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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

See 'Damages, §§ 78-85.

LIQUOR SELLING.

See Intoxicating Liquors.

LOCAL LAWS.

MANDAMUS.

See Courts, § 207; Elections, § 278.

LIVE STOCK.

See Carriers, §§ 218-230; Railroads, §§ 411- I. NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GEN

446.

See Statutes, § 76.

LOCAL OPTION.

See Intoxicating Liquors.

LOGS AND LOGGING.

See Frauds, Statute of, §§ 72, 129.

§3 (Tenn.) A deed of standing timber, with provision that the grantee is to be allowed five years to cut and remove it, passes title to the timber, subject to defeasance as to such of it as is not removed within the time specified.-Bond v. Ungerecht, 167 S. W. 1116.

Within a deed of standing timber, allowing five years to cut and remove it, cutting into sawlogs does not constitute a removal.—Id.

LUMBER.

See Logs and Logging.

LUNATICS.

See Insane Persons.

MAINTENANCE.

See Champerty and Maintenance.

MALICIOUS MISCHIEF.

cution, and though the action was brought while the court still had jurisdiction to set the nolle prosequi aside.-Scheibler v. Steinburg, 167 S. W. 866.

§ 4 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1923, making it a misdemeanor to deface or damage any church or public building, and in view of section 2233, relating to indictment for injury to person or property, an indictment charging that defendant willfully and maliciously injured, tore down, and removed a church building, being public property, held sufficient.-Saffell v. State, 167 S. W. 483.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

IV. TERMINATION OF PROSECU

TION.

§ 34 (Tenn.) In order to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must allege and prove that the prosecution has terminated in his favor.-Scheibler v. Steinburg, 167 S. W. 866.

ERAL.

§ 15 (Mo.App.) It was no defense to mandamus to compel the clerk of a school district to. record the result of an election for the consolidation of his district with another that certain voters thereat were not qualified, an election contest being a statutory proceeding.-State ex rel. Holmes v. Kernes, 167 S. W. 1080.

IL SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF
RELIEF.

(A) Acts and Proceedings of Courts, Judges, and Judicial Officers.

MACHINERY.

§ 115 (Ky.) In mandamus by a board of education to compel the board of commissioners of

See Damages, § 62; Insurance, § 499; Sales, a city to levy a tax for sinking fund to pay §§ 273, 287.

bonds, that complainants asked for levy for an amount less than that which it had estimated to be necessary, held not a defense.-City of Newport v. Board of Education of City of Newport, 167 S. W. 396.

damus is in general to compel the performance § 27 (Mo.App.) The office of the writ of manof a mere ministerial duty.-State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123.

(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Off

cers and Boards and Municipalities.

§ 84 (Mo.App.) Mandamus held to lie to compel the council of a city required by ordinance to award a contract for city printing to the lowest and best bidder to rescind their award and award it to such bidder, where the first award had been made collusively and arbitrarily and in bad faith.-State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123.

See Criminal Law, § 1137.

§

(Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1923, making it a misdemeanor to deface or damage any parts of a church, specific intent to injure is not an element of the offense, which is complete when the act is done regardless of the intent.-Saffell v. State, 167 S. W. 483. Under Kirby's Dig. § 1923, making it a mis-Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123. demeanor to deface or damage a church building, one indicted for injuring and removing a church building held none the less guilty be

cause it was also used for a schoolhouse.-Id.

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§ 173 (Mo.App.) In mandamus to compel the § 35 (Tenn.) Entry of a nolle prosequi with- council of a city to award the contract for city out the procurement of the defendant, held a printing to relator, where the lower court sufficient termination of the prosecution in his found that both relator and the defendant pafavor to sustain an action for malicious prose-per, to whom the contract was awarded, were

MARK.

efficient mediums of publication, held that de-
fendants could not complain of the want of a
specific finding as to the comparative circula- See Elections, §§ 180, 186, 194.
tion of the two papers.-State ex rel. Journal
Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123.

MARRIAGE.

