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Statutes of the United States, filed in this court his petition for a transfer of his case to the United States Circuit Court for this district for trial under said indictment; that the prayer of bis petition was granted by said Circuit Court, on which, under said statute, all further proceedings were to cease forever; that the jurisdiction of said United States Circuit Court, to which, under said statute, this cause was removed for the trial of this offence, is superior to and in exclusion of that of this court, and, that court having taken jurisdiction, this court has no jurisdiction to try the same.” Copies of the orders of the United States Circuit Court were made part of that affidavit. The court refused its permission to file such affidavit, and to that ruling the accused excepted. The case was then continued to the succeeding February Term, when a special venire issued, commanding the sheriff to summon one hundred and fifty good and lawful jurors from whom to select a jury for the trial of this [Bush's] case." But at that term the prosecution was continued, and on May 16, 1881, the case being again called for trial, the sheriff was ordered to summon a panel of seventy-five additional jurors from whom to select a jury for the trial of this case, and in executing this order he will proceed in his selections without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
We next find in the record of proceedings in the State court, under date of May 18, 1881, this order :
" And afterwards, at a term of said court held for said circuit, May 18, 1881 the Commonwealth came, by attorney, and the defendant appeared in custody. The defendari moves the court to set aside the indictment herein against him, because there was a substantial error committed to his prejudice in the selection and formation of the grand jury which found said indictment, in that the said grand jury was selected and formed in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore is unconstitutional, null, and void, because all citizens of the United States and State of Kentucky, and resident in Fayette County, who were not of the class known as white, though eligible for such service, were excluded from the lists from which said grand jury was selected, and thereby the rights, privileges, and immunities of all sucu citizens so residing, who did not belong to the class known as white, and of the defendVOL. XVII.
ant, who is not white, although a citizen of the United States and of Fayette County, Kentucky, were abridged because he and they are not white, and on account of his and their race and color, contrary to the Constitution of the United States and the laws in such cases made and provided; which was overruled by the court, and defendant excepts."
The accused then moved to set aside the panel of petit jurors, upon grounds set forth in the following order entered on the same day:
“ The defendant now moves the court to set aside the panel of petit jurors selected and summoned to try him herein, because there was a substantial error committed to his prejudice, in that said jurors were not summoned as required by law, in that all citizens of the United States and State of Kentucky, resident in Fayette County, of the African race, of which there are very many eligible and qualified to serve as jurors in Fayette County, and to which race this defendant belongs, were excluded and not summoned by the officers whose duty it was to select and sunimon said panel to serve on said panel from which the jury to try defendant was to be selected, but only such citizens eligible and qualified which belonged to the class known as white were selected and summoned by such officers. Defendant filed a petition for the transfer of this case to the Circuit Court of the United States for Kentucky, which motion was overruled, and defendant excepts."
The trial proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder; and, under the power vested in them by the laws of Kentucky, fixed the punishment at death. A judgment having been rendered accordingly, a motion for a new trial was made and overruled. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals the judgment was affirmed.
This statement of facts is quite sufficient to indicate the grounds upon which we rest our determination of such of the questions raised by the assignment of errors as we deem it necessary to consider.
1. The proposition in behalf of the accused to which we will first direct our attention is, that the removal of the prosecution under the first indictment into the Circuit Court of the United States — although the indictment was there quashed - operated to divest the State court of all jurisdiction thereafter,
under any circumstances whatever, to try him for the crime charged.
Such a construction of sect. 641 is wholly inadmissible. The prosecution against Bush could only have been commenced in the judicial tribunals of Kentucky. The crime for which he was indicted, being an offence against the laws of that State, not against those of the United States, was not originally cognizable in the courts of the Union. The removal of the first indictment into the Federal court was competent only because at that time he was denied, by the statutes of Kentucky, rights secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. And when the Federal court in that mode acquired jurisdiction to proceed, as if the prosecution had been there commenced, its authority was limited to the trial of the indictment so removed. That court had, pending the prosecution therein, the same power over the indictment that the State court could have exercised had there been no removal. When, therefore, the Federal court, in the exercise of the discretion which it unquestionably had, quashed the indictment, it was without jurisdiction further to proceed against the defendant for the crime. He could not have been held for indictment by a grand jury in that court, for the obvious reason already suggested that his offence was not one against the United States, but against Kentucky. It was for the authorities of the latter alone to determine whether he should be again indicted, or the prosecution be abandoned.
