CUSTOMS DUTIES (continued).
and "manufactures composed wholly of cotton, not otherwise pro- vided for." By sect. 1 of the act of March 3, 1857, c. 98, the du- ties on the articles enumerated in schedules C and D of the act of 1846 were fixed at twenty-four and nineteen per cent, respectively, "with such exceptions as are hereinafter made" By sect. 2 of the act of 1857, "all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, and delaines," were trans- ferred to schedule C. Held, that laces and insertings composed wholly of cotton, and bleached or dyed, were dutiable at twenty-four per cent, under the act of 1857. Barber v. Schell, 617.
7. The designations qualified by the word "cotton," in the act of 1846, are designations of articles by special description, as contradistinguished from designations by a commercial name or a name of trade, and are designations of quality and material.
8. Under the act of March 2, 1799, c. 23, the collector of customs is not entitled to a fee for putting on an invoice a stamp or certificate as to the presentation of the invoice, or for an oath to an entry or for a jurat to such oath, or for his order to the storekeeper to deliver examined packages. Id.
DAMAGES. See Equity, 1; Jurisdiction, 3.
See Admiralty, 1; Appeal, 1, 2, 4; Appeal Bond, 1; District of Columbia, 2; Equity Pleading and Practice; Jurisdiction, 2; Mu- nicipal Bonds, 9; Prize.
DEED. See County; Trust Deed.
DELIVERY. See Contract, 3; Gift, 2.
DEMURRER. See Court of Claims, 3.
DEVISE. See Will.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY. See Patent for Land, 1.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is a court of the United States, and its judgment, when suit is brought thereon in any State of the Union, is, under the legislation of Congress, con- clusive upon the defendant, except for such cause as would be sufficient to set it aside in the courts of the District. Embry v. Palmer, 3.
2. A. recovered judgment in that court against B. and C., who, when sued thereon in a State court, filed their bill to enjoin the collection of so much thereof as they claimed was in excess of the amount due on the original cause of action, and alleged, as a ground of relief, matter available as a defence in the action at law, which they were not prevented from setting up by accident, or by the fraud of A., unconnected with the negligence of themselves or agents. The court perpetually enjoined A. from suing on the judgment on their paying into court that amount. They did so, and A. received it.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (continued).
The decree was affirmed by the court of last resort in the State. Held, 1. That, according to the law then in force in the District of Columbia, the bill not being sufficient to authorize the relief granted, the decree does not give the required effect to the judg- ment, and this court has jurisdiction to re-examine it on a writ of error. 2. That A., by accepting the amount so paid, is not estopped from prosecuting that writ. Id.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. See Gift, 2.
DONATION. See Municipal Bonds; Oregon, 2.
DRAWBACK. See Court of Claims, 1.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. See Attorney. DUTIES. See Customs Duties.
ELECTIONS. See Municipal Bonds, 7, 8.
EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT. See Gift, 1.
EQUITY. See Trust Deed; Will, 10.
1. Where the object of a suit in chancery is the recovery of the dam- ages which the complainant alleges that he has sustained by reason of an unlawful and fraudulent conspiracy to cheat him out of his interest in an original invention, which is the subject-matter of the controversy, the bill should be dismissed, as his remedy is at law. Ambler v. Choteau, 586.
2. An assignee of a chose in action, or any other cestui que trust, cannot, merely on the ground that his interest is an equitable one, proceed in a court of equity to recover his demand. Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 672, cited upon this point and approved. New York Guaranty Company v. Memphis Water Company, 205.
3. The courts of the United States especially, in view of the act of Congress declaring that suits in equity shall not be sustained where there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, should enforce this rule.
4. Certain parties holding bonds secured by a mortgage filed their bill to recover moneys alleged to be due on a contract which the city of Memphis made with the mortgagor, and which was assigned in the mortgage as part of the security for the bonds. Held, that the bill will not lie, the demand against the city being cognizable at law in the name of the mortgagor, and no special circumstances shown for a resort to equity. Id.
EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
See District of Columbia,
2; National Banks, 3. Pending a bill in equity against the owner of land to compel a convey- ance of the title, subject to certain rights of his in the rents and profits, a receiver appointed in another suit against him, and to whom he had by order of court in that suit assigned his interest in the land, applied to be and was made a defendant, and answered,
EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (continued).
and also filed a cross-bill against both the original parties, which was afterwards ordered to be stricken from the files, with leave for him to apply for leave to file a cross-bill; but he never applied for such leave. The case was heard upon pleadings and proofs, and a final decree entered ordering the original defendant to convey to the complainant, and the complainant to account to him or his assigns for part of the rents and profits, and that this decree be without prejudice to the rights of the receiver. Held, that the receiver was not aggrieved. Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 466.
ESTOPPEL. See Corporation, 3; District of Columbia, 2; Missouri, 1;
EVIDENCE. See Contract, 3; Jury; Letters-patent, 6; Missouri, 1; Na- tional Banks, 4; Witness.
In a suit against a municipal corporation to recover damages for injuries received from a fall caused by a defective sidewalk, which was in an unguarded condition, it is competent for the plaintiff to show that whilst it was in that condition other like accidents had occurred at the same place. District of Columbia v. Armes, 519.
EXPORTS. See Constitutional Law, 3; Court of Claims, 1; Inspection Laws.
EX POST FACTO LAWS. See Constitutional Law, 5-8.