See Bigamy; Criminal Law, § 444; Divorce;
Evidence, § 80; Husband and Wife.

§ 176 (Tex.Civ.App.) In mandamus to compel railroad companies to comply with an order of the Railroad Commission commanding them to file plans and specifications for the construction of a union passenger depot, the court may issue a writ of mandamus commanding the filing of such plans and specifications; its power not being confined to the issuance of a writ commanding the construction and maintenance of such a depot. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 167 S. W. 192.

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§ 54 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff and defendant were never legally married, but the woman believed that they were married, she was entitled on separation to one-half of the property acquired during the existence of the putative relation.-Green v. Green, 167 S. W. 263.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

See Appeal and Error, § 233; Evidence, §§ 59, 123, 236, 471, 483; Injunction, § 114; Judg ment, 251; Parent and Child, § 7, 13; Trial, 191; Work and Labor.

I. THE RELATION.

(C) Termination and Discharge. $30 (Mo.App.) That a traveling salesman sold another line of goods for others in competition with defendant did not constitute a breach of duty, where it was shown that the two lines were not of the same class, and that one of defendant's officials recommended one or more houses to be so served.-Stockton v. John Ainsfield Co., 167 S. W. 1143.

II. SERVICES AND COMPENSATION. (B) Wages and Other Remuneration.

$ 82 (Tenn.) A petition for the establishment of the lien for wages given by Acts 1897, c. 78, as amended by Acts 1905, c. 414, was properly which was in the hands of a receiver as the denied, where it merely described the property drug business at the corner of C. and M. avliens on part of the property.-Hessig-Ellis enues in M., particularly as there were prior Drug Co. v. Stone, 167 S. W. 864.

III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN-
JURIES TO SERVANT.

(A) Nature and Extent in General.

88 (Tex.Civ.App.) The test of whether one is an independent contractor or merely a servant or agent of the general contractors is not whether they actually exercised control over the manner in which, or the means by which, the work was to be done, but whether they had the right to do so.-Corrigan, Lee & Halpin v. Heubler, 167 S. W. 159.

§ 97 (Ark.) Plaintiff, an engineer upon a work train, was injured when the engineer of a passenger train, which was passing the work train under a viaduct, blew the whistle in four or five feet of plaintiff's head, rendering him deaf, etc. Held, that the accident, was such an ex traordinary one that defendant was not negligent in not foreseeing it.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Copeland, 167 S. W. 71.

897 (Ark.) The killing of a servant by the fall of a derrick because of the breaking of a guy wire when a sudden strain was put upon it by the dropping of the log was not an inevitable accident, if the master was negligent in furnishing a derrick unable to withstand sudden jerks erage Co. v. Bunting, 167 S. W. 77. or strains incident to the work.-Burdette Coop

(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and Places for Work.

dinary care to provide his servants a safe place §§ 101, 102 (Ark.) A master must exercise orto work and safe appliances; the test being what a reasonably prudent person would have done in such a situation.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Copeland, 167 S. W. 71.

A master is only required to use such reasonable precautions to prevent accidents as would have been adopted by prudent persons prior to

§§ 101, 102 (Ky.) That the work of a brake- | special circumstances affecting the duties and man on a freight train is inherently dangerous obligations of both parties.-Shelton v. Kirksdoes not, of itself, render the railroad company ville Light, Power & Ice Co., 167 S. W. 544. liable for injuries to an inexperienced brakeman, in the absence of any showing of negligence of the part of the company.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Walker's Adm'r, 167 S. W.

128.

§ 106 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a master hired a team from a third party and placed a servant in charge as driver, it was the master's duty to exercise ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe doubletree, as though it were his own property.-Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation v. Goodman, 167 S. W. 10.

8107 (Ky.) Where a coal miner is pulling a stump, the perils to which he is subjected are of his own creation, and the duty of the employer to use ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work does not apply.— Wallsend Coal & Coke Co. v. Shields' Adm'r, 167 S. W. 918.

Where a coal miner was pulling a stump and removing coal from the side of an entry, consisting of the coal and the rock and slate above it, it was his duty either to remove the rock or to use props to prevent it falling.-Id.

