demurrer as irregular and defective. There- | Pleading. upon, defendant filed a rejoinder to the repli- cation, and the cause went to trial. Held, on the causes of action set up in the plea, as well A replication to a plea of set-off that review, that it was unnecessary to determine as those in the declaration, had been sub- whether the order striking out the demurrer mitted to arbitration, and an award thereon was erroneous or not, since the real questions delivered to the parties, is bad, in that it does in controversy between the parties were actu- not disclose the nature of the award nor in ally put at issue and determined, and the or- whose favor it was made.-Heath v. Doyle, (R. der, if erroneous, did no injury.-Monmouth I.) 27 A. 333. Park Ass'n v. Warren, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27
22. In an action on a contract which re- Argument of Counsel. quired the work to be done to the satisfaction See "Criminal Law," 7; "Trial," 5-7. and acceptance of defendant, the cause was tried on the theory that actual acceptance must be proved. The court found acceptance by defendant's engineer, and held that, by a true construction of the contract, his accept- ance was that of defendant. Held that, if there was error in the ruling, it would not jus- tify reversal, since there was sufficient evi- dence to justify a finding by the court of an actual acceptance by defendant, by implica- tion, from the acts of its officers and agents other than the engineer.-Monmouth Park Ass'n v. Warren, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 932.
23. The failure of the court in a condemna- tion proceeding, through mere inadvertence, to instruct the jury that the burden of proving damages is upon the landowners, is harmless error, where the whole course of the trial and the tenor of the whole charge is to the effect that only damages proved can be allowed.- Camden & Rockland Water Co. v. Ingraham, 27 A. 94, 85 Me. 179.
24. Where the record on appeal contains no bill of exceptions, and the only assignment of error is as to the language of the court, and the statement as to the language in appellant's paper book is denied by appellee, the judgment will be affirmed.-Harris v. Schuylkill River E. S. R. R., 27 A. 297, 156 Pa. St. 252. Awarding damages for vexatious ap- peal.
25. In an action by a minor by her next friend, pending appeal by defendants from a judgment in favor of the minor, defendants settled the same with the next friend for a discount, without the leave of the court. No paper books were filed. Held, that the appeal would be non-pros'd, with attorney's fees, and 6 per cent. damages for frivolous appeal. O'Donnell v. Broad, 27 A. 305, 149 Pa. St. 24.
APPEARANCE.
Effect as waiver of objections.
In proceedings in the orphans' court by an heir to compel the administrator to ac- count, the administrator answered that the mon- eys of the estate had been received by his attor- ney. Held that, though the attorney was not made a party to the proceedings before the orphans' court, yet, having funds of the estate in his pos- session, his appearance, both personally and by counsel, conferred on the orphans' court juris- diction over his person. Mitchell and Thomp- son, JJ., dissenting.-In re Watts' Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 861.
1. In an ex parte affidavit made for the purpose of holding a defendant to bail, state- ments to which the affiant could not lawfully testify in open court are not competent evi- dence of fraud.—Truax v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 1063.
2. Under Laws, vol. 15, c. 180, authorizing dum in a civil action on affidavit by plaintif the issuance of a writ of capias ad responden that defendant has absconded or is about to abscond "from the place of his usual abode." his place of abode" is insufficient.—Thomas v. an affidavit that he is about to abscond "from Colvin, (Del. Super.) 27 A. 829.
the issuance of a writ of capias ad responden 3. Under Laws, vol. 15, c. 180, authorizing dum in a civil action on affidavit by plaintiff that defendant has secreted, conveyed away, assigned, settled, or disposed of property with intent to defraud his creditors, an affidavit that defendant procured property by fraud is not suf- ficient.-Thomas v. Colvin, (Del. Super.) 27 A.
Of errors, see "Appeal," S. Of insurance policy, see "Insurance," 2. What constitutes.
1. A member of a firm, who was indorser on the note of S., indorsed other paper of hers in consideration of her agreement that an ac count of hers against the firm should be off- set to the amount of the note, by the note which he undertook that the firm should pay Held, that this amounted to an assignment of so much of her account to the member of the firm, and, the note having been paid when dae, though after her death, the firm was entitled to credit for the amount thereof against her estate. In re Spotts' Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 132; Appeal of Beetem, Id. Equitable assignment.
