VIII. INDEMNITY AGAINST LIENS. § 315 (Tex.Civ.App.) A surety in a building contractor's bond conditioned on the contractor discharging the property from liens and incumbrances and paying claims which may become liens is not liable to a materialman taking no steps to secure a lien.-Wilkerson & Satterfield v. McMurry, 167 S. W. 275. MEMORANDA. See Evidence, § 123; Trusts, §§ 17, 18; Witnesses, 255. MENTAL CAPACITY. See Evidence, § 501; Wills, §§ 50, 55. MENTAL SUFFERING. MORTGAGES. See Chattel Mortgages; Courts, § 231; Ex ecutors and Administrators, § 223; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 132; Husband and Wife, § 171; Insurance, § 328; Payment, § 87; Usury, §§ 18, 27. I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances as Security. § 24 (Mo.) Appointment of a nonresident trustee in a deed of trust covering land in Missouri in violation of Rev. St. 1909, § 2859, held not a fatal defect.-Commerce Trust Co. v. Ellis, 167 S. W. 974. § 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) On the issue whether a deed absolute in form is, in fact, a mortgage, the grantor may testify whether the deed was See Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 27, 56, 68, executed to secure a debt, but not that he did 71, 73. MERGER.. See Contracts, § 237; Corporations, § 583. MINES AND MINERALS See Appeal and Error, § 880; Master and Servant, 88 107, 118, 129, 211, 217, 234, 276, 278, 289. II. TITLE, CONVEYANCES, AND (C) Leases, Licenses, and Contracts. 858 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract of sale of all the oil, gas, coal, sulphur, and other minerals, in and under a described tract, that may be found by drilling and mining operations which may be conducted on the land, is a valid contract of sale, which the purchaser may not destroy by failing to drill or mine.-Whited v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 812. A contract of sale of oil, gas, coal, sulphur, and other minerals in and under described land sufficiently identifies the minerals.-Id. $83 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract by several persons for the purchase of all minerals in and under described land is, as between the purchasers, joint and several, and each is liable for the contract price.-Whited v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 812. See Infants. MINORS. MISJOINDER. See Action, §§ 38-50. MISREPRESENTATION. See Fraud; Insurance, §§ 553, 645, 818; Judgment, 143; Sales, §§ 40, 126; Vendor and Purchaser, 88 93, 108; Witnesses, § 414. MODIFICATION. See Appeal and Error, § 1152. MONEY RECEIVED. See Action, § 38; Jury, § 14; Limitation of Actions, $33; Payment, §§ 85-89; Taxation, §§ 524, 543. §3 (Mo.) One whose money was loaned on notes made payable to another, but which had not been paid, was not entitled to recover the amount of the notes in an action for money bad and received, even though entitled to the possession of the notes.-Green v. Whaley, 167 S. W. 575. MOOT QUESTIONS. See Appeal and Error, § 19. not intend to execute a mortgage.-Kidd v. Sparks, 167 S. W. 799. § 38 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence held to show that a deed absolute in form was, in fact, a mortgage.-Kidd v. Sparks, 167 S. W. 799. (D) Validity. § 84 (Ky.) The payment of interest by plaintiff on a note and mortgage, the execution of which to an innocent party was fraudulently procured by defendant, and the institution of suit to compel defendant to pay the amount thereof, was a sufficient ratification of the note and mortgage, so that their invalidity did not prevent a recovery against defendant.-Kincaid v. Bull, 167 S. W. 903. III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA TION. (D) Lien and Priority. § 151 (Mo.) A title acquired in good faith, deed of trust, relates back to the execution of and without notice, under a foreclosure of a the deed of trust, and is superior to a judgment lien based on a judgment obtained against the grantor after the execution of the deed.-McMurray v. McMurray, 167 S. W. 513. IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES. § 213 (Tex.Civ.App.) Before a mortgagor can recover property mortgaged, of which the mortgagee is rightfully in possession, he must tender the amount of money due on the mortgage. -Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S. W. 304. VI. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY MORTGAGED OR OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. § 283 (Mo.) Where a grantee of land subject to a deed of trust assumes payment of the debt as a part of the consideration for the conveyance, he becomes the principal debtor as to the incumbrance.-Terry v. Groves, 167 S. W. 563. X. FORECLOSURE BY ACTION. (B) Right to Foreclose and Defenses. 8415 (Mo.) One who, in good faith, makes a loan secured by a deed of trust may foreclose the deed and purchase the property at foreclosure sale, though in the meantime he has learned of fraud vitiating the title of the grantor.McMurray v. McMurray, 167 S. W. 513. $ 417 (Mo.) Where a deed of trust appointing a nonresident trustee in violation of Rev. St. 1909, § 2859, also provided that, in case of his "disability in any wise," the sheriff of B. county, Mo., should act, the sheriff thereby validly became a cotrustee within the statute, and had full power to foreclose the deed.