well taken.-Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz, 167 S., fective in not showing causal connection beW. 181. § 214 (Mo.) On demurrer, the truth of all matters well pleaded in a petition is admitted. -State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W. 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016. $214 (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant, demurring or pleading to the jurisdiction of the court, admits the facts charged in plaintiff's petition to be true, and only denies that they present a case within the jurisdiction of the court.-Key v. Key, 167 S. W. 173. $214 (Tex.Civ.App.) A general demurrer admits the truth of the allegations of a petition.Lastinger v. Toyah Valley Irr. Co., 167 S. W. 788. VI. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL § 262 (Ky.) Where an amended answer setting up additional damages under a counterclaim was filed several months before trial, plaintiff could not successfully claim surprise.-Louis P. Hyman & Co. v. H. H. Snyder Co., 167 S. W. 146. XI. MOTIONS. tween the master's negligence and the injury, an answer, which alleged that the proximate cause of the injuries, if any, was the negligence of fellow servants, cured the defect in the petition.-Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz, 167 S. W. 181. § 406 (Mo.App.) Where, in an action for a nuisance, prosecuted after plaintiff's death by her administrator, both parties tried the case on the theory that plaintiff's death did not result from the nuisance, the defect in that the petition did not show that her death did not result therefrom was cured.-Roth v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1155. § 423 (Ky.) Though under Civ. Code Prac. § 120, the proper practice is to file any evidence of indebtedness, upon which an action is founded, failure to do so does not invalidate the judgment where no objection was made.Hughes v. Grogan, 167 S. W. 381. § 432 (Tex.Civ.App.) The objection of variance cannot be raised after verdict.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taylor, 167 S. W. 289. § 433 (Mo.App.) Where defendant, prior to the rendition of verdict, does not question the sufficiency or form of the complaint, any defects therein, not vital, are cured by the verdict.-Falloon v. Fenton, 167 S. W. 591. PLEDGES. § 349 (Mo.App.) Where, in an action by a broker for damages caused by defendant preventing the collection of a commission from a third person, earned in procuring defendant and the third person to contract for the exchange See Corporations, § 123. of their lands, the answer alleged the execution of a binding contract of exchange, and that defendant was financially able to perform, and POLICE POWER. the broker by reply admitted the execution of See Constitutional Law, § 81. the pleadings.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172. See Insurance. § 367 (Ark.) Where the complaint was suffi cient to inferentially show that the land in suit POLICY. POOL HALLS. was the homestead of plaintiff's ancestor, the See Licenses, § 7. POPULATION. POSSESSION. $368 (Mo.App.) Where causes of action, join- See Evidence, § 12. ed in a single count of a petition, are such as, by separate counts, might, under Rev. St. 1909, § 1795, be properly united in the petition, the remedy is by motion for separate statement.De Field v. Harding Dredge Co., 167 S. W. 593; Wilkinson v. Same, Id. 595. XII. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE. 8378 (Tex.Civ.App.) A general denial puts in issue every material fact alleged in the petition. Wilkerson & Satterfield v. McMurry, 167 S. W. 275. § 399 (Ky.) Under the express provisions of Civ. Code Prac. § 131, if the allegation to which the proof is directed be unproved, not in some particular or particulars only, but in its general scope and meaning, it is not a case of variance, but a failure of proof.-Prestonsburg Coal Co. v. Wallen, 167 S. W. 395. XIII. DEFECTS AND OBJECTIONS, § 402 (Tex.Civ.App.) Allegations in a supplemental petition will not cure defects or omissions in the original petition, but such defects must be cured by amendment.-Fink v. San Augustine Grocery Co., 167 S. W. 35. § 403 (Ky.) Where error in a petition was corrected by answer, and plaintiff by reply accepted the correction, any variance between the petition and the proof, which corresponded to the allegations of the answer, was immaterial. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Jesse, 167 S. W. 407. $ 403 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a servant's petition for damages for injuries sustained was de See Adverse Possession; Mechanics' Liens, § 59; Officers, §§ 81, 82; Tenancy in Common, § 11. PRACTICE. For practice in particular actions and proceedings, see the various specific topics. PREJUDICE. See Appeal and Error, §§ 1029-1072; Criminal PREMIUMS. See Insurance, §§ 186, 198. PRESCRIPTION. See Adverse Possession; Limitation of Actions. PRESUMPTIONS. See Appeal and Error, §§ 907-934; Evidence, 88 59-83. PRIMARY ELECTIONS. See Elections, § 126. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Appeal and Error, § 1050; Attorney and Client; Brokers; Carriers, § 47; Corporations, §§ 283, 333, 410; Counties, § 89; Estoppel, § 56; Evidence, § 427; Injunction, § 114; Insurance, §§ 76, 186, 378, 379, 388; Railroads, § 17. I. THE RELATION. (A) Creation and Existence. 83 (Mo.App.) One who burned down an old mill, standing partly on the railroad right of way and partly on his own ground, in consequence of which a shipper's ties were burned, did not act as agent of the railroad company merely because, being anxious to get it away; he wrote the company that he would do so, and he was told to do it.-Eads v. St. Louis, Í. M. & S. Ry., 167 S. W. 577. $20 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the purchase price of coal furnished an alleged agent, certain evidence held admissible to show the relation of principal and agent.-Kohlberg V. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828. § 22 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action on note given insurance agent and transferred by him to plaintiff, in which defendant asked judgment over against the insurance company, the agent's declarations that he was the company's agent held admissible; this being proved by other evidence and, in effect, admitted by the company in its answer.-Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Benson, 167 S. W. 266. $22 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the purchase price of coal claimed to have been delivered to defendant's agent, testimony by the agent as to conversations with defendant's husband which fixed his status held admissible.Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828. Agency cannot be established by declarations of the agent.-Id. § 23 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the purchase price of coal claimed to have been furnished to defendant's agent, evidence held insufficient to show the relationship of principal and agent.-Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828. II. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES. (B) Compensation and Lien of Agent. § 84 (Mo.App.) One suing for commissions for the sale of oils in certain territory was not obliged to account for sales måde by another representative of defendant on credit; plaintiff merely making the deliveries and payment being made direct to defendant.-Whitaker v. Bell Oil Co., 167 S. W. 619. § 89 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action for commissions, in which defendant set up a counterclaim, held to support a verdict for plaintiff in the amount claimed.-Whitaker v. Bell Oil Co., 167 S. W. 619. There was no error in admitting evidence in an action for commissions as to plaintiff's right to a certain commission, where the claim was admitted in the answer.-Id. There was no error in permitting plaintiff, in an action for commissions, to inquire of defendant's auditor concerning certain correspondence, where he did not undertake to testify as to its contents, stating that he could not do so. -Id. In an action for commissions for selling oils, wherein defendant set up a counterclaim for sales and oil not accounted for, evidence as to freight and rent paid by plaintiff for defendant was admissible without being alleged, as bearing on the counterclaim.-Id. III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS. (A) Powers of Agent. § 101 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiffs authorized their agent to deliver certain cattle to defendant, the agent, in the absence of any agreement be tween the parties, had apparent authority to state the terms on which the cattle were so delivered.-Cotton v. Gorrell, 167 S. W. 1187. §104 (Ky.) A sales agent of a foreign corporation held apparently authorized to warrant note directed its delivery to her brother-in-law, § 171 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the owner of a who transferred it without authority, the fact that she received a portion of the proceeds, not knowing the money was from such source, did not estop her to deny the brother's authority.Sloan v. Gilmore, 167 S. W. 1089. and agent more is required than between the § 175 (Mo.App.) While as between principal principal and third persons dealing with the agent to show ratification, an agent violating his instructions is not liable, if the principal, with knowledge of the facts, ratifies, expressly or impliedly, his acts.-Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Drennon, 167 S. W. 1181. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. See Appeal and Error, § 1152; Bail; Estoppel, $63 Guaranty; Injunction, §§ 239, 252; Landlord and Tenant, § 291; Limitation of Actions, 88 22, 25; Mechanics' Liens, § 315. II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIA BILITY OF SURETY. § 86 (Mo.App.) A bond, indemnifying a surety on a contractor's bond saving harmless the owner from any liens for work or material, does not require the surety thereon to incur expenses of actions on liens and claims; but, if satisfied that a claim is correct, he may pay it and recover from a cosurety a contribution.