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pany was injured by the active negligence of the company, recovery cannot be defeated because there was another way over which she might have traveled; the question whether she was guilty of contributory negligence in selecting the path being for the jury.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246.

§ 401 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to a licensee who was struck while on the right of way of a railroad company by a piece of scantling thrown from a moving train, an instruction on the negligence of the railroad company held not improper, as casting upon the company the burden of keeping its tracks in good condition for the benefit of licensees.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Balthrop, 167 S. W. 246.

(H) Injuries to Animals on or near Tracks. 8411 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 3145, requiring railroad companies to maintain cattle guards sufficient to turn horses, only requires such guards as ordinarily will be sufficient to prevent horses from attempting to pass over them onto the right of way.-Miller v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 1160.

$413 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a railroad company assumed the duty of keeping in repair a gate which, for the benefit of plaintiff, it placed in the fence along its right of way, plaintiff is entitled to recover for the value of a mule which escaped because of defects in gate and was killed on the right of way.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Withers, 167 S. W. 5.

$413 (Tex.Civ.App.) One whose mule was killed on the right of way of a railroad company may recover, where it strayed through a gate placed by the company to afford access between two different farms owned by separate individuals, if the company did not exercise proper care to keep the gate closed.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 S. W. 797.

(1) Fires.

§ 480 (Tex.Civ.App.) Proof that sparks escaped from a railroad engine and destroyed property by fire established a prima facie case of actionable negligence of the railroad company, and to escape liability it must show that the engine was equipped with proper spark arresters, and that the same were in good repair, and that the company exercised reasonable care to keep the same in good repair.-Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Cook, 167 S. W. 158.

§ 485 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though a railroad company need only exercise ordinary care to equip its engines with suitable spark arresters, yet where, in an action for loss of property by fire set by sparks, there was no evidence by the company on that issue, it was not reversible error to charge that it was its duty to use suitable spark arresters.-Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Cook, 167 S. W. 158.

RAPE.

See Criminal Law, §§ 200, 507, 678, 772, 11662 Indictment and Information. $$ 79, 110; Jury, § 31; Witnesses, §§ 270, 337.

II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. (A) Indictment and Information. § 23 (Mo.) An information for statutory rape on a child under the age of consent must allege that the child is under the statutory age, where no exact age is stated; but where the age is stated, and it is below the statutory age. the allegation as to the general statutory age is mere redundancy.-State v. Hughes, 167 S. W. 529.

(B) Evidence.

§ 38 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where, on a trial for rape, there was no question of intercourse by consent, the testimony of a physician that one could not rape a woman without her consent, in the position testified to by her, was properly excluded.-Burge v. State, 167 S. W. 63.

§ 40 (Ark.) In a prosecution for rape, evidence of prosecutrix's previous intercourse with others, while not a defense, was admissible in mitigation.-Garrard v. State, 167 S. W. 485.

8441 (Mo.App.) In an action for killing plaintiff's horse, alleged to have strayed onto the right of way by reason of a defective cattle guard, the burden is on plaintiff to show that the guard was insufficient and that such defect was the cause of the entry of the horse on the right of way. Miller v. Chicago, M. & St. P.sidered in determining her previous chaste charRy. Co, 167 S. W. 1160.

§ 443 (Mo.App.) That plaintiff's horse and two or three of its companions crossed defendant's cattle guard was not of itself sufficient to make out a prima facie case of insufficiency, but such fact, connected with proof of the construction of the guard, might be sufficient for that purpose.-Miller v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 1160.

§ 446 (Mo.App.) In an action for killing plaintiff's horse, which strayed onto defendant's right of way over a cattle guard, evidence as to the construction of the guard held to require submission to the jury of the question of its ordinary sufficiency to turn horses.-Miller v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 1160. Where a cattle guard was so constructed as to give solid support to animals attempting to cross it, and there was nothing to repel an animal except its serrated surface, no amount of opinion evidence or proof of the adoption of the plan of such guard would establish, as a matter of law, that it constituted a performance of the company's duty to provide sufficient guards, as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 3145.Id.

$ 446 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the value of a mule killed by one of defendant's trains, where there was evidence of defendant's negligence in the particulars charged, the question of negligence was properly submitted to the jury.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas

§ 40 (Mo.) On a trial for having carnal knowledge of an unmarried female between the ages of 14 and 18 of previous chaste character, her acts subsequent to the offense cannot be con

acter.-State, v. Perrigin, 167 S. W. 573.

