the auditor of public accounts, and that no bonds should be so registered until the railroad, in aid of which the bonds had been issued, should have been completed near to or in the township issuing the bonds, and unless the subscription or donation creating the debt to pay which the bonds were issued had been first submitted to an election of the legal voters of said township under the provision of the laws of the State, and a majority of the legal voters living in such township had been in favor of such aid, subscription, or donation. And it was made the duty of the supervisor of the township, upon the completion of the railroad near to or through the township by which the bonds were issued, to certify under oath to the State auditor that all the preliminary conditions required by the act to be done to authorize the registration of the bonds and to entitle them to the benefits of the act had been complied with. See Hurd's Revised Statutes, 1880, p. 807, sect. 17. The record in this case showed that the certificate above mentioned in reference to the issue of the bonds in question had been made by Grove P. Lawrence, the supervisor of Pana Township, and transmitted by him to the auditor of public accounts. The interest on said issue of $100,000 of bonds was levied and collected and paid for three years by the State treasurer as provided by law. It further appeared that in the year 1876 the town of Pana and three taxpayers filed, in behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers of the town, a bill in the Circuit Court of Christian County against the auditor of public accounts of the State of Illinois, the treasurer of the State of Illinois, the treasurer and the clerk of Christian County, Illinois, the town collector of the town of Pana, and H. N. Schuyler, William E. Hayward, John Vedder, and William Houston, and "the unknown holders and owners of said bonds and coupons issued by the town of Pana," as defendants, in which the complainants prayed that said public officers might be perpetually enjoined from levying a tax with which to pay said bonds and coupons, and that said bonds might be declared void, and that said holders and owners of said bonds might be perpetually enjoined from selling or negotiating or suing upon said bonds or the coupons attached to them, or pretending or insisting in any court of law or equity or elsewhere, in any manner whatsoever, that said town was liable upon said bonds or coupons. The parties made defendant by name were either served with process, or they voluntarily appeared in the case. It was assumed that "the unknown holders and owners of said bonds and coupons issued by the town of Pana" were brought in by publication of a notice to them under that designation in a newspaper, according to the laws of the State of Illinois. The Circuit Court of Christian County dismissed the bill, but the appellate court, upon appeal, reversed its decree and directed it to grant the prayer of the bill; and the decree of the appellate court was affirmed by the Supreme Court, to which the case was carried by the defendants. Afterwards, at its November Term, 1879, to wit, on December 17, the Circuit Court, upon receiving the mandate of the appellate court and of the Supreme Court, entered a decree in favor of the complainants, in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The coupons offered in evidence being those upon which the suit was brought, were, at the time of the trial and before the commencement of the suit, held and owned by the plaintiffs, who were citizens of the State of Maine. Such were the material facts of the case. The town of Pana, by its assignments of error, insists: 1. That there was no authority in the charter of the Springfield and Illinois Southeastern Railway Company to hold an election and issue bonds to the amount of $100,000. 2. That the election held on April 30, 1870, was illegal and void, because it was presided over by a moderator and not by the supervisor, assessor, and collector, as required of general elections by the law of the State, and, therefore, conferred no authority upon the supervisor and town clerk to issue said bonds and coupons. 3. That it was incumbent on the plaintiffs below, the bonds having been illegally issued, to prove that they were bona fide holders of the coupons for value, which they failed to do. 4. That no judgment could be rendered for the plaintiffs on said coupons after they and the bonds to which they belonged had been declared void by the decree of the Circuit Court of Christian County. 5. That in any event the judgment was too large by $572.22. Mr. William J. Henry for the plaintiff in error. MR. JUSTICE WOODS delivered the opinion of the court, and, after making the foregoing statement, proceeded as follows: — The people of the township of Pana voted almost unanimously for the donation to pay which the bonds in this case were issued. There is no pretence of any fraud in their issue. It is not disputed that the railroad company complied on its part with all the conditions upon which they were to be issued, or that the township has received all for which it bargained in consideration of the issue of them. They were registered in the office of the auditor of public accounts, where they could not be lawfully registered unless the election authorizing the donation for which they were issued had been held in pursuance of the statute, and the sworn certificate of the supervisor of the township to that effect had been filed with the auditor. The township has paid the interest on them for three years. Under