This case and Western National Bank v. Armstrong, 152 U. S. 346, distin-
guished. Aldrich v. Chemical National Bunk, 618.
Under the act of July 5, 1884, c. 220, 23 Stat. 115, construed in connection
with the treaty with China of November 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, the
wives and minor children of Chinese merchants domiciled in this
country may enter the United States without certificates. United
States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 459.
The statute of Washington Territory of November 14, 1879, providing
that one-half of the community property of husband and wife should
be subject to the testamentary disposition of the husband or wife,
subject respectively to the community debts, and, in default of such
testamentary disposition that the share of deceased husband or wife
should descend to his or her issue, or, if there was no such issue, should
pass to the survivor, does no violation to the Constitution of the United
States when applied to such community property held under the stat-
ute of that Territory of November 14, 1873, which provided that prop-
erty acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, except such
as might be acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, should be
common property, of which the husband should have the entire man-
agement and control, with the like absolute power of disposition as of
his own separate estate. Warburton v. White, 484.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The bill of complaint on the part of Louisiana against Texas, alleged that
the State of Texas had granted to its Governor and its health officer
extensive powers over the establishment and maintenance of quaran-
tines over infectious or contagious diseases; that this power had been
exercised in a way and with a purpose to build up and benefit the
commerce of cities in Texas which were rivals of New Orleans; and
it prayed for a decree that "neither the State of Texas, nor her Gov-
ernor, nor her health officer, have the right, under the cover of an
exercise of police or quarantine powers, to declare and enforce against
interstate commerce, between the State of Louisiana, or any part
thereof, and the State of Texas, an absolute embargo, prohibiting the
movement and conduct of said commerce, or to make, declare and
enforce against places infected with yellow fever or other infectious
diseases in the State of Louisiana discriminative quarantine rules or
regulations, affecting interstate commerce between the State of Louisi-
ana, or any part thereof, and the State of Texas, different from and
more burdensome than the quarantine rules and regulations affecting
interstate or foreign commerce between the State of Texas and other
States and countries infected with yellow fever and other infectious
diseases;" and the bill asked for an injunction, restraining the Texas
officials from enforcing the Texas laws in the manner in which they
were enforced. Held: (1) That in order to maintain jurisdiction of
the bill it must appear that the controversy to be determined was a
controversy arising directly between the State of Louisiana and the
State of Texas, and not a controversy in vindication of the grievances
of particular individuals; (2) that the gravamen of this bill was not
a special and peculiar injury, such as would sustain an action by a
private person, but that the State of Louisiana presented herself in
the attitude of parens patriæ, trustee, guardian or representative of all
her citizens; (3) that the bill does not set up facts which show that
the State of Texas has so authorized or confirmed the alleged action
of her health officer as to make it her own, or from which it necessarily
follows that the two States are in controversy within the meaning of
the Constitution; (4) that the court was unable to hold that the bill
could be maintained as presenting a case of controversy between a
State and citizens of another State; (5) that the bill could not be main-
tained as against the health officer alone, on the theory that his conduct
was in violation of or in excess of a valid law of the State. MR. Justice
WHITE Concurred in the result, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the
result, but dissented from some of the propositions contained in the opin-
ion of the court: as did also MR. JUSTICE BROWN. Louisiana v. Texas, 1.
2. The decision in Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, referred to; and it is
held that the judgment now under review was not in conformity with
the opinion and mandate in that case the court adjudging, as it had
adjudged in the previous case, that when the general property and
assets of a private corporation, lawfully doing business in a State, are
in the course of administration by the courts of such State, creditors
who are citizens of other States are entitled, under the Constitution
of the United States, to stand in all respects upon the same plane with
creditors of like class who are citizens of such State, and cannot be
denied equality of right simply because they do not reside in that
State, but are citizens residing in other States of the Union. Blake
v. McClung, 59.
3. A law of Nebraska permitting the prosecution of felonies by informa-
tion is not in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
Bolln v. Nebraska, 83.
4. Whatever be the limitations upon the power of a territorial govern-
ment, it becomes entitled, upon the admission of such Territory as a
State, to all the rights of dominion and sovereignty belonging to the
original States, and stands upon an equal footing with them in all
respects. Ib.
5. An objection that a defendant was denied due process of law in being
refused a jury trial upon a plea in abatement, cannot be raised here,
when no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was set up until
after the cause had been decided by the Supreme Court of the
State. Ib.
6. The provision in section 1 of chapter 74 of the Laws of Kansas of 1891,
authorizing certain first-class cities to take in described tracts of land
in territory adjoining or touching the city limits and make them a
part of the city by ordinance, and providing that "nothing in this act
shall be taken or held to apply to any tract or tracts of land used for
agricultural purposes, when the same is not owned by any railroad or
other corporation" does not conflict with the provisions of the Con-
stitution of the United States, when exercised by such a city to take in
lands belonging to a railroad company which are not used for agricul-
tural purposes, but are occupied by the company for railroad purposes.
