2. Rev. St. c. 51, § 141, which makes rail-
road corporations liable to pay for the work of
laborers in constructing their roads, does not
apply to the labor of a subcontractor, person-
ally expended, with that of a crew employed
by him, on a section of road which he has con-
tracted to build.-Rogers v. Dexter & P. R.
Co., 27 A. 257, 85 Me. 372.
Establishment of crossings.
3. Under Rev. St. c. 51, § 21, providing
that the county commissioners shall order
the railroad to make and maintain such cattle
guards, cattle passes, and farm crossings as
they think reasonable, an award of damages
providing that the railroad should keep open
the road to an owner's limekiln is beyond the
commissioners' power, and vitiates the award
so far as based on that condition.-Hewitt v.
County Commissioners, 27 A. 179, 85 Me.
308.
Highway bridge across track-Duty to
repair.
4. Gen. St. 1888, § 3480, (Acts 1849,) pro-
vides that bridges or other structures placed
over or upon existing highways by a railroad
company in constructing its road shall there-
after be maintained by such company. Acts
1889, (entitled "An act relating to grade cross-
ings,") c. 220, § 7, provides that railroad com-
panies shall keep in repair all structures erect-
ed over their tracks at any highway crossing,
but the municipality in which the structure is
situated shall keep in repair the surface of the
highway, including planking or other surface
material of the highway upon such structure.
Held, that section 3480 was not repealed by
implication by the latter act, and a railroad
company was not relieved of the duty of re-
planking a highway bridge erected over its road
prior to 1889.- City of Middletown v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 27 A. 118, 62 Conn.
492.
Accidents at highway crossings.
5. Plaintiff's teamster tried to cross the
track with a sled load of logs, weighing three
tons. There was no snow on the track, and
the load stuck, and could not be gotten off even
with the help of four men prying. Held, the
trainmen having no reason to expect such an
accident, and having used every means to stop
the train after they saw that the load was
stuck, that the railroad was not liable for the
damages caused.-Garland v. Maine Cent. R.
Co., 27 A. 615, 85 Me. 519.
Contributory negligence.
6. One walking on a street in the daytime
came to the defendant's intersecting railroad,
which consisted of three tracks. He stopped
upon the first track, which was not in use, for
a freight train, going towards his left on the
furthest track, to pass. This train emitted
smoke, which settled down on the tracks, and
when it had passed, knowing that the middle
track was used for trains coming from his left,
he looked towards the left, and seeing nothing
but smoke on the tracks, and hearing no whistle
or bell, he proceeded at his usual gait, and was
struck by a train coming from the left on the
middle track. Held, that he was guilty of con-
Ewan, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 1064.
tributory negligence.-West Jersey R. Co. v.
7. Where plaintiff's testimony in an action
for injuries received at a railroad crossing is
confused and contradictory as to whether, be-
fore going on the track, he stopped, looked, and
listened at a place where he could see an ap-
proaching train, he is entitled to go to the jury,
as negligence on his part does not affirmative
ly appear from such testimony.-Ely v. Pitts-
burgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
8. A driver of a team, in approaching a
railroad crossing, had his view so intercepted
by buildings that he could catch only glimpses
of a limited portion of the track from particu-
lar points in the cross street upon which he
was driving, until he reached the side of a
street in which the track was laid. The side
of the street was 23 feet from the nearest rail
of the track, and at that point his view was
further intercepted by trees growing along the
curb line of the street. Held, that it was not
so clear that he could by proper vigilance have
avoided being struck by an approaching en-
gine, which gave no audible signals, as to war-
rant a nonsuit.-Goodenough v. Pennsylvania
R. Co.. (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 931.
9. The view of the track being admittedly
obstructed by cars on a sidetrack, and lumber
piled both on and off the right of way, the ques-
tion where plaintiff should have stopped to look
and listen is for the jury, and the court cannot
decide it as a matter of law.-Smith v. Balti-
more & O. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 847; Liston
v. Same, Id. 849.
cutrix for chastity may be attacked, specific
acts of improper conduct with other men can-
not be shown.-State v. Fitzsimon, (R. I.) 27
A. 446.
Ratification.
