Industrial Accidents.

the interdicted article, but at once to discharge him from employment if he withholds consent that it be made.

No person, through ignorance, or indifference to the danger which this Ruling seeks to guard against, or from any motive, should be allowed to imperil the lives of his fellow employes. It may be confidently believed where employers carefully and intelligently explain the said Ruling, its mandatory character, its need and purpose, and apply it reasonably, that employes very generally will gladly lend themselves voluntarily to its strict observance, and few will be found to resist it.

You are, therefore, advised that it is incumbent upon those engaged in manufacturing and handling ether in places where people are employed to comply with the foregoing Ruling of the Industrial Board to the point of discharging an employe who will not voluntarily and in good faith submit to the search thereby prescribed.

Industrial Accidents.

Industrial accidents-Agriculture-Act of July 18, 1919. Accidents occurring in agriculture are industrial accidents, within the meaning of the Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1045.

As a general proposition, an accident occurring to a person while going from his home to his place of work or while returning from his work to his home, is not within the provisions of the Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1045.

Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Clifford B. Connelley, Commissioner of Labor and Industry.

Collins, Deputy Attorney General, February 17, 1920:

This Department is in receipt of your communication of the 9th inst. asking to be advised as to the meaning and scope of the term "industrial accident," as used in the Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1045, providing for the rehabilitation of physically handicapped persons.

The general questions, as I understand from your communication, upon which you ask to be advised are as follows:

First: Whether accidents occurring in agriculture are to be deemed industrial accidents within the intent of the Act.

Second: Whether an injury occurring to a person enroute from his home to the place of employment or vice versa is within the intent of the Act, the specific cases mentioned in your communication being

(a) A young man who lost a leg while attempting to board a train at his home town while on his way to work at a town

Industrial Accidents.

a number of miles distant. The victim was a daily commuter to and from his work, but the circumstances of the accident did not entitle him to workmen's compensation benefits.

(b) A man who, after leaving his employment, on his way home, lost a leg by being run over by a train, off the premises of his employer, and under circumstances not entitling him to workmen's compensation benefits.

Paragraph (c) of Section 1 of the said Act reads as follows: "The term 'physically handicapped person' or 'persons,' wherever used in this act, shall mean any resident or residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania whose capacity to earn a living is in any way destroyed or impaired through industrial accidents occurring in the Commonwealth."

The Century Dictionary defines “industrial as, "Pertaining to industry or its results; relating to or connected with productive industry or the manufacture of commodities," and "industry" as "Productive labor; specifically, labor employed in manufacturing."

In the cases cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 4, page 3570, it is said that "The term 'industrial pursuit' is a very broad expression," and that acts permitting persons to associate themselves together in corporate bodies "for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits" were held as embracing such pursuits as the express business, mercantile business, etc.

I am of the opinion that it would be giving too narrow a construction to the term "industrial accident" to hold that it does not include accidents occurring in agriculture. While the word "industrial" may be more commonly thought of as applying to manufacturing, yet as in this Act, in view of the remedial purpose sought, it must be given a wide rather than a restricted and special meaning. Mention has been made that the Workmen's Compensation Laws do not apply to agriculture. Inasmuch, however, as that is by virtue of a specific act to that effect, it would strengthen the conclusion here reached that agriculture is within the terms of the Act here under consideration. We must presume that, if it had been the legislative intent to exclude accidents occurring in agriculture, such intendment would have been expressed. Only in consequence of an unmistakable intent should we withhold to those engaged in this great industry the benefits of this Act.

You are accordingly advised that accidents occurring in agriculture are within the purview of the Act.

Motor Vehicles.

By an "industrial accident" as this term is used in the Act, is evidently contemplated an accident occurring to one in the work of, or connected with, his employment in some industry. The test is not whether it happened to one engaged in industrial pursuits, but whether it happened to him in the operation of the industry in which he was engaged, or in the line of his work therein or in his furtherance of its activities. A passenger on a railroad train injured in a wreck of the train would not commonly be spoken of as having sustained an "industrial accident," but a trainman employed on the train and injured in the wreck would be so spoken of. We must assume that the term as used in the act was intended to have the meaning and import of its ordinary usage and understanding. Modern industry is attended with many perils to its operatives, and the plain purpose of the Act is to extend the aid provided by it to those injured in industrial operations, but its relief does not apply to all injuries regardless of wherever or however received. In view of both the humane and economic purposes of this statute, it may well be that there is no such distinction in reason between an accident occurring to one in the work of the work of the particular industry in which he is employed, and one occurring to him in any way, so as to allow the benefits of this law to apply to him in one case and withhold it in the other, but, if so, the matter is one for legislative correction.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the specific cases stated in your communication are not within the scope of the Act, and that as a general proposition an accident occurring to a person while going from his home to his place of work, or returning therefrom to his home, is not within its provisions. It may be that the special circumstances of some case might be such as to bring it within the provisions of the Act, and consequently no general rule can be safely laid down which will be applicable to every case, as each must be determined upon its own particular facts.