Clark v. Kansas City, 114.
7. The power of Congress to pass laws for the navigation of public rivers,
and to prevent any and all obstructions therein, cannot be questioned.
United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 211.
8. When the Attorney General acts under the authority conferred by the
river and harbor act of September 19, 1890, c. 907, he has the right to
call upon
the court, upon proper proofs being made, to enjoin the con-
tinuance of any obstruction not authorized by statute, and the court
has jurisdiction, and it is its duty to decide whether the existing
obstruction is or is not affirmatively authorized by law. Ib.
9. In such inquiry the court is bound to decide whether the boom, as
existing is authorized by any law of the State, when such law is
claimed to be a justification for its creation or continuance. Ib.
10. There is no doubt that the boom in question in this case violates the
statute under which it was built, because it does not allow free passage
between the boom and the opposite shore for boats or vessels as pro-
vided for in the state law Ib.
11. The constitutional provision that full faith and credit shall be given
in each State to the judicial proceedings in other States, does not pre-
clude inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, in which the judgment
is rendered, over the subject-matter or the parties affected by it, or
into the facts necessary to give such jurisdiction. Thormann v.
Frame, 350.
12. The provision in the statute of Minnesota for 1893, c. 151, authorizing the
Governor of the State when it is made to appear that there has been a
gross undervaluation of taxable property by the assessors for any county
in the State, to appoint a board to revalue and reassess it, which board
shall, after due examination prepare a list of all such undervalued
property, of the year or years in which it was so underassessed, the
amount of the assessment and the actual and true value thereof for
which it should have been so assessed, does no violation to the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and does
not deprive the owner of lands, so reassessed at an advanced value,
of his lands without due process of law. Weyerhaueser v. Minne-
13. The liability imposed upon stockholders in corporations by the pro-
vision in the constitution of the State of Kansas that "dues from
corporations shall be secured by individual liability of the stockholders
to an additional amount equal to the stock owned by each stock-
holder, and such other means as shall be provided by law; but such
individual liabilities shall not apply to railroad corporations, nor cor-
porations for religious or charitable purposes" and by the statutes of
that State which are referred to in the opinion of the court in this
case, though statutory in origin, is contractual in its nature; and an
action on this liability, not being one to enforce a penal statute of
Kansas, but only to secure a private remedy, can be maintained in any
court of competent jurisdiction, whether Federal or state.
v. Oxford National Bank, 559.
14. The decision in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, that the words
"due process of law" in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States do not necessarily require an indictment by
a grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder, has been often
affirmed, and is now reaffirmed and applied to this case. Maxwell v.
Dow, 581.
15. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States do not
necessarily include all the rights protected by the first eight amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution against the powers of the Federal
Government.
16. The trial of a person accused as a criminal by a jury of only eight
persons instead of twelve, and his subsequent imprisonment after
conviction do not abridge his privileges and immunities under the
Constitution as a citizen of the United States and do not deprive him
of his liberty without due process of law. Ib.
17. Whether a trial in criminal cases not capital shall be by a jury com-
posed of eight instead of twelve jurors, and whether, in case of an
infamous crime, a person shall be only liable to be tried after present-
ment or indictment by a grand jury, are proper to be determined by
the citizens of each State for themselves, and do not come within the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution so long as all persons
within the jurisdiction of the State are made liable to be proceeded
against by the same kind of procedure, and to have the same kind of
trial, and the equal protection of the laws is secured to them. Ib.
18. A plaintiff, after the recovery of a judgment against a Kansas corpo-
ration in the courts of Kansas, and the return of an execution unsatis-
fied, can maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction
against a stockholder of the corporation to recover in satisfaction of
his judgment an amount not exceeding the par value of the defend-
ant's stock. Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, ante, 559, followed to
this point. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 640.
19. The action of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in failing to recog-
nize such right in the plaintiff in error can be revised by proceeding
in error in this court.
20. The judgment rendered in the Kansas court is in that State conclusive
against the corporation, as well as binding upon the stockholder, and,
under the Constitution and laws of the United States when attempted
to be enforced in their courts. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3, 14, 15, 16, 17.
1. The seizure of importations of teas purchased after the approval of the
act of March 2, 1897, c. 358, entitled "An act to prevent the importa-
tion of impure and unwholesome tea," and the establishment of regu-
lations and standards thereunder, publicly promulgated and known to
complainants, because falling below the standards prescribed, could
inflict no other injury than what it must be assumed was anticipated,
and the interposition of a court of equity cannot properly be invoked,
under such circumstances, to determine in advance whether complain-
ants, if they imported teas of that character, could escape the conse-
|