10. A witness for plaintiff testified that Of contract, see "Infancy," 1.
plaintiff said that he told his companion, who
was driving, that he could not cross the track
there "without being hit," and the other said
he could make it, and drove on without stop-
ping. The evidence as to their stopping con-
flicted. Held, that the court properly charged
that it was for the jury to determine whether
plaintiff exercised proper care.-Smith_v. Balti-
more & O. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 847; Liston
v. Same, Id. 849.
11. In an action for the death of plaintiff's
husband, it appeared that in the evening, as
he approached a railroad crossing, the flagman,
who saw a train approaching, called to him to
stop. As he did not, the flagman caught him
by the coat, but he broke away, and was
struck by the train while crossing the track,
and was killed. Held, that plaintiff was prop-
erly nonsuited.-Oberdorfer v. Philadelphia &
R. R. Co., 27 A. 304, 149 Pa. St. 6.
12. A passenger on a street car which has
stopped at a railroad crossing to permit a loco-
motive to pass is not bound to be on the look-
out, when the car starts, for other approach-
ing engines; and his failure so to do is not con-
tributory negligence which will prevent his re-
covery from the steam-railroad company for in-
juries sustained in a collision between the car
and another locomotive, though, if he had look-
ed, he might have seen the approaching engine
in time to have jumped from the car.-O'Toole
v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
737.
13. In an action against a railroad company
for personal injuries, it appeared that plaintiff,
on approaching a crossing, stopped his team
about 150 feet from it, and looked and listened
for cars, and that, though the track could be
seen for only a short distance from this point,
it was where drivers usually stopped to look
for trains, as the road from there to the track
was descending, thus making it difficult to
check horses. Held, that the entry of nonsuit
on the ground that, where plaintiff stopped,
trains could neither be seen nor heard, was er-
ror, as there should have been submitted to the
jury the question as to whether such point was
a proper place to stop.-Whitman v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 290.
14. On the issue whether the fire was set by
defendant's locomotive, evidence that fires were
set by defendant's locomotives at different
times about the same time and place is compe-
tent. Thatcher v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 27 A
519, 85 Me. 502.
1. A court of equity has no jurisdiction to
appoint a receiver of and dissolve a solvent
beneficial assessment association on the ground
of mismanagement, fraud, and the abuse of
corporate powers.-Mason v. Supreme Court
of Equitable League, (Md.) 27 A. 171.
2. Act April 26, 1893, providing that a
court which has rendered judgment of ouster
may appoint a receiver for a corporation previ-
ously dissolved, "the affairs of which have not
been settled and adjusted," does not authorize
the appointment of a receiver when the corpo-
ration has made an assignment before the pro-
ceedings in quo warranto had begun, and the
assignee has entered on his duties under direc-
tion of a court of competent jurisdiction.-Com-
monwealth v. Order of Vesta, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
14; Appeal of Kennedy, Id.
3. A receiver should not be appointed for
a benevolent society, and an injunction issued
to restrain its officers from managing its af-
fairs, on allegations in the bill filed by one of
the members that, at a meeting of the order,
in the absence of a majority of the members,
certain members were illegally expelled, and
certain officers displaced, and new ones elected,
and that the new officers, defendants in the bill,
coerced or misled by another defendant, were
conducting the order prejudicially to the inter-
ests of plaintiff and the order at large, where
every substantial averment of the bill is denied
by a completely responsive answer, which is
not overcome, or even met, by further proof.-
Crombie v. Order of Solon, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
710.
4. That the whole scheme of the order is
utterly worthless, impracticable, and certain to
end in disaster, is no ground for appointing a
receiver, and enjoining its officers from admin-
istering its affairs, at the instance of a member
who is as much at fault as are defendants.-
Crombie v. Order of Solon, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
710.
5. Unde Pub. St. c. 237, § 13, which pro-
ment of a receiver, and "notice to the debtor,"
vides for a petition in equity for the appoint-
the notice required is personal notice; and the
service of a citation by leaving a copy at the
last and usual abode of the debtor, who has
absconded, is not sufficient.-Beck v. Ashkettle,
(R. I.) 27 A. 505.
