfeiture for nonpayment of each installment of rent as it accrues; the single bond covering the whole contract. -Id. LANDS. See Public Lands. LARCENY. See Criminal Law, § 784; Husband and Wife, See Railroads, §§ 338, 348, 360, 400; Street LAW OF THE CASE. it on the day due, before sunset, and at the See Appeal and Error, §§ 1097, 1099, 1195. most public place on the land.-Matthews v. Crofford, 167 S. W. 695. The necessity of demand, which is a condi LEASE. tion precedent to the forfeiture of a lease for See Landlord and Tenant. nonpayment of rent, may be waived by agreement in the lease.-Id. Before a landlord can declare a lease forfeit ed for nonpayment of rent, re-entry must be ef- See Wills. fected.-Id. Where a lessor declared a forfeiture of a LEGACIES. LEGISLATIVE POWER. lease for nonpayment of an installment of rent, See Constitutional Law, § 62. and instituted unlawful detainer to recover possession, the lessee cannot, by a tender of the accrued rent, avoid the forfeiture.-Id. LETTERS. See Contracts, § 26; Corporations, § 308; Criminal Law, 88 419, 420; Evidence, §§ 181, 185, 273, 318, 368, 442; Libel and Slander, 16; Trial, § 48. § 109 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a lessee, abandoning the premises, was only able to secure third persons who would take the premises for the unexpired term at the same rental on condition that the lessor would extend the period at the same rental, refusal of the lessor to lease the premises beyond the unexpired term was not an acceptance of a surrender.-Robin- See Taxation, § 493. son Seed & Plant Co. v. Hexter & Kramer, 167 S. W. 749. § 110 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a lease author- See Prostitution. ized the lessor in case of abandonment to resume possession and relet for the unexpired term, the act of the lessor in reletting for the unexpired LEVY. LEWDNESS. LIBEL AND SLANDER. term on the lessee abandoning the premises was See Appeal and Error, § 1050; Judgment, § 18. not an acceptance of a surrender, but was for the benefit of the lessee by reducing his liability.-I. Robinson Seed & Plant Co. v. Hexter & Kramer, 167 S. W. 749. VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES. (A) Rights and Liabilities. § 195 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a lessee abandoned the premises, the refusal of the lessor to accept a new tenant on condition of a lease for a period beyond the unexpired term for the same rental was not a failure to exercise ordinary diligence to relet the premises, and he could recover from the lessee the loss sustained. -Robinson Seed & Plant Co. v. Hexter & Kramer, 167 S. W. 749. IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF $290 (Tenn.) In view of Shannon's Code, & 5090, the action of unlawful detainer is a substitute for an entry by a landlord to forfeit a lease for nonpayment of rent; the institution of the action having the same effect as an entry. Matthews v. Crofford, 167 S. W. 695. § 291 (Tenn.) Where a lessee who defaulted retained possession pending unlawful detainer by giving the bond required by Shannon's Code, WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE, $6 (Ky.) The publication of an article that plaintiff, a miner who refused to participate in a union strike, was a detestable scab and blackleg is libelous per se.-United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 167 S. W. 891. § 16 (Tex.Civ.App.) A letter to plaintiff's employer charging that plaintiff had assigned his wages to the writer when shown by innuendo to be one which would affect plaintiff's financial reputation, and subject him to contempt and ridicule, is libelous per se under Rev. St. 1911, art. 5595.-Texas Furniture Co. v. Meyers, 167 S. W. 766. § 19 (Ky.) In determining whether words are libelous, the court is not bound to construe them in the least objectionable sense, but should accept them as popularly understood.-United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 167 S. W. 891. III. JUSTIFICATION AND MITIGA TION. § 56 (Tex.Civ.App.) Proof that plaintiff, acting as agent for the defendant in the purchase of a mule, drew upon the defendant for a sum verted the excess to his own use, is sufficient to justify a charge by defendant that plaintiff was a thief, under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 772.Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. IV. ACTIONS. (B) Parties, Preliminary Proceedings, and Pleading. $80 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition which clearly set forth the import of a libelous communication, and contained innuendoes explaining wherein the language used was libelous, and averred that it was falsely and maliciously made, and that plaintiff was damaged, is sufficient.-Texas Furniture Co. v. Meyers, 167 S. W. 766. 894 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for slander, justification must be specially pleaded with such particularity as to notify the plaintiff as to what charge he will be compelled to meet.Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. $100 (Tex.Civ.App.) Proof that defendant had charged that plaintiff had swindled or stolen from him in the purchase of a mule is not proof of an alleged slander that plaintiff had stolen from defendant all that he raised on defendant's place.-Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. In actions for slander, the material and actionable words must be proved strictly as they are alleged in the petition.