-Sinclair v. Wismann, 167 S. W. 580. III. DISCHARGE OF SURETY. § 101 (Ark.) Where a maker falsely represented to the payee that the sureties had agreed to an alteration of the note by raising the interest rate in consideration of extension of time, the sureties were not discharged unless the payee acted under the agreement after learning that the sureties refused to assent thereto.-Waugh v. Cook, 167 S. W. 103. Where a payee, suing on a note as altered by raising the interest rate in consideration of an extension of time, in reliance on a fraudulent representation of the maker, did not know that a surety had not assented to the alteration, she could repudiate rights under the note as altered and file an amended complaint on the original note.-Id. IV. REMEDIES OF CREDITORS. § 161 (Ky.) In an action on a demand note, evidence held insufficient to show that the holdmaker, agreed to extend the time of payment, er, in accepting payments of interest from the thereby discharging the surety. Southern Nat. Bank v. Schimpler, 167 S. W. 148. V. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF (C) As to Cosurety. § 194 (Ky.) Where A. and B., willing to assume two thirds of the liability on an official bond and sign as sureties, and C., willing to assume one-third, but refusing to sign, made a contract by which C. assumed one-third of the liability, and the negotiations did not contemplate that a third person should sign as surety, A. and B., making up a shortage of the principal, could recover a third from J., who also signed as surety, after deducting the amount paid by C.--Jefferson's Adm'r v. Bogard's $194 (Mo.App.) Where a claim within a bond to indemnify against claims went to judgment, and was then paid by a surety, the latter could recover a contribution from a cosurety.-Sinclair v. Wismann, 167 S. W. 580. PRIORITIES. See Chattel Mortgages, §§ 144, 150; Mortgages § 151. PRIVATE NUISANCE. See Nuisance, §§ 48, 50. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. See Witnesses, §§ 191, 220. PROBATE COURTS. See Courts, § 198. PROCESS. See Appearance; Dismissal and Nonsuit, § 26; See Intoxicating Liquors. 1. NATURE AND GROUNDS. § 3 (Mo.App.) Where the county court was disregarding a census of a town taken under Rev. St. 1909, § 7239, showing it to have a population entitling it to a local option election, the town was entitled to a writ of prohibition against the court, not having adequate remedy by way of election contest.-State ex rel. City of Elvins v. Marshall, 167 S. W. 1050. PROMISSORY NOTES. See Bills and Notes. PROOF. See Insurance, §§ 533-560. PROPERTY. See Adverse Possession; Animals; Constitutional Law, §§ 81, 107, 252-309; Fixtures; Logs and Logging. PROSTITUTION. PROTEST. See Bills and Notes, §§ 396, 526. PROVISOS. See Statutes, § 228. PROVOCATION. See Homicide, § 42. PROXIMATE CAUSE. See Master and Servant, § 129. PUBLIC DEBT. See Counties, § 150; Municipal Corporations, $$ 867-978; Schools and School Districts, § 103. PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. See Municipal Corporations, §§ 278-568. See Navigable Waters, § 36. III. DISPOSAL OF LANDS OF THE § 158 (Mo.) Where M. purchased school lands from the heirs of C. who had paid the pur chase price and to whom the county court had ordered a patent issued and thereafter claimed the land, his equitable title was not affected by the act of his son after his death in procuring a patent in his name.-McClanahan v. McClanahan, 167 S. W. 991. PUBLIC NUISANCE. See Nuisance, § 86. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See Schools and School Districts. PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS. See Carriers; Railroads; Street Railroads ; See Commerce, § 48; Criminal Law, §§ 507, See Waters and Water Courses. 1169. § 3 (Tex.Cr.App.) An indictment under Acts 32d Leg., c. 23, which makes it a felony to pro PUNISHMENT. cure a female to leave the state for the purpose See Criminal Law, § 1206; Injunction, § 231. of prostitution, need not allege the state into which the female was induced to go; the offense QUANTUM MERUIT. being complete though there was no particular See Work and Labor. § 4 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for procuring a female to leave the state for the purpose of prostitution, evidence that the defendant had taken the prosecuting witness to a certain place in another state was admissible to prove that he had procured her to leave the state.-Hewitt v. State, 167 S. W. 40. In a prosecution for procuring a female to leave the state for the purpose of prostitution, where the defendant contended that he endeavored to persuade the girl to return home, evidence that the defendant had borrowed money from the girl's father to enable him to search for her, when he already knew where she was, was admissible as contradicting his defense.