-Commerce Trust Co. v. Ellis, 167 S. W. 974. (J) Sale. $510 (Mo.) A notice of sale on foreclosure of a deed of trust held not fatally defective because it omitted the book and page of the recorder's record, where the deed was recorded, as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 2543.-Commerce Trust Co. v. Ellis, 167 S. W. 974. $ 551 (Mo.) Where testator bequeathed certain incumbered realty to his daughter for life, remainder to her children as to a part, and another part to the children in fee, and the daughter purchased the land on foreclosure of the trust deed, the children were entitled to share in the purchase on contributing their proportion of the debt within a reasonable time.Terry v. Groves, 167 S. W. 563. (0) Operation and Effect. $587 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband and wife executed a mortgage of the wife's separate property, a judgment foreclosing such mortgage after the death of the wife was not binding up on the heirs of the wife; they not being parties. -Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S. W. 304. MOTIONS. See Appeal and Error, §§ 129, 193-238; Continuance; Criminal Law, §§ 918-951, 974; Indictment and Information, § 137; New Trial, 128; Pleading, §§ 349-368; Trial, $ 84. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Animals, § 50; Bankruptcy, § 268; Counties; Creditors' Suit, § 8; Elections, § 126; Evidence, §§ 12, 41; Injunction, §§ 26, 186; Intoxicating Liquors, § 30; Judges, § 44; Justices of the Peace, § 36; Mandamus, §§ 84, 148, 173; Negligence, § 82; Pleading, § 8; Prohibition, § 3; Railroads, § 324; Schools and School Districts; Statutes, § 279; Street Railroads. thereon.-Prendergast v. City of St. Louis, 167 S. W. 970. § 240 (Mo.App.) Where the right to reject all bids is expressly reserved by municipal officers, they cannot act arbitrarily, through caprice or favoritism, or collusively and in bad faith, thereby abusing the discretion imposed in them or failing to exercise it; and, although the than the lowest bidder, such bidder has the right contract may be bona fide awarded to another to fair consideration and to avoid an award corruptly and collusively made to another.State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 167 S. W. 1123. § 243 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2778, a city is not liable under a contract not in writing, nor on one to pay for work already performed.-Likes v. City of Rolla, 167 S. W. IX. PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. to Make Improvements (A) Power Grant Aid Therefor. § 278 (Mo.App.) Ordinance of a small city situated about eight miles from a large city, providing for the grading of an avenue to the city limits over rough ground, connecting with a county road, which a short distance further on ran into an avenue running into the larger city, so as to make a direct connection, held reasonable and valid.-Shaw v. Stoeltzing, 167 IV. PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OR S. W. 1158. (B) Ordinances and By-Laws in General. § 108 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Dallas Charter, article 2, § 2, article 3, § 11, and article 8, where ordinance was submitted under initiative and referendum provisions to secure estimates on installing a municipal electric light and power plant, ordinance for the issuance of bonds subsequently submitted held to have been also enacted under the initiative and referendum provisions.-Holland v. Cranfill, 167 S. W. 308. § 122 (Mo.) A city ordinance may be pleaded by reference to the date of its passage and number, and by an allegation disclosing its character, and need not be set out in full.-State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Young, 167 S. W. 995. § 122 (Mo.App.) A city council's enactment of an ordinance within its powers makes out a prima facie case for the reasonableness of such ordinance, and the burden is upon one attacking it to clearly show its unreasonableness.Shaw v. Stoeltzing, 167 S. W. 1158. VII. CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. $230 (Ky.) A city was not liable on an implied contract for the value of insect exterminator purchased by the city clerk without authority because it was used by the city, where the council, which alone had power to bind the city, rejected the bill.-Worrell Mfg. Co. v. City of Ashland, 167 S. W. 922. $238 (Mo.) Under an ordinance requiring bids for a city contract to be signed by the bidder or by an authorized officer or agent, where the bid was by a corporation, held, that the bid of a corporation signed in its corporate name by a director on the direction of its president, in the absence of fraud, did not invalidate the § 282 (Mo.App.) City council's action in good faith in selecting patented material for street improvement held not subject to be impugned on the ground that such material possesses no of Chillicothe, 167 S. W. 1139. points of superiority over others.-Meek v. City Evidence that patented concrete selected by a city council for a street improvement was not superior to the ordinary concrete, which was less expensive, did not show bad faith on the part of the city council.