-Id. (C) Evidence. $107 (Ark.) Testimony by a witness for the plaintiff that a third person had repeated the slander to the witness was admissible, even though the defendants were not liable for such repetition, as tending to show that the slander was generally known, and thereby to augment the damages.-Williams v. Fulks, 167 S. W. 93. Testimony by the plaintiff that she was the next highest officer in a certain lodge, and that about the time the slander was circulated she was dropped out of line, and not promoted to the highest office, was competent.-Id. Evidence that a slander had been generally circulated in the community as a result of its utterance by the defendant is competent for the purpose of showing the extent of the damage.Id. guilty of technical theft, may be construed as a charge of swindling.-Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. VI. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. (A) Offenses. § 148 (Tex.Cr.App.) Statement of defendant to L., the father of the wife of defendant's son, B., when, B. having left his wife, L. went to defendant and asked him what was the matter, that she was unchaste before she was married was not privileged; defendant being the originator of the false charge.-Davis v. State, 167 S. W. 1108. LICENSES. See Bigamy, § 9; Criminal Law, § 444; In- I. FOR OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVI- 87 (Tex.Civ.App.) The provision of the Pool Room Statute (Acts 33d Leg. c. 74, § 11) that, if the result of the election be in favor of prohibiting the running of pool halls in the county, a contest shall not suspend the enforcement of the law pending such contest is constitutional. Winn v. Dyess, 167 S. W. 294. $40 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where it was not shown that the town had underground sewers or cesspools, and it appeared that it had no plumbing examiners' board, and refused to provide for such examinations, one conducting a plumbing business there could not be convicted of doing so without a license, under Rev. St. 1911, arts. 986, 987, 988.-Brown v. State, 167 S. W. 348. LIENS. See Appeal and Error; Attorney and Client, § LIFE ESTATES. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. $ (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for slan- See Wills, § 616. der, the character of the plaintiff and business transactions between him and the defendant and other parties affecting the rights of the defendant may be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages, even though they did not justify the accusation.-Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. (E) Trial, Judgment, and Review. § 123 (Ky.) When words are used under such special circumstances as to show that they have a meaning different from that ordinarily intended, the question of their true construction is for the jury.-United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 167 S. W. 891. 8123 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for slander, where the defense was that the charge by defendant that plaintiff had stolen the hay from defendant's place was true, evidence held suthcient to take to the jury the issue of the truth of the words spoken by defendant.-Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. Where defendant had stated that plaintiff had stolen every blade of grass upon defendant's place, proof that any part of the hay on the place had been stolen or fraudulently appropriated by the plaintiff is sufficient to take to the jury the question of justification.-Id. See Adverse Possession; Constitutional Law, $$ 107, 171; Executors and Administrators, § 223; Taxation, § 803. I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. (A) Nature, Validity, and Construction in General. § 4 (Ky.) The Legislature may change the period of limitations, and may give the statute a retrospective effect, provided it does not impair the obligation of a contract or a vested right, but it cannot remove a bar of limitation which has become complete, and no limitation can affect existing claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon.Heath v. Hazelip, 167 S. W. 905. § 5 (Ky.) When the period of limitation is shortened before a cause of action is barred, an action may be brought thereon within a reasonable time to be determined by the court, but it cannot be extended beyond the time within which it could have been brought under the old statute, nor to exceed the total time allowed by the new statute.-Heath v. Hazelip, 167 S. W. 905. Actions. $ 124 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for slander, a charge that plaintiff stole defendant's (B) Limitations Applicable to Particular property, which was made to one who knew that plaintiff was in possession of defendant's § 22 (Ky.) An action against a principal in an property, and therefore could not have been administrator's bond is barred under Ky. St. § For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER 2514, after 15 years from the accrual of the cause of action, except in case of trusts within section 2543.-Baugh's Adm'x v. Baugh's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 124. $24 (Tex.) The four-year statute of limitations is applicable to a suit to enforce plaintiff's rights as a stockholder in a corporation and for an accounting.-Yeaman v. Galveston City Co., 167 S. W. 710. § 25 (Ky.) The provision of Ky. St. § 2515, requiring actions on notes on the footing of bills of exchange to be brought within five years, was abrogated by the repeal of section 483 by the Negotiable Instruments Act (Ky. St. 8 3720b, subsec. 