Motor Vehicles.

Motor vehicles-Exceeding speed limit-Act of June 30, 1919.

In proceedings against violators of the speed provisions of the Act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 678, the testimony of two witnesses is not required, except in cases in which the motor vehicle was timed on a measured stretch of highway.

Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Benjamin G. Eynon, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, State Highway Depart

ment.

Motor Vehicles.

Gawthorp, Deputy Attorney General, February 20, 1920: I have your communication of the 16th instant, asking to be advised whether, under the Act entitled "An Act relating to and regulating the use and operation of motor vehicles, etc.," approved June 30th, 1919, P. L. 678, the testimony of two witnesses is necessary to secure a conviction for the offense of driving a motor vehicle at a rate of speed exceeding that limited by Section 19 of the Act. You refer me to Section 29 of the Act, and ask whether the provisions thereof apply in every case involving the violation of the speed regulations of said Section 19.

Section 19 of the Act provides, inter alia, that "no person shall drive a motor vehicle at a rate of speed exceeding one mile in two minutes."

It further provides for a slower speed for commercial vehicles of different classes. Section 29 of the Act provides as follows:

"When the rate of speed of any motor vehicle is timed on a measured stretch of any highway for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the operator of such motor vehicle is violating the provisions of this Act, such time shall be taken by not less than two (2) persons, one of whom shall have been stationed at each end of such measured stretch and no conviction shall be had upon the unsupported evidence of one person, and no such measured stretch shall be less than one-eighth (%) of a mile in length."

The question arises whether this Section applies in all cases of violation of the speed provisions of the Act, or only in cases in which the speed of motor vehicles is timed on a measured stretch of highway. I am of opinion that it applies only in the latter case. The provisions must be interpreted in the light of its manifest purpose, which was to require that evidence of violations of the speed limit upon a stretch of highway measured off for a trap should be thoroughly reliable and accurate. Doubtless the difficulty, if not impossibility, of one witness located at one end of a measured stretch timing with accuracy the speed of a car moving over the same was apparent to the legislature. The safeguard found in this section of the Act was inserted to meet this difficulty and insure that in such cases convictions should not be secured, except upon the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom was stationed at each end of the measured stretch. But the provisions of the section do not apply where the speed is not taken over a measured stretch. The language thereof is not susceptible of such a construction. It is in the nature of an exception

Foreign Trust Companies.

to or a limitation upon the general authority conferred by the Act to punish those who violate its terms. Its effect is merely to declare that, in the specific case referred to, to wit: where speed is timed over a measured stretch, the amount of evidence ordinarily required to secure conviction shall not be sufficient. It is to be strictly construed and limited to that which is fairly within its terms.

This conclusion is consistent with settled principles of construction, and at the same time renders effective the general penal provisions of the Act as they relate to the speed at which motor vehicles may be operated on the highways. It is only in the more thickly populated districts of the Commonwealth that it is practicable to detect violators of the speed limitations of the Act by laying out a measured course and placing a person at each end thereof. The result of requiring this in every case would be that in the more remote sections of the Commonwealth motor vehicles could be operated at an unlawful speed with impunity. There would seem to be no reason why state or local officers using motorcycles or motor vehicles equipped with accurate speedometers, should not detect, make complaints against and secure convictions of violators of the law in this respect. I am clear that Section 29 does not prevent such a method of procedure.

You are advised, therefore, that in proceedings against violators of the speed provisions of this Act of Assembly, the testimony of two witnesses is not required, except in cases in which the motor vehicle was timed on a measured stretch of highway.

Foreign Trust Companies.

Foreign trust companies-Capital stock-Reports.

A trust company incorporated under the laws of another state, which maintains an office in Pennsylvania for the purpose of purchasing securities, is not required to file capital stock reports under the Act of June 1, 1889, P. L. 420.

Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Charles A. Snyder, Auditor General.

Hargest, Deputy Attorney General, March 5, 1920:

This Department is in receipt of your letter of recent date. enclosing copy of a communication from Messrs Murray, Prentice & Howland, Attorney-at-Law, in reference to the duty of the Equitable Trust Company of New York to file. stock reports with the Auditor General.