Estoppel by, see "Estoppel," 4.
On appeal, see "Appeal," 10-12.
15. Under Rev. St. c. 51, § 64, making a cor-
poration using a locomotive engine responsible
for injuries to property by fire communicated
thereby, and giving the corporation an insurable
interest in such property, lumber piled for sea-
soning and as stock in a permanent lumber
yard is not mere movable stuff, incapable of
affording the railroad an insurable interest, and
the company is responsible for it. Lowney v. From mortgage, see "Mortgages," 9-11.
Railroad Co., (Me.) 7 A. 381, distinguished.-
Thatcher v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 27 A. 519, 85
Me. 502.
When referees, appointed under Gen.
according to the rules of law and the practice
Laws, c. 231, which requires them to proceed
in court, have admitted incompetent evidence
material to the case, and have failed to strike
it out before considering their decision, their
report is vitiated, and is not remedied by their
2. On a prosecution for assault with in- subsequent statement in a supplemental re-
tent to rape, while the character of the prose-port that, in their opinion and recollection,
RELEASE AND DISCHARGE.
See, also, "Accord and Satisfaction;" "Arbitra-
tion and Award;" "Compromise;"
ment."
Discharge of insolvent, see "Insolvency," 5–7.
Effect of judgment for part of claim, see "Judg-
Of guarantor, see "Guaranty."
Of mortgage, see "Mortgages," 7, 8.
Of one defendant, joint liability for costs, see
"Costs," 1.
Satisfaction of judgment, see "Judgment," 16.
Of joint debtor.
and ample time and opportunity afforded, an
expression in favor thereof by over two-thirds
of those voting will be treated as a request by
two-thirds of the whole society.-Schlichter v.
Keiter, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 45.
4. The constitution of a religious society,
providing that no rule or ordinance shall at
any time be passed to change or do away with
the confession of faith, does not prohibit
changes in the interest of clearness of expres-
sion, or fullness of statement, of the accepted
doctrines of the church.--Schlichter v. Keiter,
(Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 45.
Rights in property on division of soci-
5. A church society connected itself with
the General (Swedenborgian) Church of Penn-
sylvania for the purpose of co-operating in
missionary work, and not to give up control
over its own affairs in any way. In the organ-
ization of the General Church in Pennsylvania,
there was no definition of what should consti-
tute the property of the body of the church,
nor any provision that property of a society be
coming connected with it should belong to it.
There was no prohibition of secession from the
1. A release may be given to one of sev- General Church, and such right was repeatedly
eral debtors, and, if the holders' rights are re-recognized. The society afterwards decided. by
served against the others, the debt can still be a majority vote, to leave the General Church.
collected of them; and nothing but a technical whereupon the minority, with the bishop's ap-
release under seal can discharge two joint and proval, after unsuccessfully trying to take pos-
several debtors, where a part only of the debt session of the society's property, establishe 1
is paid by one.-Bradford v. Prescott, 27 A. another church, under another name. Held,
461, 85 Me. 482.
that the branch representing the majority of
the society was entitled to the property.-In re
Aitken's Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1102; Ap
peal of Macbeth, Id.
Duty of courts-Dispute over property.
6. It is the duty of courts to settle the
right to real estate conveyed in trust for a
certain religious society, as between different
parties and organizations claiming to represent
that society.-Schlichter v. Keiter, (Pa. Sup.)
27 A. 45.
2. Complainant employed defendant for
many years to manage his country store. In
1873 they had had a settlement, and complain-
ant gave defendant his duebill for $429.84. In
1878, after another settlement, the balance
found due defendant, $1,246.83, was credited
to him on the store ledger. Thereafter de-
fendant assumed to keep an account with him-
self on said ledger, but had only credited him-
self with his wages up to 1880. In 1890, com-
plainant, being dissatisfied, came over to the
store with his bookkeeper, discharged defend-
ant, and left the bookkeeper for a few hours See "Equity," 1-3; "Specific Performance," 1.
at the store to look at the books. The latter
found on their face a large balance due defend-
ant for wages, but defendant admitted that he
had about drawn his wages as they accrued. See "Negligence," 1, 2.
