Fiat Motor Company * * the Commissioner of Highways of the Commonwealth, authorizing the carrying on or conducting of such business Upon making such application the person applying therefor shall pay to the State Highway Commissioner a fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00)." Section 10 of the Act provides that a violation of the provisions of the said ninth section shall constitute a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than three hundred dollars ($300.00), and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or to imprisonment for not less than one year or more than three years, or both, at the discretion of the Court: This Act is an exercise of police power of the State. Its regulations are reasonable, and apply uniformly to all persons, whether natural or artificial, engaged in the business undertaken to be regulated. Corporate charters and franchises are granted and accepted in subordination to the police power of the State. As against this power, which finds appropriate expression in the maxim, salus populi suprema lex, the doctrine that a corporate charter is a contract, must give way. Penna. R. R. vs. Braddock Electric Ry., 152 Pa. 116. The above mentioned corporation took its charter subject to Section 3 of Article XVI of the State Constitution of 1874, which declares that: 66* * * The exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged or so construed as to permit corporations to conduct their business in such manner as to infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general well-being of the State." Section 10 of Article XVI provides thus: "The general assembly shall have the power to alter, revoke or annul any charter of incorporation now existing and revokable at the adoption of this Constitution, or any that may hereafter be created, whenever in their opinion it may be injurious to the citizens of this Commonwealth, in such manner, however, that no injustice shall be done to the corporators." The power to annul a charter of a corporation clearly embraces the lesser power to regulate the business of such corporation. Persons and property of all kinds are subject to general restraints and burdens in order to secure the welfare and prosperity of the State at large. The interests of the few must yield to the wants of the many. Commonwealth vs Hock Mutual Beneficial Association, 10 Phila. 554. The right to subject private corporations to such new regulations as the general welfare demands is discussed in an il Fiat Motor Company luminating and convincing manner in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. page 836: "Although these charters are to be regarded as contracts, and the rights assured by them are inviolable, it does not follow that these rights are at once, by force of the charter-contract, removed from the sphere of State regulation, and that the charter implies an undertaking, on the part of the State, that in the same way in which their exercise is permissible at first, and under the regulations then existing, and those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their rights while the artificial existence continues. * * * * the rights and privileges which come into existence under it are placed upon the same footing with other legal rights and privileges of the citizen, and subject in like manner to proper rules for their due regulation, protection, and enjoyment.' It was held in People, ex rel. Larrabee, vs. Mulholland, 82 N. Y. 324, that a corporation incorporated under an Act of Assembly was subject to a municipal ordinance requiring licenses for persons engaged in peddling milk in the city. The Court, in their opinion, say that the Act of incorporation did not so much give the right or privilege to sell as it declared the purpose for which the corporation was sought, and awarded to it the right to do as a corporation that which any natural person might do without it. The mere coming together as corporators gave the persons making the association no more right as a corporate body within the bounds of the city than every one of them already had as individuals. In view of the principles and decisions referred to there can be no doubt that the Fiat Motor Company, created and formed to carry on a business already lawful and proper to be engaged in by natural persons, is as much subject to, and affected by, the aforesaid Act of 1919 as a natural person. This conclusion is in harmony with the opinion of Deputy Attorney General Collins, rendered February 2, 1916, holding that the Seaman's Boarding House Association of the City of Philadelphia, incorporated by the Act of 1865, P. L. 613, is subject to the Act of 1915, P. L. 888, regulating the business of employment agents, 19 Dauphin, page 88. You are advised, therefore, that the Fiat Motor Company is not exempted by its charter from the provisions of the said Act of 1919, and that your officers should institute proceedings against it if it continues to refuse to take out the license as provided in Section 9 of the Act. Motor Vehicles Motor vehicles-License number-Used Motor vehicles The Automobile Division of the State Highway Department can assign a maker's number or an engine number to a motor vehicle in the hands of a dealer in used motor vehicles, only when the motor vehicle is registered in the owner's name. Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Benjamin G. Eynon, Register of Motor Vehicles, State Highway Depart ment. Gawthrop, Deputy Attorney General, February 19, 1920. There was duly received your communication of the 11th instant, asking to be advised whether the Automobile Division of the State Highway Department can assign a maker's number of an engine number to a motor vehicle which is in the possession of a dealer in used motor vehicles without requiring the dealer to register the motor vehicle in his name. The answer to your inquiry involves the interpretation of Section 3 of the Act of Assembly approved June 30, 1919, P. L. 678, and Section 7 of the Act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 702. Section 3 of the former Act, entitled "An Act relating to and regulating the use and operation of motor vehicles, etc." provides, inter alia, that no motor vehicle on which the manufacturer's number has been