-Id. City council held to have properly considered wishes of majority of property owners in selecting material for street improvement, where it did not act arbitrarily without determining for itself that such material was meritorious.-Id. (B) Preliminary Proceedings and Ordinances or Resolutions. § 289 (Mo.App.) A city council carnot by ordinance or otherwise bind itself to do more than the statute requires, and, where it proceeds as directed by statute, it is within its jurisdiction, even though it may not proceed in accordance with its own ordinance, since it was not intended that a city council should be given control over its own jurisdiction.-Lemon v. Shepherd, 167 S. W. 1145. § 304 (Mo.App.) A resolution to construct "curb and gutter of cement" beyond the sidewalk on designated streets sufficiently describes the improvement within the statute, and tax bills issued for the work are valid.-Wills v. Burbank, 167 S, W. 608. § 304 (Mo.App.) A resolution directing the paving of a street is sufficient, though it refers to another resolution for the grade.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 S. W. 1166. § 314 (Mo.App.) The plans and specifications the time of the passage of a resolution therefor, or at any time prior to the time for bids and the letting of the contract, unless the resolution refers to them as the only place where the general character of the work is to be described. -Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. (C) Contracts. § 330 (Mo.App.) A contract for a street improvement is not a violation of the provision that it must be let to the lowest and best bidder (Rev. St. 1909, § 9619), though it requires a patented article or one held in monopoly of exceptional value to be used.-Meek v. City of Chillicothe, 167 S. W. 1139. $330 (Mo.App.). Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 9241, 9254, 9255, held, in the absence of any statutory provision for advertising for bids for sewer construction, that an ordinance directing such advertisement was binding on the city, so that the award of a contract without advertisement rendered an assessment for the work invalid.-Lemon v. Shepherd, 167 S. W. 1145. § 340 (Mo.App.) Where a street improvement, when completed, conforms to the ordinance and resolution therefor, the contract, varying from the ordinance, must yield to the ordinance, and tax bills issued for the work are not invalid because of the variance.-Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. feet from the property line, did not invalidate tax bills for the work.-Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. fications charged a 10 per cent. increase on § 444 (Mo.App.) Where the plans and specithe estimate provided chats were used instead of sand or gravel for curbing and guttering, and the bid of the contractor was higher if chats were used than in case of sand and gravel, and sufficient gravel could not be obtained near the work and the engineer ordered chats, which did not make an inferior curb or gutter, the tax bills were not invalid.-Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. § 444 (Mo.App.) Special tax bills for street paving are not invalidated because of relatively small mistakes of computation in the estimate made by the city engineer as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 9407.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 S. W. 1166. Where an estimate of the cost of street paving made by the city engineer was understood by the city council, although the estimates for labor, breakage, etc., were merely lumped and added to the rest of the estimate without explanation, that fact will not avoid special tax bills issued for the improvement.-Id. § 445 (Mo.App.) The variance between a resolution and ordinance for curbing and guttering streets without excepting the curb and gutter already constructed and the advertisement for $353 (Ky.) Where a sewer construction con- bids and the contract for the work, which extract stipulated for partial payments and the re-empted the curb and gutter already constructed, tention of 15 per cent. until completion and the did not invalidate tax bills for the work, where deposit of 6 per cent. as security against defects, no bidder was favored and there was no denial and the bond of the contractor stipulated that of competitive bidding.-Wills v. Burbank, 167 he assigned to the surety the amounts to be re- S. W. 608. ceived by the contractor, who assigned to a third person amounts to be retained by the city, the assignment to the third person was an assignment of the amount deposited as security, and was superior to the rights of the surety. -Commissioners of Sewerage of Louisville v. Gates, 167 S. W. 417. §356 (Mo.App.) Where an ordinance providing for the pavement of a street required the contractor, whenever the parkway back of the curb needed filling, to bring it to proper grade with surplus dirt excavated out of the street, the contractor was not bound to fill a ravine 10 to 20 feet deep.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 S. W. 1166. § 360 (Mo.App.) A city is not liable for extra work under contract not so providing, though authorized by city officials in charge of the work and accepted by the city.