seen an accidental shooting in the absence of the agents, where it was not shown that he knew the pistol was there.-Burns v. Texas Midland R. R., 167 S. W. 264. (C) Condition and Use of Land, Buildings, and Other Structures. § 32 (Tex.Civ.App.) While a landowner is not bound to keep his premises safe for the benefit of licensees, yet he is liable for injuries received by licensees owing to his active negligence. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246. § 72 (Ky.) The rule that one who, in the face of a threatened danger, and in an effort to escape it, brings on himself an injury which would not have occurred but for such effort is not necessarily guilty of contributory negligence is qualified by the requirement that in thus acting there must be a reasonable appearance of danger, and his conduct must conform to that of an ordinarily careful man under like circumstances. Millers Creek R. Co. v. Barnett, 167 S. W. 402. $82 (Mo.App.) The violation of an ordinance will not defeat a recovery unless such violation is the proximate cause of the injury.-Blackburn v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 167 S. W. 457. § 82 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where his violation of a law proximately contributes to his injury, a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages.Houston, Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Rucker, 167 S. W. 301. (D) Comparative Negligence. $97 (Mo.) Where the negligence of defendant and the concurrent contributory negligence of plaintiff resulted in injury to plaintiff, there can be no recovery, as a general rule.-Keele v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 433. IV. ACTIONS. (B) Evidence. § 121 (Tex.Civ. App.) While the naked fact that an accident has happened may be no evidence of negligence, yet its character and the circumstances may lead reasonably to the belief that, without negligence, it would not have happened.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. See Bills and Notes. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. See New Trial, § 102. NEW TRIAL. See Appeal and Error, §§ 281-305, 842, 977, 979, 1072, 1195; Criminal Law, 88 918-951; Justices of the Peace, § 116; Railroads, § 351. II. GROUNDS. (A) Errors and Irregularities in General. $26 (Mo.App.) Where the petition stated plaintiff's name as "Gerard," and the evidence showed it to be "Gerald," the variance, when not complained of before motion for new trial, is not fatal.-Eisenman v. Griffith, 167 S. W. § 79 (Mo.App.) Though trial is by the court, it may grant a new trial, on the ground that its judgment was against the weight of the evidence.-Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Drennon, 167 S. W. 1181. (H) Newly Discovered Evidence. $ 102 (Tex.Civ.App.) A motion for new trial for alleged newly discovered evidence was properly denied, where defendant knew of the evidence before the trial but did not produce it. and his only excuse was that it "slipped" his memory.-Clemmons v. Johnson, 167 S. W. 1103. III. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE NEW TRIAL. $128 (Mo.App.) A motion for a new trial "because the verdict of the jury is not supported by the law and the evidence and the weight of the evidence" was not sufficiently definite, except on the assignment that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.-Falloon v. Fenton, 167 S. W. 591. $ 128 (Mo.App.) A ground of motion for new trial that the verdict is against the law, as declared in the instructions, is too general for consideration.-Raifeisen v. Young, 167 S. W. 648. A ground of a motion for new trial that the verdict should have been for plaintiff and not for defendant is merely equivalent to a contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and is not sufficiently specific to be of any effect.-Id. A motion for new trial must set out the reasons therefor so definitely as to direct the trial court's attention to the precise ground of complaint. Id. $143 (Mo.App.) Affidavits of jurors as to their misconduct will not be admitted to impeach their verdict.-Roth v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1155. NOLLE PROSEQUI. See Criminal Law, § 302. NOTARIES. $3 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 10692, 10712, a notary could charge 50 cents for affixing his jurat and seal to an affidavit, which is included within the term "certificate"; there being valid reasons for giving a notary a larger fee than a justice, in view of sections 10180. 10181, requiring the notary to keep a seal and furnish bond.-Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. Morten, 167 S. W. 658. NOTES. NOTICE. See Animals, § 70; Appearance, 13; Bills and Notes, §§ 344, 396, 497, 526; Carriers, § 218; Constitutional Law, § 309; Evidence, $ 185, 368; Executors and Administrators, $362; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 158; Insurance, §§ 198, 328, 379, 533-560, 748, 756; Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 279, 287, 310; Judgment, § 17; Mechanics' Liens, § 115; Mortgages, 510; Municipal Corporations, 867; Telegraphs and Telephones, § 68; Trial, § 48; Vendor and Purchaser, $ 230, 231; Wills, § 840. office, who claims the same under some color of title, as against an intruder, it devolves upon the incumbent to show that he himself is not a mere intruder and to establish by proof some right to the office he occupies.-Stamps v. Tittle, 167 S. W. 776. Plaintiff was appointed, during recess, by the Governor as a prison commissioner under Acts 31st Leg. (4th Called Sess.) c. 10 (Rev. St. 1911, art. 6175), creating the board of prison commissioners, and thereafter, before the Legislature convened, Const. art. 16, § 58, was amended, so as to make the office a constitutional office, and the same day such amendment took effect the Senate confirmed the appointment, held, that plaintiff had no title to the conSee Appeal and Error, § 1170; Intoxicating stitutional office, and hence a court of equity Liquors, 88 259-279. would not restrain interference with his possession.-Id. NUISANCE. I. PRIVATE NUISANCES. (D) Actions for Damages. OIL. See Mines and Minerals, § 58. OPINION EVIDENCE. § 48 (Mo.App.) A petition in an action for a nuisance, prosecuted after plaintiff's death by her administrator, which alleged damages for injury to plaintiff's health and to her property, See Criminal Law, § 451; Evidence, §§ 471 demanded damages for injury to her health merely, and, even were it necessary to allege that the injury to the health did not result in of damages, defendant must either demur to that part of the petition or raise the issue 553. death to state a cause of action as to that item See Courts, 88 89-107; Evidence, § 348. OPINIONS. OPTIONS. that damages resulting from ill health caus- See Specific Performance, § 97. ing death did not survive to the administrator. -Roth v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1155. $50 (Ky.) Verdict for $1,000 for burying the carcasses of dead animals within a few feet of plaintiff's residence, the condition extending over several years and causing offensive odors, held not so excessive as to warrant reversal.-Cumberland R. Co. v. Bays, 167 S. W. 882. II. PUBLIC NUISANCES. ORDERS. See Appeal and Error; Executors and Administrators, §§ 333-349, 360, 382. ORDINANCES. See Municipal Corporations, §§ 108, 122, 278. OVERCHARGE. PARENT AND CHILD. 886 (Tenn.) Failure of bill for injunction See Carriers, § 202. against maintenance of nuisance to allege that the state sustained any special injury and was entitled to an injunction held immaterial in a contempt proceeding.-State v. Ragghianti, 167 S. W. 689. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. See Constitutional Law, § 171. § 58 (Tex.Civ.App.) The power of the Governor, under the Constitution, to make appointments to certain offices in case of vacancies applies equally to filling vacancies occurring during the session as well as recess.-Stamps v. Tittle, 167 S. W. 776. II. TITLE TO AND POSSESSION OF 881 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a person holds a certificate of election or a commission of appointment to an office, he is entitled to the possession of the office; such certificate or commission being the highest and best evidence of title to the office until it is annulled by a judicial determination in a quo warranto or other proceeding.-Stamps v. Tittle, 167 S. W. 776. $82 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though a court of equity will protect by injunction an incumbent of an See Adoption; Adverse Possession, §§ 61, 85; 87 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a father consented to the employment of his minor child for one kind of work, the employer, changing the work without the consent of the father to a more dangerous work, was responsible to the father for loss of the services of the child and expenses incurred following from the changed employment.-Southwestern Telegraph & Tele phone Co. v. Coffey, 167 S. W. 8. In an action by a father for injuries sustained by his minor son while an employé of defendant, evidence held to show that the father. consenting to the employment by defendant of the child, did not consent to a change of work ordered by defendant.-Id. in a dangerous service without the consent of 87 (Tex.Civ.App.) One who employs a minor his parent is liable to the parent for any loss of the minor's services due to the employment, without reference to whether the loss resulted from negligence of the master, or was due to the ordinary risks of the employment, or to the minor's contributory negligence.