§ 41 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where prosecutrix testified that she was a little over 16 years of age at the time of the alleged assault, and that she was born in April, 1897, it was error to exclude depositions of her father and mother that she was born in April, 1895.-Caples v. State, 167 S. W. 730.

§ 43 (Tex.Cr.App.) The appearance of prosecutrix about four hours after the alleged rape of her may be proved.-Burge v. State, 167 S. W. 63.

Where prosecutrix made complaint about four hours after the occurrence, it was proper to permit the persons to whom she made complaint to testify as to her condition and that she was in a wrecked, nervous condition on the Sunday afternoon following the offense on the preceding Friday morning.-Id.

§ 51 (Tex.Cr.App.) The failure of prosecutrix to make outcry or call for aid, when it may readily be obtained, or within reasonable time to disclose the offense after an opportunity to do so, tends to discredit her testimony.-Burge v. State, 167 S. W. 63.

$52 (Mo.) Where, on a trial for rape of a child below the age of consent, the prosecutrix testified to the assault, and there were no facts rendering her testimony uncertain, a conviction was justified.-State v. Hughes, 167 S. W. 529.

Though the testimony of prosecutrix on a trial for rape of a child under the age of con

of prosecutrix to sustain a conviction should be convincing and leave the mind of the court free from doubt.-Id.

$52 (Tex.Cr.App.) The evidence amply showed that prosecutrix was under 15 years of age, where, though the year of birth was not named, it was fixed by an event the date of which was shown. Mora v. State, 167 S. W. 344.

Where penetration was testified to by the girl and admitted by appellant in his confession introduced in evidence it was sufficiently proven. -Id.

(C) Trial and Review.

59 (Mo.) Instruction stating the elements of the offense of having carnal knowledge of an unmarried female of previous chaste character between 14 and 18 held not erroneous.-State v. Perrigin, 167 S. W. 573.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

See Criminal Law, § 508.

87 (Mo.) A charge of receiving stolen goods is not sustained by proof that the goods received were only embezzled.-State v. Gennusa, 167 S. W. 439.

RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE.

See Criminal Law, §§ 673-684; Trial, §§ 4884. RECORDS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 501-714, 837; Criminal Law, §§ 1086-1122, 1186; Evidence, § 348; Mandamus, §§ 15, 187.

REDUNDANCY.

REFERENCE.

$ 59 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where there was no evidence that the intercourse was by consent, and See Pleading, § 22. the court charged that, if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether prosecutrix consented, accused should be acquitted, refusal to charge that consent would be presumed until the state proved the contrary was proper.Burge v. State, 167 S. W. 63.

III. CIVIL LIABILITY.

§ 66 (Mo.App.) In an action for damages for rape, evidence held to support a verdict for plaintiff.-Williams v. Collins, 167 S. W. 1189. RATE.

See Carriers, § 26; Interest, § 37.

RATIFICATION.

See Executors and Administrators, §§ 131, 150; Frauds, Statute of, § 116; Mortgages, 884; Principal and Agent, §§ 171, 175.

REAL ACTIONS.

See Arbitration and Award.

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See Cancellation of Instruments; Pleading, § 69; Trial, § 194.

I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES.

§ 3 (Mo.) Where part of a description is inconsistent with other parts, and the remaining part is sufficient to designate the land, a remedy is afforded at law by disregarding the false description and giving effect to the other calls, and a resort to equity for the correction of the description is unnecessary.-Walker v. Garner,

167 S. W. 955.

§ 16 (Mo.) Where, after correspondence looking to the sale of a store building adjoining another building owned by the vendor, a deed was made which by mistake included 24 feet of the

See Ejectment; Partition; Quieting Title; ground covered by the building retained, the unTrespass to Try Title.

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RECEIVERS.

See Appeal and Error, § 874.

VII. ACCOUNTING AND COMPENSATION.

§ 194 (Ky.) The allowance of $1,000 as fees to the attorney, in addition to $2,500 previously allowed, held excessive; the $2,500 being sufficient to cover any future services required of the attorney in the final settlement.-Stockholders of First State Bank v. First State Bank's Receiver, 167 S. W. 678.