2. Where a person in writing acknowledges himself indebted to another, and binds himself to pay the debt with the money from an inherit-
ance to be collected by an attorney, and depos- its the instrument with the attorney, with or- ders to pay the debt from the money when col- lected, this, though not a legal assignment, is an equitable one.-Moeser v. Schneider, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1088.
and succeeds therein, it is proper to bring in the assignee as a party before making a final decree as to distribution of such newly-discov- ered assets.-Hamlin v. Bennett, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 651. Associations.
Action in assignor's name - Authority. 3. Testimony of C. that he bought all the See "Benevolent Societies." accounts and claims of all kinds of T. & L., a partnership, with right to use their names in the collection of the same, that his dealings
were with T., and that a claim against a rail- road for discrimination in freight rates was mentioned as among the claims sold, with tes- timony of L. that he did not know of the pend- ency of an action on such claim brought by C. in the name of T. & L., and, so far as he knew, T. did not employ or authorize the at- torney to bring the action, together with his answer, to the question whether he had any- thing to do with the action except as a wit- ness, that he did not know; the question was a broad one: he had already said he did not bring the action, but he sold certain rights to C..-shows a right in C. to bring the action in the name of T. & L.-Tucker v. Providence & W. R. Co., (R. I.) 27 A. 448.
Action by assignee-On part of claim.
4. Section 19 of the practice act, as amend- ed by Act March 4, 1890, making bills, con- tracts, and choses in action assignable at law, and authorizing the assignee to sue in his own name, does not make a part of a contract as- signable, so that the assignee of such part may sue in his own name, without the consent of the party who might be subjected to two suits.- Otis v. Adams, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 1092.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
See, also, "Fraudulent Conveyances;" "Insol-
Basis for computing dividends, see "Factors and Brokers," 2.
What passes to assignee.
Recovery of money paid for liquor, see “Intox-
Remedy by covenant or assumpsit, see "Ac- Ultra vires contract, recovery on quantum mer- uit, see "Corporations," 9. When lies.
1. A corporation which makes a proposition to its creditors for the selection by them of a committee to supervise its business is liable to the members of the committee for the services rendered by them.-Dallas v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1055.
2. Where property placed in defendants' custody, under a contract by which they are to make repairs thereon, is destroyed by their negligence, assumpsit may be properly brought by the owner to recover the value thereof.— Zell v. Dunkle, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 38.
3. A contract provided for delivery of 25 machines by plaintiff between certain dates, and settlement therefor by defendant at a later date by cash, indorsed notes, or his own note. Plaintiff performed his part, but there was no settlement. Held, that plaintiff had an action in assumpsit on the special contract, but none for goods sold and delivered.-Thomas Manuf'g Co. v. Watson, 27 A. 176, 85 Me. 300.
sold to defendant's testator has introduced his 4. Where plaintiff in assumpsit for goods books of account in evidence under the general issue, defendants may show that the items of the account were charged on a consideration previously executed by decedent, and not for him.-Cargill v. Atwood, (R. I.) 27 A. 214. the purpose of creating an indebtedness against
1. An assignment for benefit of creditors, of the goods, chattels, and property of the as- signor, does not pass to the assignee a claim of the assignor against a decedent's estate for commissions as executor.-In re Mulligan's Es- tate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 398; Appeal of Cattell, See "Master and Servant," 27, 28.
Id. Consent of creditors to assignment.
2. An instrument under seal, by an in- solvent debtor, purporting to convey and assign all his property to the grantee in trust for, and as agent of, all creditors whose names are signed thereto as accepting the property, is, in the absence of fraud, an ordinary sale and con- veyance for valuable consideration, and not an assignment, and is valid as against subsequent
process of creditors who refuse to accept its provisions. Kenefick v. Perry, 61 N. H. 362, followed.-Hosmer v. Farley, (N. H.) 27 A. 22.3. Proceedings by creditors to discover property.
See, also, "Execution;" "Exemptions;" "Gar- nishment." Failure to comply with statute, good as com- mon-law bond, see "Bonds," 3. Lien of chattel mortgage against, see "Chattel Mortgages," 2.