-Cook v. Urban, 167 S. W. 251. As between the employer of a minor in a dangerous service and the minor's parent, the parent's knowledge of, and acquiescence in, the employment amounts to consent thereto.-Id. Though a minor is employed in a dangerous service without the parent's consent, and is injured therein, the master, sued by the minor's parent for the loss of his services, may show that he did not know of the servant's minority, and, if the jury believe he thought he was of age the parent cannot recover, without regard to the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.-Id. Though the parent of a minor consents to his employment in a dangerous service, he being injured therein through the negligence of the master, she may recover for his diminished earning capacity during his minority.-Id. That the evening before plaintiff's minor son was injured in defendant's employment he advised plaintiff, his mother, that he would not return home that night, because he was employed by defendant to run his gin, is insufficient to raise the issue of her having consented to his employment.-Id. § 13 (Mo.App.) A parent may be liable for negligence in permitting a minor son to use a dangerous weapon by which plaintiff was injured. Charlton v. Jackson, 167 S. W. 670. Where plaintiff, a caller in defendants' home was shot by defendants' minor son, 13 years of age, during the absence of the father, both mother and father were liable for their negligence in permitting the child to have and use the gun with knowledge of his careless habits. -Id. Where plaintiff, as an uninvited guest, went to defendants' house to make a social call, she was entitled, even had she been a trespasser, to protection against injury by the negligent use of firearms by defendants' minor son.-Id. PAROL EVIDENCE. pass to one of them, or there could have been no other reasonable purpose, the law will carry out such intent, whether fully expressed in words or not.-Scott v. Watson, 167 S. W. 268. II. ACTIONS FOR PARTITION. (B) Proceedings and Relief. § 46 (Tex.Civ.App.) All persons interested in the estate must be parties to a partition suit.Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22. $110 (Mo.) Where a partition decree of a homestead and dower tract described it in accordance with the partition report setting it off to the widow, which passed only the quantity specified, notwithstanding a conflict with one of the distances, and such quantity was marked by a fence well known to the purchaser, the deed passed only the quantity in the homestead and dower tract.-Walker v. Garner, 167 S. W. 955. PARTNERSHIP. See Appeal and Error, § 1054; Evidence, 314; Insurance, § 328; Intoxicating Liquors, $$ 152, 171; Joint Adventures; Joint-Stock Companies; Witnesses, § 175. I. THE RELATION. (A) Creation and Requisites. § 5 (Mo.App.) The rule that a sharing of profits raises a prima facie presumption of a partnership as between the parties sharing in the profits is applicable only where there is no proof of actual agreement; and, where there is must be determined therefrom.-In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463. See Criminal Law, § 444; Evidence, §§ 390-an actual agreement, the question of partnership 450. PARTIES. See Abatement and Revival, § 73: Appeal and Error, 34; Carriers, § 76; Equity, § 91; Injunction, § 114; Joint Adventures; Judgment, $$ 707-712; Limitation of Actions, & 124; Mandamus, § 148; Partition, § 46 Municipal Corporations, § 845; Trusts, 8 366; Venue, §§ 27, 32. V. DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND AMENDMENT. $76 (Ky.) Under Civ. Code Prac. §§ 92 and 118, objection that the action could not be maintained against the defendant because it was a mere voluntary association was waived when not taken by special demurrer or answer by way of plea in abatement.-United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 167 S. W. 891. PARTITION. See Boundaries, § 3; Deeds, § 211; Frauds, Statute of, § 68; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 179; Judgment, § 707; Partnership, § 315. I. BY ACT OF PARTIES. 85 (Tex.Civ.App.) A parol partition of lands is valid.-Scott v. Watson, 167 S. W. 268. Where R., W., and S. sold land, reserving a vendor's lien, and R. and S. orally agreed with W.'s widow that she should have the notes and their two-thirds interest in the land for her onethird interest in another tract, in pursuance of which the notes were delivered to her, and she signed a deed for the other tract, the transaction constituted a parol partition.-Id. § 9 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where parents, in anticipation of the death of one of them, made a partition of land among their children and each child and the mother and father pursuant to the agreement took possession of their respective interests and improved the property, and continued so to do for several years after the mother's death, the partition would be enforced in equity.-Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241. $9 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in the partition of land, the facts show that it was the intention § 9 (Mo.App.) An agreement between a contractor for railroad work and S., which shows that the contractor desired that S. should superintend the work, and that in consideration thereof he should receive a half of the proceeds, did not create a partnership.-In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463. § 17 (Mo.App.) The existence of a partnership is a question of intention, and each case must be determined in its own facts.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. § 22 (Mo.App.) A partnership as between the members results from their agreement evidenc ing an intention to create a partnership.In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463. Where parties entered into a written agreement, the question whether they formed thereby a partnership must be determined by ascertaining their intention from a construction of the writing itself, in view of the surrounding circumstances.-Id. (C) Evidence. § 44 (Mo.App.) Participation in the profits of a business raises a presumption of the exist ence of a partnership.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. $ 46 (Mo.App.) Until a prima facie case is made out that a partnership exists, its existence cannot be proved by acts and declarations of an alleged partner.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. § 52 (Mo.App.) In joint ownership of personal property, community of interest does not necessarily evidence a partnership; and when such community of interest is held by members of a social or fraternal organization, the presumption is against its existence.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. $55 (Mo.App.) In an action against certain members of the "Farmers' Co-Operative League," in which it was sought to hold defendants as partners, evidence held not to show that defendants intended to form a partnership, nor an agreement among defendants to share profits.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. $56 (Mo.App.) In an action to recover for "Farmers' Co-Operative League," in which it take so as to entitle plaintiff to recover the was sought to hold defendants as partners, evi- same.-Bone v. Friday, 167 S. W. 599. dence held not to show that defendants held $85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendant bank themselves out as partners, or that plaintiff twice collected a debt which plaintiff oil comsupposed they were partners, and hence insuf-pany owed a shipper of cotton seed, the bank ficient to establish a partnership by estoppel. Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS (D) Actions by or Against Firms or Part ners. $219 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action against several carriers, as partners, for negligent delay and rough handling of live stock, where the pleadings of defendants denying the charge were unverified, plaintiff could recover the whole sum against either of the defendants.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Shank & Dean, 167 S. W. 1093. VI. DEATH OF PARTNER, AND SUR- § 251 (Mo.App.) An administrator of a partnership estate is not entitled to possession of chattels not the assets of the partnership.-In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463. § 252 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, §§ 240, 241, held applicable to partnership assets by virtue of section 99, and the administrator of a partnership estate may be allowed a credit for debts charged in the inventory as due the estate, where the same cannot be collected by due diligence. In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463. VII. DISSOLUTION, SETTLEMENT, (D) Actions for Dissolution and Account- § 317 (Tex.Civ.App.) That partner invested money in partnership to defeat his creditors held not to prevent a partition and accounting from the other partner.-Freidenbloom v. McAfee, 167 S. W. 28. § 336 (Ky.) In an action by a survivor against the estate of a deceased partner for an accounting, evidence held to support a finding that the deceased partner died indebted to the surviving partner in the sum of $10,274.38.-Newberry's Adm'x v. Rhinehart, 167 S. W. 674. PART PAYMENT. See Limitation of Actions, § 155. PASSENGERS. See Carriers, §§ 247-408. PAYMENT. See Accord and Satisfaction; Compromise and II. APPLICATION. $45 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a petition in an action to foreclose several chattel mortgages did not show how the mortgagor's payments, which were sufficient to pay the first mortgage, had been credited, they would be applied to the payment of the first mortgage.