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were delivered to him containing on each a written statement, disclosing by whom they were made and to whom they belonged. The cashier did testify, however, that he was not the agent of the grantor for any purpose. But the grantor went home and apportioned to each of his daughters 'the specific tracts of land wherein he had conveyed to them a life estate, and they and their husbands took possession and inclosed the tracts by fencing them off from each other and from the remaining lands of their father. For three years thereafter, each of the daughters asserted ownership of the particular tract which had been put in their possession by listing it for taxation, and, with the aid of their husbands, by cultivating it and by selling the crops and receiving the money.

[5] Their father is shown to have admitted to the assessor that the property conveyed to his daughters was correctly listed by them, and to have completely refrained from any claim of interest thereto in himself. That he notified his daughters where his deeds had been left is shown by the fact that both

It is well stated in Cannon v. Cannon, su- of them at his death applied to, and received pra: them from, the bank where they had been left. It would have been impossible, without some previous communication from their father, for the daughters to have divined that the deeds to the land, into the actual possession of which they had been placed, had been left for them with the cashier of [4] Tested by these principles of law, do the bank. The inference, therefore, is not the facts in this case show that this deed, only natural, but irresistible, that the two made by Nathaniel A. Schooler to his daugh- daughters had been told by their father that ter Mrs. Yoakum, conveying a life estate to the deeds made to them had been put in the her with the remainder to the adult children bank for safekeeping and delivery. That he of her sister, Mrs. Cowsert, was delivered to made no secret of his purpose to turn over and accepted by the life tenant actually or by the deeds, as well as the property itself, to relation when the deed was turned over to his daughters is also shown by his statements the cashier of the bank? We think there is to other persons of the reasons that actuated no escape from an affirmative answer to this his conveyance-his desire to equalize his question. The undisputed facts show that daughters with their brother, and his intenwhen the grantor in the deed decided to tion to repay his two grandchildren (born of make the conveyance, as therein expressed, the first marriage of one of his daughters) he went to the office of his attorney for that for their care, attention, and services to himpurpose, and took the husband of one of his self, and his further statement that the deeds daughters with him then, or on a subsequent "ought to have been turned over to them." visit, to receive the deeds after they had been It is also impossible to draw the conclusions prepared. It is certain that the grantor and that the two daughters were unaware of the his attorney, and inferably the accompanying nature of the estate given to them. For on husband, knew what the deeds contained, and that subject the grantor was equally open, that they were signed and acknowledged having taken one of their husbands with and securely sealed in separate envelopes, up-him at the time the deeds were prepared, or on each of which was a written statement or at the time they were directed to be prepared, description showing the fact of the convey- and one of his daughters having admitted ance and the party to whom it was made. her knowledge of the nature of the conveyWith these in his hands the grantor went to ance to her sister, as was shown by the testhe cashier of a bank, where he kept a cur- timony of the persons to whom she made the rent account, and placed the deeds in the statement. The facts and circumstances surhands of the cashier, stating at the time, rounding the transaction exclude any other what should be done with them. Unfortu- view than that the matter was fully undernately the cashier, when called to testify, stood by the grantor and the two grantees was unable to recall the directions then given of the life estate, and point unerringly to the to him; hence, as far as regards the mat- conclusion that the statement which the cashters between him and Mr. Schooler, all that ier does not recollect, made by the grantor,

land is familiar law. Miller v. McCaleb, 208 Mo. loc. cit. 578, 106 S. W. 655. But it is not essential to the delivery of a deed or its acceptance that either of these facts should be shown by express terms or by direct evidence. Either or both of them may be established by indirect or inferential evidence. Rumsey v. Otis, 133 Mo. loc. cit. 95, 34 S. W. 551; Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104 Mo. 201, 16 S. W. 497, 24 Am. St. Rep. 326; Standiford v. Standiford, 97 Mo. 233, 10 S. W. 836, 3 L. R. A. 299; Miller v. Lullman, 81 Mo. loc. cit. 316; Tobin v. Bass, 85 Mo. 654, 55 Am. Rep. 392; McNear v. Williamson, 166 Mo. loc. cit. 367, 66 S. W. 160.