-Id. In a prosecution for procuring a girl to leave the state for the purpose of prostitution, evidence held insufficient to show that the defendant had such purpose.-Id. QUASHING. See Indictment and Information, § 137. QUIETING TITLE. See Judgment, § 256; Pleading, § 49. II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. § 29 (Mo.) Where plaintiffs, having but an equity in certain land in controversy, waited for more than 12 years after it had been purchased at a foreclosure sale by their mother, 8 years after the youngest of them became of age, and 4 years after the land had been platted, and many residences erected thereon by in nocent purchasers, they were barred of their right to relief, by laches.-Terry v. Groves, 167 S. W. 563. § 52 (Ky.) A judgment that a party is the owner of land which he did not claim is erroneous.-Parsons v. Dills, 167 S. W. 415. RAILROADS. See Adverse Possession, § 10: Appeal and Error, §§ 171, 877, 1050, 1056; Assignments, § 23; Carriers; Commerce, § 27; Constitutional Law, $$ 62, 297; Damages, § 44; Evidence, §§ 450, 471, 481, 483; Fixtures, 21: Injunction, § 26; Justices of the Peace, § 36; Mandamus, § 176; Master and Servant; Municipal Corporations, § 845; Negligence, 22; Principal and Agent, § 3; Street Railroads; Trial, §§ 191, 194, 296. II. RAILROAD COMPANIES. § 17 (Tex.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 6445, vesting all the corporate powers of a railroad corporation in its directors, and article 6446, providing that the president shall perform such duties as the directors may require, the president could not contract for the maintenance of the road, its offices and station on certain land, in the absence of express authority from, or ratification by, the directors.-Logue v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co. of Texas, 167 S. W. 805. §22 (Tex.) "Residence," within Rev. St. 1911, art. 1830, subd. 26, defining the venue of actions against railroad corporations for personal injuries, means living in a particular locality, as distinguished from “domicile," which means living in such locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 167 S. W. 801. A laborer who went from place to place in search of work, and working at short intervals, and who obtained work as a brakeman at a town, and continued in such employment for something over a month to the time of an injury, was either a resident or a transient, and an action for his injury must be brought in the county in which it occurred or in the county in which he resided, as required by Rev. St. 1911, art. 1830, subd. 26.-Id. § 72 (Tex.) The grantee of a tract upon which a railroad located its right of way and a station was entitled to the benefit of any contract with his grantor for the permanent maintenance of the same thereon.-Logue v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co. of Texas, 167 S. W. 805. A corporation purchasing a railroad was only charged with such conditions as attached by law, and no presumption could arise from the mere occupancy of land under deed that there was a private agreement with the president of the railroad that the road, its offices and station, should be permanently located thereon. Id. § 226 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 784, requiring railroad companies to keep their waiting rooms open and warm, does not require them to keep such rooms open at flag stations during the nighttime, but does require such room to be kept open at a station for a train that regularly stops at such station. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Lauhorn, 167 S. W. 132. § 246 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 768, subsec. 5, if a train which has blocked a crossing for five minutes is not ready to move, the crossing must be cleared by cutting the train in two, or by some other method.-Harvey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 167 S. W. 875. Where a railroad company is under the duty of clearing a highway crossing under Ky. St. § 768, subsec. 5, it must do so in such manner as to leave the entire right of way of the road open for travel.-Id. (C) Companies and Persons Liable for Injuries. $259 (Ky.) Under Const. § 203, lessor of railroad held liable for death of brakeman knocked from passing train by depot shed constructed dangerously close to the track by lessee.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. of Kentucky v. Vaughan's Adm'x, 167 S. W. 141. (F) Accidents at Crossings. Under the proviso of Rev. St. 1911, art. 1830, $301 (Ky.) Where a railroad crosses a public subd. 26, that a nonresident may sue a railroad highway the railroad company and the public company in any county in which it operates its must each exercise the right to use the crossing road, or has an agent, must show that he was a so as to subject the other to as little inconvenresident of some other state, territory, or coun--Harvey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 167 S. W. ience as is practicable under the circumstances. try at the time of the accident.