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involves invention, and that both the letters-patent are therefore void.
A glance at the specification and claim of the patent granted to the complainant Slawson shows that the invention described therein consists simply in the placing, in the ordinary fare-box used on street cars and omnibuses, of a glass panel opposite to the glass panel next the driver, usually inserted in such boxes. The patent does not cover the fare-box, it does not cover the insertion in the side of the fare-box next the driver of a glass panel, nor a combination of these two elements. It consists merely in putting an additional pane of glass in the fare-box opposite the side next the driver, so that the passengers can through it see the interior of the box. Such a contrivance does not embody or require invention. It requires no more invention than the placing of an additional pane of glass in a showcase for the display of goods, or the putting of an additional window in a room opposite one already there. It would occur to any mechanic engaged in constructing fare-boxes, that it might be advantageous to insert two glass panes, - one next the driver and the other next the interior of the car. But this would not be invention within the meaning of the patent law. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248; Phillips v. Page, 24 id. 164; Dunbar v. Myers, ubi supra. It is not a combination of the fare-box, having one glass panel with an additional glass panel, but is a mere duplication of the glass panel. Doubtless, a fare-box with two glass panels, arranged as described in the patent, is better than a fare-box with only one. But it is not every improvement that embodies a patentable invention. This rule was fairly illustrated in Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall. 117, in which it was held that where a roller, in a particular combination, had been used before without particular designs on it, and a roller, with designs on it, had been used in another combination, it was not a patentable invention to place designs on the roller in the first combination, and that such a change, with the existing knowledge in the art, involved simply mechanical skill, which is not patentable.
In Brown v. Piper, ubi supra, it was said, that when the invention was simply the application by the patentees of an old
process to a new subject, without any exercise of the inventive faculty, and without the development of any idea which could be deemed new and original in the sense of the patent law, it was not patentable; and it was held that the application of a process for preserving meats and fruit, which had previously been used for preserving other perishable substances, was not patentable.
In Atlantic Works v. Brady, ante, pp. 192, 200, a case much in point, decided by this court at the present term, Mr. Justice Bradley said: “ The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts. It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures." And it was held that the placing of a screw for dredging at the stem of a screw propeller, when the dredging had been previously accomplished by turning the propeller stern foremost and dredging with the propelling screw, was not a patentable invention.
These authorities, and others that might be cited, are adverse to the appellant's case, and clearly show that the contrivance covered by the patent issued to him does not embody a patentable invention.
The same authorities apply with equal force to the patent for lighting the interior of the fare-box at niglit by using the headlight of the car for that purpose. The elements of the contrivance, namely, the fare-box, the head-light, and the reflector, are all old. What is covered by the patent is simply the making of an aperture in the top of the fare-box and turning the rays of the head-lamp through it into the box by means of a reflector. In other words, it is the turning of the rays of light to the spot where they are wanted by means of a reflector, and taking away an obstruction to their passage. The facts of general knowlerlge of which we take judicial notice teach us that devices similar to this are as old as the use of reflectors. Taylor's liv., sect. 4, note 2 ; Brown v. Piper, uchi supra. The new application of thein does not involve invention. We are of opinion that there
was nothing patentable in the contrivance described in the second patent.
The result of our views is that the decree of the Circuit Court was right and must be
UNITED STATES v. BRITTON.
1. The counts of an indictment against the president of a national banking asso
ciation for making such a false entry on its books as is punislable under sect. 5209 of the Revised Statutes are sufficient if they are in the form hereinafter set fortlı, post, p. 656, as the offence is thereby alleged in apt
terms, and with the requisite averments of time and place. 2. The counts which charge his fraudulent purchase of shares of the capital
stock of the association are bad if they either fail to state for whose use the purchase was made, or if they state that it was made for the use of the association, or if they do not aver that it was not made in order to prevent
loss on some previously contracted debt. 3. The counts which charge him with having wilfully misapplied the funds of
the association, should aver that he did so for the benefit of himself or soinc person or body other than the association, and with intent to injure
or defraud the association or some otlicr person or body corporate. 4. The counts which charge his fraudulent purchase of the shares of stock, and
allege that they were by him held " in trust for the use of said association, and that said shares were not purchased as aforesaid in order to prevent luss upon any debts theretofore contracted with said association in good
faith,” do not allege with sufficient certainty an offence under said sect. 5209. 5. The purchase of stock in violation of sect. 5201, if made with intent to de
fraud, and by one or more of the officers of the bank named in said sect. 5209, is not a crime punishable under the latter section.
CERTIFICATE of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is as follows:
“ Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any" national banking “association who embezzles, abstracts, or wilfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the association ; or who, without authority from the directors, issues or puts in circulation any of the notes of the association ; or who, without such authority, issues or puts forth any certificate of deposit, draws any order or bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decrce; or
who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud the association or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of the association or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association ; and every person who, with like intent, aids or abets any of ficer, clerk, or agent in any violation of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five years nor more than ten.”
An indictment based on this section was, on Jan. 20, 1879, found against defendant, James H. Britton, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. It contained one hundred and nineteen counts. The first count charged as follows:
“ That James H. Britton, late of said district, on the thirtieth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, at said district, being then and there president of a certain national banking association then and there known and designated as the National Bank of the State of Missouri, in St. Louis,' which said association had been theretofore created and organized under and by virtue of an act of Congress, entitled . An Act to provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof,' approved June third, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and which said association was then and there acting and carrying on a banking business in the city of St. Louis, in said district, under the said act of Congress and the acts amendatory thereof, did make in a certain book then and there belonging to and in use by the said association in transacting its said banking business, and then and there designated and known as “ profit and loss, number six,' a certain entry to the credit of a certain account known as profit and loss, which said entry was then and there in the words and figures following, that is to say : –
• RICHARD L. DICKSON : *182 days int., 8 per cent., 132,673.49, to July 1, '76 ... 5,365.88 ' and which said entry, so as aforesaid made in said book, then and there purported to show, and did, in substance and effect,
indicate and declare, that the sum of five thousand three hun. dred and sixty-five dollars and eighty-eight cents was then and there received by said association, on account of interest then and there due and payable to said association by one Richard L. Dickson.
" And the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths aforesaid, do further present that the said entry so made as aforesaid was then and there false in this, that the said sum of five thousand three hundred and sixty-five dollars and eighty-eight cents was not then and there received by said association on account of interest then and there due and payable to said association from the said Richard L. Dickson, as he, the said James H. Britton, then and there well knew; and that the said entry, so made as aforesaid, was then and there false in this, that the said sum of five thousand three hundred and sixty-five dollars and eighty. eight cents was not then and there received by said association upon any account from any source, as he, the said James H. Britton, then and there well knew; and that the said false entry was then and there made as aforesaid with the intent then and there on the part of him, the said James H. Britton, to deceive any agent who might be thereafter appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency to examine the affairs of said association, contrary to the form of the statute of the United States in such case made and provided, and against their peace and dignity.”
The thirty-four counts next following, numbered from 2 to 35, inclusive, charged, in the same language, the making of similar false entries in the same book with the same intent.
The thirty-sixth count was in all respects similar to the preceding thirty-five counts, except that it omitted the averment that the false entry was made with the intent “ to deceive any agent who miglit be thereafter appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency to examine the affairs of said association,” and in lieu thereof alleged it to be with intent “ to injure and defraud the said association and certain persons to said jurors unknown."
The thirty-seventh count charged as follows: “That the said James H. Britton, late of said district, on the second day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred