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agreement, waived such time limit.-Lester v.
V. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
(A) As to Each Other.
§189 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiffs had title to 160 acres by adverse possession, and accepted a deed to 200 acres, including the 160 See Indictment and Information, 180; New the 40 acres held not to defeat their right to acres from defendant, failure to tender back Trial, § 26; Pleading, § 599.
assert their adverse title to the 160 acres.Stewart v. Williams, 167 S. W. 761.
See Judgment, § 143.
See Evidence, § 489.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
See Adverse Possession, § 63; Appeal and Error, 8877; Brokers; Courts, § 163; Deeds; Dower, § 116; Exchange of Property; Execution; Executors and Administrators, §§ 333-388; Frauds, Statute of, 88 129-138;' Infants, § 37; Joint Adventures, § 7; Reformation of Instruments, § 28; Sales; Specific Performance; Taxation, § 730.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
§ 16 (Tex.Civ.App.) Written correspondence between vendor and purchaser held not to show a meeting of minds so as to create a contract of sale.-Connell v. Nickey, 167 S. W. 313.
§ 16 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under an agreement whereby plaintiff's intestate was to have certain land upon the happening of certain conditions, held, that his entry and making of improvements, recognized by defendant, imposed an obligation upon him to pay the purchase price and furnished a consideration which made an executed binding contract.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321.
Under a contract for an interest in land fixing a limit for the acceptance of its terms, considered either as an option, an agreement to convey, or a conditional contract of sale, held, that an entry under claim of right and title and the making of improvements acquiesced in by defendant constituted an acceptance.-Id.
When a vendor agrees to convey land upon the doing of a particular act, such as acceptance within a certain time, the relation of ven
dor and purchaser does not exist until acceptance; but, if the vendor continues his offer which is accepted and he thereafter deals with the purchaser under its terms, the contract is made, even though the acceptance is not within the time limit.-Id.
III. MODIFICATION OR RESCISSION
(B) Rescission by Vendor. $93 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a purchaser had sued to recover damages for misrepresentations affecting the value of the land, and had asked that the damages be applied on the lien notes, his failure to pay a note which became due pending the action does not entitle the vendor to rescind the contract; the jury having found the existence of fraud.-Kallison v. Poland, 167 S. W. 1104.
(C) Rescission by Purchaser.
§ 108 (Tex.Civ.App.) When a purchaser discovers fraud in connection with the sale of land, he has the election, either to ask for a rescission and the repayment of the money, or to sue for damages from the fraud.-Kallison v. Poland, 167 S. W. 1104.
$ 190 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiffs had title by limitations before receiving a deed from defendant reserving a vendor's lien, they were not estopped by the deed from asserting their adverse title, as the deed was without consideration.-Stewart v. Williams, 167 S. W. 761.
(C) Bona Fide Purchasers.
$228 (Tex.Civ.App.) A vendee who purchases land with notice that a lease exists and that his vendor is holding as a tenant under a third party is in no better attitude in respect to such lessor than his vendor.-Gosch v. Vrana, 167 S. W. 757.
§ 230 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a deed of trust was expressly made a part of a deed and the deed of trust expressly recited that plaintiffs claimed a portion of the land conveyed, the grantee in the deed was put upon notice of the claims of plaintiff as to the land.-Gosch v. Vrana, 167 S. W. 757.
of land could not claim as innocent purchasers 8231 (Tex.Civ.App.) Subsequent purchasers for value, where, at the time of the conveyance to them, there was then recorded a prior deed covering the same land, executed by their grantors.-Green v. Eddins, 167 S. W. 196.
VI. REMEDIES OF VENDOR.
(A) Lien and Recovery of Land. § 261 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a grantor had previously assigned secured notes and conveyed at the same time to the assignee the "vendor's lien rights, equities, and interest" which, as prior vendor, he then had in the land, a second grantee and assignee of the notes only took by conveyance to him the right to receive any balance of the proceeds of a sale made to satisfy the notes.-Green v. Eddins, 167 S. W.
§ 261 (Tex.Civ.App.) An ordinary transfer of a vendor's lien note to a stranger to the title of the land does not carry with it the superior title of the vendor.-Scott v. Watson, 167 S. W. 268.
§ 284 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action on a vendor's lien note or, in the alternative, for recovery of the land held to warrant a directed verdict for defendants, where the note and land were not owned by plaintiffs, but had been allotted to another joint owner with plaintiffs in a parol partition.-Scott v. Watson, 167 S. W. 268.
See Corporations, § 666; Criminal Law, § 108;
I. NATURE OR SUBJECT OF ACTION.
85 (Tex.Civ.App.) The venue of trespass to try title is in the county where the land lies.Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT. (D) Payment of Purchase Money.
II. DOMICILE OR RESIDENCE OF PARTIES. § 27 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where breach of contract was assigned to plaintiff for a valuable consideration, the assignor guaranteeing payment, the denial of defendant's plea
§ 187 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action in the nature of an action of trespass to try title, held, that defendant, by allowing plaintiff's intestate to remain on the land and improve it under a claim of right after the time fixed by their
a claim for
of privilege to be sued in the county of its residence, rather than that of the residence of plaintiff and his assignor, was not error.-McFadden, Weiss, Kyle Rice Milling Co. v. Ardis, 167 S. W. 5.
§ 32 (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant, by pleading a counterclaim and going to trial without calling his plea of privilege to the attention of the court, waived it.-Harper v. Dawson, 167 S. W. 311.
III. CHANGE OF VENUE OR PLACE OF TRIAL.
$77 (Tex.) Where a plea of privilege is in due order of pleading, the subsequent filing of a plea over against plaintiff did not effect a waiver of the plea of privilege.-Hickman v. Swain, 167 S. W. 209.
§ 11 (Tex.Cr.App.) One who goes from a point in one county to a point in another is a "traveler" within the law, which allows a traveler to carry arms; but after he arrives at his destination, secures a room, and remains there all night, he ceases to be a traveler, and, if he carries his pistol next morning while going around the town, he is guilty of unlawfully carrying it. filed-Ballard v. State, 167 S. W. 340.
See Homicide, $$ 90, 145, 173; Master and Servant, §§ 302, 304; Negligence, §§ 22, 23; Parent and Child, § 13.
§ 17 (Mo.) Substantial evidence of self-defense in a prosecution for unlawfully exhibiting a weapon, even though coming from the defendant alone, entitles him to an instruction upon that theory.-State v. Arnett, 167 S. W. 526.
In a prosecution for unlawfully exhibiting a weapon in an angry and threatening manner, testimony by the defendant, corroborated by circumstances, held sufficient to require an in§struction on the right of self-defense.-Id.
Where an irrigation company contracts with the owner of land to furnish water, it is presumed to have contracted in contemplation of Rev. St. 1911, art. 5002, and hence the owner's tenant may recover damages for injuries suffered by the company's refusal to carry out
§ 13 (Tex.Cr.App.) It is no defense to a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a pistol that the defendant armed himself for the purpose of hunting another who had had adulterous relations with his wife in order to seek an explanation from him.-Ballard v. State, 167 S. W. 340.
That another had made threats to kill the defendant under certain circumstances is no defense to a prosecution of the defendant for unlawfully carrying a pistol, where he armed himself and went into another county to seek
§ 14 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 4496, necessary self-defense is a defense against a prosecution for exhibiting a weapon in a threatening and angry manner.-State v. Arnett, 167 S. W. 526.
814 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where, at the time defendant displayed his rifle in such a way as to frighten a tenant's wife and children, the tenant had loaded his household articles preparatory to moving off the premises, but was still there, the place was properly found to have been the tenant's private residence at the time of the offense.-Ward v. State, 167 S. W. 343.
§ 17 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a pistol, evidence held to sup port a conviction.-O'Hara v. State, 167 S. W. 1113.
