demurrer as irregular and defective. There- | Pleading.
upon, defendant filed a rejoinder to the repli-
cation, and the cause went to trial. Held, on the causes of action set up in the plea, as well
A replication to a plea of set-off that
review, that it was unnecessary to determine as those in the declaration, had been sub-
whether the order striking out the demurrer mitted to arbitration, and an award thereon
was erroneous or not, since the real questions delivered to the parties, is bad, in that it does
in controversy between the parties were actu- not disclose the nature of the award nor in
ally put at issue and determined, and the or- whose favor it was made.-Heath v. Doyle, (R.
der, if erroneous, did no injury.-Monmouth I.) 27 A. 333.
Park Ass'n v. Warren, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27
22. In an action on a contract which re-
Argument of Counsel.
quired the work to be done to the satisfaction See "Criminal Law," 7; "Trial," 5-7.
and acceptance of defendant, the cause was
tried on the theory that actual acceptance
must be proved. The court found acceptance
by defendant's engineer, and held that, by a
true construction of the contract, his accept-
ance was that of defendant. Held that, if
there was error in the ruling, it would not jus-
tify reversal, since there was sufficient evi-
dence to justify a finding by the court of an
actual acceptance by defendant, by implica-
tion, from the acts of its officers and agents
other than the engineer.-Monmouth Park
Ass'n v. Warren, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A.
932.
23. The failure of the court in a condemna-
tion proceeding, through mere inadvertence, to
instruct the jury that the burden of proving
damages is upon the landowners, is harmless
error, where the whole course of the trial and
the tenor of the whole charge is to the effect
that only damages proved can be allowed.-
Camden & Rockland Water Co. v. Ingraham,
27 A. 94, 85 Me. 179.
24. Where the record on appeal contains no
bill of exceptions, and the only assignment of
error is as to the language of the court, and
the statement as to the language in appellant's
paper book is denied by appellee, the judgment
will be affirmed.-Harris v. Schuylkill River E.
S. R. R., 27 A. 297, 156 Pa. St. 252.
Awarding damages for vexatious ap-
peal.
25. In an action by a minor by her next
friend, pending appeal by defendants from a
judgment in favor of the minor, defendants
settled the same with the next friend for a
discount, without the leave of the court. No
paper books were filed. Held, that the appeal
would be non-pros'd, with attorney's fees, and
6 per cent. damages for frivolous appeal.
O'Donnell v. Broad, 27 A. 305, 149 Pa. St. 24.
APPEARANCE.
Effect as waiver of objections.
In proceedings in the orphans' court
by an heir to compel the administrator to ac-
count, the administrator answered that the mon-
eys of the estate had been received by his attor-
ney. Held that, though the attorney was not made
a party to the proceedings before the orphans'
court, yet, having funds of the estate in his pos-
session, his appearance, both personally and by
counsel, conferred on the orphans' court juris-
diction over his person. Mitchell and Thomp-
son, JJ., dissenting.-In re Watts' Estate, (Pa.
Sup.) 27 A. 861.
1. In an ex parte affidavit made for the
purpose of holding a defendant to bail, state-
ments to which the affiant could not lawfully
testify in open court are not competent evi-
dence of fraud.—Truax v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
(N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 1063.
2. Under Laws, vol. 15, c. 180, authorizing
dum in a civil action on affidavit by plaintif
the issuance of a writ of capias ad responden
that defendant has absconded or is about to
abscond "from the place of his usual abode."
his place of abode" is insufficient.—Thomas v.
an affidavit that he is about to abscond "from
Colvin, (Del. Super.) 27 A. 829.
the issuance of a writ of capias ad responden
3. Under Laws, vol. 15, c. 180, authorizing
dum in a civil action on affidavit by plaintiff
that defendant has secreted, conveyed away,
assigned, settled, or disposed of property with
intent to defraud his creditors, an affidavit that
defendant procured property by fraud is not suf-
ficient.-Thomas v. Colvin, (Del. Super.) 27 A.
Of errors, see "Appeal," S.
Of insurance policy, see "Insurance," 2.
What constitutes.
1. A member of a firm, who was indorser
on the note of S., indorsed other paper of hers
in consideration of her agreement that an ac
count of hers against the firm should be off-
set to the amount of the note, by the note
which he undertook that the firm should pay
Held, that this amounted to an assignment of
so much of her account to the member of the
firm, and, the note having been paid when dae,
though after her death, the firm was entitled
to credit for the amount thereof against her
estate. In re Spotts' Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
132; Appeal of Beetem, Id.