While due consideration is given the affidavits of attorneys as to the fees to be allowed to an attorney, the court is not bound thereby, but will review the extent of the services and fix what it thinks is a reasonable fee under all the facts. -Id.

VIII. FOREIGN AND ANCILLARY RECEIVERSHIPS.

8210 (Tenn.) While a receiver has no legal right to sue in a state other than that of his appointment, the privilege of doing so will be accorded, as matter of comity; the suit being neither inimical to the interest of local creditors, or of any one who has acquired rights under a local statute, nor in contravention of the policy of the forum.-Hardee v. Wilson, 167 S. W. 475.

doubted intention being to merely include the ground covered by the one building, the deed and a subsequent deed and mortgage by the purchasers containing the same description were properly reformed.-Fischer v. Dent, 167 S. W. 977.

§ 28 (Mo.) A purchaser from parties whose deed included by mistake 24 feet of an adjoining building owned by the original vendor stood in no better position in a suit to reform the deeds than his immediate vendors.-Fischer v. Dent, 167 S. W. 977.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. included 24 feet of the ground covered by an § 44 (Mo.) Where a deed to a store building adjoining building retained by the vendor, the unquestioned possession by the respective parties to the line marked by the buildings measured their claim, and was evidence of their intention in a suit to reform the deed.-Fischer v. Dent, 167 S. W. 977.

§ 45 (Mo.) A reformation of a deed cannot be decreed on slight evidence, for the courts cannot deal lightly with the solemnly expressed terms of a written instrument.-Driskill v. Ashley, 167 S. W. 1026.

§ 45 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action for the reformation of an insurance policy, naming L. as the insured and K. as mortgagee and payee in case of loss, held sufficient to support a judgment reforming the policy by inserting plaintiff's name in the mortgage clause, on the ground of mistake.-Western Assur. Co. v. HillyerDeutsch-Jarratt Co., 167 S. W. 816.

In an action to reform an insurance policy, the evidence must be clear and convincing to overcome the presumption that the policy embodies the real intention of the parties.-Id.

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See Abatement and Revival, §§ 73, 77.

RIGHT OF WAY.

§ 17 (Ky.) A release which an injured servant was induced to sign on the representation that it was for his policy money from defend- See Railroads, § 72. ant's relief department held no defense to an action for damages.-Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Dixon, 167 S. W. 682.

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RISK, ASSUMPTION OF.

See Master and Servant, §§ 204-226, 228, 288, 295.

See Insurance, § 464.

RISKS.

ROADS.

See Highways; Municipal Corporations, §§ 763-822.

ROBBERY.

See Homicide, § 166; Indictment and Information, § 125.

$1 (Mo.) Rev. St. 1909, § 4530, defining robbery in the first degree, defines but one offense, which may be committed either by taking the property of another from his person or in his presence and against his will, by violence or by putting him in fear of some immediate injury. -State v. Flynn, 167 S. W. 516.

§ 24 (Mo.) Evidence held to sustain a conviction of robbery.-State v. Flynn, 167 S. W. 516.

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See Brokers; Carriers, § 56; Deeds; Election of Remedies, § 3; Estoppel, § 63; Evidence, § 442; Execution; Executors and Administrators. $$ 333-388; Guaranty, § 38; Guardian and Ward, §§ 99, 103; Intoxicating Liquors; Judicial Sales; Mines and Minerals, §§ 58, 83; Vendor and Purchaser.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF CONTRACT.

§ 40 (Tex.Civ.App.) A statement of value of machinery sold is not ordinarily a material representation which, if false, will defeat a contract of sale.-A. S. Cameron Steam Pump Works v. Lubbock Light & Ice Co., 167 S. W. 256.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT. $ 54 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a buyer acquiesced in the seller's interpretation of a contract

See Criminal Law, §§ 338-364; Evidence, $$ for the sale of cotton, the price of which was 123, 127.

RES JUDICATA.

See Judgment, §§ 565-717.

RESOLUTIONS.

to be determined with reference to the value of cotton thereafter, the courts will enforce the contract as construed by the parties; hence the refusal of an instruction correctly submitting the question as to the rights of the parties in case their minds never met was not error.Charles B. Smith & Co. v. Duncan, 167 S. W.