184), and an action against the surety on a note may be brought within seven years. Southern Nat. Bank v. Schimpler, 167 S. W. 148. § 33 (Mo.) In action by county against former county clerk, counts seeking to recover money received by him as plaintiff's agent held not to state causes of action, within the three years' statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1909, § 1890).-Putnam County v. Johnson, 167. S. W. 1039. ancestor under trust certificates which had been long lost, and plaintiffs had no knowledge of their ownership as heirs of the original owner until August, 1909, and brought suit to establish their rights in November following, the action was not barred by limitations.-Yeaman v. Galveston City Co., 187 S. W. 710. § 99 (Mo.) The "improper act" in Rev. St. 1909, § 1905, must be one in the nature of a fraud that will prevent the commencement of an action, and a judgment debtor, who merely concealed his name from the assignee of the judgment, did not commit an improper act which prevented suit.-Davis v. Carp, 167 S. W. 1042. § 102 (Ky.) Where testatrix directed a sale of her real estate to discharge an indebtedness her son owed her daughter-in-law, and provided for a division of the surplus, the administrator of testatrix had no right to hold the property as trustee, but the daughter-in-law or her adminis tratrix could sue for it; and an action therefor was barred by the 15-year statute of limitations (Ky., St. $ 2514).-Baugh's Adm'x v. Baugh's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 124. Counts in action by county against former $103 (Tex.) A corporation's relation to its county clerk to recover money claimed to have stockholders is that of a trustee of a direct been wrongfully exacted and obtained by him trust, concerning which limitations have no apheld not to state causes of action for fraudu- plication until there has been a clear and unlently receiving the money so as to render inap-equivocal notice of repudiation to the cestui que plicable the three years' statute of limitations trust.-Yeaman v. Galveston City Co., 167 S. (Rev. St. 1909, § 1890), and hence they were W. 710. demurrable, where they showed that more than three years had elapsed.-Id. Money received by a county clerk in excess of that due him for making out and computing tax books, salary, etc., held to have been received in virtue of his office, within the three years' statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1909, § 1890).-Id. II. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION. (A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense. § 56 (Tex.Civ.App.) Limitations would not run against an action by a bank receiving drafts for collection against another bank to which it sent them and which detached the bills of lading until it paid the judgment recovered against it by the drawer.-Collin County Nat. Bank v. Turner, 167 S. W. 165. (H) Commencement of Action or Other Proceeding. in by amendment, the suit as to them is begun § 124 (Mo.App.) Where parties are brought when the amendment is filed.-Hiller v. Schulte, 167 S. W. 461. In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, new parties defendant cannot be brought in by amendment so as to affect their rights after the expiration of 90 days from the filing of the lien.-Id. The rule that the filing of a petition is the commencement of an action, and that subsequent amendments relate to the institution of the suit, applies only to defendants originally sued, and not to new parties brought in by amendment.-Id. Where defendant D. became the owner of certain property sought to be subjected to a mechanic's lien before the materials were furnished, and the work done, and she was not joined thereof, it could not be enforced as against her. (B) Performance of Condition, Demand, as a party to the action for days after the filing and Notice. § 66 (Tex.) The obligation of a corporation-Id. to pay a declared dividend to a stockholder is not subject to limitations until there has been a demand on the corporation and a refusal to pay. Yeaman v. Galveston City Co., 167 S. W. 710. (E) Absence, Nonresidence, and Concealment of Person or Property. § 127 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in action against bank for detaching bills of lading from drafts sent it for collection, the original petition alleged the facts and was sufficient as against a general demurrer, cause of action held not barred by limitations, though amended petition making the allegations more specific was filed after the expiration of the period of limitation. § 91 (Mo.) The absconding or concealing with--Collin County Nat. Bank v. Turner, 167 S. W. in Rev. St. 1909, § 1905, must be of such a character as to prevent the commencement of an action, and a judgment debtor, who merely concealed his name from an assignee of the judgment, did not prevent an action on the judgment.-Davis v. Carp, 167 S. W. 1042. 165. § 127 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under the original and amended petitions in an action to recover double the usurious interest paid, held that the suit throughout was against defendant as the sole owner of the company which made the loan, so that his plea of limitations was bad.-Cotton v. Barnes, 167 S. W. 756. III. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, NEW § 155 (Ark.) A claim against an estate barred by the statute of nonclaim cannot be revived by part payments by the administrator.