It follows that there was no error in the order directing the prisoner to be returned to the county in which he was originally indicted. That course was due to the State to the end that its authorities, being duly notified, might take such further action in the premises as they should deem expedient.' Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509; United States v. McBratney, 104 id. 621; United States v. Cisna, 1 McLean, 254.
2. But it is contended, upon behalf of the accused, that his petition for removal, filed after the second indictment was returned, should have been granted, and that the State court could not thereafter rightfully proceed. The petition referred to is doubtless the one described in the order of May 18, 1881. But the recotd contains no copy of it; nor did it appear in the
record sent to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. The same question having been raised in that court, it replied properly that "an inspection of the petition is essential to determine whether it contained allegations sufficient to authorize a transfer, and, in its absence, it must be presumed that it was defective in the allegation of jurisdictional facts, and, therefore, that the court below did right to disregard it."
But there is another and distinct ground upon which that petition, assuming that it was based upon sect. 641, was properly disregarded by the inferior State court. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509, decided June 29, 1880 (and hereafter more fully referred to), had declared that the statutes of Kentucky excluding from a grand or a petit jury citizens of African descent because of their race or color, was unconstitutional, and that thereafter every officer charged with the duty of selecting or summoning jurors must so act without regard to race or color. That decision was binding as well upon the inferior courts of Kentucky as upon all of its officers connected with the administration of justice. After that decision, so long as it was unmodified, it could not have been properly said in advance of a trial that the defendant in a criminal prosecution was denied or could not enforce in the judicial tribunals of Kentucky the rights secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within their jurisdiction. The last indictment was consequently not removable into the Federal court for trial under sect. 641 at any time after the decision in Commonwealth v. Johnson had been pronounced. This point was distinctly ruled in Neal v. Delaware, and is substantially covered by the decision in Virginia v. Rives. If any right, privilege, or immunity of the accused, secured or guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States, had been denied by a refusal of the State court to set aside either that indictment, or the panel of petit jurors, or by any erroneous ruling in the progress of the trial, his remedy would liave been through the revisory power of the highest court of the State, and ultimately through that of this court. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Neal v. Delaware, 103 id.
3. It is also assigned for error that the court of original jurisdiction erred in overruling the motion to set aside the panel of petit jurors. We have seen that the ground of this motion was that the petit jurors were not selected and summoned as required by law, in that all citizens of African descent in the county, very many of whom were eligible and qualified to serve as jurors, were excluded from the panel by the officer charged with the duty of selecting and summoning the petit jurors, and that only white citizens were selected and summoned.
It is sufficient for, this assignment to say that the motion was properly overruled, for the reason, amongst others, that the grounds upon which it was rested do not clearly and distinctly show that the officers who selected and summoned the petit jurors excluded from the panel qualified citizens of African descent because of their race or color. It may have been true that only white citizens were selected and summoned, yet it would not necessarily follow that the officer had violated the law and the special instruction given by the court “ to proceed in his selection without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” There was no legal right in the accused to a jury composed in part of his own race.
All that he could rightfully demand was a jury from which his race was not excluded because of their color. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313. The allegation that colored citizens were excluded, and that only white citizens were selected, was too vague and indefinite to constitute the basis of an inquiry by the court whether the sheriff had not disobeyed its order by selecting and summoning petit jurors with an intent to discriminate against the race of the accused. This motion was, therefore, properly overruled.
4. But the most important question raised by the assignments of error is that which relates to the overruling of the motion made before the trial to set aside the indictment because found by a grand jury selected and formed upon the basis of excluding therefrom, because of their color, all citizens of the African race resident in Fayette County and eligible for such service.
In several cases heretofore decided in this court we have had