-Likes v. City of Rolla, 167 S. W. 645. § 446 (Mo.App.) Where a contractor with the approval of the city engineer, laid a pavement higher than the specifications provided, but that did not injure abutting owners whose land was considerably higher than the street and merely diminished the contractor's compensation, as he was paid according to the amount of earth excavated, the failure of the contractor will not avoid special tax bills.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 'S. W. 1166. A special assessment for street paving cannot be avoided on the ground that there was not an exact compliance with the ordinance, which provided for a bed of sand four inches in depth; a substantial compliance being all required.-Id. A special assessment for paving cannot be avoided because the sand bed was not smoothed in accordance with the ordinance, where the method prescribed was found impracticable, and another method was substituted with the ap the work for the municipality.-Id. off the curb as required will not defeat the enThe failure of a paving contractor to finish tire tax bill for the paving assessment.-Id. $ 363 (Mo.App.) Where an ordinance provid-proval of the city engineer, who superintended ing for the pavement of a street with vitrified brick, laid on a sand bed four inches deep, did not require any impervious filler between the bricks, the fact that, four years after the pavement was laid, the sand had worn thin in many places did not show a noncompliance with the specifications.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 S. W. 1166. § 372 (Mo.App.) A contract for paving, providing that work thereunder shall be paid for in tax bills, and that the city shall not be liable therefor, extra work to be done at the direction of the city engineer is to be paid for in the same way.-Likes v. City of Rolla, 167 S. W. 645. (E) Assessments for Benefits, and Special Taxes. $443 (Mo.App.) Where an ordinance provided that curbing on a street should be placed 8 feet from the property line, while a prior general ordinance provided that sidewalks should not exceed 10 feet in width, the fact of the construction of a curb and gutter, pursuant to a resolution and ordinance therefor, located 10 the curb as required, and there was no evidence Where a paving contractor did not finish off as to what sum should be deducted for that reason, the entire value of the curb should be deducted in an action to enforce special tax bills for the assessment.-Id. $ 447 (Mo.App.) A tax bill issued before the completion of a street improvement is invalid.Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. 460 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 9403, a paving of the intersections of alley crossings back to the property line is not curbing or guttering within an ordinance and resolution providing for the curbing and guttering of designated streets, and a charge against the property abutting on the street for the paving is illegal. -Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. § 469 (Mo.App.) Where streets were guttered and curbed pursuant to a resolution ordinance, and contract therefor at a price per front foot, tax bills against lots abutting on streets and al XII. TORTS. leys intersecting a street were invalid as to the curb and gutter charge to the extent of the por- (A) Exercise of Governmental and Corpotion thereof lying outside the owners' front footage. Wills v. Burbank, 167 S. W. 608. § 485 (Mo.App.) In an action to enforce the lien of special tax bills, the introduction of the tax bills alone makes out a prima facie case, and casts on defendants the burden of showing their invalidity.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 S. W. 1166. (F) Enforcement of Assessments and Special Taxes. § 568 (Mo.App.) Though the resolution providing for pavement, which furnished the basis for special tax bills sought to be enforced, referred to another resolution for the grade of the street, plaintiff was not bound to introduce the second resolution in evidence.-City of Maryville v. Cox, 167 S. W. 1166. XI. USE AND REGULATION OF PUB- (A) Streets and Other Public Ways. § 705 (Mo.App.) The unnecessary use by a steam roller of a steam whistle close to travelers on a street, whereby horses are frightened, is negligence.-Phelan v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 167 S. W. 1059. § 705 (Mo.App.) It is the duty of the driver of a motor car to keep a lookout in the direction his car is going and turning so as to avoid others on the street.-Eisenman v. Griffith, 167 S. W. 1142. Where the driver of an automobile sees a pedestrian in peril, he must take all reasonable measures to avoid running him down.-Id. § 706 (Mo.) In an action against the owner and driver of an automobile for negligently running down a boy, a demurrer was properly sustained to plaintiff's evidence, where it appeared that plaintiff's act in suddenly running from behind a street car to the curb in front of the automobile, too close to avoid him, was the proximate cause.-Winter v. Van Blarcom, 167 S. W. 498. The burden was upon a boy suing for being run down by an automobile to show negligence upon the part of defendant, and the mere fact that plaintiff was struck by the automobile was not a sufficient showing of negligence.-Id. 8706 (Mo.App.) Evidence, in an action for injury to the horse of one driving along the right side of a street, from the backing of an automobile, held to authorize a finding of freedom from contributory negligence.