[3] It is also the law that the presumption of the delivery of a deed, or its acceptance in case of voluntary settlement, is stronger than a case of bargain and sale. Rumsey v. Otis, 133 Mo. loc. cit. 95, 34 S. W. 551; Hamilton v. Armstrong, 120 Mo. 597, 25 S. W. 545; Crowder v. Searcy, 103 Mo. 97, 15 S. W. 346; Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316; Williams v. Williams, 148 Ill. loc. cit. 430, 36 N. E. 104.

"To make delivery of a deed, it is not necessary that it should be actually handed over to the grantee, or to another person for him. It may be effected by words without acts, or by both acts and words. Indeed, it may be made though the deed remains in the custody of the grantor."

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to him should be delivered to the parties, clusion is that they took the deeds with subwhose names were inscribed upon the pack- stantial knowledge of their contents, and inage as owners thereof. In view of the fact tended at the time to accept them. 16 Cyc. that these owners did apply for them and did p. 1064, par. G; Werner v. Litzsinger, 45 Mo. get them, we think there was a technical de- App. loc. cit. 108. livery to them which, under settled principles of law, related back to the time the deeds were left with the cashier, and therefore in

volved a conveyance as if the whole matter

had been done in the lifetime of the grantor. On this point it has been conclusively said by Judge Black speaking for this court:

"A deed delivered by the grantor to a third person, to be delivered to the grantee and by such third person delivered to the grantee, will constitute a good delivery, though the grantor is dead at the date of the last delivery; for the delivery takes effect by the relation as of the date when first made to the third person. In such case it should appear that the grantor parted with all dominion and control over the instrument, intending it to take effect and pass the title as a present transfer. This intention may be manifested by acts, or by words, or by both words and acts." 104 Mo. loc. cit. 209, 16 S. W. 499, 24 Am. St. Rep. 326; 2 Black. Comm. p. 307; 4 Kent, § 67, pp. 454, 456.

II. The learned counsel for appellant cite McNear v. Williamson, supra. That case is in perfect accord with the doctrine here announced. Besides, it was radically different as to the facts in judgment; for there the land was not delivered, while in this case the possession was turned over to the grantee immediately after the making of the deeds. Said the court in that case:

The judgment of the trial court is correct, and is affirmed.

Farris & Divelbiss, of Richmond, for ap

pellants. Garner, Clark & Garner, of Rich

mond, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of BOND, J., in division is adopted as the opinion of the court in banc.

GRAVES, BOND, BROWN, and FARIS, JJ., concur. LAMM, C. J., and WOODSON and WALKER, JJ., dissent.

COWSERT et al. v. SCHOOLER et al. (No. 16150.)

(Supreme Court of Missouri. May 20, 1914.) In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Ray County; Francis H. Trimble, Judge.

Action by Mary A. Cowsert and others against George W. Schooler and another. From a judg ment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Farris & Divelbiss, of Richmond, for appel lants. Garner, Clark & Garner, of Richmond, for respondents.

"It is not claimed that there was any delivery of the premises to the plaintiff on the execution of the deed, or that any was demanded then or immediately thereafter. The conduct of the parties in that respect also was inconsistent with the idea that there had been a real sale." 166 Mo. loc. cit. 369, 66 S. W. 163. [6] The learned counsel for appellants also insists that there is not sufficient proofed by him. I find it unnecessary, however, to consider the views expressed by him in the last paragraph of the opinion, for the reason that the failure of Mrs. Cowsert to offer herself as a witness has not influenced me in my conclusion.

BROWN, C. This case was tried in the circuit court with the case of Luther S. Schooler et al. v. William N. Schooler et al., 167 S. W. 444, decided by us at this term. One trial was made to answer for both cases. The facts, which are the same in each, were fairly and fully stated by Bond, J., in that case, and I can do no better than to express my approval of the result reach

The judgment is affirmed.

