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Statutes, originally enacted as sect. 8 of the act of Aug. 23, 1842, c. 188. Such interest, for the time a writ of error is pending, is really damages for delay. When the mandate of this court goes to the court below, it is necessary that that court, with a view to execution, should enter a further judgment in accordance with the mandate, covering the direction of this court as to interest and as to costs in this court on the writ of error. A writ of error in a case of this kind, being brought by direction of a department of the government, operates as a supersedeas, under sects. 1000 and 1001 of the Revised Statutes, without any bond to answer in damages being given. The plaintiff in the judgment being stayed as to execution while the case is in this court, and there being a new judgment rendered by this court in the suit, "the final judgment” referred to in sect. 989 is the judgment as it stands after its affirmance by this court, and after the court below has rendered such judgment as the mandate of this court requires. Therefore, the interest allowed in this case is interest before final judgment, and is of the same character as the interest allowed before judgment in a suit against a collector where there is no writ of error. In both cases, when there is a final judgment, the principle applies, declared by this court in Erskine v. Van Arsdale, ubi supra, that it is to be presumed the government is always ready and willing to pay its ordinary debts. But, where there is a judgment and a certificate of probable cause, and thus a case for payment out of the treasury under sect. 989, and then, by direction of the government, a writ of error is taken which operates as a stay, interest on the judgment during the stay ought to be allowed, and the statutes not only do not forbid such allowance, but permit it. The expression “interest and costs in judgment cases,” in the appropriation bills before referred to, clearly includes the interest in the present case, it being interest before final judgment.
SCHELL v. DODGE.
BARNEY v. ISLER.
BARNEY v. Cox.
BARNEY v. FRIEDMAN.
Where a cause has been finally disposed of here, by the dismissal of the writ
of error, this court has no power, at a subsequent term, to alter its 'judg. ment to one of affirmance, although, if there had been a judgment of affirmance, interest during the pendency of the writ would have been allowed on the amount of the judgment below, and in the judgment of dismissal no such interest was allowed.
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
These are all suits in each of which a judgment was ren. dered against a late collector of customs for the recovery of money paid as duties. There has been a certificate of probable cause in each. A writ of error in each case was brought here by direction of the government. When the cases were reached in order on the docket of this court at October Term, 1881, the Solicitor-General, on the part of the government, moved that the writs of error be dismissed, as presenting no question which he desired to argue. This was done. There was no affirmance of the judgments below, and the judgments and mandates of this court contained no direction as to interest on the judgments below during the time the writs of error were pending. Those judgments were rendered in 1878, and suspended by the writs of error for over three years. In the Dodge case the mandate was issued, but has never been presented to the court below. In the other cases, the mandates were issued
and presented to the court below, and orders for judgment were entered thereon. Counsel for the defendants in error in the Dodge case were present in this court when that case was 80 dismissed, but in the other cases no counsel for the defendants in error was present, and the motions to dismiss were made without their knowledge, and the mandates were not issued till after the close of the term.
The defendants in error now apply to this court to correct the judgments and mandates in these cases, so as to award to them interest as such or as damages for delay. There is no doubt that, if the defendants in error in these cases had in season asked for judgments of affirmance, their applications would have been granted, and interest would have been allowed, in accordance with the decision in Schell v. Cochran, ante, p. 625. But the difficulty now is that we have no power to vary the judgments or the mandates, after the close of the term, no especial right to do so in these cases having been reserved. It has always been held by this court that it has no power, after the term has passed, and a cause has been dismissed or otherwise finally disposed of here, to alter its judgment in such a particular as that now asked for, the change of a dismissal of a writ of error, with its legal consequences, to an affirmance of the judgment below, with its legal consequences, and not an error of mere form, or a clerical error, or a misprision of the clerk, or the like. Jackson v. Ashton, 10 Pet. 480; Bank of the United States v. Moss, 6 How. 31, 38.
HILL v. HARDING.
A State court, in which an action against a bankrupt upon a debt provable in
bankruptcy is pending, must, on his application under sect. 5106 of the Revised Statutes, stay all proceedings to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy on the question of his discharge, unless unreasonable delay on liis part in endeavoring to obtain his discharge is shown, or the court in bankruptcy gives leave to proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due ; even if an attachment has been sued out in the action more than four months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and has been dissolved by giving bond with sureties to pay the amount of the judgment which might be recovered. And if the highest court of the State denies the application, and renders final judgment against the bankrupt, he may, although he has since obtained his certificate of discharge, bring a writ of error, and his assignee may be heard here in support of the writ.
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.
The material facts, as appearing by the record of this case in the Supreme Court of Illinois, are as follows:
On the 16th of March, 1877, the original plaintiffs, in accordance with the statutes of Illinois, and upon the affidavit of one of them that the defendant was indebted to them in the sum of $8,264 for services as attorneys at law, and that he was a resident of Illinoi, and was about fraudulently to conceal, assign or otherwise dispose of his property or effects so as to hinder or delay his creditors, sued out from the Circuit Court of Cook County a writ of attachment against him, upon which his real estate was attached. On the 28th of March, 1877, in ilccordance with those statutes, he dissolved the attachment by giving bond with sureties to pay to the plaintiffs, within ninety days after judgment, the amount of any judgment which might be rendered against him on a final trial in the suit. On the 12th of April, 1878, a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs in the sum of $3,500, and the defendant moved the court to set it aside and grant a new trial. On the 7th of May, 1878, he
filed in the cause a duly attested copy of an order, dated the 1st of May, 1878, adjudging him a bankrupt under the Bankrupt Act of the United States.
On the 11th of May, 1878, before judgment on the verdict, the defendant suggested the adjudication in bankruptcy (which was admitted) and applied to the State court, under sect. 5106 of the Revised Statutes, for a stay of proceedings to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy upon the question of his discharge. On the same day, the court denied this application, as well as the motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment against him on the verdict, and afterwards allowed a bill of exceptions, which stated the facts above recited. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois on the 19th of November, 1878, and by the Supreme Court of Illinois on the 18th of November, 1879. The opinion of the Supreme Court is reported in 93 Illinois, 77. On the 6th of January, 1880, the defendant sued out this writ of error.
At October Term 1880 of this court, the defendants in error moved to dismiss the writ of error, because at the time it was sued out the plaintiff in error had been discharged from the obligation of the debt to them; and the assignee in bankruptcy moved to substitute his name for that of the bankrupt as plaintiff in error. By the papers submitted with these motions, it appeared that the assignment in bankruptcy was made on the 17th of June, 1878, and a certificate of discharge granted to the bankrupt on the 15th of September, 1879. The court overruled both motions; but granted leave to the assignee to be heard by counsel at the argument on the merits, as to all matters affecting the estate of the bankrupt.
The record clearly shows that a privilege under sect. 5106 of the Revised Statutes was claimed by the original defendant, and was denied by the highest court of the State. There can therefore be no doubt of the authority of this court to revise the judgment.
The section in question is as follows: “No creditor whose debt is provable shall be allowed to prosecute to final judgment any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt, until the question of the debtor's discharge shall have been