omitted, obliterated or defaced. shall be registerable without a special permit from the State Highway Commissioner, and that before issuing a registration certificate for any such motor vehicle the Highway Commissioner shall require information as to the date of the purchase of such vehicle, and the name and address of the person from whom it was purchased, together with satisfactory evidence that the number was not removed for the purpose of concealing the identity of such vehicle. It provides further that the Commissioner shall require that a special number designated by him shall be immediately stamped thereon. Section 7 of the second Act referred to, and known as the Act regulating the sale and transfer of second-hand motor vehicles, makes it unlawful for any person to have in his possession any motor vehicle with the knowledge that any trademark, distinguishing or identification number, manufacturer's number, serial number or mark has been or is removed, defaced, destroyed or obliterated. The main purpose of this Act was to break up the business of trafficking in stolen motor vehicles, and to that end the Legislature declared an automobile from which the maker's number or identification marks had been removed to be outlawed property, and that it should not become the subject of barter Motor Vehicles and sale. This Act, however, makes no provision for remarking or renumbering the motor vehicle. The only authority for assigning a new number to a motor vehicle is found in the Act first above referred to. It will be noted that applicants for dealers' license do not ask for, and do not receive, registrations of particular cars. Their license is one permitting them to operate motor vehicles. The only method provided for remarking or renumbering a motor vehicle is that provided in the Act first referred to, which involves the registration of the vehicle and an owner's license therefor. Under these circumstances you are hereby advised that your Department may assign a maker's number or an engine number only in case application is made for the registration of the car under Section 3 of the Motor Vehicle Act first referred to above. It is only by pursuing this method that a motor vehicle from which the numbers have been obliterated can become again the subject of barter and sale. Motor Vehicles Motor Vehicles- Defaced or Destroyed Identification Numbers Act of June 30, 1919 An Officer who seizes a motor vehicle, under Section 7, of the Act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 702, must keep possession of the machine until the true owner is ascertained, in the manner provided in the Act. If he wishes to relieve himself of the care of the machine, he should store it in the nearest reliable garage and seccure a non-negotiable warehouse receipt for it under the Act of March 11, 1909, P. L. 19. Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Captain William E. Mair, Department of State Police. Swoope, Deputy Attorney General, February 28, 1920. Your letter of the 18th instant, requesting an opinion from this Department "in regard to who is the proper authority and the procedure to dispose of a motor vehicle seized by police under the provisions of Section 7, Act 284, P. L. 1919," has been referred to me. In reply would say that the Act of the 30th of June, 1919, P. L. 702, (Act No. 284, Section 7, provides as follows: "Section 7. That it shall be unlawful, and it is hereby prohibited, for any person to have in his possession any motor vehicle, or any part or parts thereof, with the knowledge that any trade-marks, distinguishing or identification number, manufacturer's number, serial number, or mark has been or is removed, defaced, destroyed, or obliterated, or so covered as to be concealed, or where such trademark, distinguishing or Motor Vehicles identification number, manufacturer's number, serial number, or mark has been or is altered or changed in any manner whatsoever. Any person having in his possession any motor vehicle, or part or parts thereof, from which such trademarks, distinguishing or identification number, manufacturer's number, serial number or mark has been so removed, defaced, destroyed or obliterated, covered, altered, or changed, shall be prima facie presumed to have knowledge thereof, and the burden of proof shall rest upon such person to show that he had no such knowledge. "It shall be the duty of every sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, or police officer, having knowledge of any motor vehicle on which the manufacturer's number or identification mark has been defaced, altered, or obliterated, to seize and take possession of the same, and to arrest the owner or cus'todian thereof, and make information against him for violation of this act, and to notify immediately the State Highway Commissioner." Under the latter provision of this Act, the officer has the right and must seize and take into his possession any motor vehicle on which the manufacturer's number or identification mark has been defaced, altered, or obliterated and make information before a Justice of the Peace against the person having the same in his possession. This procedure does not in any way divest the legal title of the true owner. "In the absence of facts tending to estop the true owner from asserting his rights, no title is acquired by one who purchases in good faith from a mere bailee, or from a thief, borrower or finder." Rapp vs Palmer, 3 Watts, 178; Hegeman vs McCall, 1 Philadelphia, 529; McMahon vs Sloan, 12 Pa. 229; Hosack vs Weaver, 1 Yeats, 470. Under these decisions, therefore, this seizure by the officer of the motor vehicle under Section 7 of the Act of June 30th, 1919, P. L. 702, in no way prevents the true owner from asserting his title to it in any legal matter. Bnt this act unfortunately does not provide any method or procedure by which the true owner of the motor vehicle can recover possession thereof. When seized by the officer under this Section of the Act, the motor vehicle is in custodia legis and is therefore not subject to be replevied. In the case of Cunningham vs Wilmerding Borough, 38 P. Superior Ct. at page 20, Judge Rice said: "The Act of April 3, 1779, 1 Sm. L. 470, provides as follows: 'That all writs of replevin granted or issued for any owner or |