5. What was the nature of the intelligence sent to Lord Wellington by Abispal, which induced the former to move some of the 6th Division behind the heights of San Cristoval; that is to say, by Berioplana. The intelligence I mean was brought to Lord Wellington by Camac?

I don't recollect any such communication.

The 6th Division were ordered from the valley of the Lanz for the reasons above stated. They arrived on the ground most opportunely on the morning of the 28th.

The armies were so near each other that I saw Marshal Soult; and so distinctly as to know him by sight from that view of his person.

I don't recollect any deviation from the original route from Ostiz.

6. I cannot discover any good reason why Picton did not draw Campbell's brigade from Engui on the night of the 26th, and then with the 17,000 men

I cannot give any answer to these questions.

he could thus have had, disputed the heights of Linzoin with Soult on the 27th. I do not think he could have been forced in front, and Soult could hardly have turned him to any purpose by descending the valley of Urroz. If Picton had held his ground it is probable the 6th Division might have joined him, and perhaps that was the object of its moving into the valley of Lanz.

7. It appears to me that Soult failed in not attacking Sir L. Cole on the evening of the 26th at Linzoin before the 3rd Division joined him from Zubiri.

APPENDIX IV.

NOTES ON THE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

I BEGIN with the Channel Islands, which are more immediately connected with the defence of England, and even of London, than is generally supposed; at least Alderney is. As to Jersey and Guernsey, having made them a study for five years, I am convinced that they must fall to France whenever she chooses to annex them, because steam gives her such an expeditious force that she can throw ten or twelve thousand men into either in a few hours; and the militia, though good men and able to fight, are and must be so badly officered, that I doubt their being able to resist the sudden well-concerted attack of a superior French force, even with the aid of a British regiment. The safety of either island would

then depend on their fortresses. That of Guernsey is the weakest ; the Jersey one is strong. Either might be held for three weeks against open force if prepared beforehand, but they will not be so prepared; and the magazines in Guernsey, the bomb-proof in the fort, are very dangerous. Moreover if Jersey falls, and it is the most exposed, Guernsey must in time follow, for England can never, in a war with France begun by an attack on those islands and accompanied by a menacing demonstration against Ireland and the south coast of England, undertake such a major operation of war as the reconquest of Jersey.

This reasoning does not apply to Alderney. Its size is such that, although within eight miles of French harbours, from whence steamers can come over in an hour, it can be entirely and completely defended. A memoir on that subject, sent in to the Government by me, showed how the defence could be made good, and recommended the construction of a large steamer harbour and specific works for the security of the island. The harbour has been commenced, the works of defence have been neglected; the consequence of which will likely be that when the harbour is finished, the French will seize the island, and thank us for having made the harbour for them. Now let us examine the value of Alderney in the two suppositions of its being a French or an English island.

1st. As a French island, with the harbours finished.-Alderney is less than three miles long, I think, but certainly so little above that measure that it offers a strong position for five thousand men ; it is about a mile and a half wide at the broadest part, and there are heights which look into both the great harbours at each side of the island, where troops could land; hence, double batteries and heavy shell-guns would secure those harbours, which are, from the violence of the tides and the currents and the dangerous rocks outside, difficult to invade and not to be blockaded. There is indeed at one end of the island, called the Chanque, a sheltered rather than a quiet piece of sea, where I am told Sir Sidney Smith during the late war remained for some weeks with a frigate, but that does not prove that a blockading squadron could so remain; and if it could it would have to work up on either side against the Race one way, and the Swinge of Alderney the other, to intercept French vessels attempting the relief of the island, and could never do so effectually even with steamers; to retake Alderney therefore, if once it fell and was fortified and garrisoned, would be nearly impossible. As a French island it would with its harbour nearly intercept the Channel trade, because from Alderney, taking

in the Casket rocks, to Portland Bill, is only fifty-seven miles; and when the sun rises with an east wind vessels going up or down that narrow passage would be seen three or four hours from Alderney before they could be perceived from the English coast; hence, a French steamer would always be in readiness, and able to issue out like a spider and seize the vessel. If followed by an English one, five or six more steamers would aid, and, if opposed by a superior force, have a safe refuge, while heavy ships-of-the-line from Cherbourg could menace to cut off the English pursuers.