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871 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract for the sale
of a stipulated quantity of gasoline, or so much
as plaintiff might require for its own consump-
tion, held to include only such quantity as plain-
tiff might need for its own consumption, and
not the full stipulated amount.-Gulf Refining
Co. v. Brown-Lloyd Co., 167 S. W. 162.

§ 72 (Tex.Civ.App.) Contract for sale and de-
livery of orange trees held to require the seller
to deliver them in a sound and healthy condi-
tion.-Alsworth v. Reppert, 167 S. W. 1098.

§ 77 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where cotton was sold
under an agreement that the sale price might
be fixed at the market price of any day between
delivery and the succeeding March, the seller,
who notified the buyer's clerk, and attempted
to notify the buyer, but was unable to see him,
because of his illness, is entitled to have the
sale price fixed as of the day he selected.-
Charles B. Smith & Co. v. Duncan, 167 S. W.

922

Where cotton was sold under an agreement
that the sale price should be fixed as the mar-
ket price of any day selected by the seller be-
tween delivery and the succeeding March, the
buyer, who, because of illness, did not receive
on the day selected notice of the seller's de-
mand for settlement, ratified the selection by
promising settlement after he finally was noti-
fied.-Id.

Where cotton was sold under an agreement
that settlement should be made on the buyer's
basis limit at any time between delivery and
March 1st, the buyer impliedly agreed to be in
the market and to have a basis limit during
that time, and could not preclude the seller from
selecting a day on which he was not in the
market as basis for settlement.-Id.

§ 88 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the pur-
chase price of a large quantity of cotton, which
the seller claimed was to be fixed by the mar-
ket price in a certain locality, evidence held
sufficient to carry the issue whether that was
the agreement between the parties to the jury.
-Charles B. Smith & Co. v. Duncan, 167 S.
W. 233.

III. MODIFICATION OR RESCISSION
OF CONTRACT.

(B) Rescission by Seller.

§ 97 (Mo.App.) Where sale is induced by the
buyer's fraud, the seller upon discovery of the
fraud may either rescind the sale or ratify it
notwithstanding the fraud.-Long-Bell Lumber
Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 167 S. W. 1183.

(C) Rescission by Buyer.

§ 119 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract of sale of
jewelry, which provides that the seller, on re-
ceipt of any goods, will exchange them for any
other goods, and that if at any time an article
proves unsatisfactory it must be returned, and
the seller will replace it with a new one, etc.,
does not limit the buyer's right to repudiate the
contract in its entirety for the failure of the
seller to deliver the kind of goods ordered.-Bix-
ler v. Dolieve, 167 S. W. 1102.

§ 126 (Mo.App.) The rule that a purchaser
must promptly rescind upon discovering mis-
representations does not apply in the case of a
rescission of the purchase of a horse which was
not gentle as represented, where the vendor re-
quested the purchaser to continue to try the
animal.-Peterson v. Barbero, 167 S. W. 1180.
$ 133 (Mo.App.) Though a vendor refuses to
accept a return of the article sold, that will not

defeat the purchaser's right to rescission.-Pe-
terson v. Barbero, 167 S. W. 1180.

IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT.
(C) Delivery and Acceptance of Goods.
tract, the risk of loss of goods sold goes with
$150 (Tex.Civ.App.) In the absence of con-
the title.-Alsworth v. Reppert, 167 S. W. 1098.
V. OPERATION AND EFFECT.
(D) Bona Fide Purchasers.

§ 241 (Mo.App.) A sale of railroad ties was
no protection to a bona fide buyer, if the seller
was not the owner.-P. R. Walsh Tie & Timber
Co. v. Chester, P. & S. G. R. Co., 167 S. W.
614.

VI. WARRANTIES.

267 (Mo.App.) Where there was a special
contract of warranty imposing conditions pre-
cedent, the buyer could not plead and prove a
breach of an implied warranty, and escape per-
formance of the conditions precedent.--Brooks
Tire Mach. Co. v. Wells, 167 S. W. 604.

$270 (Ark.) The seller of corn, which the
buyer had no opportunity to inspect, impliedly
warrants that it is reasonably fit for use.-
Thompson v. O. A. Crenshaw Grain Co., 167 S.
W. 699.

§ 273 (Tex.Civ.App.) A manufacturer or deal-
er who, without special warranty, sells machin-
ery impliedly warrants that the same is suitable
for the particular purpose for which it was
manufactured or bought; but there is no im-
plied warranty that it shall be equal to any
other make in design, operation, cost of opera-
tion, or the like.-A. S. Cameron Steam Pump
Works v. Lubbock Light & Ice Co., 167 S. W.
256.

$287 (Tex.Civ.App.) A warranty by a seller
of machinery that the same shall work to the
satisfaction of the buyer is a trial guaranty,
and the buyer may, unless satisfied after a rea-
sonable test, return the machinery.-A. S. Cam-
eron Steam Pump Works v. Lubbock Light &
Ice Co., 167 S. W. 256.

§ 288 (Mo.App.) Where a machine was sold
under a warranty requiring the buyers to notify
the seller within 10 days of any defect there-
in, and give an opportunity for repair or re-
placement, the buyers, having kept the machine
eight or nine months without objection, could
not defend an action for the price on the ground
that the machine did not comply with the war-
ranty.-Brooks Tire Mach. Co. v. Wells, 167 S.
W. 604.

§ 288 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a buyer under a
time, manifest his dissatisfaction, that fact is
trial guaranty does not, within a reasonable
strong evidence of satisfaction, and where, aft-
tains the machinery, he is estopped from setting
er the expiration of a reasonable time, he re-
up damages for breach of warranty.-A. S.
Cameron Steam Pump Works v. Lubbock Light
& Ice Co., 167 S. W. 256.

VII. REMEDIES OF SELLER.

(E) Actions for Price or Value.
§ 353 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition in an action
upon a contract for lumber sold, though it
showed that plaintiff had failed to deliver the
amounts in the time prescribed by the contract,
was not subject to general demurrer, where it
also showed that defendant had failed to make
the required payments, thus relieving plaintiff
of the duty to deliver.-Fink v. San Augustine
Grocery Co., 167 S. W. 35.

§ 358 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the
price of sound and healthy orange trees which
however were frozen before delivery, evidence
that the term "sound and healthy" meant,
among nursery men, such condition as was cer-
tified to by inspectors from the department of

agriculture held inadmissible.-Alsworth v. Rep- | after the institution of an action for breach of
pert, 167 S. W. 1098.

$ 364 (Mo.App.) Where defendants failed to
comply with a warranty requiring them to noti-
fy plaintiff within 10 days if the machine did
not comply with the warranty, the court erred
in charging that defendants' failure to offer to
return the machine within the time could not be
considered except to determine whether the
machine was satisfactorily doing the work war-
ranted. Brooks Tire Mach. Co. v. Wells, 167
S. W. 604.

(F) Actions for Damages.

§ 384 (Ky.) In an action for breach of a
contract of sale by the buyer, who agreed to
remove the property, the seller may recover the
cost incident to removal, in addition to the
difference between the contract price and mar-
ket value at the time of breach, or the differ-
ence between the contract price and the price
at which the seller is compelled to sell, if there
is no market value.-Louis P. Hyman & Co. v.
H. H. Snyder Co., 167 S. W. 146.

VIII. REMEDIES OF BUYER.
(A) Recovery of Price.

§398 (Mo.App.) In an action to recover back
the price of a horse on the ground that the ani-
mal was not as represented, the question whether
the horse and a vehicle were sold separately or
together held, under the evidence, for the jury.
Peterson v. Barbero, 167 S. W. 1180.

(C) Actions for Breach of Contract.

§ 404 (Ky.) Where plaintiff was induced to
purchase a traction engine by defendant's fraud,
and there was breach of the contract by defend-
ant, plaintiff could either sue for damages for
breach or seek a cancellation of the contract
and a return of the money paid.-Piersall v.
Huber Mfg. Co., 167 S. W. 144.

8416 (Ky.) Where, in an action for defend-
ant's breach of a contract for the sale of cer-
tain scrap materials, plaintiff only bid on such
material, and did not bid on all the items re-
ferred to in the circular asking for bids, nor
on the material as a whole, the court did not
err in excluding the circular when offered in
evidence.-Louis P. Hyman & Co. v. H. H.
Snyder Co., 167 S. W. 146.