When complainant returned, thinking to set-
tle the wages account, and without looking at
the books, he gave defendant his notes for
$500 for the duebill. Later it turned out that Of trustee, see "Trusts," 12.
the duebill had been included in the 1878 bal-
ance, and that defendant had drawn large
sums and set off personal debts with debtors
of the store, which he had failed to charge. Of statute, see "Statutes," 4.
Held, that complainant was not concluded by
his settlement, and should have an accounting.
-Benezet v. Yourison, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 431.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.
Adoption of constitution.
1. Acquiescence in and use of a constitu-
tion by a religious society for 50 years makes it
valid, and binding on the society.-Schlichter v.
Keiter, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 45.
Changes in constitution and confession large in violation of such ordinance, is "acting
1. Where a borough, in pursuance of Bor-
ough Act April 3, 1851, (P. L. 320,) under which
it is incorporated, passes an ordinance prohib
iting stock from running at large within the
borough, and authorizing its seizure and sale
for the borough's benefit, a high constable of
such borough, in seizing stock found running at
in his office under the authority of the state."
2. Under the constitutional provision of a
within the meaning of Act April 3, 1779, (Purd.
church that there shall be no alteration of the Dig. pp. 1489, 1490,) which provides that all
constitution unless by the "request" of two-writs of replevin granted to any owner of chat-
thirds of the whole society, the request need
not originate with the members of the society;
but a proposed change may be laid before the
society by its highest church judiciary, and,
after the society has expressed its wish for
such change, it may be made by such judiciary.
-Schlichter v. Keiter, (Pa. Sup.) 27 Å. 45.
3. Where a proposed change has been sub-
mitted to the whole society by its highest judi-
ciary for an expression of preference by vote,
els seized in execution, distress, or otherwise.
by any sheriff or other officer, acting in their
several offices "under the authority of the
state," are void.-Koos v. Mathers, (Pa. Sup.)
27 A. 881.
2. A high constable of a borough, in im-
pounding cattle running at large on a street in
violation of an ordinance enacted under an-
thority of the borough act of April 3, 1851, (P.
L. 320,) is an officer acting under authority of
the state, within Act April 3, 1779, providing
that writs of replevin issued for owners of
chattels taken by an officer acting under au-
thority of the state shall be quashed, and treble
damages shall be awarded defendants. - Mc-
Junkin v. Mathers, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 873.
Ownership and right to possession.
3. A sale of a portion of a large mass of See "Master and Servant," 27, 28.
unpressed hay, without separation of the por-
tion sold, or delivery of any part of it to the
vendee, does not vest in him such title as will
the relative rights of the parties beyond low-
water mark.-Proprietors of Maine Wharf v.
Proprietors of Customhouse Wharf, 27 A. 93,
85 Me. 175.
sustain replevin.-Lawry v. Ellis, 27 A. 518, See "Waters and Water Courses."
85 Me. 500.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
Remedies of riparian owners, see "Nuisance," 2.
Prescriptive rights.
1. The fact that a sluiceway formed on
river flats between the piers of a bridge and
sections of a causeway erected across such
flats and river, by the filling in of such cause-
way and of other portions of the flats, has ex-
isted for over 15 years, does not confer riparian
rights on owners of land across which such
sluiceway extends. Chamberlain v. Heming-
way, 27 A. 239, 63 Conn. 1.
Adjoining proprietors-Boundaries.
2. The judicial settlement of the divisional
line between adjoining riparian proprietors, so
far as the line runs from high to low water
mark, is at least a prima facie settlement of
See "Easements;" "Highways."
Rule in Shelley's Case.
See "Wills," 23.
See, also, "Judicial Sales;" "Vendor and Pur-
chaser."
Bona fide purchasers, of corporate stock, see
"Corporations," 11.
Effect of collecting insurance on damages, see
"Damages," 5.
For taxes, see "Taxation," 23, 24.
Validity of contract,
Entire or severable contract.