See Adoption, § 20; Courts, §§ 107, 198; Descent and Distribution; Estoppel, § 68; Executors and Administrators; Mortgages, § 551; Specific Performance, § 97; Tenancy in Common, § 3.
II. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. § 50 (Mo.App.) Capacity to make a will, by which is meant intelligence sufficient to understand the act he is performing, the property he possesses, the disposition he is making of it, and the persons or objects he makes his beneficiaries, may exist where ability to conduct business may be lacking.-Thomas v. English, 167 S. W. 1147.
$55 (Mo.App.) Evidence in a will contest held not sufficient to establish the testator's lack of testamentary capacity.-Thomas v. English, 167 S. W. 1147.
IV. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (C) Execution.
§ 120 (Mo.App.) Where witnesses were called to attest a will which the testator had himself written, and where he signed the will in their presence, and they signed the attestation in his presence, and the presence of each other, the will was properly attested, though no words passed between the witnesses and testator.
(F) Mistake, Undue Influence, and Fraud. § 155 (Ky.) Undue influence is any influence over testator's mind destroying his free agency and constraining him to do against his will what he otherwise would refuse to do.-Yahr v. Hynes, 167 S. W. 680.
§ 163 (Ky.) Evidence that a devisee's husband telephoned for an attorney to draw testatrix's will, without evidence that the devisee in any way superintended its preparation, the attorney having prepared it in accordance with instructions he had previously received from testatrix, held insufficient to impose on the devisee the burden of negativing undue influence.-Yahr v. Hynes, 167 S. W. 680.
§ 439 (Ark.) Such construction is to be given to a will as will carry into effect the intention of the testator, and will give force and meaning to every clause of the will.-Archer v. Palmer, 167 S. W. 99.
(B) Designation of Devisees and Legatees and Their Respective Shares.
$533 (Tenn.) Will construed, and held to vest the fee in certain real estate, left in trust for testator's children for life, in the surviving grandchildren per stirpes; the word "survivors" being used to include, not only children of testator who survived, but children of such children as died leaving children surviving them.-Lee v. Villines, 167 S. W. 1117.
(D) Description of Property.
§ 559 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a will is uncertain as to whether testator disposed only of his own property or included that which belonged to his wife, the will will be construed to simply dispose of his estate, and the wife, taking under the will, does not thereby relinquish her feesimple title to her community share.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brandenburg, 167 S. W. 170. A will whereby testator "lent" unto his wife for life all of his estate, and after her death all his property should be divided among his legal heirs, disposed only of his community interest in the estate, and the wife, electing to take under the will, did not relinquish her fee-simple title to her community share.-Id.
(E) Nature of Estates and Interests Cred.
8616 (Ark.) Where testator devised his property to his wife during life, and by a subsequent clause gave her full power to sell all the property, she was given only a life interest.-Archer v. Palmer, 167 S. W. 99.
Where a will gave to a life tenant the power to dispose of the property as she might desire, in a clause separate from that creating the life estate and the remainders, the power of dispos
al is not limited to the life estate.-Id.
Where a testator devised his property to his wife for life, with remainder over, but gave the wife absolute power to dispose of the property during her lifetime, a conveyance by her vests a fee in the purchasers and cuts off the interest of the remaindermen.-Id.
§ 506 (Mo.) Where testator bequeathed the (G) Debts of Testator and Incumbrances use of an undivided half interest in certain land to plaintiff, his son, during the life of J., with the right to purchase for a specified price on J.'s death, the price to be divided among testator's "heirs at law" in case J. died without heirs of his body, such event having happened, plaintiff was entitled to share in the distribution of such price.-Tevis v. Tevis, 167 S. W. 1003.
§ 840 (Mo.) Where plaintiffs took title to incumbered realty under a will which was filed for record, they were charged with notice of all the facts contained in their chain of title; that the property was subject to sale by exercise of power conferred in the deed of trust; and also that the purchaser might sell the land, improve or subdivide it.-Terry v. Groves, 167 S. W. 563.
thereof to the heirs of the body of testator's son J., and if he should have no heirs of his body living at his death the money to pass to testator's heirs at law, the interest of such heirs at law was contingent and not devisable prior to J.'s death.-Tevis v. Tevis. 167 S. W. 1003.