Bond for release of property.
1. A bond given to procure the release of goods taken under attachment, conditioned as attachment, and takes its place as a security, provided by Pub. St. c. 207, § 16, dissolves the and therefore the liability of the obligors does 3. One whose debtor has made an assign- not depend on the attachment, and the execu- ment for the benefit of creditors may, after tion by the attachment debtor of an assignment neglect on the part of the assignee for 11 years for the benefit of creditors will not release the to take proceedings to discover property be obligors, under Pub. St. c. 237, § 12, providing longing to the debtor, and having established that an assignment shall dissolve attachments his claim by judgment, institute such proceed-pending_against the assignor.-Easton v. Orms- ings himself.-Hamlin v. Bennett, (N. J. Ch.) by, (R. I.) 27 A. 216. 27 A. 651.
4. The fact that the creditor filed his claim with the assignee does not prevent him from instituting such proceeding.-Hamlin v. Bennett, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 651.
Making assignee party.
5. Where a creditor of one who has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors in- stitutes proceedings for the discovery of assets
2. Plaintiff in attachment does not, by ac- cepting a dividend from the assignee for the benefit of creditors of defendant in attachment, lose his recourse against a bond given for the release of the goods attached.-Easton v. Orms- by, (R. I.) 27 A. 216. Lien.
3. Rev. St. c. 81, § 59, declares that no attachment of real estate or mesne process
creates any lien thereon, unless the nature and amount of plaintiff's demand is set forth in proper counts, or a specification thereof is an- nexed. Held, that a deed made by the attach- ment debtor after service of a writ defective as containing only a general money count, and duly recorded, was good against the creditor's subsequent levy of final process on the same land.-Everett v. Carleton, 27 A. 265, 85 Me. 397; Gilman v. Same, Id.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Arguments of counsel, see "Criminal Law," 7. Authority of attorney.
A plaintiff is bound by directions as to the service of the writ given by his attorney to the officer to whom the writ is delivered for service.-Morgan v. Joyce, (N. H.) 27 A. 225.
See "Arbitration and Award."
In criminal cases-Power of bail com- missioner.
1. Rev. St. c. 99, §§ 34-36, requires the su- preme judicial court to appoint in each county, from the number of the justices of the peace and of the quorum, one or more bail commis- sioners, who may admit to bail persons in jail for a bailable offense, or for failure to find sureties, and exercise the same power as a jus- tice of the supreme or superior court; and any person under arrest for a bailable offense may, before commitment, on request, appear before such commissioner, who may inquire into the case, and admit him to bail. Held, that during a term of the supreme judicial court in any county, a bail commissioner cannot admit to bail any person confined in jail or under arrest on a precept returnable to said term.-In re Bail Commissioners, (Me.) 27 A. 455.
2. When one is confined in jail for a bail- able offense, or for not finding sureties on re- cognizance, and his bail has been fixed by a justice of the supreme judicial court, a bail com- missioner cannot change the amount of such bail.-In re Bail Commissioners, (Me.) 27 A.
See, also, "Banks and Banking;" "Carriers;" "Chattel Mortgages;" "Pledge;" "Ware- housemen."
Negligence of bailee-Loss by fire.
In assumpsit for the value of a boiter left by plaintiff with defendants, and which, while in their custody, was destroyed, with their shop, by an incendiary fire, it appeared that the boiler was stored in a building used for storing engines and boilers belonging to defendants, and that it was cared for in the same way as de- fendants cared for their own boilers. No watch- man was employed at the building at night, when the fire occurred; but there was no evi- dence that ordinary care required the employ- ment of such watchman, or that he was usually employed at such shops. Held, that a nonsuit was properly entered.-Zell v. Dunkle, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 38.
1. In an action against a bank to recover a deposit, the court properly charged that, if the money was really plaintiff's, the fact that it was deposited by plaintiff's brother in plain- tiff's name, and so entered on the books of the bank and in the pass book, warranted no im- plication of authority in the brother to check it out, but that if, at the brother's suggestion, the account was opened in plaintiff's name only as another form of identifying the brother's deposit of his own money, then the payment on the brother's check protected the bank, and plaintiff could not recover. Fletcher v. Safe- Deposit Co.. 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 503, followed. -Kerr v. People's Bank, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 963. 2. Where the bank knew that the money deposited belonged to plaintiff, the brother had no right, because he carried it to the bank, to check it out without authority from plaintiff, nd the mere declaration of the brother to the bank that he had such authority was of no weight. Mitchell, Green, and Thompson, J.J., concur in the statement of law. but dissent to its application to the facts.-Kerr v. People's Bank, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 963.