-Hicks v. Hicks, 167 S. W. 95. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. $95 (Tex.) Where defendant corporation, prior to July, 1909, had taken no affirmative See Carriers, §§ 154, 163; Telegraphs and LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See 'Damages, §§ 78-85. LIQUOR SELLING. See Intoxicating Liquors. cution, and though the action was brought while the court still had jurisdiction to set the nolle prosequi aside.-Scheibler v. Steinburg, 167 S. W. 866. MANDAMUS. See Courts, § 207; Elections, § 278. See Carriers, §§ 218-230; Railroads, §§ 411- I. NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GEN 446. LIVE STOCK. See Intoxicating Liquors. LOGS AND LOGGING. See Frauds, Statute of, §§ 72, 129. $3 (Tenn.) A deed of standing timber, with provision that the grantee is to be allowed five years to cut and remove it, passes title to the timber, subject to defeasance as to such of it as is not removed within the time specified.-Bond v. Ungerecht, 167 S. W. 1116. Within a deed of standing timber, allowing five years to cut and remove it, cutting into sawlogs does not constitute a removal.-Ïd. LUMBER. See Logs and Logging. LUNATICS. See Insane Persons. MACHINERY. ERAL. § 15 (Mo.App.) It was no defense to mandamus to compel the clerk of a school district to. record the result of an election for the consolidation of his district with another that certain voters thereat were not qualified, an election contest being a statutory proceeding.-State ex rel. Holmes v. Kernes, 167 S. W. 1080. IL SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF (A) Acts and Proceedings of Courts, damus is in general to compel the performance § 27 (Mo.App.) The office of the writ of manof a mere ministerial duty.-State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123. (B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Off cers and Boards and Municipalities. § 84 (Mo.App.) Mandamus held to lie to compel the council of a city required by ordinance to award a contract for city printing to the lowest and best bidder to rescind their award and award it to such bidder, where the first award had been made collusively and arbitrarily and in bad faith.-State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123. § 115 (Ky.) In mandamus by a board of education to compel the board of commissioners of See Damages, § 62; Insurance, § 499; Sales, a city to levy a tax for sinking fund to pay §§ 273, 287. MAINTENANCE. See Champerty and Maintenance. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF. See Criminal Law, § 1137. § (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1923, making it a misdemeanor to deface or damage any parts of a church, specific intent to injure is not an element of the offense, which is complete when the act is done regardless of the intent.-Saffell v. State, 167 S. W. 483. Under Kirby's Dig. § 1923, making it a misdemeanor to deface or damage a church building, one indicted for injuring and removing a church building held none the less guilty because it was also used for a schoolhouse.-Id. § 4 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1923, making it a misdemeanor to deface or damage any church or public building, and in view of section 2233, relating to indictment for injury to person or property, an indictment charging that defendant willfully and maliciously injured, tore down, and removed a church building, being public property, held sufficient.-Saffell v. State, 167 S. W. 483. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. IV. TERMINATION OF PROSECU TION. § 34 (Tenn.) In order to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must allege and prove that the prosecution has terminated in his favor.-Scheibler v. Steinburg, 167 S. W. 866. § 148 (Mo.App.) Printing company submitting a bid for city printing, to be awarded under ordinance to the lowest and best bidder, held to have such interest as to be entitled to maintain mandamus to compel the rescission of a fraudulent award and a re-award to the lowest bidder.-State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123. 154 (Ky.) In mandamus by the board of edumissioners to levy a tax to create a sinking cation of a city to compel the board of comfund to pay outstanding bonds, if such bonds were invalid, that was a matter of defense, and it was not necessary for the petition to allege that they were valid.-City of Newport v. Board of Education of City of Newport, 167 S. W. 396. 1864, expressly extending to mandamus the § 160 (Mo.App.) In view of Rev. St. 1909, § Code provisions as to amendments, it was proper to permit amendments to the alternative writ in mandamus, which is regarded as the first pleading therein.-State_ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123. § 168 (Mo.App.) Evidence in mandamus to compel the clerk of a school district to enter of record certain orders of the school board held to support a judgment making the alternative writ peremptory.-State ex rel. Holmes v. Kernes, 167 S. W. 1080. $173 (Mo.App.) In mandamus to compel the $35 (Tenn.) Entry of a nolle prosequi with- council of a city to award the contract for city out the procurement of the defendant, held a printing to relator, where the lower court sufficient termination of the prosecution in his found that both relator and the defendant pafavor to sustain an action for malicious prose-per, to whom the contract was awarded, were |