1. The fourth section of the act of the legislature of Illinois passed in 1819, touching a ferry across the Mississippi River from a place in Illinois to the city of St. Louis, Missouri, declares: "That the ferry established shall be subject to the same taxes as are now, or here- after may be, imposed on other ferries within this State, and under the same regulations and forfeitures." Held, that the section pro- vides for equality of taxation; that is to say, that the property of the ferry company shall be valued and taxed by the same rule as other like property, and be subject to the same exactions and forfeitures; but the company is not exempted from any license tax on its ferry- boats which the State or a municipal corporation thereunto author- ized might impose. Wiggins Ferry Company v. East St. Louis, 365. 2. The power to license is a police power, although it may also be exer- cised for the purpose of raising revenue. Id.
3. A State has the power to impose a license fee, either directly or through one of its municipal corporations, upon the ferry-keepers living in the State, for boats which they own and use in conveying from a landing in the State passengers and goods across a navigable river to a landing in another State. Id.
4. The levying of a tax upon such boats, although they are enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, or the exaction of a license fee by the State within which the property subject to
the exaction has its situs, is not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, nor is such tax or fee a duty of tonnage if it be not graduated by the tonnage of the boats or by the number of times they cross the river or land within the limits of the State. Id.
FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.
FORECLOSURE. See Appeal Bond; Jurisdiction, 12; Receiver.
FRAUD. See Criminal Law, 1-5; Customs Duties, 2; Equity, 1; National Banks, 2.
GARNISHMENT. See Appeal, 2.
GEORGIA. See Corporation, 2; Will, 2, 5, 6, 10.
See Charitable Gifts and Devises.
1. A certificate of deposit in these terms:
"EVANSVILLE NATIONAL BANK,
"EVANSVILLE, IND., Sept. 8, 1875.
"H. M Chaney has deposited in this bank twenty-three thousand five hundred and fourteen 10% dollars, payable in current funds, to the order of himself, on surrender of this certificate properly indorsed, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, if left for six months.
"$23,514.70. HENRY REIS, Cashier," -may, as a subsisting chose in action, be the subject of a valid gift, if the person therein named indorse and deliver it to the donee, and thus vest in him the whole title and interest therein, or so deliver it, without indorsement, as to divest the donor of all present control and dominion over it, and make an equitable assignment of the fund, which it represents and describes. Basket v. Hassell, 602. 2. A donatio mortis causa must, during the life of the donor, take effect as an executed and complete transfer of his possession of the thing and his title thereto, although the right of the donee is subject to be divested by the actual revocation of the donor, or by his surviv- ing the apprehended peril, or by his outliving the donee, or by the insufficiency of his estate to pay his debts. If by the terms and condition of the gift it is to take effect only upon the death of the donor, it is not such a donatio, but is available, if at all, as a testa- mentary disposition. Where, therefore, during his last illness, and when he was in apprehension of death, the person named in the above certificate made thereon the following indorsement:
"Pay to Martin Basket, of Henderson, Ky.; no one else; then not till my death. My life seems to be uncertain. I may live through this spell. Then I will attend to it myself.
— and then delivered it to Basket, and died at his home in Ten- nessee, Held, that Basket by such indorsement and delivery acquired no title to or interest in the fund. Id.
ILLINOIS. See Ferry, 1; Municipal Bonds, 5–10; Navigable Waters.
IMPORTS. See Constitutional Law, 3; Court of Claims, 1; Customs
INDICTMENT. See Civil Rights; Criminal Law; Jurisdiction, 6.
INDORSEMENT. See Gift; Jurisdiction, 12.
INFRINGEMENT. See Letters-patent.
INSANITY. See Witness, 1.
INSOLVENT DEBTOR. See Bankruptcy; United States, Claims by and against.
INSPECTION LAWS. See Constitutional Law, 1-4.
1. Section 41 of chapter 346 of the laws of Maryland of 1864, as amended and re-enacted by chapter 291 of the laws of 1870, provides as fol- lows: "After the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful to carry out of this State, in hogsheads, any tobacco raised in this State, except in hogsheads which shall have been inspected, passed, and marked agreeably to the provisions of this act, unless such tobacco shall have been inspected and passed before this act goes into opera- tion; and any person violating the provisions of this section shall forfeit and pay the sum of three hundred dollars, which may be recovered in any court of law of this State, and which shall go to the credit of the tobacco fund: Provided, that nothing herein con- tained shall be construed to prohibit any grower of tobacco, or any purchaser thereof, who may pack the same in the county or neighborhood where grown, from exporting or carrying out of this State any such tobacco without having the same opened for inspec- tion; but such tobacco so exported or carried out of this State with- out inspection shall in all cases be marked with the name in full of the owner thereof, and the place of residence of such owner, and shall be liable to the same charge of outage and storage as in other cases, and any person who shall carry or send out of this State any such tobacco, without having it so marked, shall be subject to the penalty prescribed by this section." Under that proviso, no re- quirement of the act of 1864 is dispensed with, except that of having the hogshead opened for inspection. The hogshead must still be delivered at a State tobacco warehouse, and there numbered and recorded and weighed and marked, and be found to be of the dimen- sions prescribed by statute, and to have been packed and marked as required. Held, 1. That said section 41, as so amended and re- enacted, is not, in its provisions as to charges for outage and storage, in violation of clause 2 of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, as respects any impost or duty imposed by it
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