$113 (Ky.) When structures are placed so close to the tracks as to endanger employés while discharging their duties, the railroad company is liable for injuries occurring without fault on the part of the injured employé.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. of Kentucky v. Vaughan's Adm'x, 167 S. W. 141.

That a depot shed which knocked a brakeman from a train was intended to protect passengers from inclement weather, to do which it was necessary to leave the smallest possible distance between it and the top of passenger coaches, held not to show such necessity for its location at that point as to relieve the company from liability.-Id.

(C) Methods of Work, Rules, and Orders.

death of a servant, killed while driving a team § 137 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the which was pulling wire off a reel half a mile away, to string it as feed wire for an electric car, caused by the clevis breaking and doubletree flying back striking him, held that it was § 111 (Ark.) It was the duty of a railroad the primary duty of the master to distribute a company to exercise ordinary care to equip its sufficient number of men along the line to transcars with such ladders, grabirons, and hand- mit signals.-Stone & Webster Engineering Corholds as would furnish its employés with a rea-poration v. Goodman, 167 S. W. 10. sonably safe place in which and reasonably safe appliances with which to work, irrespective of statute.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

118 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 2739b, held to impose on a coal operator the nondelegable duty of furnishing props on the request of miners, so that a miner injured by the operator's failure to perform such duty may recover damages unless the danger was so imminent that an ordinarily prudent man would not have continued to work. Continental Coal Corporation v. York's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 131.

§ 129 (Ark.) If negligence of the master in furnishing a derrick having a cap plate at the top of the mast, with sharp-edged holes which cut into the guy wires fastened thereto, contributed to the death of a servant from the falling of the derrick, it was liable, though a jerk caused by the falling of a log being lifted also concurred in producing the result.-Burdette Cooperage Co. v. Bunting, 167 S. W. 77.

8137 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where it was the custom of a railroad to give warnings of movements of freight trains between the cars of which serv

$112 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 3163, requirants engaged in repair work were compelled to ing railroads to block switches and frogs in all pass, the failure of those in charge of a train, between the cars of which a servant was passyards, divisional and terminal stations, held not ing, to give the customary warning will suplimited to yards in divisional and terminal stations, but to include as a "yard" a way sta- Ry. Co. v. Dereberry, 167 S. W. 30. port a finding of negligence.-Missouri, O. & G. tion where there were tracks on which cars

could be cut out of trains and either stored or delivered to connecting lines, and where switching was customarily, though not constantly, carried on.-George v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R.

ped between the carpenter shop and repair Where for over a year freight trains had stoptracks so carpenters had to cross between the cars, but those in charge always gave warning of any movement, the railroad cannot deny failure of the operators of a train to give waruknowledge of the custom, so as to excuse the ing before they moved it.-Id.

Co., 167 S. W. 153.

The statute, contemplates that they shall be blocked when they are put "in use" subsequent to September 1, 1907.-Id.

The requirement that railroads shall adopt, use, and maintain the best known appliances or inventions to fill or block frogs, held not invalid for uncertainty or impossibility of performance, because no criterion was prescribed by which the railroad company might determine what appliance or precautions should be adopted to comply with the act.-Id.

§ 129 (Ky.) Where the roof of an entry in a coal mine was unsafe, and the employé injured by slate falling on him knew of the condition, and also knew that he could use a safe entry, the negligence of the employer was not the proximate cause of the injury.-Elliott v. Greenville Coal Co., 167 S. W. 424.

$ 119 (Mo.App.) The degree of care required by an electric company is to be measured by the terms of the employment, the employer's rules, or its custom as to inspection of wires, or other

of a freight train with an unusual jar or jolt, § 137 (Tex.Civ.App.) The sudden stopping in the absence of ordinary care, may be negligence entitling a servant injured thereby to recover.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

(D) Warning and Instructing Servant.

§ 151 (Tex.Civ.App.) The duty to warn and instruct the servant cannot be delegated by the master.-Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz, 167 S. W.

