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instructed the jury that the duty was correctly assessed and that the plaintiffs could not recover.
The question as to the fees involved four items. On the presentation of an invoice and an entry, the collector, before he would receive them as collector, impressed on each invoice, for the convenience and security of himself and the government, a stamp or certificate, certifying in the name of a deputy collector that the invoice was presented “on entry” on such a day. On each entry, one of the plaintiffs was required to make and subscribe before the collector or his deputy the owner's or consignee's oath. For each of such stamps the collector exacted twenty cents, and for each of such oaths twenty cents. He also exacted a fee of twenty cents for each permit to land the merchandise embraced in each entry on which the duties had been paid or secured, such permit being signed by the collector and the naval officer. Said three fees of twenty cents were paid with the duties, and otherwise no permit for the landing and delivery of the goods could be obtained. The permit to land covered all the goods embraced in the entry; but at least one package of each invoice, and one package in every ten packages of each invoice, were, by order of the collector, desig. nated on each invoice, and each entry, and also on the permit, to be sent, and were sent, to the public store for examination and appraisement; and, after they had been examined and appraised and reported on, an order was required by the plaintiffs' firm, signed by the collector alone, to the storekeeeper, to deliver such examined packages to the plaintiffs' firm. For every such order, without which the examined packages could not be obtained, the collector exacted a fee of twenty cents. At the trial, the plaintiffs conceded that the fee for the permit was legal. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amounts exacted for the other three fees, with interest, being $1,734.80, "and, after a judgment for the plaintiffs therefor, with costs, the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error based on their failure to recover the alleged excess of duty exacted on the laces and insertings, and the defendant sued out a writ of error based on the recovery for the three alleged illegal fees.
By schedule D of the act of July 30, 1846, c. 74, a duty of twenty-five per cent ad valorem was imposed on “cotton laces,
cotton insertings, cotton trimming laces, cotton laces and braids,” and “ manufactures composed wholly of cotton, not otherwise provided for.”
By sect. 1 of the act of March 3, 1857, c. 98, it was enacted that after July 1, 1857, ad valorem duties should be imposed in lieu of those then imposed on imported goods, as follows: "Upon the articles enumerated in schedules A and B” of the tariff act of 1846, a duty of thirty per cent," and upon those enumerated in schedules C, D, E, F, G, and H of said act," the duties of twenty-four, nineteen, fifteen, twelve, eight, and four per cent, respectively, “ with such exceptions as are hereinafter made.” The schedules above mentioned respectively imposed duties of one hundred, forty, thirty, twenty-five, twenty, fifteen, ten, and five per cent.
Thus far cotton laces and cotton insertings, being in schedule D of the act of 1846 at twenty-five per cent, were reduced by the act of 1857, with the other articles in schedule D, to nineteen per cent. But sect. 2 of the act of 1857 provided that all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, and delaines, shall be transferred to schedule C.” Under this provision it would seem very plain that the goods in the present case were subject to a duty of twenty-four per cent, and not of nineteen per cent. If sect. 1 of the act of 1857 had merely reduced from twenty-five per cent to nineteen per cent the duty on the articles specially mentioned in schedule D of the act of 1846, without exception, the duty on the goods in question would have been reduced to nineteen
But the enactment was distinct that there should be excepted out of the reduction “all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, and delaines,” and that they should go into schedule C, the twenty-four per cent schedule.
The contention for the plaintiffs is, that as cotton laces and cotton insertings were made dutiable by those names in the act of 1846, they are not to be affected by the subsequent general provision as to manufactures composed wholly of cotton.
Schedule C of the act of 1846 imposed a duty of thirty per cent on cotton cords, gimps and galloons,” and on “ manufactures of cotton, . . if embroidered or tamboured in the loom,
or otherwise, by machinery, or with the needle, or other process.” Schedule E imposed a duty of twenty per cent on “caps, gloves, leggins, mits, socks, stockings, wove shirts and drawers, made on frames, composed wholly of cotton, worn by men, women, and children,” and on “velvet, in the piece, composed wholly of cotton.” These provisions, and the one in schedule D as to cotton laces, &c., relate to goods made of cotton entirely. Those goods are all of them goods to which, as "manufactures composed wholly of cotton," sect. 2 of the act of 1857 applies, transferring them, when bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, to the twenty-four per cent schedule, schedule C. The duty on them had been thirty, twenty-five, and twenty per cent respectively. But for such transfer the new duty on those in schedules D and E would have been nineteen and fifteen. A new uniform rate of twenty-four was imposed, and while the thirty was reduced by six per cent, the twenty-five was reduced by only one, and the twenty was increased by four. This indicates an intention, in the act of 1857, to impose, in general, on manufactures composed wholly of cotton, when bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, a relatively higher duty as compared with other articles named in the act of 1846.