these circun stances, if they and the coupons thereto attached are in the hands of bona fide holders for value, the defences through which the township can escape liability will be reduced to narrow limits. The charter of the Illinois Southeastern Railway Company declared that any town in any county under township organization might donate to the company any amount not to exceed $30,000. The question is raised by the first assignment of error whether this limit was removed by the amendatory act of Feb. 24, 1869. We think that it was. Section 10 of the act last named is an entire revision of sections 9 and 10 of the original charter of the company. The original charter authorized townships only to make donations to the railroad company, and it required that the railroad, or some part of it or its branches, should be completed before the donation was paid. It did not authorize the issue of bonds to pay the donations, but required the assessment and collection of a tax upon all the taxable property of the town for that purpose. The amendatory act authorized not only townships, but also villages, cities, and counties along the route of the railroad to make donations to the company. It prescribed an entirely different condition precedent to the making of a donation, and required the issue of bonds to pay the donation when made, and it did not require the completion of the railroad, or any part of it, before the bonds were issued. It did not limit the amount which might be donated to $30,000, but declared that if a majority of the votes cast at the election provided for by the act should be in favor of donation, the corporate authorities of the village, city, county, or township, as the case might be, should donate to the company the amount so voted at said election, and issue bonds in payment thereof. It thus appears that sect. 10 of the amendatory act covered the entire subject embraced by sects. 9 and 10 of the original act. It related to the same railroad company; it prescribed different methods of procedure in reference to the same subject, and embraced entirely new provisions, thus plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute, pro tanto, for the original act. 10 of the amendatory act therefore operated as a repeal, by implication of sects. 9 and 10 of the original act, and removed the restriction limiting to $30,000 the amount which could be donated by a township to the railroad company. United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88; Henderson's Tobacco, id. 652; Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 id. 590; King v. Cornell, 106 U.S. 395. The next question raised by the assignments of error relates to the power of the township of Pana, under the circumstances of this case, to issue the bonds in question. This court decided, in Harter v. Kernochan, 103 id. 562, that bonds issued by the township of Harter, dated April 1, 1880, signed by the supervisor and countersigned by the clerk of the township, reciting that they were issued in pursuance of the acts of Feb. 25, 1867, and Feb. 24, 1869, which are the acts relied on in this case, and in pursuance of an election of the legal voters of the township held Nov. 10, 1868, were valid obligations of the township. The power of the township of Pana, under the same acts, to issue bonds to pay its donation to the same railroad company is, therefore, settled beyond dispute, unless what the plaintiff in error insists was a defect in the method of conducting the election by which the donation was voted is fatal to the authority of the officers of the township to issue the bonds. This defect was that the election was presided over and the returns made, not by the supervisor, assessor, and collector of the township, ex officio judges of elections, but by a moderator chosen by the electors present. It is insisted by the plaintiff in error that as the Constitution of Illinois, adopted July 2, 1870, by its second additional section cut off the power of any township or other municipality to subscribe to the capital stock of, or make a donation to, any railroad company, except when such subscription or donation had been authorized under existing laws, by a vote of the people of the municipality prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and as, by reason of the defect just mentioned, there was no legal election, it follows that there was no authority in the officers of the township of Pana to make the donation or issue the bonds in question in this case, and that the bonds are not binding on the township. We cannot assent to this conclusion. It is clear that this case in no wise differs from other cases where the holding of an election and a vote of the people in favor of an issue of bonds is made by law a condition precedent upon which the authority to issue bonds rests. The bonds in question in this case recite on their face that they were issued by the township, in compliance with the vote of the legal voters thereof at an election held on April 30, 1870, under and by virtue of the authority conferred by acts of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, specifying the acts of Feb. 26, 1867, and Feb. 24, 1869, above mentioned. This court has again and again decided that if a municipal body has lawful power to issue bonds or other negotiable securities, dependent only upon the adoption of certain preliminary proceedings, such as a popular election of the constituent body, the holder in good faith has the right to assume that such preliminary proceedings have taken place if the fact be certified |