GRAVES, BROWN, BOND, and FARIS,
JJ., concur. LAMM, C. J., and WOODSON

of acceptance of the deeds by the life tenant.
We cannot agree with that view for reasons
heretofore stated. Besides, when the two
daughters demanded their deeds, the act of
acceptance was complete, unless that demand
was made in ignorance of the quality of the
estate conveyed in the deeds. Neither of
these daughters submittted themselves to an
examination on this point, although it was a
matter peculiarly within their knowledge.
[7] The principle is plain that when a par-
ty in a civil cause has full power to give tes-and WALKER, JJ., dissent.
timony exonerating himself from a rational
inference of inequitable action arising out of
his own conduct, and refuses to do so, then
the conclusion will be drawn that the adverse
deduction from the facts was true, and could
not have been disproved. So in this case if
the two plaintiff daughters could have truth-
fully stated that they were unaware of the
estate granted them, and that they voluntari-
ly returned the deeds when they discovered
the exact nature of the estate conveyed, then
their rights as heirs at law would have been
unaffected as to the property described in
the deeds. This was not done, and our con-

PER CURIAM. This case coming from division into banc on a dissent on rehearing, the foregoing opinion of BROWN, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.

(No. 15677.)

May 20, 1914.)

ACTIONS TO

FERGUSON v. ROBINSON.

(Supreme Court of Missouri.
1. EXECUTION (§ 256*) — SALES
SET ASIDE-GROUNDS.
Where an execution debtor was present at

the sale, in the hope that, by an arrangement
with defendant, the successful bidder, the prop-
erty could be made to yield nothing for his
creditors, and the successful bidder was there
to assist him, equity would not at the debtor's

suit set aside the sale.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 723-733; Dec. Dig. § 256.*]

2. TRUSTS (§§ 17, 18*)-EXPRESS TRUSTS-IN- [titled to but little weight, especially where the STRUMENTS IN WRITING. evidence is inconsistent.

Under the statute of uses and trusts (Rev. St. 1909, § 2868), an express trust in land cannot be created by oral contract, but must be evidenced by some writing signed by the party to be charged.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. 88 15-24; Dec. Dig. §§ 17, 18.*]

3. TRUSTS (§ 62*)—"RESULTING TRUST."

A resulting trust is one which the law implies to meet the requirement of justice that a legal status be given to what is the clear intention of the parties; but fraud is not necessarily essential to its creation.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 88; Dec. Dig. § 62.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6188-6192.]

4. TRUSTS (§ 91*)-"CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS." A constructive trust rests on the public policy which requires that the law shall not become an instrument with which to perpetrate fraud, and fraud, actual or constructive, is essential for the creation of a constructive trust which, in view of Rev. St. 1909, § 2869, will be given force and effect.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 139; Dec. Dig. § 91.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1476-1479; vol. 8, p. 7614.] 5. TRUSTS (§§ 17, 18*)-EXPRESS TRUSTS CONTRACTS TO CREATE - ENFORCEMENT IN EQUITY.

Under the statute of uses and trusts (Rev. St. 1909, § 2868) and the statute of frauds (section 2783), equity will not enforce an express trust created by parol, in the absence of any fraud prior to or contemporaneous with the creation of the trust.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. §§ 15-24; Dec. Dig. §§ 17, 18.*]

6. TRUSTS (§ 110*)-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTSEVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.

The evidence, to support a constructive trust resulting from fraud, must be clear, strong, and unequivocal, and leave no room for a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the trust.

7. TRUSTS (§ 21*) - EXPRESS TRUSTS - CREATION-SUFFICIENCY OF INSTRUMENT.

ed petition herein states: That on the "Now comes the plaintiff and for his amendday of October, 1908, he was the owner of the following described real estate in Jasper county, Missouri, to wit: The south half of the south half of section twelve (12), and the north half of the north half of section thirteen (13), township twenty-eight (28), range thirty-two (32), and two (2) acres as follows: 165 feet east and west by 528 feet north and south off of the east end of the north two-fifths (%) of the east fifty (50) acres of the north half of the northeast quarter of section eighteen (18), township twenty-eight (28), range thirty-two (32), the north half of lots sixty-five (65) and sixtysix (66) in the original town of Webb City and a tract beginning 23 feet north of the southwest corner of lot forty-five (45) in the original town of Webb City, thence running east 100 feet; thence north 100 feet; thence west 100 feet; thence south 100 feet to the place of beginning; and the undivided one-half of the north 37 feet of lots forty-five (45) and forty-six (46) in the original town of Webb City, and fifteen (15) acres in the southeast corner of the southeast quarter, and the undivided one-half of the east twenty-five (25) acres of the southeast [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. quarter of the northwest quarter of section Dig. § 160; Dec. Dig. § 110.*] twenty-nine (29), township twenty-eight (28). range thirty-two (32). That on said day said property was worth the sum of one hundred and ten thousand dollars ($110,000), and there was against it and other property owned by this plaintiff an aggregate indebtedness of forty thousand dollars ($40,000). That the other real es tate in said county belonging to this plaintiff, and not specifically described above, was of the value of forty thousand dollars ($40,000). That certain judgments have been rendered against this plaintif in the circuit court of Jasper county, Missouri, upon which executions had issued, and the real estate above described was advertised for sale by the sheriff of said county, and the amount of the executions in the hands of the said sheriff were less than two thousand dollars. That the two-acre tract above described at said time was free of mortgage and other liens except said judgment, and was of the value of three thousand dollars. That when said property was advertised for sale, and at all times mentioned in this petition, and for many years prior thereto, the plaintiff and the defendant were warm personal friends. The defendant used to be a practicing lawyer at the Jasper county bar, and during said time was the attorney for the plaintiff. That, while the defendant was so practicing law, he was elected judge of the above-named court, and subsequently elected to the Supreme Court of the state, and, after his term of office had expired, was