The expression “ manufactures composed wholly of cotton is not found in the act of 1846. It is in that act qualified by the words “not otherwise provided for.” In the act of 1857 the expression is, “all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached,” &c. If the words “ manufactures composed wholly of cotton,” unqualified, and the words “cotton laces” and “cotton insertings,” had all of them been found in the act of 1846, as the general expression would not have embraced the specific terms in that act, for dutiable purposes, though including them in general language, it would be reasonable to say that the general expression in a later act would not include the specific terms for dutiable purposes. But the fact that the general expression, as used in schedule D of the act of 1816, is qualified by the words “not otherwise provided for," shows that there were manufactures composed wholly of cotton otherwise provided for, that is, in other items in that act. Thus, besides the embroidered and tamboured manufactures of cotton provided for in schedule C of that act, there are cords,
gimps, galloons, laces, insertings, trimming laces, laces and braids, each with the word “ cotton ” prefixed, indicating manufactures composed wholly of cotton, and there are also the articles composed wholly of cotton named in schedule E. The material “ cotton ” is the thing of special mark, as the sole material in the manufacture. In this view it cannot properly be said that these manufactured articles, manufactures of cotton composed wholly of cotton, designated in the act of 1816 always by the epithet “cotton ” applied to them, are not embraced, for dutiable purposes, in the terms "all manufactures composed wholly of cotton,” in sect. 2 of the act of 1857.
The designations qualified by the word “ cotton,” in the act of 1846, are designations of articles by special description, as contradistinguished from designations by a commercial name or a name of trade. They are designations of quality and material. The articles referred to, named in schedules C, D, and E of the act of 1846, are all of them manufactures wholly of cotton; but under that act they were not all subject to the same duty, and so that act designates them substantially as manufactures wholly of cotton which are gimps at thirty per cent, manufactures wholly of cotton which are laces or insertings at twenty-five per cent, manufactures wholly of cotton which are stockings, made on frames and worn by human beings, at twenty per cent, and so on. But for the exceptions provided for by sect. 1 of, the act of 1857 the duties on those articles, if bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, would have been reduced to twenty-four, nineteen, and fifteen per cent, respectively; but sect. 2 of that act says, in substance, that manufactures wholly of cotton which are gimps, or laces, or insertings, or stockings, and so on, shall, all of them, be subject to twentyfour per cent duty. This was the view applied by Mr. Justice Nelson, in Reimer v. Schell, 4 Blatchf. 328, in 1859, to colored cotton hosiery, under the provisions in question, and we think it a sound one. It was the view adopted by the Circuit Court in this case. There is no question of commercial designation. Hence, the cases cited and relied on by the importers are not in their favor.
Homer v. The Collector, 1 Wall. 486, in 1863, was a case in which Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of this court.
It was a case under these same statutes. Almonds were dutia. ble, by that name, at forty per cent, in schedule B of the act of 1846. Under the act of 1857 the duty on the articles in said schedule B was reduced to and fixed at thirty per cent, and the collector exacted that duty on almonds. It was contended that as, by sect. 2 of the latter act, “ fruits, green, ripe, or dried," were transferred to schedule G, and so made subject to only eight per cent duty, almonds were so transferred, as being “ fruits, green, ripe, or dried.” An attempt was made, at the trial, to show that, at the time the act of 1857 was passed, almonds were fruit, green, ripe, or dried, according to the commercial understanding of those terms in the markets of this country, and questions were certified to this court, on a division of opinion in the Circuit Court, as to the proper duty on almonds, and as to the admissibility of such evidence. It was contended, for the importer, that the term “dried fruits," in popular meaning, included almonds. The government claimed that the term “almonds" was a specific name, and, therefore, commercial nomenclature had no application. This court held that inquiry as to whether, in a commercial sense, almonds were dried fruit, had nothing to do with the question, as a duty had been imposed on almonds, eo nomine, almost immemorially; and that, as almonds were charged specifically with a duty of forty per cent in the act of 1816, and were not named as almonds in the changes in the act of 1857, and full effect could be given to the term “ fruit, dried,” without including almonds in it, it followed that almonds were dutiable at thirty per cent. There is nothing in this decision that overrules that in Reimer v. Schell, or that aids the importers in the present case. The act of 1846, in substance, mentions manufactures wholly of cotton which are laces or insertings, bleached or dyed, and sect. 2 of the act of 1857 mentions them in naming manufactures composed wholly of cotton, bleached or dyed.
Nor does the case of Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162, as to birds, apply. That case was decided on the ground that the word “ animals," in the act of 1861, did not include « birds," and so could not include them in the act of 1866.
There is nothing in Smythe v. Fiske, 23 id. 374, or in Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U. S. 108, which applies to this case.