1. Bastardy complaints are civil actions, to be brought in the county where the com- plainant resides.-Hodge v. Sawyer, 27 A. 153, 85 Me. 285.
Death of defendant-Abatement.
death of the respondent during the pendency of 2. Proceedings in bastardy abate by the the proceeding and before trial.-McKenzie v. Lombard, 27 A. 110, 85 Me. 224.
BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES. Payment of fees, see "Insurance," 17, 18. Doing insurance business.
1. An association incorporated under the benevolent association act (Revision, p. 79; P. L. 1883, p. 57; Id. 1886, p. 221) does not come within the prohibition of the insurance laws, so long as it confines its agreements to the payment of sick benefits and burial ex- penses.-State v. Taylor, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A.
Personal liability of members.
2. Act April 28, 1876, entitled "An act re- lieving members of beneficial societies from in- dividual liability for lodge indebtedness," and providing that "members of lodges of the order of Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias, and other organizations, paying periodical or funeral benefits, shall not be individually liable for the payment of periodical or funeral benefits or other liabilities of the lodge or other organiza- tion," exempts members of a post of the Grand Army of the Republic which pays periodical or funeral benefits from individual liability on contracts made by them as a committee of the post.-Pain v. Sample, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1107.
Power of society to make con- tracts.
3. In an action against a committee ap- pointed by a post of the Grand Army of the Republic, as partners, upon a contract, after- wards ratified by the post, to give a theatrical performance for its benefit, where the only ev idence in regard to the power of the post is a by-law providing that upon the death of a comrade the sum of $100 shall be paid to his heirs as a funeral benefit, the same to be drawn from the funds of the post, it is error to hold See "Assignment for Benefit of Creditors;" "In- the contract "ultra vires."-Pain v. Sample, solvency."
See "Elections and Voters," 5, 6.
Assessment of members-Power of di- rectors.
Books of Account.
See "Evidence," 27-30.
4. The courts will not interfere to prevent the suspension of an officer of a beneficial or- der by a superior officer when no property rights are involved, and the rights of appeal See "Municipal Corporations." from the decision of the superior officer, al- lowed by the constitution of the order, have not been exhausted.-Mead v. Stirling, 27 A. 591, 62 Conn. 586.
5. The fact that such appeal, within the order, cannot reinstate plaintiff in office, be- cause his term of office would expire before the appeal could be heard, is immaterial.-Mead v. Stirling, 27 A. 591, 62 Conn. 586.
Best and Secondary Evidence. See "Evidence," 4.
Bills and Notes.
See "Negotiable Instruments."
In deed, filling, see "Deed," 1.
Of chattel, see "Sale," 24, 25.
Of land, see "Vendor and Purchaser," 9.
BOUNDARIES.
See, also, "Riparian Rights," 2. Highways.
1. Plaintiff claimed under a deed bounding him by the seashore and a road, and asserted the road to be a boundary, as if constructed in a right line with its general course until it should reach the shore, whereas, in fact, in its building, the road had been deflected north- erly, and a few rods short of the seashore. Held, that the road, as actually built, was the monument, and constituted plaintiff's bounda- ry.-Brown v. Heard, 27 A. 182, 85 Me. 294. Seashore.
2. A grant "to the seashore, thence by the seashore,' does not carry title beyond high- water mark.-Brown v. Heard, 27 A. 182, 85 Me. 294.
3. Where the boundary of land is described in a deed as running on the bank of a certain
Of negotiable instrument, see "Negotiable In- brook, and such brook has both a main and an struments," 4, 5.
See, also, "Principal and Surety." Estoppel of obligor, see "Estoppel," 3. For release of attached property, see "Attach- ment," 1, 2.
Given by road master as tax collector, see "Towns," 2.
