2. An assignment made in the State is void if it vests in the assignee a
discretion in conflict with the provisions of that statute, and author-
izes him in effect to sell such property in a manner which they do
not permit. Id.
ARMY. See Officer of the Army.
ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY.
ASSIGNMENT. See Equity, 2; Gift; Receiver, 2.
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS. See Arkansas.
ATTACHMENT. See Appeal, 2; Bankruptcy.
A rule was made by the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Florida, which, after reciting that it had come
to the knowledge of the court that W., an attorney of the court,
did, on a day specified, engage in and with an unlawful, tumultuous,
and riotous gathering, he advising and encouraging thereto, take
from the jail of Hillsborough County, and hang by the neck until
he was dead, one John, otherwise unknown, thereby showing such
an utter disregard and contempt for the law which, as a sworn at-
torney, he was bound to support, as shows him to be totally unfitted
to occupy such position: thereupon cited him to appear at a certain
time and show cause why his name should not be stricken from
the roll. The attorney appeared, and answered, denying the charge
in mass, and excepting to the jurisdiction of the court, (1) because
there was no charge against him under oath, (2) because the offence
charged was a crime by the laws of Florida for which he was
liable to be indicted and convicted. The court overruled the excep-
tions, and called a witness who proved the charge, showing that
the hanging took place before the court-house door, during a tem-
porary recess of the court; thereupon the court made an order
striking W.'s name from the roll. On motion made here for a
mandamus to compel the judge of that court to reverse this order,
and he having answered the rule, showing the special circumstances
of the case,
- Held, 1. That although not strictly regular to grant
a rule to show cause why an attorney should not be struck off the
roll, without an affidavit making charges against him, yet that,
under the special circumstances of this case, the want of such affi-
davit did not render the proceeding void as coram non judice. 2. That
the acts charged against the attorney constituted sufficient ground
for striking his name from the roll. 3. That although, in ordi-
nary cases, where an attorney commits an indictable offence, not
in his character of attorney, and does not admit the charge, the
courts will not strike his name from the roll until he has been
regularly indicted and convicted, yet that the rule is not an inflexible
one; that there may be cases in which it is proper for the court
to proceed without such previous conviction; and that the present
case, in view of its special circumstances, the evasive denial of the
charge, the clearness of the proof, and the failure to offer any
counter proof, was one in which the court might lawfully exercise
its summary powers. 4. That the proceeding to strike an attorney
from the roll is one within the proper jurisdiction of the court of
which he is an attorney, and does not violate the constitutional
provision which requires an indictment and trial by jury in criminal
cases; that it is not a criminal proceeding, and not intended for
punishment, but to protect the court from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practise as attorneys therein. 5. That such a
proceeding is not an invasion of the constitutional provision that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; but that the proceeding itself, when instituted in
proper cases, is due process of law. 6. That, as the court below
did not exceed its powers in taking cognizance of the case, no such
irregularity occurred in the proceeding as to require this court to
interpose by the writ of mandamus. Ex parte Wall, 265.
BANKRUPTCY. See United States, Claims by and against.
A State court, in which an action against a bankrupt upon a debt provable
in bankruptcy is pending, must, on his application under sect. 5106
of the Revised Statutes, stay all proceedings to await the determi-
nation of the court in bankruptcy on the question of his discharge,
unless unreasonable delay on his part in endeavoring to obtain his
discharge is shown, or the court in bankruptcy gives leave to pro-
ceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due;
even if an attachment has been sued out in the action more than
four months before the commencement of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy, and has been dissolved by giving bond with sureties to pay
the amount of the judgment which might be recovered. And if the
highest court of the State denies the application, and renders final
judgment against the bankrupt, he may, although he has since ob-
tained his certificate of discharge, bring a writ of error, and his
assignee may be heard here in support of the writ. Hill v. Harding,
631.
BANKS AND BANKING. See National Banks.
BEER. See Customs Duties, 5.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES. See Juris-
diction, 12, 13.
BOND. See Appeal Bond; Equity, 4; Louisiana; Municipal Bonds; Public
Lands, 2; Virginia.
BOTTLES. See Customs Duties, 5.
BOTTOMRY BOND. See Maritime Law.
BRIDGES. See Navigable Waters.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Maritime Law, 2.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
The following, among others, expressly approved and affirmed: -
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 259. See People v. Compagnie Générale
Transatlantique, 59.
Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235.
See Union Trust Company v. Souther,
Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562. See Pana v. Bowler, 529.
Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 672.
See New York Guaranty Com-
pany v. Memphis Water Company, 205.
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 275. See People v. Com-
pagnie Générale Transatlantique, 59.
Miltenberger v. Logansport Railway Company, 106 U. S. 286. See Union
Trust Company v. Souther, 591.
Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 402. See Missionary Society v. Dalles, 336.
United States v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265. See Sun Marine Insurance Com-
pany v. Ocean Insurance Company, 485.
CASES QUALIFIED OR OVERRULED.
Shelton v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 113. See United States v. Phelps, 320.
CAUSES, REMOVAL OF. See Civil Rights, 1; Jurisdiction, 6.
1. Section 643 of the Revised Statutes, which provides for removing to
the Circuit Courts suits or criminal prosecutions commenced in a
State court against any officer appointed under or acting by author-
ity of any revenue law, or any person acting under or by authority
of such officer," applies to marshals of the United States, their depu-
ties and assistants, when engaged in enforcing a revenue law of the
United States. Davis v. South Carolina, 597.
2. Where such a prosecution is duly removed, the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court completely vests, and the subsequent action of the
State court, forfeiting the recognizance of the defendant for his non-
appearance there, is coram non judice and void. Id.
3. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company is made by the stat-
utes of Alabama an Alabama corporation; and, although previously
incorporated in Tennessee also, cannot remove into the Circuit Court
of the United States a suit brought against it in Alabama by a citi-
zen of Alabama. Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company v. Ala-
bama, 581.
CEMETERY COMPANY. See Corporation, 3.
CHARITABLE GIFTS AND DEVISES. See Will.
William Russell, of St. Louis, "for the purpose of founding an institu-
tion for the education of youth in St. Louis County, Missouri,"
granted lands and personal property in Arkansas to John S. Horner
and his successors, in trust for the use and benefit of the Russell
Institute of St. Louis, Missouri," with directions to the grantee to
sell them, and to account for and pay over the proceeds "to Thomas
Allen, President of the Board of Trustees of the said Russell Insti-
tute at St. Louis, Missouri," whose receipt should be a full discharge
to the grantee. Held, that this was a charitable gift, valid against
CHARITABLE GIFTS AND DEVISES (continued).
the donor's heirs and next of kin, although the institution was
neither established nor incorporated in the lifetime of the donor or
of Allen. Russell v. Allen, 163.
CHICAGO RIVER. See Navigable Waters.
CHOSE IN ACTION. See Equity, 2; Gift.
CITIZENSHIP. See Causes, Removal of, 3; Civil Rights, 1; Jurisdiction,
5, 7-12.
1. Where the highest court of the State had declared to be unconstitu-
tional her statute whereby, because of their race and color, citizens
of African descent were excluded from grand and petit juries, and
it had further decided that the officer summoning or selecting jurors
must disregard race or color, a person of that descent against whom
a criminal prosecution was subsequently instituted in the State
court has no just ground for declaring, in advance of a trial, that
he was denied, or that in the State tribunals he cannot enforce, the
equal civil rights secured to him as a citizen by the Constitution or
the statutes of the United States. The case was not, therefore, re-
movable to the Circuit Court, nor should the panel of petit jurors be
set aside simply on the ground that it consisted wholly of white
persons. Bush v. Kentucky, 110.
2. Where pursuant to such a statute, and before its unconstitutionality
was so declared, the grand jurors were selected who found the in-
dictment against the prisoner, a person of that descent, the court
of original jurisdiction should, on his motion, set aside the indict-
ment.
CLAIMS BY AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. See Con-
tract, 2; Court of Claims; Pension.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Missouri; National Banks, 1.
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS. See Customs, Collector of.
COLLISION. See Admiralty, 2.
COMITY. See Jurisdiction, 7-11.
COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, 1-4; Ferry, 4; Inspection Laws
Navigable Waters; Wharves and Wharfage.
COMMON CARRIERS. See Railroad.
COMPROMISE. See Swamp and Overflowed Lands, 3.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY. See National Banks, 4.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Municipal Bonds, 10; Will, 3, 4.
CONGRESS. See Inspection Laws, 3; Navigable Waters; Officer of the
CONSPIRACY. See Equity, 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Attorney; Civil Rights; Corporation, 3;
Ferry, 4; Inspection Laws, 1, 3; Louisiana; Municipal Bonds, 2, 3,
11, 12; Navigable Waters; Virginia; Wharves and Wharfage.
1. The statute of New York of May 31, 1881, imposing a tax on every
alien passenger who shall come by vessel from a foreign country to
the port of New York, and holding the vessel liable for the tax, is a
regulation of foreign commerce, and void. Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 92 U. S. 259, and Chy Lung v. Freeman, id. 275, cited,
and the rulings therein made reaffirmed. People v. Compagnie
Générale Transatlantique, 59.
2. The statute is not relieved from this constitutional objection by de-
claring in its title that it is to raise money for the execution of the
inspection laws of the State, which authorize passengers to be in-
spected in order to determine who are criminals, paupers, lunatics,
orphans, or infirm persons, without means or capacity to support
themselves, and subject to become a public charge, as such facts are
not to be ascertained by inspection alone. Id.
3. The words "inspection laws," "imports," and "exports," as used in
cl. 2, sect. 10, art. 1, of the Constitution, have exclusive reference to
property. Id.
4. This is apparent from the language of cl. 1, sect. 9, of the same arti-
cle, where, in regard to the admission of persons of the African race,
the word "migration" is applied to free persons, and "importation
to slaves. Id.
5. A. was convicted of murder in the first degree, and the judgment
of condemnation was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. A
previous sentence pronounced on his plea of guilty of murder in the
second degree, and subjecting him to an imprisonment for twenty-
five years, had, on his appeal, been reversed and set aside. By the
law of Missouri in force when the homicide was committed this sen-
tence was an acquittal of the crime of murder in the first degree; but
before his plea of guilty was entered the law was changed, so that by
force of its provisions, if a judgment on that plea be lawfully set aside,
it shall not be held to be an acquittal of the higher crime. Held, that
as to this case the new law was an ex post facto law, within the mean-
ing of sect. 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and
that he could not be again tried for murder in the first degree.
Kring v. Missouri, 221.
6. The history of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution reviewed
in connection with its adoption as a part of the Constitution, and
with its subsequent construction by the Federal and the State
courts. Id.
7. The distinction between retrospective laws, which relate to the rem-
edy or the mode of procedure, and those which operate directly
on the offence, is unsound where, in the latter case, they injuri-
ously affect any substantial right to which the accused was entitled
under the law as it existed when the alleged offence was com-
mitted.
8. Within the meaning of the Constitution, any law is ex post facto which
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