The court, to establish an express trust, must be able to determine, from the instrument signed by the party creating it, the existence, terms, and limits of the trust.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 29, 30; Dec. Dig. § 21.*]

8. TRUSTS (§ 107*) - CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS — EVIDENCE.

A party seeking to establish a constructive trust by oral evidence must show such a state of facts as will create a trust and define its

terms and limits.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 157; Dec. Dig. § 107.*]

9. TRUSTS (§ 110*)-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTSEVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.

Evidence held not to establish, as against a purchaser at execution sale, a constructive trust in the property sold for the benefit of the execution debtor.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 160; Dec. Dig. § 110.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 160; Dec. Dig. § 110.*]

In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jasper County; David E. Blair, Judge.

Action by Pauline Ferguson against W. M. Robinson. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This suit was instituted May 18, 1909, in the Jasper circuit court at Carthage by Charles A. Parker, who has died during the pendency of this appeal, and it has been revived in the name of Pauline Ferguson, his only heir. It was tried at the June term, and on July 31 1909, after the evidence was all in, the plaintiff, by leave of court, filed an amended petition, which, omitting the caption, is as follows:

10. TRUSTS (§ 110*)-ADMISSIONS BY TRUSTEE -WEIGHT.

Oral admissions made by a party sought to be charged as constructive trustee are en

again practicing law in Jasper county, Mis- I trust held by said J. W. Aylor, and good faith souri. That, when the plaintiff's property and fair dealing required and demanded of him above described was advertised for sale, he ap- that he prolong the day of said foreclosure, inpealed to the defendant, who was a man of stead of soliciting said foreclosure. large means, to bid in the property for him at the execution sales above mentioned, and agreed to pay the defendant therefor, in addition to the amount expended by the defendant, interest on expenditures, and, in addition thereto, a reasonable sum for the services of the defendant. "The plaintiff states that the defendant gave him to understand that he would so bid in said property under the terms above set forth.

"The plaintiff states that, previous to the making of said arrangement, he had arranged with one Grant Ashcraft, of Webb City, a man of large means, to bid at said sale on said twoacre tract, and said Grant Ashcraft was then and there ready to bid the sum of three thousand dollars, but after the defendant had given the plaintiff to understand that he would bid in said property for him, and after making the arrangement with the defendant as above set forth, this plaintiff notified the said Grant Ashcraft not to bid on said property; that he had arranged with the defendant to bid in said property for him and give him a chance to redeem the same.

"The plaintiff states that, relying upon said promise, and understanding with said defendant to so bid in said property, and believing that the defendant would bid in the same for this plaintiff, plaintiff made no further effort to have persons bid on his said property, but instructed the said Ashcraft as aforesaid not to bid on the same.

"The plaintiff states that said property was offered for sale, and, by reason of the understanding that plaintiff had thereof, the defendant bid in said property as follows: The said two-acre tract for five hundred dollars, the said land in sections 12 and 13 for five hundred dollars, and the remainder of the property offered at said sale for the sum of eighteen hundred dollars.

"The plaintiff states that the said land in sections 12 and 13 at the day of said sale was well worth one hundred dollars per acre, and the said Grant Ashcraft was then and there ready to pay the sum of fifteen thousand dollars on said property at said sale.

