Opinion of the Court.

nation of the tomb and accompanying seats and vases was thereby fixed, but not that of property in Wisconsin; nor can the bare appointment be held, on principle or authority, to foreclose inquiry into the fact of domicil in the courts of another sovereignty.

The technical distinction between an original and an ancillary administration is unimportant here.

Whatever the effect of the appointment, it must be as a judgment and operate by way of estoppel. Now a judgment in rem binds only the property within the control of the court which rendered it; and a judgment in personam binds only the parties to that judgment and those in privity with them. This appointment cannot be treated as a judgment in personam, and as a judgment in rem it merely determined the right to administer the property within the jurisdiction, whether considered as directly operating on the particular things seized, or the general status of assets there situated.

In this country the general rule is, "that administration may be granted in any State or Territory where unadministered personal property of a deceased person is found, or real property subject to the claim of any creditor of the deceased." 1 Woerner on Administration, (2d ed.) § 204.

As to successions, the law of Louisiana provides as follows (Code of Practice, 1899):

"Art. 929. The place of the opening of successions is fixed as follows:

"In the parish where the deceased resided, if he had a domicil or fixed place of residence in this State.

"In the parish where the deceased owned immovable property, if he had neither domicil or residence in this State, or in the parish in which it appears by the inventory, his principal effects are, . if he have effects in different parishes.

"In the parish in which the deceased has died, if he had no fixed residence, nor any immovable effects within this State, at the time of his death."

The order of appointment by the Louisiana court did not make, nor did the letters themselves recite, any finding as to Fabacher's last domicil, and as he died in the parish of

Opinion of the Court.

Orleans, and owned, as contended, immovable property, and effects, there, such a finding was wholly unnecessary to jurisdiction, and is not to be presumed.

In De Mora v. Concha, 29 Ch. Div. 268, it was held that the decree of a probate court was not conclusive in rem as to domicil, although the fact was found therein, because it did not appear that the decree was necessarily based on that finding; and it was doubted whether the findings on which judgments in rem are based are in all cases conclusive against the world. The decision was affirmed in the House of Lords. 11 App. Cas. 541. The case is a leading and instructive one, was ably argued, and has been repeatedly followed since the judgment was pronounced.

In Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, conclusive effect to judgments in probate proceedings in respect of their grounds was denied altogether.

Again, it is thoroughly settled that the constitutional provision that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of other States, does not preclude inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judg ment is rendered, over the subject-matter, or the parties affected by it, or into the facts necessary to give such jurisdiction. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107; Grover and Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254; Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555.

The point before us is a narrow one, but in any aspect in which it may be considered we are unable to assent to the view that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was bound to treat the proceeding in Louisiana as conclusively determining the question of domicil; and unless it was so bound its decision deprived plaintiff in error of no right secured to her by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Judgment affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

BENEDICT v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 485. Argued January 15, 1900.- Decided February 26, 1900.

Extra compensation received by a District Judge for holding court outside of his own district is no part of his official salary, or recoverable as such under the provisions of the retiring act.

THIS was a petition by the late District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, for his retiring salary, under Rev. Stat. § 714, at the rate of $6800 per annum, which the petition avers was the salary which was by law payable to him during the year previous to his resignation. The petitioner acknowledges the payment of $5000 and claims a residue of $1800, to which he avers himself to be justly entitled.

Upon hearing the case and upon the consent of parties, the Court of Claims found the following facts:

"First. The petitioner, Charles L. Benedict, is a citizen of the United States, of lawful age, and resides at Dongan Hills, Staten Island, in the city of New York, and State of New York.

"Second. In the month of April, 1865, the petitioner was duly appointed by the President of the United States Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.

"Third. The petitioner duly entered on the duties of his office, and duly performed the same until the year 1897, during which, and on or about the 20th of July, 1897, he resigned his office, having then held his commission as judge of said court for more than ten years, and having attained the age of 70 and upward.

"Fourth. Since the passage of the act of February 7, 1873, the petitioner has held, under the provisions of that act and the Revised Statutes, to wit, sections 613 and 658 of the Revised Statutes, the six terms of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, referred

Opinion of the Court.

to in said statutes, in every year, and has received for holding each of said terms the sum of $300; the same being paid to him by the United States marshal for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to sections 613 and 597, Revised Statutes. "Fifth. That the same was paid upon a voucher in substance as follows:

(Omitted.)

"The total amount thus paid annually to the plaintiff was $1800.

"Sixth. That such payments to the petitioner by the marshal were from time to time allowed in the marshal's accounts and paid to him out of the appropriations for defraying the expenses of the courts of the United States.

"Seventh. During the year previous to the petitioner's resignation he received the said $1800 for that year, in accordance with the provisions of sections 613, 597 and 658, Revised Statutes, as above set forth, and also the salary of $5000, payable to him, as provided by the act of Congress of February 24, 1891, 26 Stat. 783, out of the appropriation to pay the salaries of District Judges of the United States.

"Eighth. During the year since his resignation petitioner has only received as salary the sum of $5000, which sum has been received by him without prejudice to the claim which he makes in this proceeding.

"Ninth. The petitioner presented to the auditor of the State and other departments a bill for the amount of his salary claimed by him herein to be remaining due and unpaid, and made claim on the auditor for the payment of said bill, but the auditor refused to audit or approve the said bill, and no part of the said $1800 has been paid to him."

The petition was dismissed, (34 C. Cl. 388,) and petitioner appealed to this court.

Mr. Robert D. Benedict for appellant.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Opinion of the Court.

By Revised Statutes, sec. 714, "when any judge of any court of the United States resigns his office, after having held his commission as such at least ten years, and having attained the age of seventy years, he shall, during the residue of his natural life, receive the same salary which was by law payable to him at the time of his resignation."

In April, 1865, petitioner was appointed by the President, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, and served as such until July 20, 1897, when he resigned his office, having then held his commission for over thirty years, and attained the age of seventy years and upwards. The salary of all District Judges was fixed by the act of February 24, 1891, c. 287, 26 Stat. 783, at the rate of $5000 per annum. There is no question made but that petitioner was entitled to this amount, and that it has been paid him.

The controversy arises over the proper construction of the. act of February 7, 1873, reproduced in Rev. Stat. §§ 658 and 613. By section 658 it is enacted that "the regular terms of the Circuit Courts shall be held in each year, at the times and places following: in the Southern District of New York, at the city of New York, exclusively for the trial and disposal of criminal cases, and matters arising and pending in said court, on the second Wednesday in January, March and May, on the third Wednesday in June, and on the second Wednesday in October and December;" and by section 613 it is provided that "the terms of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, appointed exclusively for the trial and disposal of criminal business, may be held by the Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial Court (Circuit) and the District Judges for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, or any one of said three judges; and at every such term held by said judge of said Eastern District he shall receive the sum of three hundred dollars, the same to be paid in the manner now prescribed by law for the payment of the expenses of another District Judge while holding court in said district." The facts are that, after the passage of this act of February 7, 1873, petitioner held each year the six terms of the District