(F) Vested or Contingent Estates and In
(H) Estates in Trust and Powers.
§ 686 (Ky.) Under a devise of real property in trust for the support of the trustee's wife and children, he to have the control of the property for such purpose, and at his death the trust to end and the property to descend to his heirs per stirpes, the death of one of the trustee's sons before him terminated the son's contingent interest in the estate.-Bank of Taylorsville v. Vandyke, 167 S. W. 869.
§ 687 (Tenn.) Will construed, and held that, on the death of one of testator's children entitled to the income of certain real property left in trust, the trust ceased as to such portion, and an unlimited fee vested in the remaindermen.-Lee v. Villines, 167 S. W. 1117.
VII. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
(H) Void, Lapsed, and Forfeited Devises and Bequests, and Property and Interests Undisposed of.
§ 858 (Mo.) Provisions of a will disposing of an undivided half of real property, the use of which had been bequeathed to plaintiff during the life of J., subject to the right to purchase, and after J.'s death, remainder as to the land or purchase price to testator's heirs, held not uncertain or repugnant, but that the interest was "property specifically devised," and therefore did not pass under the residuary clause.Tevis v. Tevis, 167 S. W. 1003.
See Continuance, § 26; Criminal Law, §§ 507, 508, 598, 603; Divorce, § 184; Evidence; Trial, § 84.
(C) Testimony of Parties or Persons Interested, for or against Representatives, Survivors, or Successors in Title or Interest of Persons Deceased or Incompetent.
§ 140 (Mo.App.) On hearing exceptions to the final settlement of the administrator of a partnership estate, testimony by the administrator of transactions and conversations between himself and decedent was incompetent.In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
§ 144 (Mo.App.) Where defendant's husband, since deceased, represented her in transactions with plaintiff, out of which the cause of action grew, plaintiff was disqualified by reason of the husband's death from testifying to conversations and transactions had between them.Bone v. Friday, 167 S. W. 599.
§ 149 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the purchase price of coal furnished after the death of defendant's husband, and used in running the machinery of the hotel to which defendant succeeded upon his death, testimony by one who claimed to be defendant's agent, instead of an independent contractor, engaged to operate the hotel machinery at a fixed sum, as to
§ 634 (Mo.) Where a will bequeathed a specified interest in real property, the purchase price
conversations with defendant's husband, held | ing marriage knowledge of which they did not not inadmissible under Rev. St. 1911, art. 3690. acquire by reason of their relation.-Id. -Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828.
§ 158 (Ky.) In an action for an accounting by the surviving partner against the estate of the deceased partner, written contracts, the articles of dissolution, the books, etc., being record evidence and having no reference to any verbal statements of the deceased, were not rendered incompetent by Civ. Code Prac. § 606.Newberry's Adm'x v. Rhinehart, 167 S. W. 674.
$220 (Ark.) Failure of the plaintiff, in an action upon policy insuring her husband against accidental death, to, object to testimony by the physicians who attended the insured, which was privileged, renders the testimony competent.Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 S. W. 845.
$ 159 (Mo.) In an action by the administrator of a mother against her son, with whom she lived, for an accounting of his acts as her agent, no books having been kept, the court properly refused to permit the son to testify as to his oral accounting to her as to each item of business done.-Barnett v. Kemp, 167 S. W.
$159 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action to recover an interest in land, testimony of defendant that there was no agreement for its sale and the application of the proceeds to the obligation of plaintiff's intestate, as asserted, held based on a transaction with decedent and inadmissible.Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321.
In an action to recover an interest in land, where plaintiff relied on the possession of her intestate, testimony of defendant, that before he purchased the land in question intestate was in possession, held not objectionable as a transaction between defendant and deceased.-Id.
Testimony of defendant as to his possession held not incompetent as a transaction with deceased. Id.