Of guardian, see "Guardian and Ward," 2, 3. On appeal, see "Appeal," 7.
Refusal to accept bond of highway supervisor, see "Towns," 3.
To support pauper, see "Poor and Poor Laws," 9.
1. On seizure of B.'s property under dis- tress for rent, defendant executed a penal bond for a certain sum to plaintiff, B.'s landlord, conditioned to be void if B. should keep all his property in his house, and remove none of it before a specified date. Held not to bind de- fendant to so control B.'s actions that he would not, on the date specified, or at any previous time, prevent access to or seizure of such property for the rent. Crawford's Ex'r v. Evans, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1105.
auxiliary channel, "brook" means the main channel, in the absence of evidence that the parties did not use the word according to its ordinary signification when referring to one of the two branches of the stream.-Pike v. Hood, (N. H.) 27 A. 139; Hood v. Pike, Id. . Adverse possession-Mistake.
4. In case of occupancy by mistake be- yond a line capable of being ascertained, the intention to claim title to the extent of the occupancy must appear to be absolute, and not conditional; otherwise the possession will not be deemed adverse. Emery, J., dissenting.- Preble v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 27 A. 149, 85
5. One who by mistake occupies land not covered by his deed, with no intention to claim title beyond his true boundary, wherever that may be, does not acquire title by adverse pos- session to land beyond the true line. Emery, J., dissenting. Preble v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 27 A. 149, 85 Me. 260.
Obstruction of water course by bridge, see "Waters and Water Courses," 9, 10.
2. In an action on a bond conditioned to save plaintiff harmless from all damage which See "Appeal," 9. may be sustained by her by reason of defendants' digging a gas well on premises adjoining hers, defendants cannot complain of an instruction
that they are liable for cutting off a subter- See "Factors and Brokers."
ranean spring feeding two wells on plaintiff's premises, if they neglected any precaution that would have prevented the diversion of the sub-
terranean stream.-Steele v. Todd, (Pa. Sup.) See "Contracts," 5. 27 A. 942.
Failure to comply with statute - Good as common-law bond.
3. A bond given to procure the release of goods taken under attachment, conditioned, as provided by Pub. St. c. 207, § 16, to pay any final judgment that plaintiff should recover, and also conditioned, as provided by section 20, to return the goods if plaintiff should recover final judgment in the attachment suit, is not good as a statutory bond, since it does not conform to either section, but is good as a common-law bond.-Easton v. Ormsby, (R. I.) 27 A. 216.
Burden of Proof.
See "Gifts," 4; "Intoxicating Liquors," 7; "Ne- gotiable Instruments," 4, 5.
Evidence of another breaking and entry, see "Criminal Law," 9. Election between entries.
On a prosecution for burglary, the fact that defendant entered the house at two dif-
ferent times on the same night will not neces- sitate an election by the state as to which en- try it will go to the jury on, where both entries were, made for the same purpose, and defend- ant was frightened away the first time.-State v. Fitzsimon, (R. I.) 27 A. 446.
Of contracts in equity, see "Equity," 7-15
man permitted the passenger to pass through the gate without examining and punching the ticket, or by the fact that the sleeping-car conductor fail- ed to notice that the ticket was unstamped, where the regular passenger conductor noticed that the ticket was unstamped as soon as he received it, and so informed the passenger.- Bowers v. Pennsylvania Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 893.
Injuries to passengers.
8. A cable car stopped short at a power house, where the cables were changed. The windows of the car were broken, and plaintiff,
See, also, "Horse and Street Railroads;" "Rail- a passenger, was thrown forward, broke her road Companies."
Discrimination by carrier of goods.