-Brickell v. Williams, 167 S. W. 607. § 706 (Mo.App.) In an action against a street paving company for an injury to the driver of a wagon caused by his horse becoming frightened at defendant's steam roller on a city street, an instruction held not misleading.-Phelan v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 167 S. W. 1059. In an action for injury to the driver of a wagon caused by his horse becoming frightened at defendant's steam roller on a city street, an instruction held not erroneous in requiring a finding for plaintiff, if his horse became frightened at the usual" puffing of the roller and defendant failed to stop it, as not conforming to the complaint, which alleged that the puffing was unusual, since the liability did not turn upon the character of the noises.-Id. In an action for an injury to the driver of a wagon caused by his horse becoming frightened at defendant's steam roller, an instruction held not erroneous in making defendant liable if its engineer failed to stop the noises after seeing plaintiff's peril, where another part of the same instruction told the jury that it was the duty of the engineer to exercise ordinary care to stop rate Powers in General. §733 (Mo.) A city operating an electric light plant assumes the same responsibilities to its employés injured therein as private persons and private corporations running similar plants.Riley v. City of Independence, 167 S. W. 1022. (C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets and Other Public Ways. § 763 (Mo.App.) A city is not an insurer of the safety of pedestrians, and they must assume the risks attending a general slippery condition of the sidewalks produced by natural causes and which remain despite reasonable care and diligence.-Jackson v. Kansas City, 167 S. W. 1150. § 770 (Mo.App.) A city is not liable for injury from the general slipperiness of its streets or sidewalks, occasioned by a recent fall of rain or snow.-Lueking v. City of Sedalia, 167 S. W. 1152. 8771 (Mo.App.) Where fallen snow was not removed from a sidewalk and by the alternate thawing and freezing formed into a rough coating of ice covering the whole sidewalk, including the pathway made by pedestrians, the city was liable for injuries sustained by a person falling thereon.-Jackson v. Kansas City, 167 S. W. 1150. § 771 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to a pedestrian by falling on ridges of ice formed from water from an alley, an instruction that plaintiff could not recover if the ice had formed from water running from the alley shortly before she fell was proper.-Cowgill v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1157. § 805 (Ky.) A resident who knew that a street was closed, and had seen the obstructions and danger signals, cannot recover for an injury sustained in using the street during a storm.-Barrickman v. City of Louisville, 167 S. W. 151. Where a municipality had closed a street for repairs and placed barriers and lights thereon, it is not liable for injuries to a traveler who knew of the obstruction, because during a storm the lights were extinguished.-Id. § 805 (Mo.App.) A pedestrian, knowing of a defect in a street not obviously dangerous, may use it, provided he exercises the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances.-Lueking v. City of Sedalia, 167 S. W. 1152. $816 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff fell by reason of an obstruction composed of snow and ice forming a ridge, that the petition charged only that the obstruction consisted of ice was not a variance.-Cowgill v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1157. § 819 (Mo.App.) Evidence from weather bureau that slippery condition of sidewalks at the time of an injury resulted from a very recent precipitation held not conclusive in view of the other evidence.-Jackson v. Kansas City, 167 S. W. 1150. § 819 (Mo.App.) In an action for injury from slipping upon the worn surface of a stone in a crosswalk covered with a light fall of snow, evidence held to show that the defendant's negligence as to the worn surface was the concurrent cause of the injury.-Lueking v. City of Sedalia, 167 S. W. 1152. § 821 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries from stepping on the worn surface of a stone in a crossing covered with a light fall of snow, where plaintiff knew the danger, held, that the question of her contributory negligence was for the jury.-Lueking v. City of Sedalia, 167 S. W. 1152. § 822 (Mo.App.) An instruction in an action for injuries by defects in a sidewalk, that to find for plaintiff the jury must believe that ice Drains, and Water Courses. § 845 (Mo.App.) In an action against a city for a surface water nuisance created by a rail See Homicide. MURDER. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE. See Insurance, §§ 694-819. NAMES. road company building an embankment in the See Elections, §§ 180, 186. NAVIGABLE WATERS. der Rev. St. 1909, §§ 8862, 9110.-Roth v. See Taxation, § 1; Waters and Water Courses. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1155. XIII. FISCAL MANAGEMENT, PUB- (A) Power to Incur Indebtedness and Ex penditures. $867 (Ky.) The determination of the necessity for incurring indebtedness by a town of the sixth class, under Ky. St. § 3705, may be made by resolution; an ordinance not being required. -Bernheim v. Town of Anchorage, 167 S. W. 139. A notice of election upon incurring of an indebtedness by a town of the sixth class, which states that the amount of the proposed indebtedness and the amount to be raised annually by taxation for the interest and sinking fund would not exceed specified sums, was sufficient under Ky. St. § 3705, prescribing the requisites for such notice.-Id. $867 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 3705, requiring notice of election on question of incurring indebtedness by towns of the sixth class to state the amount necessary to be raised annually for an interest and sinking fund, held mandatory, and noncompliance therewith rendered an election void.-Kash v. City of Jackson, 167 S. W. 676. (D) Taxes and Other Revenue, and Ap plication Thereof. § 956 (Mo.) A citizen of a city or village under special charter enjoys his residence subject to all applicable laws, among which is the provision that it may surrender its special charter and join a general class, and, when it does so, the citizen must abide by the statutes governing the assessment and collection of taxes in such cities.-State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Young, 167 S. W. 995. I. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC. § 19 (Ark.) The right of the state to regulate and control the beds of navigable streams does not imply a right to relinguish its control over a river bed or permit its use so as to interfere with navigation.-State v. Southern Sand & Material Co., 167 S. W. 854. II. LANDS UNDER WATER. $36 (Ark.) The state holds its title to the beds of navigable streams as trustee for its citizens.State v. Southern Sand & Material Co., 167 S. W. 854. All powers over navigable waters and the beds thereof, which, under the English system, vested in the king and in Parliament, are vested in the states under the American system; property rights therein being held in common by the people of the states, subject to legislative control and regulation.-Id. The bed of a navigable stream being held by the state for the benefit of its citizens, the Legislature may require those taking sand and gravel therefrom to make compensation for the benefit of the state.-Id. Acts 1913, p. 1088, providing for the removal of sand and gravel from navigable streams on payment of compensation to the state, held a proper exercise of the state's power to regulate and control the use of beds of such streams.-Id. Acts 1913, p. 1088, regulating the removal of sand and gravel from the beds of navigable streams, only requires payment therefor by corporations and not by natural persons.-Id. The minimum price for sand and gravel taken from the beds of navigable streams by corporations fixed by Acts 1913, p. 1088, held a definite price which could not be increased by the Attorney General.-Id. § 957 (Mo.) An assessment of city taxes in a city for the year 1908, after it had elected to NAVIGATION. operate as a city of the fourth class, based on an See Navigable Waters, § 19. assessment obtained by the mayor from the county collector under Rev. St. 1909, § 9347, on which defendant's city taxes for 1907 had been assessed, held not double taxation.-State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Young, 167 S. W. 995. § 971 (Mo.) Where a city, having surrendered its special charter and become a city of the fourth class, levied a city assessment for 1908, on an abstract of the assessment for 1907, the validity of the assessment for 1907 was not material to the validity of the levy for 1908.-State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Young, 167 S. W. 995. $978 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Laredo City Charter, an action by the city attorney on behalf of the city for taxes due held presumptively authorized and want of authority is available as a defense under a sworn plea.-O'Connor v. City of Laredo, 167 S. W. 1091. A petition in an action by a city for back taxes and for the foreclosure of a tax lien, which describes the personal property assessed for the taxes as "personal property in the nature of merchandise," sufficiently describes the property.-Id. Laredo City Charter creates a statutory remedy for the recovery of delinquent taxes, and Rev. St. 1911, arts. 7692, 7693, are inapplicable.-Id. NEGLIGENCE. See Animals, $$ 70, 72; Bailment, §§ 31, 33 Carriers, 92, 105-163, 228, 229, 247-408; Charities, 45; Death; Electricity; Evidence, § 219; Highways, § 184; Husband and Wife, § 102: Judgment, § 143; Master and Servant, $$ 88-311; Municipal Corporations, §§ 705, 706, 763–822; Parent and Child, §§ 7, 13; Railroads, §§ 226-485; Street Railroads, §§ 93-117; Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 27-73; Trial, §§ 191, 194, 203. I. ACTS OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUT- (B) Dangerous Substances, Machinery, § 22 (Tex.Civ.App.) A railroad and a telegraph company had a right to keep a loaded pistol in their local office for the protection of the money and property kept therein.-Burns v. Texas Midland R. R., 167 S. W. 264. $23 (Tex.Civ.App.) It could not be said that a boy was attracted to the local office of a railroad and a telegraph company by a loaded pistol in an unlocked drawer, so they should have fore |