Equitable assignment.
2. Where a person in writing acknowledges
himself indebted to another, and binds himself
to pay the debt with the money from an inherit-
ance to be collected by an attorney, and depos-
its the instrument with the attorney, with or-
ders to pay the debt from the money when col-
lected, this, though not a legal assignment, is
an equitable one.-Moeser v. Schneider, (Pa.
Sup.) 27 A. 1088.
and succeeds therein, it is proper to bring in
the assignee as a party before making a final
decree as to distribution of such newly-discov-
ered assets.-Hamlin v. Bennett, (N. J. Ch.) 27
A. 651.
Associations.
Action in assignor's name - Authority.
3. Testimony of C. that he bought all the See "Benevolent Societies."
accounts and claims of all kinds of T. & L., a
partnership, with right to use their names in
the collection of the same, that his dealings
were with T., and that a claim against a rail-
road for discrimination in freight rates was
mentioned as among the claims sold, with tes-
timony of L. that he did not know of the pend-
ency of an action on such claim brought by C.
in the name of T. & L., and, so far as he
knew, T. did not employ or authorize the at-
torney to bring the action, together with his
answer, to the question whether he had any-
thing to do with the action except as a wit-
ness, that he did not know; the question was
a broad one: he had already said he did not
bring the action, but he sold certain rights to
C..-shows a right in C. to bring the action in
the name of T. & L.-Tucker v. Providence &
W. R. Co., (R. I.) 27 A. 448.
Action by assignee-On part of claim.
4. Section 19 of the practice act, as amend-
ed by Act March 4, 1890, making bills, con-
tracts, and choses in action assignable at law,
and authorizing the assignee to sue in his own
name, does not make a part of a contract as-
signable, so that the assignee of such part may
sue in his own name, without the consent of the
party who might be subjected to two suits.-
Otis v. Adams, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 1092.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT
OF CREDITORS.
See, also, "Fraudulent Conveyances;" "Insol-
Basis for computing dividends, see "Factors
and Brokers," 2.
What passes to assignee.
Recovery of money paid for liquor, see “Intox-
Remedy by covenant or assumpsit, see "Ac-
Ultra vires contract, recovery on quantum mer-
uit, see "Corporations," 9.
When lies.
1. A corporation which makes a proposition
to its creditors for the selection by them of a
committee to supervise its business is liable to
the members of the committee for the services
rendered by them.-Dallas v. Columbia Iron &
Steel Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1055.
2. Where property placed in defendants'
custody, under a contract by which they are to
make repairs thereon, is destroyed by their
negligence, assumpsit may be properly brought
by the owner to recover the value thereof.—
Zell v. Dunkle, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 38.
3. A contract provided for delivery of 25
machines by plaintiff between certain dates,
and settlement therefor by defendant at a later
date by cash, indorsed notes, or his own note.
Plaintiff performed his part, but there was no
settlement. Held, that plaintiff had an action
in assumpsit on the special contract, but
none for goods sold and delivered.-Thomas
Manuf'g Co. v. Watson, 27 A. 176, 85 Me.
300.
sold to defendant's testator has introduced his
4. Where plaintiff in assumpsit for goods
books of account in evidence under the general
issue, defendants may show that the items of
the account were charged on a consideration
previously executed by decedent, and not for
him.-Cargill v. Atwood, (R. I.) 27 A. 214.
the purpose of creating an indebtedness against
1. An assignment for benefit of creditors,
of the goods, chattels, and property of the as-
signor, does not pass to the assignee a claim
of the assignor against a decedent's estate for
commissions as executor.-In re Mulligan's Es-
tate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 398; Appeal of Cattell, See "Master and Servant," 27, 28.
Id.
Consent of creditors to assignment.
2. An instrument under seal, by an in-
solvent debtor, purporting to convey and assign
all his property to the grantee in trust for, and
as agent of, all creditors whose names are
signed thereto as accepting the property, is, in
the absence of fraud, an ordinary sale and con-
veyance for valuable consideration, and not an
assignment, and is valid as against subsequent
process of creditors who refuse to accept its
provisions. Kenefick v. Perry, 61 N. H. 362,
followed.-Hosmer v. Farley, (N. H.) 27 A. 22.3.
Proceedings by creditors to discover
property.
See, also, "Execution;" "Exemptions;" "Gar-
nishment."
Failure to comply with statute, good as com-
mon-law bond, see "Bonds," 3.