1. The fact that a railroad company, by agreement with a manufacturing concern, made previous to the latter's organization, which agreement was an inducement to its or- ganization, charges it less per ton for the trans- portation from a certain point of coal to be used for manufacturing purposes than it charges a dealer in coal for like transportation, does not constitute an "undue or unreasonable discrimination," within the meaning of Act June 4, 1883, prohibiting such discrimination, since the charges are not for a like service from the same place, upon like conditions, and under similar circumstances.-Hoover v. Penn- sylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
2. When the facts are ascertained, the question of the existence of an "undue or un- reasonable discrimination." within the meaning of the act, is for the court.-Hoover v. Penn- sylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
3. The fact that the manufacturing con- cern, without the knowledge of the railroad company, sold to its employees coal so carried for it, is immaterial, in the absence of proof that any damage resulted therefrom to the coal dealer. Hoover v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
4. Under Act June 4, 1883, making a rail- road company liable to a person injured by injust discrimination in charges "for damages treble the amount of injury suffered," the "in- jury suffered" must be proved, and it is not to be measured by the total amount of the dis- criminations complained of.-Hoover v. Penn- sylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
Of passengers-Contract of carriage.
right clavicle, and was otherwise injured. Held, that the court properly charged that, if the ac- cident occurred by defect in the roadway or machinery, the law presumed the company neg ligent, and it must explain the accident.-Clow v. Pittsburgh Traction Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1004.
9. The rule that a carrier of passengers is bound to exercise the highest degree of care that is possible to human foresight and pru- dence, does not make the carrier an insurer against accidents, nor require it to prevent an accident by the employment of means which, if the accident could have been foretold, might have been used to prevent it; nor does the rule render the carrier liable for the wrongful acts of strangers, unless the carrier was remiss in not discovering them in time to avert the in- jury; nor is the carrier required to exercise an impracticable character or extent of precaution which could not be observed without so serious a cost as to destroy the business; and in all cases the liability is only such as results from negligence. Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 689.
10. A carrier of passengers is not required to take precaution against the criminal acts of strangers which could not have been foreseen by any human skill or diligence, and negligence does not arise from the want of such precau- tions.-Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 689.
11. The crew of a freight train placed ser eral loaded cars on a side track, securely tight- ened the brakes, and threw off the switch, so as to prevent the cars from getting on the main track, and so as to derail them, if they did get loose. A boy, not in any way connect- ed with the railroad company, turned back the switch, opened the brakes with a hammer, de- tached two of the cars, and started them down the side track. They reached the main track, 5. Plaintiff bought an excursion ticket and within a very few minutes collided with a from R. to M. and return, "via B. Branch,' passenger train, killing several passengers and "not good to stop off en route." The road injuring others. Held that, the collision being from R. to B., where it was necessary to caused by the criminal acts of a stranger, the change trains, was the main line; and from B. presumption of negligence arising from the to M., the B. Branch. On his return from M., fact of the accident was completely rebutted: he would, if trains were on schedule time, have and that, the court having submitted to the had to wait in the B. station a half hour for jury the question whether the failure to block a train to R. A half mile from B., however, the wheels of the cars, to lock the derailing his train had to wait to let a belated train pass. switch, and to place in position another throw- Plaintiff there left his train, and walked to B., off switch, further down the side track, was a getting there in time to board the belated failure to exercise the highest degree of care train. Held, that his ticket was not good on possible to human foresight and prudence, a this train, it not being a connecting train. Ma- verdict of the jury in favor of the railroad com- gie, Abbett, Brown, and Kreuger, JJ., dissent-pany was conclusive that it was not negligent. ing.-Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Parry, (N. J. Err. -Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., (Pa. & App.) 27 A. 914.
6. A "special excursion ticket" was express- ly subject to the condition "that for the return journey this ticket will not be valid unless pre- sented by the original purchaser to the agent of the Pennsylvania line at Chicago, Ill., to be stamped on the back," as a "notice to purchas- er," printed in large letters on the face of the ticket, stated. Held, that the condition was rea- sonable, and that it was the purchaser's duty to read it and comply with its terms.-Bowers v. Pennsylvania Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 893.
7. The condition of a "special excursion ticket," that for the return journey it should be stamped by the ticket agent, was not waived by the carrier, either by the fact that the gate-
12. Where the accident was the result of the willful criminal trespass of a stranger, for which the railroad company was not responsi ble, it was not reversible error for the trial court to fail to emphasize and reiterate the rule that the company was bound to use the high- est degree of care, skill, and prudence that was humanly possible. Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 689.
13. Where plaintiff's intestate was killed in a railway accident caused by a rock becoming detached from a hillside, and falling on the train, the burden of proof to show negligence is on plaintiff, the accident being disconnected with the appliances and operation of the road.—
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