-Marshall v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co., 167 S. W. 230. V. RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS. § 85 (Mo.App.) Where a mistake of $565.75 was made in figuring an inventory by which plaintiff purchased goods from defendant, through her husband, acting as her agent, and it was not claimed that the husband fraudulently received the over payment, it would be regarded as having been made by mutual mis was in possession of money of the oil company which it ought not to keep, and which the oil company was entitled to recover in a suit for money had and received.-Jewett State Bank v. Corsicana Nat. Bank, 167 S. W. 747. § 87 (Ky.) Mortgagor's voluntary payment of 1 per cent., in addition to the 6 per cent. rate on the loan, in consideration of the mortgagee's surrender of its right to carry the loan to maturity and earn the interest, held not made under duress so as to entitle the mortgagor to recover.-Hamilton v. Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co., 167 S. W. 898. § 89 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff oil company paid to defendant bank its debt to a shipper of cotton seed, and the bank used the bill of lading to collect a second time for the same debt, the oil company's act in taking up the bill entitled it to recover the second payment. Jewett State Bank v. Corsicana Nat. Bank, 167 S. W. 747. PENALTIES. See Carriers, § 20; Commerce, § 47; Costs, § 260; Damages, §§ 78-85; Usury, § 138. PERSONAL INJURIES. See Appeal and Error, §§ 1064, 1066, 1068; Assault and Battery, §§ 27, 39; Attorney and Client, 88 143-190; Carriers, §§ 280-348; Charities, § 45; Corporations, § 590; Damages, §§ 132, 185, 216; Electricity; Evidence, $ 506; Master and Servant, $$ 88-311: Municipal Corporations, §§ 763-822; Negligence; Parent and Child, §§ 7, 13; Pleading, 18; Railroads, §§ 22, 259-401; Release, 17; Street Railroads, §§ 93-117; Trial, 88 48, 191, 251-253, 296. See Pleading. PETITION. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. See Damages, § 177; Evidence, § 506; Rape, § 38; Witnesses, § 220. §6 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 750, information for practicing medicine unlawfully held fatally defective, where it did not allege defendant's residence and that he had not registered his authority or license in the district clerk's office of the county of his residence. -Young v. State, 167 S. W. 1112. PLEADING. See Appeal and Error, §§ 193, 195, 233, 238, For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER formance, 1164; Statutes, § 279; Taxa- | venue in the county of one's residence, mentiontion, 592; Trespass to Try Title, § 32; Trial, 88 250-253; Venue, §§ 32, 77, 78. I. FORM AND ALLEGATIONS IN GENERAL. $8 (Mo.) A petition charging fraud which merely charges fraud without specifications is, as a general rule, insufficient, as stating a mere conclusion.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030. 88 (Mo.App.) The allegation of the answer that at the time of the accident plaintiff's horse was driven in violation of the ordinance, without alleging in what respect it was being violated, is a mere conclusion of the pleader.Brickell v. Williams, 167 S. W. 607. 88 (Mo.App.) A pleading alleging that a contract is valid and binding is an allegation of a mere legal conclusion.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172. § 8 (Tex.Civ.App.) An allegation in a plea of privilege that the suit did not come within any of the exceptions provided by law, authorizing suit to be brought in the county of Milam or outside the county of Harris, held a conclusion of law, and ineffective.-Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Terry, 167 S. W. 1. § 18 (Ark.) In alleging a cause of action, the particular grounds upon which plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable should be stated with as much certainty as possible, but more specific details are to be developed by the testimony.Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83. § 18 (Tenn.) Not only may plaintiff allege that the personal injury for which she sues was inflicted on or about" a certain day, but, being unable to do so, she may not be required to allege the date with greater particularity, and may recover on her testimony that the accident occurred in the month alleged, and to the best of her recollection on the day alleged. -May v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 167 S. W. 477. § 21 (Tex.Civ.App.) Allegations of a petition, in an action for lumber sold, declaring upon a cause of action for lumber delivered at defendant's special instance and request, were not ambiguous nor inconsistent with allegations declaring upon a written contract, and hence defendant's exception was properly overruled.-Fink v. San Augustine Grocery Co., 167 S. W. 35. § 22 (Ark.) That portions of a complaint were redundant, and that it contained unnecessary details, did not render it defective.