Lien of chattel mortgage against, see "Chattel
Mortgages," 2.
Bond for release of property.
1. A bond given to procure the release of
goods taken under attachment, conditioned as
attachment, and takes its place as a security,
provided by Pub. St. c. 207, § 16, dissolves the
and therefore the liability of the obligors does
3. One whose debtor has made an assign- not depend on the attachment, and the execu-
ment for the benefit of creditors may, after tion by the attachment debtor of an assignment
neglect on the part of the assignee for 11 years for the benefit of creditors will not release the
to take proceedings to discover property be obligors, under Pub. St. c. 237, § 12, providing
longing to the debtor, and having established that an assignment shall dissolve attachments
his claim by judgment, institute such proceed-pending_against the assignor.-Easton v. Orms-
ings himself.-Hamlin v. Bennett, (N. J. Ch.) by, (R. I.) 27 A. 216.
27 A. 651.
4. The fact that the creditor filed his
claim with the assignee does not prevent him
from instituting such proceeding.-Hamlin v.
Bennett, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 651.
Making assignee party.
5. Where a creditor of one who has made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors in-
stitutes proceedings for the discovery of assets
2. Plaintiff in attachment does not, by ac-
cepting a dividend from the assignee for the
benefit of creditors of defendant in attachment,
lose his recourse against a bond given for the
release of the goods attached.-Easton v. Orms-
by, (R. I.) 27 A. 216.
Lien.
3. Rev. St. c. 81, § 59, declares that no
attachment of real estate or mesne process
creates any lien thereon, unless the nature and
amount of plaintiff's demand is set forth in
proper counts, or a specification thereof is an-
nexed. Held, that a deed made by the attach-
ment debtor after service of a writ defective
as containing only a general money count, and
duly recorded, was good against the creditor's
subsequent levy of final process on the same
land.-Everett v. Carleton, 27 A. 265, 85 Me.
397; Gilman v. Same, Id.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Arguments of counsel, see "Criminal Law," 7.
Authority of attorney.
A plaintiff is bound by directions as to
the service of the writ given by his attorney
to the officer to whom the writ is delivered for
service.-Morgan v. Joyce, (N. H.) 27 A. 225.
See "Arbitration and Award."
In criminal cases-Power of bail com-
missioner.
1. Rev. St. c. 99, §§ 34-36, requires the su-
preme judicial court to appoint in each county,
from the number of the justices of the peace
and of the quorum, one or more bail commis-
sioners, who may admit to bail persons in jail
for a bailable offense, or for failure to find
sureties, and exercise the same power as a jus-
tice of the supreme or superior court; and any
person under arrest for a bailable offense may,
before commitment, on request, appear before
such commissioner, who may inquire into the
case, and admit him to bail. Held, that during
a term of the supreme judicial court in any
county, a bail commissioner cannot admit to
bail any person confined in jail or under arrest
on a precept returnable to said term.-In re
Bail Commissioners, (Me.) 27 A. 455.
2. When one is confined in jail for a bail-
able offense, or for not finding sureties on re-
cognizance, and his bail has been fixed by a
justice of the supreme judicial court, a bail com-
missioner cannot change the amount of such
bail.-In re Bail Commissioners, (Me.) 27 A.
See, also, "Banks and Banking;" "Carriers;"
"Chattel Mortgages;" "Pledge;" "Ware-
housemen."
Negligence of bailee-Loss by fire.
In assumpsit for the value of a boiter
left by plaintiff with defendants, and which,
while in their custody, was destroyed, with their
shop, by an incendiary fire, it appeared that the
boiler was stored in a building used for storing
engines and boilers belonging to defendants, and
that it was cared for in the same way as de-
fendants cared for their own boilers. No watch-
man was employed at the building at night,
when the fire occurred; but there was no evi-
dence that ordinary care required the employ-
ment of such watchman, or that he was usually
employed at such shops. Held, that a nonsuit
was properly entered.-Zell v. Dunkle, (Pa.
Sup.) 27 A. 38.
1. In an action against a bank to recover
a deposit, the court properly charged that, if
the money was really plaintiff's, the fact that
it was deposited by plaintiff's brother in plain-
tiff's name, and so entered on the books of the
bank and in the pass book, warranted no im-
plication of authority in the brother to check
it out, but that if, at the brother's suggestion,
the account was opened in plaintiff's name only
as another form of identifying the brother's
deposit of his own money, then the payment
on the brother's check protected the bank, and
plaintiff could not recover. Fletcher v. Safe-
Deposit Co.. 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 503, followed.
