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the court, said: “No question can be made of the power of a court to strike a member of the bar from the roll for official misconduct. We do not mean to say that there not be cases of misconduct not strictly professional, which would clearly show a person not to be fit to be an attorney, nor fit to associate with honest men. Thus, if he was proved to be a thief, a forger, a perjurer, or guilty of other offences of the crimen falsi. But no one, we suppose, will contend that for such an offence he can be summarily convicted and disbarred by the court without a formal indictment, trial, and conviction by a jury, or upon confession in open court.” Reference was then made to a provision in the Bill of Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, that "no conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers, &c., where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently made, shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury;” and it was held that this provision, at all events, entitled the parties to a jury trial.

The cases now cited do undoubtedly hold, that where the offence charged is indictable and is committed outside of the attorney's professional employment or character, and is denied by him, a conviction by a jury should be had before the court will take action for striking his name from the roll.

There are other cases, however, in which it is held that a previous conviction is not necessary.

In Ex parte Burr, 1 Wheeler, Criminal Cases, 503, s. C. 2 Cranch C. C. 379, the Circuit Court of the District of Co lumbia struck Burr off the roll on charges made by Mr. Key, of various instances of malpractice, and also of dishonest conduct, in procuring deeds of property from persons in distress, &c. Burr objected, amongst other things, that he was entitled to a trial by jury. The court examined witnesses, who were cross-examined by the defendant, and Chief Justice Cranch delivered an elaborate opinion, concluding by making the ru'e absolute for disbarring the accused, holding that proceedings by attachment, as for contempt and to purify the bar of unworthy members, are not within those provisions of the Constitution which guarantee a trial by jury. This case was brought

to the attention of this court on an application for a mandamus to compel the Circuit Court to restore Burr to the bar, and the writ was refused. The court, by Chief Justice Marshall, expressed a disinclination to interpose unless the conduct of the court below was irregular or flagrantly improper; as where it had exceeded its power or decided erroneously on the testimony; and upon the testimony, it would be unwilling to interpose where any doubt existed.

Fields v. The State, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 168, was the case of a constable (but placed upon the same ground as that of attorneys), and the charge was, extortion. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, by Catron, J., held that a previous conviction was not necessary to enable the court below to suspend from office.; that the constitutional privilege of trial by jury for crime does not apply to prevent courts from punishing its officers for contempt, and to regulate them or remove them in particular cases; that removal from office for an indictable offence is no bar to an indictment; that it is a proceeding in its nature civil, and collateral to any criminal prosecution by indictment; and that, even if acquitted by a jury, the party could be removed if the court discovered from the facts proved on the trial that he was guilty of corrupt practices.

In the subsequent case of Smith v. The State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 228, the charge was that the attorney bad accepted a challenge in Tennessee to fight a duel, and had fought with and killed his antagonist in Kentucky, where an indictment had been found against him. He demurred to the charge, and judgment was. given against him on the demurrer, that his name be struck from the roll. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held the charge to be sufficient; but that, instead of receiving a demurrer, the Circuit Court should have proceeded to take the proofs to ascertain the truth of the charge. The court, by Catron, J., said : “ The principle is almost universal in all governments, that the power which confers an office has also the right to remove the officer for good cause; the county court; constables, &c.; the senate; officers elected by the legislature and people ; in all these cases the tribunal removing is of necessity the judge of the law and fact; to ascertain which,

every species of evidence can be heard, legal in its character, according to common-law rules, and consistent with our Constitution and laws. This court, the Circuit Court, or the county court, on a motion to strike an attorney from the rolls, has the same right, growing out of a similar necessity, to examine evidence of the facts, that the senate of the State has when trying an impeachment. ... The attorney may answer the charges in writing if he chooses, when evidence will be heard to support or to resist them; or, if he does not answer, still the charges must be proved, or confessed by the defendant, before be can be stricken out of the roll.” The cause was thereupon remanded to the Circuit Court, to hear the proofs; and it was declared that if the facts were proved as charged, it would be amply sufficient to authorize that court to strike the defendant from the roll, even though there had been no law in Tennessee for the suppression of duelling.

Here, it will be observed, there was no conviction ; nothing but an indictment found in another State; and yet the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the court below might lawfully proceed with the case.

In Perry v. The State, 3 Greene (Iowa), 550, there were charges of misconduct as an attorney, and of perjury. The charge was dismissed for want of certainty; but as to the charge of false swearing, which it was contended could not be set up without a previous conviction, the court said that a conviction was not necessary.

In re John Percy, 36 N. Y. 651, an attorney was struck off the roll on the ground that his general reputation was bad, that he bad been several times indicted for perjury, one or two of the indictments being still pending, and that he was a common mover and maintainer of suits on slight and frivolous pretexts. The order was affirmed on appeal. Some of the offences charged in this case were of an indictable character, and one point raised on the appeal was, that the court has no right to call upon an attorney to answer such charges, because it compels him to give evidence against himself. But to this the court answered that he is not compelled to be sworn, but may introduce evidence tending to show his innocence.

In Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 110, an attorney was

accused of misconduct, both in his professional character and otherwise, obtaining money by false pretences, and the like. He had also, many years before, been convicted of forgery of a deposition used in court, but had been pardoned. It was held that he was an unfit person to be an attorney, and he was struck from the roll. In this case indictable offences of which the party had not been regularly convicted were embraced in the charges against him.

In Delano': Case, 58 N. H. 5, an attorney, being collector of taxes for the town, appropriated the money to his own use, intending to return it; but failing to do so, he was struck from the roll. The offence in this case was clearly of an indictable character, and no conviction had been obtained against him in a criminal proceeding.

In Matter of George W. Wool, 36 Mich. 299, a bill in equity having been filed against an attorney charging him with procuring a deed to himself by forgery or substitution of a paper, and a decree having been made against him, the court entered an order to show cause why he should not be struck from the roll, allowing him to present affidavits in exculpation; but no sufficient cause being shown against the rule, it was made absolute. Here was an indictable offence, and no previous conviction; yet the court, upon the evidence it had before it, struck the party's name from the roll.

In Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461, the charge was of forging an affidavit to obtain a change of venue in a cause pending in the court. Special proceedings were had under the statute of Indiana, and the party was struck off the roll. On error brought, it was objected that he should have been first

regularly convicted of the crime by a prosecution on the part of the state. The court held that this is only true when the object is to inflict punishment, but not when it is to disbar the party, any more than when forgery is proved as a defence in a civil suit; that whilst a conviction would have authorized a disbarment, the proceeding to disbar might precede the criminal prosecution. This case, it is true, was for malpractice as an attorney, and, therefore, may not be strictly in point; but the ground taken by the court was general, and applicable to all cases for which an attorney may be disbarred.

In the recent case of People v. Appleton, 15 Chicago Legal News, 241, where the charge against an attorney was for disposing of property held by him as a trustee, and appropriating the proceeds to his own use, but was not made out to the satisfaction of the court; it was observed, however, that whilst as a general rule if an attorney is guilty of misconduct in his private character, and not in his official character as attorney, relief can only be obtained by a prosecution in a proper court, at the suit of the party injured, yet that “it is not to be held that there are no exceptions; that there are not cases in which an attorney's misconduct in his private capacity merely, may be of so gross a character that the court will exercise the power of disbarment. There is too much of authority to the contrary to say that.”

From this review of the authorities in this country it is apparent, that whilst it may be the general rule that a previous conviction should be had before striking an attorney off the roll for an indictable offence, committed by him when not acting in his character of an attorney, yet that the rule is not an inflexible one. Cases may occur in which such a requirement would result in allowing persons to practise as attorneys, who ought, on every ground of propriety and respect for the administration of the law, to be excluded from such practice. A criminal prosecution may fail by the absence of a witness, or by reason of a flaw in the indictment, or some irregularity in the proceedings; and in such cases, even in England, the proceeding to strike from the roll may be had. But other causes may operate to shield a gross offender from a conviction of crime, however clear and notorious his guilt may be, - a prevailing popular excitement; powerful influences brought to bear on the public mind, or on the mind of the jury; and many other causes which might be suggested; and yet, all the time, the offender may be so covered with guilt, perhaps glorying in it, that it would be a disgrace to the court to be obliged to receive him as one of its officers, clothed with all the prestige of its confidence and authority. It seems to us that the circumstances of the case, and not any iron rule on the subject, must determine whether, and when, it is proper to dispense with a preliminary conviction. If, as Lord Chief Justice

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