181.

§ 157 (Tex.Civ.App.) The duty of a master to instruct a minor of the dangers of the task assigned him, assisting in the operation of a gin, comprehends more than the incidental warning to the minor by a customer of the master that it was dangerous to place his hands in the gin stand.-Cook v. Urban, 167 S. W. 251.

(E) Fellow Servants.

§ 177 (Ky.) In a servant's action for injury, not resulting in death, he could recover only for gross negligence, and not for ordinary negligence, on the part of the other servants_superior in authority to himself. Ohio Valley Coal & Mining Co. v. Heine, 167 S. W. 873.

§ 189 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a foreman had been superseded by a superintendent who was a member of the employer firm, the negligence of the superintendent causing injury to the foreman was the negligence of the employer, for which the foreman could recover.-Lisle-Dunning Const. Co. v. McCall, 167 S. W. 810.

In an action for injuries to an employé struck by steel rods thrown from a car, it was imma

terial whether the superintendent gave the or- the failure of the operators to give the usual der to change the manner of unloading the steel warning.-Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Dererods, where he was negligent because remain- berry, 167 S. W. 30. ing silent when he saw men preparing to throw steel rods on the side where he had ordered the employé to go.—Id.

(F) Risks Assumed by Servant. § 204 (Ky.) The distinction between "assumed risk" and "contributory negligence" is of great importance in cases arising under federal Employers' Liability Act, since the former bars recovery while the latter merely diminishes the amount of recovery.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley, 167 S. W. 933.

§ 234 (Ky.) That a miner, after ordering props, continued to work under the roof until a portion of it fell on him, after the props should have been furnished, when he could have worked in other places, was not in itself sufficient to convict him of negligence.-Continental Coal Corporation v. York's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 131.

$246 (Ky.) Where, through the default of an employer, an employé is placed in such a peril§ 211 (Ky.) An employé in a mine required ous condition as to render it an act of reasononly to remove dirt and ore torn loose by blast-ble precaution for the purpose of self-presering did not assume the risk of injury by mate- vation to do an act resulting in injury, the emrial falling from the sides of the ditch after ployer is responsible.-Millers Creek R. Co. v. he had been ordered to work.-Evans Chemical Barnett, 167 S. W. 402. Works v. Ball, 167 S. W. 390.

§ 206 (Ky.) An employé assumes the ordinary risks of his employment.-Evans Chemical Works v. Ball, 167 S. W. 390.

An employé creating a danger in the progress of the work must protect himself therefrom. -Id.

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§ 213 (Mo.App.) The extent of the risk assumed by a lineman is to be measured by the terms of the employment, the employer's rules, or its custom as to inspection of wires, or other special circumstances affecting the duties and obligations of both parties.-Shelton v. Kirksville Light, Power & Ice Co., 167 S. W. 544.

§ 217 (Ark.) Where a rule of a railway company against making a flying switch was habitually disregarded to the extent that it amounted to a total abrogation of the rule, the risk of making such switches was assumed by a brakeman employed by the railway.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rodgers, 167 S. W. 106.

$217 (Ky.) Where an employé in a coal mine had two ways by which he could go out of the mine, one a safe way, and the other a dangerous one, and he voluntarily selected the latter, he could not recover for injuries sustained. -Elliott v. Greenville Coal Co., 167 S. W. 424. $217 (Mo.App.) Where linemen in defendant's employ were required to inspect and repair insulation, and decedent, an experienced lineman, received a shock that resulted in his death by coming in contact with a wire from which the insulation had been removed, he assumed the risk.-Shelton v. Kirksville Light, Power & Ice Co., 167 S. W. 544.

8218 (Tex.Civ.App.) As between a master and a minor servant in a dangerous service, whether instructed by the master or afterwards becoming aware of the danger, the minor's assumption of the risk depends on his having discretion to properly weigh his risk of injury, which is a question for the jury.-Cook v. Urban, 167 S. W. 251.