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83. ed in "articles 1194, 1585, of the Revised Statutes," instead of articles 1830, 2308, as required by Rev. St. 1911, art. 1903, existed in the case, was insufficient.-Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Terry, 167 S. W. 1. 8111 (Tex.Civ.App.) On a claim of privilege it is not necessary to introduce evidence as to residence which is admitted by the pleadings of both parties.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321. (C) Traverses or Denials and Admissions. § 120 (Mo.App.) An answer, in terms denying "each and every material allegation" in the petition "except such as are hereinafter specifically admitted," raises no issue except as to matters subsequently specifically alleged.— Brickell v. Williams, 167 S. W. 607. 127 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a paragraph of the petition alleged that the defendant had stated that plaintiff had stolen all he raised on defendant's place, and was a thief, an answer denying the language used as set forth in that paragraph, but pleading the truth of any charge made that the plaintiff had been guilty of fraudulent acquisition of property and conversion thereof to his own use, is not an admission of the speaking of the words charged.-Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244. (E) Set-Off, Counterclaim, and Cross-Complaint. § 147 (Tex.Civ.App.) A cross-action must contain allegations which, given every reasonable intendment, would justify evidence of facts essential to be shown to obtain a judgment.— Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Benson, 167 S. W. 266. IV. REPLICATION OR REPLY AND SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS. § 174 (Mo.App.) Where an answer alleged the execution of a contract and set out the contract, and then alleged that it was binding on both parties thereto, a reply specifically admitting the contract, followed by a general denial, did not deny the legal conclusion of the validity of the contract, but to do so the reply must set up the facts showing invalidity.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172. $180 (Ky.) Where the petition, in an action to enforce a lien for reconstructing a vessel, showed that the sum claimed was due under three contracts of March, May, and August, 1911, and that the contract of March provided for extra work, a reply to the answer, relying exclusively on the contract of March, was not a departure, and a judgment for plaintiff was not in violation of Civ. Code Prac. §§ 98, 101.II. DECLARATION, COMPLAINT, PE- Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., TITION, OR STATEMENT. 167 S. W. 384. § 32 (Mo.App.) Where a written contract is pleaded and set out in full, the facts are stated from which a legal conclusion follows.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172. § 49 (Tex.Civ.App.) The designation of an action as one to remove a cloud does not necessarily make it such, but the character of the suit is to be determined by the facts alleged therein.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321. § 69 (Tex. Civ.App.) In an action to reform a policy by inserting the name of plaintiff as mortgagee and payee, an allegation in the petition that the person named insured was building on the premises, and had no interest there in at the time of loss or at any time, held not an admission that such insured had no interest in the building, so as to avoid the policy for want of insurable interest.-Western Assur. Co. v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarrett Co., 167 S. W. 816. III. PLEA OR ANSWER, CROSS-COMPLAINT, AND AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. (B) Dilatory Pleas and Matter in Abatement. $104 (Tex.Civ.App.) A plea of privilege, re V. DEMURRER OR EXCEPTION. §193 (Ark.) Where the complaint was sufficient to inferentially show that the land in suit was the homestead of plaintiff's ancestor, the defect that it did not directly allege that fact cannot be questioned by demurrer.-Jarrett v. Jarrett, 167 S. W. 482. § 193 (Mo.App.) The causes of action, joined in a single count of a petition, being such as, by separate counts, might, under Rev. St. 1909, § 1795, be properly united in the petition, demurrer, under section 1800, "that several causes of action have been improperly joined" will not lie.-De Field v. Harding Dredge Co., 167 S. W. 593; Wilkinson v. Same, Id. 595. § 205 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the causal connection betwen the negligence of the master and the injury to the servant is sufficiently shown by reasonable deduction from the facts set up in the petition, the petition is good against general demurrer, although a special exception to its |