-Kerr v. People's Bank, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 963.
2. Where the bank knew that the money
deposited belonged to plaintiff, the brother had
no right, because he carried it to the bank, to
check it out without authority from plaintiff,
nd the mere declaration of the brother to the
bank that he had such authority was of no
weight. Mitchell, Green, and Thompson, J.J.,
concur in the statement of law. but dissent to
its application to the facts.-Kerr v. People's
Bank, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 963.
1. Bastardy complaints are civil actions,
to be brought in the county where the com-
plainant resides.-Hodge v. Sawyer, 27 A. 153,
85 Me. 285.
Death of defendant-Abatement.
death of the respondent during the pendency of
2. Proceedings in bastardy abate by the
the proceeding and before trial.-McKenzie v.
Lombard, 27 A. 110, 85 Me. 224.
BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES.
Payment of fees, see "Insurance," 17, 18.
Doing insurance business.
1. An association incorporated under the
benevolent association act (Revision, p. 79;
P. L. 1883, p. 57; Id. 1886, p. 221) does not
come within the prohibition of the insurance
laws, so long as it confines its agreements to
the payment of sick benefits and burial ex-
penses.-State v. Taylor, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A.
Personal liability of members.
2. Act April 28, 1876, entitled "An act re-
lieving members of beneficial societies from in-
dividual liability for lodge indebtedness," and
providing that "members of lodges of the order
of Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias, and other
organizations, paying periodical or funeral
benefits, shall not be individually liable for the
payment of periodical or funeral benefits or
other liabilities of the lodge or other organiza-
tion," exempts members of a post of the Grand
Army of the Republic which pays periodical or
funeral benefits from individual liability on
contracts made by them as a committee of the
post.-Pain v. Sample, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1107.
Power of society to make con-
tracts.
3. In an action against a committee ap-
pointed by a post of the Grand Army of the
Republic, as partners, upon a contract, after-
wards ratified by the post, to give a theatrical
performance for its benefit, where the only ev
idence in regard to the power of the post is a
by-law providing that upon the death of a
comrade the sum of $100 shall be paid to his
heirs as a funeral benefit, the same to be drawn
from the funds of the post, it is error to hold
See "Assignment for Benefit of Creditors;" "In- the contract "ultra vires."-Pain v. Sample,
solvency."
See "Elections and Voters," 5, 6.
Assessment of members-Power of di-
rectors.
Books of Account.
See "Evidence," 27-30.
4. The courts will not interfere to prevent
the suspension of an officer of a beneficial or-
der by a superior officer when no property
rights are involved, and the rights of appeal See "Municipal Corporations."
from the decision of the superior officer, al-
lowed by the constitution of the order, have
not been exhausted.-Mead v. Stirling, 27 A.
591, 62 Conn. 586.
5. The fact that such appeal, within the
order, cannot reinstate plaintiff in office, be-
cause his term of office would expire before the
appeal could be heard, is immaterial.-Mead v.
Stirling, 27 A. 591, 62 Conn. 586.
Best and Secondary Evidence.
See "Evidence," 4.
Bills and Notes.
See "Negotiable Instruments."
In deed, filling, see "Deed," 1.
Of chattel, see "Sale," 24, 25.
Of land, see "Vendor and Purchaser," 9.
BOUNDARIES.
See, also, "Riparian Rights," 2.
Highways.
1. Plaintiff claimed under a deed bounding
him by the seashore and a road, and asserted
the road to be a boundary, as if constructed
in a right line with its general course until it
should reach the shore, whereas, in fact, in
its building, the road had been deflected north-
erly, and a few rods short of the seashore.
Held, that the road, as actually built, was the
monument, and constituted plaintiff's bounda-
ry.-Brown v. Heard, 27 A. 182, 85 Me. 294.
Seashore.
2. A grant "to the seashore, thence by the
seashore,' does not carry title beyond high-
water mark.-Brown v. Heard, 27 A. 182, 85
Me. 294.
3. Where the boundary of land is described
in a deed as running on the bank of a certain
Of negotiable instrument, see "Negotiable In- brook, and such brook has both a main and an
struments," 4, 5.
See, also, "Principal and Surety."
Estoppel of obligor, see "Estoppel," 3.
For release of attached property, see "Attach-
ment," 1, 2.
Given by road master as tax collector, see
"Towns," 2.
