XIV. literal sense, confined to a duty levied while the Chapter article is entering the country, but extends to a duty levied after it has entered the country." But at the close of the opinion, the case holding that a State statute taxing, by way of discrimination, importers who sold, by wholesale, foreign goods, was repugnant to this clause, the chief justice remarked: "It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to importations from a sister State." This casual remark, in connection with the particular holding, seems to have been misunderstood, and left open the question whether the words "imports and exports "include importations from other States. The words "imposts," "imports," and "exports," being frequently used in the Constitution, if there is a clear idea of what either word means in any particular connection in which it may be found, this furnishes a satisfactory test of its definition in other parts of the same instrument. Referring to that clause of Article I, section 8, which provides that "the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court in Woodruff v. Parham,5 said: "Is the word' impost,' here used, intended to confer upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried from one State into another? Or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the 5 (1868) 8 Wall. (U. S.) 123. Similar sumed to words pre havesimilar meaning. XIV. Chapter ninth section, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any State, for no article can be imported from one State into another which is not, at the same time, exported from the former. But if we give to the word 'imposts,' as used in the first-mentioned clause, the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word export 'the corresponding idea of something carried out of the United States, we have, in the power to lay duties on imports from abroad, and the prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power Same words and its limitations concerning imposts.' 99 In the used in Articles of Confederation. Articles of Confederation, also, it was provided that no State should lay any imposts or duties which might interfere with any stipulation in treaties entered into by the United States, and that no treaty of commerce should be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States should be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people were subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever; and " in these two articles," said the court further," the words' imports,'' exports,' and 'imposts' are used with exclusive reference to foreign trade, because they have regard only to the treatymaking power of the federation." From the necessary interpretation of these clauses, and the fact that one of the chief reasons for assembling the Constitutional Convention was the necessity of vesting in Congress the power to levy duties on foreign goods and of imposing a restraint upon the States in that respect, the word "imports" in the clause under consideration must refer to goods imported from foreign countries and not to goods imported from other States, and the word "exports " has a cor"' has a cor- Chapter XIV. relative meaning." The words refer to property, in regard to which some one is owner and is either the importer or exporter, and not to persons. The language of Article I, section 9, that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person," was relied on in People v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, to sustain a contention that the words "imports" and "exports are applicable to persons as well as property. But Mr. Justice Miller said: "There has never been any doubt that this clause had exclusive reference to persons of the African race. The two words migration' and 'importation' refer to the different conditions of this race as regards freedom and slavery. When the free black man came here he migrated; when the slave came, he was imported. The latter was property, and was imported by his owner as other property, and a duty could be imposed on him as an import. We conclude that free human beings are not imports" within the meaning of the Constitution.8 See also Austin v. Tennessee, (1900) 179 U. S. 343; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, (1898) 171 U. S. 345; Pittsburg, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, (1895) 156 U. S. 577; Coe v. Errol, (1886) 116 U. S. 517; Brown v. Houston, (1885) 114 U. S. 622. 7 (1882) 107 U. S. 59. 8 See Crandall v. Nevada, (1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35; wherein it was held that while a statute of Nevada, imposing a capitation tax upon passengers leaving the State by the means furnished by common carriers, and requiring that the carriers should pay the Chapter By reason of its close connection with the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce, and the Considered resulting restriction on the taxing power of the States, the application of this express prohibition has occasionally arisen in particular connections, where it was urged that the taxation under consideration violated both clauses.9 in other parts of this work. tax, could not be declared a violation of the commerce clause or of the clause prohibiting a State from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports, it was void as tending to embarrass the operations of the national government. Consult the index under Imports and Exports, and see especially infra, pp. 292, 309, 322, 324. THE CHAPTER XV. DUTIES OF TONNAGE. XV. As a limithe taxing tation on power. HE last clause of Article I, section 10, of the Chapter Federal Constitution, provides, in part, that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage." As to the power of Congress in this regard, Chief Justice Marshall, declaring that this is a restriction on the taxing power and not on the power to regulate commerce, said, in Gibbons v. Ogden:1 "This tax may be imposed by a State, with the consent of Congress; and it may be admitted that Congress cannot give a right to a State, in virtue of its own powers. But a duty of tonnage being part of the power of imposing taxes, its prohibition may certainly be made to depend on Congress, without affording any implication respecting a power to regulate commerce. It is true that duties may often be, and in fact often are, imposed on tonnage, with a view to the regulation of commerce; but they may be also imposed with a view to revenue; and it was, therefore, a prudent precaution to prohibit the States from exercising this power." A duty of tonnage within the meaning of the Constitution has been defined to be "a charge upon a vessel, according to its tonnage, as an instrument of commerce, for entering or leaving a port, or navigating the public waters of the country."2 Any 1 (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1. 2 Per Mr. Justice Field, in Huse v. Glover, (1886) 119 U. S. 543. What con stitutes a duty of tonnage. |