8421 (Ky.) Where, in an action for breach
of contract for the sale of certain scrap, the
issue was whether plaintiff purchased all the
old iron and valves from the building being
wrecked, or only such as was suitable for scrap,
to which the evidence was confined, an instruc-
tion predicating plaintiff's right to recover on
whether defendant sold all the old iron con-
tained in the building was not misleading.-

Louis P. Hyman & Co. v. H. H. Snyder Co.,

167 S. W. 146.

8421 (Ky.) Instruction authorizing recovery
for breach of agreement to deliver goods within
a reasonable time held not to fairly submit the
issue under allegations that the goods were to
be delivered in such quantities and at such
times as the buyer might designate within six
weeks from the date of the contract.-Green-
berg v. Hyman & Oppenheim, 167 S. W. 914.
(D) Actions and Counterclaims for Breach
of Warranty.

$425 (Ark.) Where goods delivered were not
as warranted, the buyer, after acceptance and
payment of the purchase price, may bring an
action for breach of warranty.-Thompson v.
O. A. Crenshaw Grain Co., 167 S. W. 699.

§ 429 (Mo.App.) Where there is a written
warranty with conditions precedent annexed
thereto, the buyer, to make a successful de-
fense of failure of consideration, must prove
a compliance with such conditions.--Brooks
Tire Mach. Co. v. Wells, 167 S. W. 604.

$430 (Ark.) Where a buyer accepted goods

warranty, defeat recovery by tendering the buy-
er the purchase price and demanding return of
the goods.-Thompson v. O. A. Crenshaw Grain
Co., 167 S. W. 699.

§ 440 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the
agreed price of machinery sold under a written
order stating the price, evidence that the ma-
chinery in good condition was worth less than
half the price held inadmissible.-A. S. Came-
ron Steam Pump Works v. Lubbock Light &
Ice Co., 167 S. Ŵ. 256.

§ 441 (Ky.) A warranty of a pump held to
have been omitted from a written contract by
defendant's mistake and fraud or mistake on
the part of plaintiff's agent, and defendant was
not precluded thereby from proving the war-
ranty.-Miller Supply Co. v. Limestone Mining
Co., 167 S. W. 889.

Evidence held to warrant a finding that plain-
tiff's agent, as one of the terms of a contract
for the sale of a pump, agreed to accept a re-
turn thereof if it failed to comply with a war-
ranty to do the work for which it was sold.-Id.

§ 442 (Ark.) Where goods sold were not as
warranted, the buyer's measure of damages is
the difference between the value of the goods
as warranted and the value of the goods actu-
ally delivered.-Thompson v. O. A. Crenshaw
Grain Co., 167 S. W. 699.

§ 446 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in an action for
the price, defendant relied on breach of war-
ranty, a charge authorizing a verdict for the
buyer if the machinery did not possess certain
good qualities was not sufficient; but the charge
should require the jury to find that the machin-
ery was defective in the particulars alleged.-A.
S. Cameron Steam Pump Works v. Lubbock
Light & Ice Co., 167 S. W. 256.

IX. CONDITIONAL SALES.

§ 477 (Tenn.) A seller having reserved title
under a conditional sale contract held not to
have waived the right to retake the property
by subsequently taking security, personal or
collateral.-McDonald Automobile Co. v. Bick-
nell, 167 S. W. 108.

§ 479 (Tenn.) Where a reservation of title
to a chattel sold under a conditional sale was
contained in the contract, and not in the notes,
the seller's indorsement of the notes to another
did not deprive him of the right to enforce the
condition and recover the property.-McDonald
Automobile Co. v. Bicknell, 167 S. W. 108.

SATISFACTION.

See Accord and Satisfaction; Compromise and
Settlement; Payment; Release.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
See Electricity, 8 17; Mandamus, §§ 15, 115,
154, 168, 187; Taxation, § 242.

II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
(C) Government, Officers, and District
Meetings.

§ 53 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. §§ 448, 1596a,
4426a, subsec. 3, and Čiv. Code Prac. § 679, a
majority of the officers of election of a school
subdistrict may execute a certificate of returns
of election of trustee and file the same with
167 S. W. 426.
the county superintendent.-Carpenter v. Hale,

(E) District Debt, Securities, and Taxa-

tion.

§ 103 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 3219, as amended
by Acts 1906, c. 79, and section 4372, and Acts
1912, c. 137, §§ 26, 28, 29, 31, though board
of commissioners of second class city may levy
tax of only 40 cents on the $100, where the
amount certified by the board of education
would require a greater rate, it must in ad-

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