2nd. As an English island.—The harbour finished, and the works I recommended completed, the garrison need not be above a thousand with the island militia, because the harbours are few and easily defended, the works themselves would be strong, and the attack would only be by surprise, as great preparations would give timely warning. Now the Tourel Hill, a sugarloaf one, is so situated that if a tower one hundred or one hundred and fifty feet high were constructed on it, an observer with a good telescope could, through a break in the French hills, see into Cherbourg harbour. Hence, if eighteen or twenty steamers were always in Alderney harbours, we should have without expense a blockading squadron watching Cherbourg; the distance is only twenty-seven miles I think round Cape la Hogue, and consequently, besides the Tourel Observatory, one steamer could always be on the lookout. This would be a bridle on the Cherbourg fleet; for if it came out, the steamers of Alderney would follow in a few hours and hover on its rear, sending off expresses to the English Channel squadron as to its direction; it would then be difficult to effect a sudden landing in England of any importance without a fight between Dover and Portland; and I suppose that west of Portland would hardly serve the French, for any great operation must be designed to act against London, and certainly no widely extended movement could effect the capture of London, as it would give time for the whole strength of England to be assembled in opposition. It has generally been taken for granted that France would invade with a principal army and one or two accessories. This I do not think she will attempt; that would be a regular invasion of England, and she must confine herself to a coup-de-main against London or she will do nothing. A buccaneering warfare she may certainly undertake, but then she must confine her efforts to that; to capture London she must devote her whole strength and all her subtlety of warfare. But she may detach twenty thousand men to menace Liverpool or land in Ireland. If the last she will probably succeed, and the mode of opposing her there depending upon a

complete change of policy, which cannot be established for years, and which will not be tried, renders the question too great to be discussed here. I therefore look upon Ireland as indefensible at present, and confine myself to England. A recent work by a Swiss officer contemplates an auxiliary force landing in the Avon to take Bristol. That would be a folly. By erecting shell-gun batteries on the Holme Islands in the Severn, and mooring a hulk fitted as a floating battery between those islands and the Welsh shore, no flotilla with troops could reach the Avon, and, as there are no landing-places on the Somerset side of the Severn, the enemy must land on the right bank and march on Gloucester, where a bridge and a few works would stop him for a day or two, while the Welshmen were raised on his back. He might indeed go to Milford Haven by land or water, but the loss of that naval arsenal would not affect the general defence. The foregoing · reasoning brings the attack to the southern coast between Dover and Portland, and I leave out the chance of a Brest or a Toulon fleet proceeding against Ireland, because the attack on London must, as I have said, be made by a concentration of all the naval and military forces of France, and all the military subtlety of France combined, to have a good result. If Alderney is French, the chances and combinations will be greatly multiplied against England; if English the contrary; but I suppose a landing to be effected to the amount of eighty thousand men; how are they to be opposed?

Between Portsmouth and Portland.-It will be necessary to have a strong force to observe the former, if, as it should be, it is well fortified and garrisoned by dockyard-men, armed citizens, marines, and volunteers from the country. From any point west of Portsmouth the enemy would probably move in a direct line upon Chertsey and pass the Thames there, and it would be the most difficult operation to meet, as will be seen further on. If the French disembarked eastward of Portsmouth, as they probably would, it is unlikely they would do so very near Dover, not only as they would find at that harbour a naval force-I suppose the new harbour to be finished—but as it would oblige them to leave a detachment to watch Dover, and lengthen their march to turn the navigable part of the Medway. Having thus brought the invaders to the coast, it remains to consider how they might be opposed on the hypothesis that Portsmouth, Dover, and Chatham are in defensible condition, and garrisoned with marines, citizens, yeomanry, and volunteers, and with detachments of artillerymen ; leaving,-say forty thousand regulars in hand to protect London.

I do not think with such a force that we could oppose an invading army of eighty thousand in a pitched battle between the coast and London; for though there are strong ridges in the way, every position could be easily turned in England from the number of roads; some disaster, or at least some disorder, would happen, and a retreat which would influence the fears of the Londoners perniciously; but on the coast something might be done. For the lines of railways do now run along the coast a great way, and I would propose to add branches to run along those parts which are accessible to disembarkations, and not now within reach of the existing lines. Suppose the outward bank of those railroads reduced in height so as to form a glacis, and that the stations and other chosen points were fortified with Napoleon's coast forts, having shell-guns; ten thousand men with field artillery could be moved along the railroads to any point signalised as attacked or going to be attacked, and with the forts could offer a powerful resistance without being compromised. Let it be supposed that from fortune, or the pressure of superior numbers, the French effect their landing and march on London. How is that immense capital to be protected? Entirely to protect it is impossible, and its outskirts must be resigned to the enemy; yet the following system might effectually delay the occupation until the strength of the country could gather round the invaders, always supposing them to be only double the regular force in defence, that is to say, forty and eighty thousand; but the same system would continue good, and rather would become more sure if the relative forces are raised on both sides.

Portsmouth, Dover, and Chatham being garrisoned, and the Medway provided with armed vessels as high as the depth will admit, the enemy must turn the navigable part of that river, and certainly would never throw himself between it and the Thames, except to seize the stores at Woolwich and Deptford. Those two places cannot be secured by works, and I would therefore construct a large work in the Plaistow and East Ham levels on the opposite side, which could be easily done as they are marshes, and into that work I would pour all the spare guns and valuable stores on the first alarm. The enemy would then have no business on the side of the lower Thames, which could be secured by armed vessels from Sheerness to the Tower. He would therefore march against Southwark. To oppose him I would take the Greenland Docks as the left of the line of defence, and from thence have a rampart running behind the Surrey Canal, which, with the docks, would furnish a wet ditch as far as Walworth, three miles. From