Of guardian, see "Guardian and Ward," 2, 3.
On appeal, see "Appeal," 7.
Refusal to accept bond of highway supervisor,
see "Towns," 3.
To support pauper, see "Poor and Poor
Laws," 9.
1. On seizure of B.'s property under dis-
tress for rent, defendant executed a penal bond
for a certain sum to plaintiff, B.'s landlord,
conditioned to be void if B. should keep all his
property in his house, and remove none of it
before a specified date. Held not to bind de-
fendant to so control B.'s actions that he would
not, on the date specified, or at any previous
time, prevent access to or seizure of such
property for the rent. Crawford's Ex'r v.
Evans, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1105.
auxiliary channel, "brook" means the main
channel, in the absence of evidence that the
parties did not use the word according to its
ordinary signification when referring to one of
the two branches of the stream.-Pike v. Hood,
(N. H.) 27 A. 139; Hood v. Pike, Id. .
Adverse possession-Mistake.
4. In case of occupancy by mistake be-
yond a line capable of being ascertained, the
intention to claim title to the extent of the
occupancy must appear to be absolute, and not
conditional; otherwise the possession will not
be deemed adverse. Emery, J., dissenting.-
Preble v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 27 A. 149, 85
5. One who by mistake occupies land not
covered by his deed, with no intention to claim
title beyond his true boundary, wherever that
may be, does not acquire title by adverse pos-
session to land beyond the true line. Emery,
J., dissenting. Preble v. Maine Cent. R. Co.,
27 A. 149, 85 Me. 260.
Obstruction of water course by bridge, see
"Waters and Water Courses," 9, 10.
2. In an action on a bond conditioned to
save plaintiff harmless from all damage which See "Appeal," 9.
may be sustained by her by reason of defendants'
digging a gas well on premises adjoining hers,
defendants cannot complain of an instruction
that they are liable for cutting off a subter- See "Factors and Brokers."
ranean spring feeding two wells on plaintiff's
premises, if they neglected any precaution that
would have prevented the diversion of the sub-
terranean stream.-Steele v. Todd, (Pa. Sup.) See "Contracts," 5.
27 A. 942.
Failure to comply with statute - Good
as common-law bond.
3. A bond given to procure the release of
goods taken under attachment, conditioned, as
provided by Pub. St. c. 207, § 16, to pay any
final judgment that plaintiff should recover, and
also conditioned, as provided by section 20, to
return the goods if plaintiff should recover final
judgment in the attachment suit, is not good
as a statutory bond, since it does not conform
to either section, but is good as a common-law
bond.-Easton v. Ormsby, (R. I.) 27 A. 216.
Burden of Proof.
See "Gifts," 4; "Intoxicating Liquors," 7; "Ne-
gotiable Instruments," 4, 5.
Evidence of another breaking and entry, see
"Criminal Law," 9.
Election between entries.
On a prosecution for burglary, the fact
that defendant entered the house at two dif-
ferent times on the same night will not neces-
sitate an election by the state as to which en-
try it will go to the jury on, where both entries
were, made for the same purpose, and defend-
ant was frightened away the first time.-State
v. Fitzsimon, (R. I.) 27 A. 446.
Of contracts in equity, see "Equity," 7-15
man permitted the passenger to pass through the
gate without examining and punching the ticket,
or by the fact that the sleeping-car conductor fail-
ed to notice that the ticket was unstamped,
where the regular passenger conductor noticed
that the ticket was unstamped as soon as he
received it, and so informed the passenger.-
Bowers v. Pennsylvania Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
893.
Injuries to passengers.
8. A cable car stopped short at a power
house, where the cables were changed. The
windows of the car were broken, and plaintiff,
See, also, "Horse and Street Railroads;" "Rail- a passenger, was thrown forward, broke her
road Companies."
Discrimination by carrier of goods.
1. The fact that a railroad company, by
agreement with a manufacturing concern,
made previous to the latter's organization,
which agreement was an inducement to its or-
ganization, charges it less per ton for the trans-
portation from a certain point of coal to be
used for manufacturing purposes than it
charges a dealer in coal for like transportation,
does not constitute an "undue or unreasonable
discrimination," within the meaning of Act
June 4, 1883, prohibiting such discrimination,
since the charges are not for a like service
from the same place, upon like conditions, and
under similar circumstances.-Hoover v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
2. When the facts are ascertained, the
question of the existence of an "undue or un-
reasonable discrimination." within the meaning
of the act, is for the court.-Hoover v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
3. The fact that the manufacturing con-
cern, without the knowledge of the railroad
company, sold to its employees coal so carried
for it, is immaterial, in the absence of proof
that any damage resulted therefrom to the coal
dealer. Hoover v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (Pa.