$ 219 (Ark.) The danger of a derrick falling because of the guy wires being cut by the sharp edges of the plate to which they were fastened at the top of the 42-foot mast was not assumed by a servant engaged in hooking the logs to be lifted, as the defects were not obvious, and the risk was not one ordinarily incident to the employment.-Burdette Cooperage Co. v. Bunting, 167 S. W. 77.

$219 (Ky.) An employé assumes the risk of obvious dangers of his employment.-Evans Chemical Works v. Ball, 167 S. W. 390.

(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant.

§ 228 (Ky.) The distinction between "assumed risk" and "contributory negligence" is of great importance in cases arising under federal Employers' Liability Act, since the former bars recovery while the latter merely diminishes the amount of recovery.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley, 167 S. W. 933.

$ 226 (Ky.) An employé does not assume risks created by the employer's negligence.Evans Chemical Works v. Ball, 167 S. W. 390. § 226 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where it was the custom of the servants of a railroad company, engaged in repair work, to pass between the cars of long freight trains so as to reach the repair tracks, and those in charge of the trains always gave warnings of any movement, a repairman

(H) Actions.

§ 256 (Tex.Civ.App.) Petition, in an action by an administrator for the death of his intestate, a brakeman, held to sufficiently show that the suit was not brought under the state statutes. but under the federal Employers' Liability Act. -Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

§ 258 (Ark.) In action for death of railway brakeman, complaint, alleging negligence in failing to provide ladders and grabirons, placing a tank car next to a higher car and in the manner in which the engineer handled the engine, held to state a cause of action.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

§ 264 (Ark.) In an action for the death of a servant from the falling of a derrick, alleged to have been caused by the old, rusty, rotten, and worn condition of the guy wires, evidence was admissible that part of the strands of the broken wire were not inserted in the cap plate, where the court instructed that it was only admissible as tending to show the conditions alleged.-Burdette Cooperage Co. v. Bunting, 167 S. W. 77.

268 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract by a firm with a county to do work, providing against the firm subletting without the written consent of the county, in connection with evidence that there was no such consent, is admissible on the issue of one doing part of the work for the firm, being an independent contractor.-Corrigan, Lee & Halpin v. Heubler, 167 S. W. 159.

§ 270 (Ark.) In an action for the death of a servant from the falling of a derrick, evidence that the derrick had been considered dangerous by old employés was admissible to show that the master knew, or by reasonable diligence might have known, that it was unsafe.-Burdette Cooperage Co. v. Bunting, 167 S. W. 77.

$ 274 (Ky.) In a servant's action for injury, evidence as to the use of unsafe appliances is competent on the question of contributory negligence.-Ohio Valley Coal & Mining Co. v. Heine, 167 S. W. 873.

.

§ 276 (Ky.) Where a brakeman as injured by falling between the cars of a freight train while it was switching, and it was merely conjectural from the evidence whether the fall was caused by his own fault or the fault of the company, there can be no recovery.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Walker's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 128.

$ 276 (Ky.) In an action for injuries, evidence held to warrant a finding that plaintiff's hip was dislocated by the accident.-Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Dixon, 167 S. W. 682.

§ 276 (Ky.) In an action for death of a rail

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of a train as he was endeavoring to board it, evidence held insufficient to warrant a finding that his fall was caused by a ridge of dirt and cinders dug from the track and alleged to have been negligently piled alongside thereof.-Weidekamp's Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 167 S. W. 882.

§ 278 (Ark.) In an action for the death of a brakeman, caused by a collision between the caboose in which he was riding and other cars on a siding upon which the caboose was sent by a flying switch, evidence held insufficient to show negligence in making the switch_at too great a speed.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rodgers, 167 S. W. 106.

In an action for injuries to a brakeman received while making a flying switch, evidence that the switch might have been made at less speed is not evidence of negligence, where it was uncontradicted that it was perfectly safe to cut loose the caboose in which the brakeman was riding at the speed at which it was then moving.-Id.