1. A contract for the sale of a lot of furni-
ture, all to be of a certain quality, for a lump
sum, is an entire contract, and the buyer is
not obliged to receive it, part of it not being of
such quality.-Sidney School Furniture Co. v.
School Dist. of Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
856.
Acceptance of subject of sale.
2. Where the goods are contracted for in
writing, to be delivered at a place agreed upon
by the parties, proof of delivery at such place
raises a presumption of acceptance by the pur-
chaser.-White v. Harvey, 27 A. 106, 85 Me.
3. In an action for breach of warranty of
a horse, the question as to whether there was
a warranty, or whether plaintiff bought on his
own knowledge of the qualities of the horse, is
for the jury.-Toner v. Zell, 27 A. 304, 149 Pa.
St. 458.
Election of remedies by seller.
4. Plaintiff on conversion, by first bringing
the action in assumpsit, did not elect to afhrm
the contract of sale under which he alleged
the goods were fraudulently obtained.-Bona-
parte v. Clagett, (Md.) 27 A. 619.
Rights of seller as against third per-
5. The fact that a purchaser of goods in-
duces the sale by fraudulent representations
of solvency does not divest him of the legal
title; and the sheriff, who takes them out of
the purchaser's possession under lawful pro-
cess against him, before any attempt at rescis-
sion is made by the sellers, is guilty of no tres-
pass.-Schwartz v. McCloskey, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
Rescission by seller.
6. In an action to recover goods for fraud
it was not error to admit evidence that the pur-
chaser made false representations to other cred-
itors, similar in character to those made to
plaintiff.-Schofield v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. | sons who would not press them so as to inter-
7. Defendants having committed an act of
bankruptcy 13 days after a sale of goods to
them on credit, plaintiffs' agent, with his at-
torney, called on them, accused them of false-
hood in statements made at time of sale, and
demanded payment or security, which were re-
fused. Held, that the agent's acts did not rat-
ify the sale, and an instruction "that if plain-
tiffs asked for payment and an assignment of
book accounts after they were aware of the
fraud, they could not recover the goods," was
much too favorable to defendants.-Boyd v.
Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 60.
8. A sale effected through the false and
fraudulent representations of the vendee may
be rescinded by the vendor without the return
of part payments made by the vendee, where
it appears that the vendee, from the goods
purchased, had sold more than enough to reim-
burse him for the payments made. Sloane v.
Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 67.
9. A seller may rescind a sale effected by
the fraud of the purchaser, without returning
the money received in part payment, where it
appears that the portion of the goods undis-
posed of by the purchaser does not exceed in
value the balance due the seller.-Schofield v.
Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 69.
10. Plaintiffs contracted with defendants
for certain stone monuments for a sum fixed
by one of defendants on information given him
by their foreman, and on which he relied. The
price was much below the value of the goods,
through an error in computation of the fore-
man, as was known by plaintiffs. Held, that
the contract, was the result of a mistake, and
plaintiffs could not recover thereon. - Everson
v. International Granite Co., (Vt.) 27 A. 320.
11. Where part of the price of goods is paid
in cash, and the purchaser gives his notes for
he balance, it is the duty of the seller, on at-
tempting to rescind the sale for fraudulent rep-
resentations of the purchaser as to his sol-
vency, to return, not only the notes, but also
the cash received, though at the time of the at-
tempted rescission the goods are in the custody
of the sheriff, who has seized them under exe-
cution against the purchaser.-Schwartz v. Mc-
Closkey, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 300.
12. Where a sale is rescinded by the seller,
and he brings an action to reclaim the goods,
a tender by him before verdict of notes given
by the purchaser is sufficient.-Schofield v.
Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 69.
13. Where a vendor seeks to rescind a con-
tract of sale for fraud of the vendee, and is
subsequently made plaintiff in an interpleader
issue to determine the ownership of the goods
sold, a tender by him at the trial of the issue
of notes given by the vendee in payment will
be treated as if made at the date of rescission.
-Sloane v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 67.