"The plaintiff further states that the balance of his said property was bid in by the defendant for the sum of eighteen hundred dollars, and that said property was well worth the sum of sixty thousand dollars at that date.

"The plaintiff states that the defendant, after he had bid in said property, again repeated to this plaintiff that he would hold the same for him and give him a chance to redeem said property as he had previously agreed to do. "The plaintiff further states that, after the purchase of said property, a deed was made to this defendant for the same, and afterwards, in the month of November, 1908, a part of said property with other property was again offered for sale, and this plaintiff, relying on the understanding he had with the defendant, made no effort to procure purchasers at said sale, and the defendant bid the same in at a nominal

sum.

"The plaintiff further states that, after the making of said agreement and the purchase of said property at execution sale by the defendant, and notwithstanding the arrangement made between the plaintiff and defendant, as above set forth, the defendant, for the purpose of getting the complete title to said property, and for the purpose of getting the title of this plaintiff, and in violation of his agreement before said property was bid in, went to one J. W. Aylor, who held a mortgage upon said premises, and solicited and urged the said J. W. Aylor to foreclose his deed of trust upon said property; that at said time the defendant was in no wise interested in the foreclosure of the deed of

"Plaintiff further states that, by reason of the solicitation of this defendant, said property and other property were advertised for sale under a deed of trust, and bid in by the defendant for the sum of twenty-eight thousand five hundred dollars, and the plaintiff states that at the time of said last sale he still believed that the defendant was acting in good faith for him, and did not know that the defendant at any time had solicited and procured the sale of said premises under said deed of trust.

"The plaintiff states that, had it not been for the arrangement made with the defendant, he could have procured bidders for said property, who would have paid a sum therefor exceeding fifty thousand dollars more than the entire indebtedness of this plaintiff.

"The plaintiff further states that the defendant now denies said agreement, and claims to be the absolute owner of said property, and that this plaintiff has no right, title, or interest therein.

"Wherefore the plaintiff prays the court for a judgment declaring that the defendant hold said property in trust for this plaintiff, and that the court ascertain the amount of the moneys expended by the defendant, determining the interest thereon, and fix a reasonable compensation to the defendant for his services, and then provide a time in which this plaintiff should pay the same, and, when the same is paid, that the defendant be divested of the title to said premises. Howard Gray and G. E. Booth, Attorneys for Plaintiff."

The answer states, in substance, that all the land described in the petition, except the two-acre tract in the northeast corner of section 18, township 28, of range 32, was, at the time of the execution sales mentioned in the petition, and had for a long time been, covered with deeds of trust made by plaintiff to secure indebtedness aggregating about $40,000, and was subject to tax liens and tax judgments, and judgments in favor of individual creditors, amounting, in the aggregate, to about $20,000; that he purchased all the real estate at execution sales under judgments of various creditors of plaintiff; that he also purchased the north half of lots 65 and 66 and the north 77 feet of lots 45 and 46 of the original town of Webb City, and lot 10 in Webb's Second addition to Webb City, at foreclosure sale made by Samuel McReynolds, trustee, and received a trustee's deed, paying therefor $1,392.33; also purchased a note signed by plaintiff and wife, and secured by a prior deed of trust executed by them, paying therefor $15,467.75, the amount of principal and interest due thereon; and that defendant himself held a note secured by deed of trust on the tract in sections 12 and 13, on which about $7,000 of principal and interest is due. The answer denies every other allegation of the petition not so admitted.

The answer further says that, after his purchase of the two-acre tract at the execution sale, he told plaintiff, if he would find a purchaser for it, he would give him all over the sum of $1,000 that might be realized on such sale, which he is still willing to do. To the affirmative matter in the answer, issue was taken by reply.

On the trial Mr. Frank Sharp, secretary of enough to pay off the execution and judgthe McNeal Machinery Company, testified ment under which the levy was made; but that his company had a judgment of four-when he got over there he found two unsatisteen hundred and odd dollars against Mr. fied mortgages on it. Plaintiff called Judge Parker. It was under an execution issued Robinson over to explain to Ashcraft that, if on this judgment that the sale was made at the mortgages had been paid, they were not which the defendant purchased, and that the a lien on the property; but this did not satlatter told him after the sale that he was isfy Ashcraft, and for that reason he would bidding it in for Charley (Parker). This wit- not and did not bid. The two-acre piece was ness further testified that before the sale he sold first, and bid in by defendant for $500; had tried to get the defendant to stand in the plaintiff remarking, "You fellows are robwith him to bid in the property, but could bing me in buying in my property at these not, and that he was at the sale to bid, and prices." This, he says, was said “for its efthat in each instance he made the last bid fect on outside bidders." before Mr. Robinson.

