been misled by villains, and that he, their King, desired only their welfare, and their country's hap piness. The prisoners, expecting to be shot before night, would first take the oath of fidelity he exacted; and, when armed and accoutred, they would then desert, and return to their armies. This made our soldiers term King Joseph "The principal administrator and organizer-general of the military depots of the Supreme Junta of Seville."

The French Generals and Marshals could, with difficulty, persuade themselves to obey a man whom they could not recognise as a Frenchman, now that he was acknowledged King of Spain. They often even tried to contradict and displease him, that they might be remanded back to Ger many. They wished, at any rate, to abandon this irregular war, which was both unpopular with the army, and deprived them of the chance of being distinguished, and obtaining higher promotion, by fighting under the eye of the Emperor. The Spanish war was impoverishing France, without kindling the military enthusiasm of the nation.

King Joseph had neither sufficient authority or military genius, nor enough of self-confidence to direct the operations, which the unforeseen changes of general affairs rendered indispensably necessary. He dared not issue any orders, without consulting his brother. The plans came all from Paris or Germany; sometimes they arrived too late, and at best they could only be imperfectly executed, by one who had no share in their formation. The French army in Spain was totally devoid of that unity of action, without which the simplest operations of war cannot prosper.

In the month of April, the corps of Marsh

Victor, to which we belonged, left for a time its cantonments on the Guadiana, between Merida and Medellin; and approached the Tagus and Alcantara, to unite with the division of Lapisse, which had proposed terms of surrender to CiudadRodrigo, but without effect. A division of the Marshal's corps crossed that river on the 14th of May, after a slight engagement with the Portuguese militia, and proceeded once more to Alcantara. The 8th was spent reconnoitering in the direction of Castel-Blanco ; but having learned that 8000 English and Portuguse were in possession of Abrantes, they conjectured that Marshal Soult's expedition against Lisbon had failed, and therefore they returned. Marshal Victor then collected together his troops in the vicinity of Truxillo, between the Guadiana and the Tagus, to secure his communications by the bridge of Almarez, to cover Madrid, and to observe the army of Cuesta. The fourth corps, commanded by General Sebastiani, had continued in La Mancha since the engagement at Ciudad-Real.

On the 20th of May, the officers and subalterns of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry-regiment in the army, received orders from the Minister of War to return to the head depots of their regiments, in order to raise additional squadrons. In consequence of this appointment, I quitted Spain, and on my arrival in France, was sent against the English on the coast of Flanders. Their expedition against the fleet and dockyards at Antwerp having failed, through the slowness and indecision of their leader, I returned to Spain at the commencement of the following year.

AFTER Marshal Soult had been obliged to leave Oporto and Portugal, the English army again passed the Douro, and returned to the towns of Thomar and Abrantes, near the Tagus, intending to march against Spanish Estremadura, by way of Coria and Placencia. The corps of Marshal Victor, occupying the country around Truxillo and Caceres, being apprehensive that the English would get behind them by the right bank of the Tagus, crossed that river in the beginning of June, and retired to Calzada, and afterwards on the 26th, to Talavera de la Reyna.

On the 20th of July, the English army commanded by General Sir A. Wellesley, formed a junction at Oropeza, with the Spanish army of General Cuesta. The number of the English was about 20,000, with from 4000 to 5000 Portuguese. General Cuesta's army amounted to 38,000. Another Spanish army, under the command of General Venegas, of 18,000 or 20,000 men, waited to co-operate with General Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, in La Mancha.

A party of Portuguese and Spaniards of the advance, commanded by the English General Wilson, passed on to Escalona by the Arenas moun

tains, arriving on the 23d, to open a communication with the Spanish army of General Venegas, which was advancing from Tembleque by Ocana, to Aranjuez and Valdemoro. Generals Wilson and Venegas, were to march upon Madrid, and endeavour to get possession of it through the aid of the inhabitants. This combined movement was intended to oblige King Joseph to concern himself solely with the safety of his capital, and to hinder him from concentrating his scattered forces. The Anglo-Spanish armies hoped soon to overcome the French, or at least to expel them from Madrid and the centre of Spain, and to force them to cross the mountains and retire to Segovia.

The armies of Generals Wellesley and Cuesta, advanced on the 22d of July to Talavera. Not far from that city, the cavalry of General Cuesta gained a slight advantage over the rear-guard of the French cavalry, which withdrew to the main body. This success inspired the Spaniards with the most confident hopes, longing to avenge their defeat at Medellin by attacking the French themselves, whom they believed to be half-defeated because they had retired. They left the English at Talavera, and unwisely advanced by El Bravo and Santa Olalla, towards Torrijos.

Marshal Victor retired behind the Guadarama, near to Toledo, and on the 25th was joined by the corps of General Sebastiani, and the troops brought from Madrid by King Joseph. The whole central French army thus united amounted to 47,000 men, and on the 26th it marched for Talavera, under the command of King Joseph.

The 2d regiment of Hussars, which formed part of the French advanced guard, almost annihilated

Villa Viciosa's regiment of dragoons, in the defile of Alcabon, near to Torrijos, and the whole army of Cuesta retired precipitately behind the Alberche. The French crossed the river in the afternoon of the following day, drove in the English picquets, and arrived by five o'clock within cannonshot of the enemy.

The Spaniards were posted in a situation deem ed impregnable, behind old walls and gardenfences, which border and encompass the city of Talavera. Their right was defended by the Tagus, and their left joined the English, near a redoubt constructed on an eminence. The ground in front of the Anglo-Spanish armies was very unequal, and intersected here and there by ravines, formed by the rains of winter. The whole extent of their position was covered by the channel of a pretty deep torrent, at that time dry. The English left, was strengthened by a conical eminence that commanded the greater part of the field of battle, and which was separated by a deep extensive valley from the Castilian chain of mountains.

This eminence was thus in a manner the key to the enemy's position, and against this decisive point of attack, an experienced general, possessed of that intuitive glance which insures success, would immediately have led the principal part of his disposable force, to obtain possession of it. He would either have taken it by assault, or have turned it by the valley. But King Joseph, when he should have acted, was seized with an unfortunate spirit of indecision and uncertainty. He attempted only half measures, he distributed his forces partially, and lost the opportunity of conquering while feeling the way for it. Marshal