-Id. IV. LOCATION OF ROAD, TERMINI, AND STATIONS. § 58 (Tex.Civ.App.) Gen. Laws (2d Extra Sess.) 31st Leg. c. 10 (Rev. St. 1911, Arts. 6695, 6696), relating to the construction of union depots and the powers of the Railroad Commission with reference thereto, held constitutional. -Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 167 S. W. 192. An order by the Railroad Commission under Gen. Laws (2d Extra Sess.) 31st Leg. c. 10 (Rev. St. 1911, arts. 6695, 6696), for the construction of a union depot by two railroad companies, whose lines intersected in a town, held not too vague for enforcement because it left to the railroad companies the right to determine for themselves the location and the character of the depot. Id. V. RIGHT OF WAY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND. § 72 (Ark.) A deed of land to a railroad for the erection and maintenance of a section house thereon, providing that when it should cease to be used as such the title to the land should revert to and vest in the grantor, held not an absolute conveyance, but to express a condition subsequent, upon the happening of which the title reverted to and vested in the grantor.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. 875. Under ordinary circumstances railroad trains have the right of way over other vehicles at highway crossings.-Id. 305 (Ky.) Where a railroad crosses a public highway, the railroad company has no more authority than other persons to place obstructions likely to frighten horses upon or near the public road, unless necessary in the use, repair, or construction of the road.-Harvey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 167 S. W. 875. 3, requiring the bell or whistle of a train to be § 307 (Tenn.) Shannon's Code, § 1574, subsec. sounded when approaching a city or town, etc.. applies to through trains which do not stop at a town.-Southern Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 167 S. W. 688. $324 (Tex.Civ.App.) The driver of an automobile which was injured in turning to avoid a locomotive at a crossing was guilty of negligence per se in approaching at from 15 to 25 miles per hour in violation of Pen. Code 1911, art. 815, in the absence of any showing that a greater speed was permitted by ordinances.Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Rucker, 167 S. W. 301. § 332 (Ky.) Driver of gentle horse accustomed to trains held not negligent in attempting to cross a track where a train had been cut in two, though the horse became frightened.-Harvey v. § 338 (Mo.) Where the negligence of a person struck by a train put him in a peril while still so distant from the approaching train that the trainmen could by warning or by stopping avoid the accident after the discovery of the peril, the company was liable.-Keele v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 433. Where trainmen negligently failed to maintain a lookout or give signals or slack or stop the train on approaching a crossing, and decedent was struck by the train at the crossing, having negligently moved from a place of safety to one of danger when the train was so near that the accident could not be averted, the humanitarian doctrine was inapplicable, and the doctrine of concurrent negligence operated to defeat a recovery.-Id. A person who approaches a railroad crossing at an ordinary gait in complete control of his own movement is not in danger, within the humanitarian doctrine, until he takes the last few fatal steps, or is oblivious to his danger as to indicate a present intention to step on the track, and the engineer, seeing the person, may rely on the presumption that he will stop before stepping on the track before the approaching train until he discovers the contrary. Id. 8 347 (Mo.) Where an action for the death of a person struck by a train at a crossing was tried on the theory that decedent was sui juris, evidence of the surrounding conditions and the decedent's knowledge thereof and of her attention being diverted was competent only on the issue of decedent's negligence, and was immaterial where it was admitted that she was guilty of contributory negligence.-Keele v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 433. § 348 (Mo.) In an action for the death of a person struck by a train at a crossing, evidence held not to justify a recovery under the humanitarian doctrine.-Keele v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 433. § 348 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence, in an action for injuries to an automobile in turning to avoid a locomotive at a crossing, held to show that the negligence of the driver in approaching at an excessive speed, in violation of Pen. Code 1911, art. 815, concurred with the negligence, if any, of the railroad company in causing the accident.-Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Rucker, 167 S. W. 301. § 350 (Ky.) Evidence held to make questions for the jury as to whether railroad employés in cutting a train standing at a crossing left the cars so that they obstructed a part of the highway, and whether this caused injury to plaintiff. -Harvey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 167 S. W. 875. Whether driver injured at a crossing while attempting to hold his horse, frightened at a standing freight train partly obstructing crossing, from backing onto the main track in front of a passenger train was negligent held a question for the jury.-Id. § 351 (Mo.App.) In an action for the destruction of plaintiff's automobile by collision at a crossing, where the ordinance involved only required that defendant's flagman should "give timely notice of the approach of trains," an instruction that it was not only the flagman's duty to give the warning, but also to stop the train or the persons crossing the track or both, held error calling for a new trial.-Botts v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 167 S. W. 1154. § 356 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a railroad company acquiesced in the public's use of a path on its right of way for many years, there was an implied permission to use the path, which rendered the users licensees.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246. § 360 (Ky.) Railroad employés are not required to watch an adjoining highway, but only to use ordinary care with all reasonable means at their command to prevent injury to one driving or riding thereon after discovering his peril.Millers Creek R. Co. v. Blevins, 167 S. W. 886. Railroad employé who saw danger of traveler frightened from the blowing of the whistle for on adjoining highway from her horse becoming the whistle and resort to the bell.-Id. a crossing held under the duty to cease blowing $ 364 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a licensee on a path adjoining railroad tracks was injured by a piece of scantling, which the movement of the train threw from one of the cars, the company was liable.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246. § 381 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to plaintiff by being struck by a train in a city railway yard, plaintiff held negligent as a matter of law.-Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. La Grone, 167 S. W. 7. § 395 (Ky.) Where plaintiff suing for negligent death, did not specify the negligence relied on, but alleged in a general way that decedent was killed by the negligence of defendant in operating its train, it was competent for plaintiff to prove facts bearing on the accident, including the use by pedestrians of the track.Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Dawson's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 125. $395 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a licensee, while using a path near a railroad track, was struck by a piece of scantling hurled from a moving train and the negligence claimed was that the railroad company failed to remove the scantling from the floor of the car, evidence of the roughness of the track, which tended, with the motion of the train, to throw the scantling out of the car, was admissible.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246. $398 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to plaintiff's wife, hurt by a piece of scantling, which was thrown from a moving train, a finding that the railroad company was negligent in not discovering and removing the scantling from its car held justified under the evidence.— St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246. A finding by the jury that plaintiff's wife was struck by a piece of scantling thrown from a moving train, as she was proceeding on a path adjacent to the tracks, held not in conflict with the physical facts.-Id. $ 400 (Ky.) Where a railroad track in a town of about 350 inhabitants was used daily by about 100 persons going to and from the depot, the question, whether a person on the track was a trespasser or a licensee, was for the jury.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Dawson's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 125. Whether a pedestrian on a railroad track struck by a train was guilty of contributory negligence held for the jury.-Id. § 400 (Ky.) In an action for injuries when the horse which plaintiff was riding became frightened at a train, evidence held to make questions for the jury as to whether the railroad employés discovered plaintiff's peril, and whether they failed thereafter to use ordinary care for her safety.-Millers Creek R. Co. v. Blevins, 167 (G) Injuries to Persons on or near Tracks. § 356 (Ky.) The question whether one struck by a train was a trespasser or a licensee while on the track does not depend on the fact that the accident happened in a city or incorporated town, but on the number of persons using the track at the place of the accident.-Chesapeake S. W. 886. & O. Ry. Co. v. Dawson's Adm'r, 167 S. W. § 400 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a licensee using 125. a path on the right of way of a railroad com.. |