Sup.) 27 A. 282.
4. Under Act June 4, 1883, making a rail-
road company liable to a person injured by
injust discrimination in charges "for damages
treble the amount of injury suffered," the "in-
jury suffered" must be proved, and it is not to
be measured by the total amount of the dis-
criminations complained of.-Hoover v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 282.
Of passengers-Contract of carriage.
right clavicle, and was otherwise injured. Held,
that the court properly charged that, if the ac-
cident occurred by defect in the roadway or
machinery, the law presumed the company neg
ligent, and it must explain the accident.-Clow
v. Pittsburgh Traction Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
1004.
9. The rule that a carrier of passengers is
bound to exercise the highest degree of care
that is possible to human foresight and pru-
dence, does not make the carrier an insurer
against accidents, nor require it to prevent an
accident by the employment of means which,
if the accident could have been foretold, might
have been used to prevent it; nor does the rule
render the carrier liable for the wrongful acts
of strangers, unless the carrier was remiss in
not discovering them in time to avert the in-
jury; nor is the carrier required to exercise an
impracticable character or extent of precaution
which could not be observed without so serious
a cost as to destroy the business; and in all
cases the liability is only such as results from
negligence. Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R.
Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 689.
10. A carrier of passengers is not required
to take precaution against the criminal acts of
strangers which could not have been foreseen
by any human skill or diligence, and negligence
does not arise from the want of such precau-
tions.-Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co.,
(Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 689.
11. The crew of a freight train placed ser
eral loaded cars on a side track, securely tight-
ened the brakes, and threw off the switch, so
as to prevent the cars from getting on the
main track, and so as to derail them, if they
did get loose. A boy, not in any way connect-
ed with the railroad company, turned back the
switch, opened the brakes with a hammer, de-
tached two of the cars, and started them down
the side track. They reached the main track,
5. Plaintiff bought an excursion ticket and within a very few minutes collided with a
from R. to M. and return, "via B. Branch,'
passenger train, killing several passengers and
"not good to stop off en route." The road injuring others. Held that, the collision being
from R. to B., where it was necessary to caused by the criminal acts of a stranger, the
change trains, was the main line; and from B. presumption of negligence arising from the
to M., the B. Branch. On his return from M., fact of the accident was completely rebutted:
he would, if trains were on schedule time, have and that, the court having submitted to the
had to wait in the B. station a half hour for jury the question whether the failure to block
a train to R. A half mile from B., however, the wheels of the cars, to lock the derailing
his train had to wait to let a belated train pass. switch, and to place in position another throw-
Plaintiff there left his train, and walked to B., off switch, further down the side track, was a
getting there in time to board the belated failure to exercise the highest degree of care
train. Held, that his ticket was not good on possible to human foresight and prudence, a
this train, it not being a connecting train. Ma- verdict of the jury in favor of the railroad com-
gie, Abbett, Brown, and Kreuger, JJ., dissent-pany was conclusive that it was not negligent.
ing.-Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Parry, (N. J. Err. -Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., (Pa.
& App.) 27 A. 914.
6. A "special excursion ticket" was express-
ly subject to the condition "that for the return
journey this ticket will not be valid unless pre-
sented by the original purchaser to the agent
of the Pennsylvania line at Chicago, Ill., to be
stamped on the back," as a "notice to purchas-
er," printed in large letters on the face of the
ticket, stated. Held, that the condition was rea-
sonable, and that it was the purchaser's duty
to read it and comply with its terms.-Bowers
v. Pennsylvania Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 893.
7. The condition of a "special excursion
ticket," that for the return journey it should
be stamped by the ticket agent, was not waived
by the carrier, either by the fact that the gate-
12. Where the accident was the result of
the willful criminal trespass of a stranger, for
which the railroad company was not responsi
ble, it was not reversible error for the trial
court to fail to emphasize and reiterate the rule
that the company was bound to use the high-
est degree of care, skill, and prudence that was
humanly possible. Fredericks
v. Northern
Cent. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 689.
13. Where plaintiff's intestate was killed in
a railway accident caused by a rock becoming
detached from a hillside, and falling on the
train, the burden of proof to show negligence is
on plaintiff, the accident being disconnected
with the appliances and operation of the road.—
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