$175 (Mo.App.) Where, on the hearing of exceptions to the final settlement of the administrator of a partnership estate, the exceptor introduced portions of a referee's report as bearing on a question of res judicata, the administrator was not thereby rendered competent to testify to transactions with decedent, though the report contained incompetent testimony of the administrator.-In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
The exceptor did not waive the incompetency of the administrator to testify to transactions with decedent, by introducing such report.-Id. § 178 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 3690, held that, when a deposition of the opposite party was taken by the representative of decedent, such party might cross-examine the witness and bring out matters favorable to his interest.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321. Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 3690, held that a party so called and whose deposition had been taken could not testify to matters not testified to or inquired about in the deposition.-Id.
Where a witness is called by an administrator, his disqualification to testify against decedent is waived, and his testimony elicited by deposition or otherwise is admissible.-Id.
(D) Confidential Relations and Privileged Communications.
§ 191 (Ky.) Under Civ. Code Proc. § 606, testimony of the divorced wife of plaintiff in an action against her parents for alienation of her affections, that in her presence defendant told plaintiff that he might take his farm, rent free, and live there with his wife, but that plaintiff declined, left, and never returned, held competent, not being a communication between husband and wife growing out of the marriage relation.-Hostetter v. Green, 167 S. W. 919.
Under Civ. Code Prac. § 606, providing that neither a husband nor wife shall testify during the marriage, or afterwards, as to any com munication between them during marriage, held, that the word "communication" should be given a liberal construction to embrace all knowledge upon the part of either obtained by reason of the marriage relation, but that a divorced husband or wife was a competent witness against
(A) Taking Testimony in General. $255 (Tex.Cr.App.) A school teacher who testified that she always made a correct record of the age of the children in her room as furnished by them, but that she had no independent recollection of the age of a child, could testify to the age of the child by referring to the memorandum made by her.-Sorell v. State, 167 S. W. 356.
(B) Cross-Examination and Re-examina
§ 268 (Ark.) Where engineer of train denied tiff held properly allowed to show on his crossthat there was any lurching or jerking, plainexamination that, if there was, it could only have been caused by letting off too much steam. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.
$268 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, arts. 794, 795, a wife who testifies for her husband on his trial for crime is subject to cross-examination like any other witness, except that new incriminating evidence cannot be brought out by her.-Taylor v. State, 167 S. W. 56.
$268 (Tex.Cr.App.) The cross-examination of a deputy sheriff testifying for accused is not limited to what was testified to on direct examination; but the state may ask him any question material in the case.-Martoni v. State, 167 S. W. 349.
§ 268 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in an action upon a benefit certificate, the defenses being that insured in her application falsely stated that she had never had a certain disease, defendant had introduced a physician showing that he had treated her for the disease, it was proper to permit plaintiff to show on crossexamination that she completely recovered from the disease in a few days.-Modern Brotherhood of America v. Jordan, 167 S. W. 794.
§ 270 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where a witness for the state on trial for rape testified that accused had paid a specified sum to the husband of prosecutrix and had received a fourth thereof, but there was no agreement that he should receive any part of the damages recovered by prosecutrix in a civil action, a question whether he thought he was entitled to any part of such damages was properly excluded.-Burge v. State, 167 S. W. 63.
IV. CREDIBILITY, IMPEACHMENT,
(A) In General.
§ 330 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the wife of accused testified that decedent had insulted her the night before the killing and that she then told accused thereof, the state on her crossexamination, could prove that decedent had previously insulted her, and that she had not told her husband, thereof and could ask her whether she had told a third person that she did not know why accused killed decedent.-Taylor v. State, 167 S. W. 56.
§ 330 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused, on the cross-examination of a witness, may show any fact affecting his credibility.-Burge v. State, 167 S. W. 63.
(B) Character and Conduct of Witness.
proper cross-examination to ask her if she had not been guilty of prior acts of intercourse with others, to affect her credibility as a witness.Garrard v. State, 167 S. W. 485.