§ 276 (Ky.) In an action for the death of a $285 (Mo.) In an action for injuries to an miner by falling slate, evidence held to sustain employé in a municipal electric light plant a finding that the accident was not caused by caused by an electric shock, evidence held to the failure or refusal of defendant to furnish make a question for the jury as to whether, if sufficient cross-timbers or props.-Beaver's a switch was negligently constructed and mainAdmir v. Proctor Coal Co., 167 S. W. 885. tained, the accident was due to such negligence. § 278 (Ark.) In action for the death of a rail-Riley v. City of Independence, 167 S. W. way brakeman claimed to have been due to the absence of ladders and handholds on the end

1022.

of a box car, evidence as to the proportion of such cars in the country equipped with ladders and handholds on the end was properly admitted.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

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$278 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to brakeman who fell between the cars of a freight train while it was switching, at a time when there was a rough or unusual jerk of the train, evidence held insufficient to show negligence by the other employés in handling the train.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Walker's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 128.

Evidence held insufficient to show that the employés in charge of the train saw the brakeman fall so that they could have stopped the train and avoided the injury.-Id.

§ 278 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to a miner struck by material falling from the sides of a ditch, evidence held to show that the employer negligently failed to make the working place reasonably safe, and that its foreman negligently ordered the miner to work in the ditch, without first examining the condition of its sides.Evans Chemical Works v. Ball, 167 S. W. 390.

$278 (Mo.App.) Evidence that an eyebolt, by the breaking of which plaintiff was injured, appeared after the accident to have had an old crack partly through the bolt for a considerable time prior to the injury held to warrant a finding of negligence on defendant's part in failing to perform its duty of inspection. Spaulding v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 167 S. W. 663.

§ 278 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence, in an action for the death of a brakeman, held to show that his fall from a freight car was caused by fendant's negligence in suddenly stopping the train with unusual force and jar.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

§ 285 (Ky.) In a brakeman's action for injuries from being thrown from a train which he was attempting to board, held that the question whether the speed of the train was the proximate cause of his injuries was for the jury.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley, 167 S. W. 933.

§ 279 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to an employé struck by a rod of steel thrown from a car, evidence held to show negligence of the employer's superintendent.-LisleDunning Const. Co. v. McCall, 167 S. W. 810. § 284 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action for injury to an employé held to make a question for the jury whether the person who employed plaintiff was an independent contractor, or merely a servant or agent.-Corrigan, Lee & Halpin v. Heubler, 167 S. W. 159.

§ 286 (Ark.) Whether the master exercised ordinary care to provide a safe derrick, able to withstand any sudden strain incident to the work, for the use of a servant who was killed by its fall because of the breaking of guy wire, held, under the evidence, for the jury.-Burdette Cooperage Co. v. Bunting, 167 S. W. 77.

§ 286 (Ark.) In action for death of brakeman claimed to have been thrown from train while attempting to pass from the top of a box car to the platform of a tank car, evidence held to make questions for the jury as to defendant's negligence, and its causal connection with the injury, though there were no eyewitnesses.Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

§ 286 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to an employé on a work train struck by a mail crane, held, that the question of negligent failure to give the employé notice in time to board the train in safety was for the jury.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Jesse, 167 S. W. 407.

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§ 288 (Ky.) A servant who knew of the defective condition of the tipple and appliances for unloading coal cars, and that the brakes had been oiled, held not as a matter of law de-charged with notice that because of such conditions an ascending car would probably jump the track and injure him.-Ohio Valley Coal & Mining Co. v. Heine, 167 S. W. 873.

tiff, while riding on
§ 288 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to plain-
motor attached to a train
in a mine, by being crushed between the motor
for the jury. Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Dixon,
and a mine rib, the issue of assumed risk held
167 S. W. 682.

§ 288 (Ky.) Under the evidence in a brakeman's action for injuries from being thrown from a train which he attempted to board while it was going at high speed, failure to instruct on the theory of assumption of extraordinary risk held not error.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley, 167 S. W. 933.

§ 289 (Ky.) Whether decedent, a miner, who was killed by the falling of certain slate from the roof of the mine, was negligent in loosening a portion of the coal under the slate held for

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