14. Plaintiffs, on receipt of defendants' order
for goods on credit, asked them for a statement
and references to others with whom they had
dealt. Defendants grossly misstated their as-
sets and liabilities, and gave some references.
Plaintiffs consulted one of these, who gave
them, without comment, a statement made him
lately by defendants, similar, in substance, to
that given to plaintiffs. The active partner of
plaintiffs' firm swore positively that they sought
corroboration of the statement from said dealer,
but sold their goods solely on the credit of the
statement made to them. Held, as to plain-
tiffs' right to rescind the sale, that the question
whether they relied on the statement, or on
their own judgment after inquiry, was for the
jury. Boyd v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 60.
15. The fact that an intending purchaser,
though knowing that his liabilities exceed his
resources, asserted his ability to pay for the
goods, does not constitute such a fraud as will
authorize a rescission of the sale after delivery
of the goods, when the statement was made
under the belief that the larger part of the
claims against him were in the hands of per-
fere with the conduct of his business.-Wessels
v. Weiss, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 535.
Rescission by seller-As against third
persons.
16. A sale of goods cannot be rescinded by
the sellers, as having been induced by the
fraudulent representations of the purchasers as
to solvency, after such goods have been seized
by the sheriff on an execution against the pur-
chasers under a judgment for a debt incurred
after the sale, since creditors whose debts are
contracted subsequent to the possession by the
purchaser of goods under a voidable title are
treated as bona fide purchasers.-Schwartz v.
McCloskey, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 300.
17. The suppression of a judgment note
given by the debtors in statements of assets
and liabilities made by them to creditors who
furnished them goods on the faith of such rep-
resentations does not estop the holder of the
note, to whom it had been theretofore trans-
ferred, from asserting the same as a valid
claim against the purchasers.-Reese v. Reese,
(Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 703; Appeal of Hart, Id.
Action for price.
sale of coal is terminated by the buyer, the sell-
18. Where an executory contract for the
er's right of action at once accrues, not only
for the breach of contract, but for the price of
all the coal delivered before bringing the ac
tion.-Hocking v. Hamilton, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A.
836.
19. In an action by a seller for the contract
price of the goods, though defendant relies on a
rescission of the contract before the goods were
shipped, he may also show that they were not
of the quality stipulated for in the contract.--
Sidney School Furniture Co. v. School Dist. of
Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 856.
Buyer's rights and remedies.
20. Where the purchaser of corporate stock,
under a contract to return it and have the
money paid for it refunded, tenders the stock
in rescission, and the seller refuses to accept
it, the purchaser has the right to do any acts
in regard to the stock reasonably necessary to
protect his interests, and at the same time to
maintain his claim to rescind.-Jessop v. Ivory,
(Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 840.
21. Where such purchaser subsequently di-
rects the sale of the stock, gives a proxy to
cast his vote, and personally attends and par-
ticipates in the business of a stockholders'
meeting, such acts are prima facie acts of own-
ership inconsistent with the demand for rescis-
sion, and a jury is at liberty to infer from them
an acquiescence in the seller's refusal and a
waiver of the demand.-Jessop v. Ivory, (Pa.
Sup.) 27 A. 843.
22. Where a contract for the sale and de
livery of lumber fails to specify the time for
delivery, it is a question for the jury what is a
reasonable time.-Bagby v. Walker, (Md.) 27
A. 1033.
23. An instruction that notwithstanding the
provision in a contract by which plaintiff was
to deliver lumber to defendant within a certain
time, if the jury should find that defendant
waived the requirement, and accepted and haul-
ed lumber from plaintiff's wharf thereafter, de-
fendant could not have damages for the failure
to deliver within the specified time, does not
treat the mere acceptance as a waiver.-Bagby
v. Walker, (Md.) 27 A. 1033.
Bona fide purchasers.
24. One who receives chattels in payment of
a pre-existing debt is not a bona fide purchaser
for value, as against one from whom the prop
erty was obtained by fraud.-Hurd v. Bickford,
27 A. 107, 85 Me. 217.
25. One who, having agreed to receive cer
tain shares of stock in payment of notes held
by him, learns of equities affecting such stock
before he delivers up the notes or in any way
|