taken prisoners. Yet at the Alma all our flaming generals escaped the Minié at least, for Sir De Lacy Evans's hurt seems to have been a contusion from a stone; while two Russian generals were mortally wounded and taken we know, and several more might have been.

Sir William gives in another letter the following instance of the great distance to which one of the old muskets had been known to carry.

"Most of the old Peninsulars who were at Fuentes Onoro must have known of the immense distance at which Julian Sanchez' lieutenant was killed by a corporal of the Guards. The vapouring fellow had ridden close up to the French cavalry line, brandishing his sword and menacing their troopers, who were probably laughing at him at the time. The Duke was earnestly watching them as they were coming out of a wood; and this grotesque figure was continually passing before the field of his telescope, disturbing his vision. The distance may be guessed when with his keen eye and a telescope to boot he mistook him for a Frenchman, and in his impatience exclaimed 'Will nobody put that dancing fellow aside?' 'I will, Sir,' said a corporal of the Guards with a grave stern air, and stepping forward two paces levelled his musket in the most formal manner, and the Guerilla fell dead from his horse. It was thought at the time to be a mile; it could not be less than three-quarters."

The above opinions as to the general adoption of the Minié, or rather Enfield rifle, as the weapon of our army, have never, it must be remembered, been yet tested by actual experience. Indeed the Indian mutiny and the late China campaign furnish some instances in support of the view that it is not for general purposes superior to an improved

smooth-bore musket. These however are only a few facts on one side of the question; and the astonishing results obtained at Hythe under General Hay would seem to furnish an overwhelming mass of evidence on the other side. And yet the China troops had all had the benefit of the Hythe training.

It appears unquestionable that the general adoption of the improved rifle musket by foreign armies renders its use by our own troops an imperative necessity; no less is it certain that in its handling the British soldier will always maintain the pre-eminence. But Sir William Napier's principal objection to, or rather his lament over, its invention that the national rush with the bayonet and the close fighting in which the British excel, and by which they have won many a battle when apparently hopeless, will have less scope-is not the less founded in reason. It is a grave consideration; and the wonderful improvement which has also been effected in artillery confirms and increases what cannot but be regarded as an abstract disadvantage to ourselves. The improved artillery and small arms have introduced new features into war, which can only be fully elucidated, as Sir William Napier says, by the aggregate experience of several campaigns by manoeuvring armies; and all thinking military men look anxiously to obtain the results of such experience, before they can feel safe in dogmatising on the subject. It may however be asserted, that general strategy must assimilate itself to the principles on which Napoleon declared that war should be conducted in a mountainous country: that is to say, the task of a commander must be to occupy positions in which the enemy will be forced to attack him, rather than to attack strong positions occupied by the enemy. The new arms undoubtedly confer on the defensive an advantage it did not before possess; for what

troops, though the bravest in the world, could hope successfully to attack a position, if before they could come to close quarters they had to march over a mile of open ground, exposed to the fire of modern guns which should be protected from counter fire by earthworks?

Here follow letters and extracts from letters to General Shaw Kennedy, about this time.

To Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy.

"MY DEAR SHAW,

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Scinde House, January, 1855.

"I did not trouble you with my views at the first projection of the Crimean affair; and since then I have been so ill as nearly to give up all thought but of death, which would certainly release me from horrible sufferings, and a future worse than the past. Caldecot has just come, and tells me you have a desire for my opinion. I wrote it to my son-in-law day by day before events happened, so I may honestly say it is not formed 'après coup.' I will not give it you in detail, I am too weak, but the heads of it.

"1st.-Odessa, or Turkey in Asia, were more likely points for great operations.

"2nd. St. Petersburg was the point to send an army against, because, landing in Finland, and a great treaty made previously with Denmark and Sweden, it would have not only taken St. Petersburg, but have brought all the Russians up from the south.

"3rd.-The Crimea being chosen, our force was too small, our information defective, and the whole enterprise ill-considered.

"4th.-At Alma the French should have taken our ground, while the Russian left was held in check by the Turks and the fleet. The British should, by an oblique movement with a powerful advanced guard, have turned the position, and when their attack began the French

should have taken it up: the Russians would have gone into the sea.

"5th.-The allies should have left two divisions and the marines to keep the field of battle and help the wounded, and pursued with the rest even that night.

"6th. The march to Balaklava was bold and good, but the whole army should have been set to work to fortify it and the communications, so that a few men could defend it, before the attack of the place was formed-that is to say, unless the place could be taken by a coup-de-main.

"7th.-The moment Balaklava was safe, or even before it, 25,000 men should have followed up the retreating Russians, attacked them, and driven them towards Perekop, if they could not be dispersed by a battle.

"8th. The place was too large for investment, therefore camps should have been fortified and reinforcements sent for. Meanwhile troops should be in hand to reinforce the covering army, and fight the Russians when their reinforcements came up; but to delay! these, Eupatoria should have had a corps of all arms of 12,000 men to act on the flank of the reinforcements and delay their march.

"9th. On the 20th October I wrote The siege will prove a tough job; a storm will fail; it is an army entrenched that we shall attack. I expect to hear soon of great cavalry actions.' Lord Raglan's despatches soon after arrived using the same words as to the town, and telling of the cavalry fight. I now see nothing favourable, except the French reinforcements.

"10th.-I do not believe the Russians had 60,000, nor that they lost 15,000. And where were our other troops when 8000 were exposed for three hours, and finally 15,000, to the attacks of 40,000 Russians? for that number I believe in: the field of battle is only six miles by four!*

*Meaning the ground occupied by the allies, from which reinforcements might be drawn.

"11th.-The Russians may fail in provisions and in ammunition; if not we shall fail."

"Jan, 1855.

"I hear you have been very ill, but are getting better again. I have not written to you because my hands are always in such pain: they are going fast, and all the use I can make of them is to finish my brother's Life. Two volumes I have written, and fear there will be two more, but hope to do it in one.

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says you hold the same opinion as I do about Lord Raglan and Lord Lucan: but as is not always the most precise in his views, I will tell you what I really think.

"1st.-Lord Lucan obeyed Captain Nolan's order, not Lord Raglan's.

"2nd. He should have put Nolan in arrest for insolence, and put his whole cavalry force slowly in motion, with outguards and reserves, sending a well-mounted officer to Lord Raglan to say what he was doing, and to bring back a confirmation or rescinding of the ordertelling Lord Raglan that if he confirmed it he ought to send for more cavalry to England.

"3rd.-It is not just to condemn Lord Lucan for not communicating with the French cavalry; the order implied that his flank was safe, as the French were there: at least I would so have interpreted it."

*

"Like you, I never looked at the subject in detail, always taking for granted that it was impossible to stem favouritism: but now I think public opinion may be brought to bear on it and give it a check. To abolish it is impossible.

"Purchase" in the army.

VOL. II.

S