The defendant denied that he made any Mr. Aylor, the beneficiary in the deed of agreement or had any understanding with the trust under which the defendant afterward plaintiff that he would buy in the property for purchased a part of the property, said that him at the execution sale, although he told Judge Robinson asked him to close it out, him, after the sale, that he could redeem the that he wanted to get his money; that he two-acre tract on the terms mentioned in his had told defendant that, if he did push the answer, and that offer was still open. He also thing, he wanted him to take care of Mr. and stated that after the execution sale, at which Mrs. Parker; and that defendant said that he had paid $2,800 for such interest as could all he wanted was to get his money and ex-be sold under the McNeal judgment, he might penses out of it, and that Mr. and Mrs. Par- have stated and probably did, as he felt that ker might have the rest. The witness said way, that all he wanted was to be let out on that was the only thing he would do. He account of his expense already incurred and traded off his note to a man named Thomp- work done in that matter, and that Mr. Parson, in Texas, and went to Mr. McReynolds, ker might have the rest. After the sale the trustee, and it was closed out. This wit- plaintiff found a purchaser who was willing ness said he was in Kansas City at the time | to pay $3,000 for the two-acre tract, provided of the execution sale, but would have been he could get a good title, or even a warranty present to bid in the property if he had deed from defendant, who was willing to known there was no understanding; if it make a quitclaim deed or a warranty deed had not been already fixed up, he would have subject to the dower of Mrs. Parker, who was been present to bid on it. On cross-examina- separated from her husband, and he is still tion this witness said: willing to do so.

"He never said he was going to buy it in for Parker; but he said all over what was coming to him would go to Parker. All hewanted out of it was what was coming to him and expenses."

He also said that he proposed to Robinson that they stand in together and buy in the property. He also said that he had asked Mr. McReynolds to see Mr. Robinson about buying the Parker paper. He did not know whether he had consulted a lawyer about bringing this suit for Parker before he had talked with Robinson about it or not.

Mr. Parker himself testified that, when the property was first advertised for sale under the execution, he had Mr. Booth write to Judge Robinson to come down. He came, and the plaintiff saw him on the morning of that sale. He said he would bid the property in and give plaintiff a reasonable length of time in which to redeem it-to pay him his money and for his trouble and time. Had first spoken to Grant Ashcraft because Judge Robinson was so late in coming. Mr. Ashcraft showed up at the sale, and plaintiff told him there was no use to bid because of the arrangement with defendant. At the sale under the Aylor mortgage he made no effort to procure a bidder. Ashcraft was at the sale, and had made an arrangement by which he was to bid for the two-acre tract,

The other lands involved in defendant's purchase under the execution sale were incumbered with deeds of trust in which Mrs. Parker had released her dower. After the execution sale the defendant took steps to secure the foreclosure of one of these held by Mr. Aylor, in which Mr. McReynolds was trustee. Mr. Aylor proposed to Mr. Parker to stand in with him and buy the property; but they failed to come to an agreement, and when the property was advertised by the trustee to be sold March 8, 1909, the plaintiff procured Mr. G. E. Booth, who was one of his attorneys in this case in the trial court, to communicate with the defendant for the purpose of inducing him to buy at the sale for his benefit. Mr. Booth did so, and the matter proceeded until it was closed out by the following letter:

"Jefferson City, Mo., Feb. 28, 1909. "Friend Booth:. Yours of the 27th inst. con

taining notice of the sale of the old Parker property under the Aylor deed of trust eame duly to hand this morning. Thanks. I appreciate the act, as you say, that Parker is hopelessly bankrupt unless some one comes to his assistance at once; but because of that fact. I do not feel that I should offer myself as that one. And as to the request of you and Parker that I come to Webb & make arrangements to buy in the property at trustee's sale for him or buy it in my name with right in Parker to redeem whenever he gets able, that is out of the

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