§ 337 (Mo.) Under the direct provisions of Rev. St. 1909, § 6283, when the defendant becomes a witness, it is proper to prove his conviction of other crimes, but not that he has committed other crimes of which he has never been convicted.-State v. Banks, 167 S. W. 505.
§ 337 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused, who filed a plea for suspended sentence, testified in his own behalf, the state on cross-examination could ask him as to the number of times he had been arrested and confined in jail for offenses not involving moral turpitude.-Williamson v. State, 167 S. W. 360.
That accused, testifying in his own behalf, had been charged with robbing a railroad car did not affect his credibility as a witness, where it was shown that, after investigation, no indictment was returned against him.-Id.
§ 337 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where accused, charged with selling whisky, testified in his own behalf, the state could attack his general reputation and show that he had been indicted for various offenses.-Martoni v. State, 167 S. W.
§ 343 (Ky.) Where accused testifies in his own behalf, impeaching testimony as to his reputation should be confined to the reputation prior to the commission of the offense charged. -Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 167 S. W. 942.
§ 344 (Mo.) The court did not err in refusing to permit accused to testify that the prosecuting witness swore falsely against him in another prosecution, to prove that such witness was untruthful.-State v. Hyder, 167 S. W.
§ 345 (Tex.Civ.App.) It is not competent to impeach a witness by proving that he has been indicted for a felony or other crime, but the inquiry should be confined to proof of general reputation for truth.-Western Assur. Co. v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarratt Co., 167 S. W. 816.
$350 (Tex.Cr.App.) A question on cross-ex- See Damages, § 112.
amination of a state's witness as to whether he had not run away with another man's wife was properly excluded, in the absence of any showing that the witness had been indicted, or that any complaint had been filed against him.-Willis v. State, 167 S. W. 352.
§ 389 (Mo.) Where witness, who testified that he did not know defendant intended to fendant's father had tried hard to keep defendshoot deceased, denied stating that he and deant from killing deceased, testimony that he did make such statement held properly admitted.-State v. Prince, 167 S. W. 535.
(E) Contradiction and Corroboration of Witness.
8414 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for fraudulent misrepresentations, where a witness for the plaintiff testified that defendant kept a false account book as to the receipts of the property which he leased to plaintiff, testimony that others had seen and examined a similar book, which contained false entries of the amounts, was admissible to corroborate the witness.Loftus v. Sturgis, 167 S. W. 14.
(D) Inconsistent Statements by Witness. § 379 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the wife of accused testified that decedent had insulted her, and that she told accused before the killing, and
WOODS AND FORESTS.
WORDS AND PHRASES.
App.) 167 S. W. 601.
'Absconding or concealing."-Davis v. Carp (Mo.) 167 S. W. 1042. "Accidental."-Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co. (Ark.) 167 S. W. 845. "Assumed risk."-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley (Ky.) 167 S. W. 933. "Blackleg."-United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer (Ky.) 167 S. W. 891. "Burden of proof."-Ranney v. Lewis (Mo. "By virtue of office."-Putnam County v. Johnson (Mo.) 167 S. W. 1039. "Cash value."-Gulf Compress Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (Tenn.) 167 S. W. 859. "Certificate."-Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. Morten (Mo. App.) 167 S. W. 658. "Children."-Warne v. Sorge (Mo.) 167 S. W. "Citizens."-State v. Southern Sand & Material Co. (Ark.) 167 S. W. 854. "Communications."-Hostetter v. Green (Ky.) 167 S. W. 919. "Constructive trust."-Ferguson V. Robinson (Mo.) 167 S. W. 447.
"Contributory negligence."-Chesapeake & O.
Ry. Co. v. De Atley (Ky.) 167 S. W. 933; Bryning v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas (Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 826. "Deadly weapon."-Jones v. State (Tex. Cr.
App.) 167 S. W. 1110. "Deface, disfigure, or damage."-Saffell v. State
(Ark.) 167 S. W. 483. "Disability in any wise."-Commerce Trust Co. v. Ellis (Mo.) 167 S. W. 974.